From: Evgeniy Polyakov <johnpol@2ka.mipt.ru>
To: Herbert Xu <herbert@gondor.apana.org.au>
Cc: Jeff Garzik <jgarzik@pobox.com>,
David McCullough <davidm@snapgear.com>,
cryptoapi@lists.logix.cz, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, Andrew Morton <akpm@osdl.org>,
James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
Subject: Re: [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy (2.6.11)
Date: Fri, 25 Mar 2005 10:58:16 +0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1111737496.20797.59.camel@uganda> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20050325072531.GA416@gondor.apana.org.au>
[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 1803 bytes --]
On Fri, 2005-03-25 at 18:25 +1100, Herbert Xu wrote:
> On Fri, Mar 25, 2005 at 10:19:55AM +0300, Evgeniy Polyakov wrote:
> >
> > Noone will complain on Linux if NIC is broken and produces wrong
> > checksum
> > and HW checksum offloading is enabled using ethtools.
>
> This is completely different. The worst that can happen with checksum
> offloading is that the packet is dropped. That's something people deal
> with on a daily basis since the Internet as a whole does not guarantee
> the delivery of packets.
It will just completely stop network dataflow.
It is of course not as catastrophic as removing strong random numbers
from system.
But nevertheless - write cahce in disks may corrupt data on power-down,
but people do not turn it off, crypto HW can be broken and does not
encrypt dataflow, but people want it, broken NIC can corrupt data with
various sg/offload combinations, but it can be enabled.
It is a feature, that _may_ broke thing badly.
But if all is ok - it is extremly usefull.
And as I said there may be other [HW/driver] validating techniques,
not only userspace daemon.
> On the other hand, /dev/random is something that has always promised
> to deliver random numbers that are totally unpredictable. People out
> there *depend* on this.
>
> If that assumption is violated the result could be catastrophic.
>
> That's why it's OK to have hardware RNG spit out unverified numbers
> in /dev/hw_random, but it's absolutely unaccpetable for the same
> numbers to add entropy to /dev/random without verification.
Userspace daemon can read data from /dev/random and validate it
in background, if it fells it is broken - turn feature off.
--
Evgeniy Polyakov
Crash is better than data corruption -- Arthur Grabowski
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next prev parent reply other threads:[~2005-03-25 7:52 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 97+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2005-03-15 13:36 ocf-linux-20050315 - Asynchronous Crypto support for linux David McCullough
2005-03-24 4:27 ` [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy (2.6.11) David McCullough
2005-03-24 4:30 ` [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy (2.4.29) David McCullough
2005-03-24 4:33 ` [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy (2.6.11) Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 4:46 ` David McCullough
2005-03-24 4:49 ` Michal Ludvig
2005-03-24 5:13 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 12:37 ` Folkert van Heusden
2005-03-24 12:52 ` David McCullough
2005-03-24 20:51 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 7:18 ` Jan Engelhardt
2005-03-24 7:37 ` Dave Jones
2005-03-24 4:38 ` [PATCH] " Andrew Morton
2005-03-24 5:17 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 5:32 ` Andrew Morton
2005-03-29 1:33 ` Matt Mackall
2005-03-24 5:43 ` Randy.Dunlap
2005-03-24 12:21 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-24 20:39 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 4:25 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 4:45 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 5:46 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-31 3:52 ` David McCullough
2005-03-31 13:58 ` [PATCH] API for TRNG (2.6.11) [Fortuna] Jean-Luc Cooke
2005-04-13 15:36 ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2005-03-24 12:28 ` [PATCH 2.6.12-rc1] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy David McCullough
2005-03-24 12:38 ` [PATCH] API for true Random Number Generators to add entropy (2.6.11) David McCullough
2005-03-24 18:51 ` Andi Kleen
2005-03-24 20:37 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-27 17:19 ` Andi Kleen
2005-03-27 18:55 ` folkert
2005-03-28 15:20 ` Andi Kleen
2005-03-28 15:24 ` folkert
2005-03-29 7:17 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-29 15:03 ` Andi Kleen
2005-03-29 7:16 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-29 15:07 ` Andi Kleen
2005-03-29 7:15 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 11:59 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-24 12:48 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 13:08 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-24 20:53 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 13:23 ` David McCullough
2005-03-24 13:46 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-24 20:56 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 4:34 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 4:48 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 5:33 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 5:58 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 6:16 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 6:13 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-25 6:34 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 6:33 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-25 6:59 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 6:56 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-25 7:19 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 7:19 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 7:38 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-25 7:25 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-25 7:58 ` Evgeniy Polyakov [this message]
[not found] ` <424495A8.40804@freescale.com>
2005-03-25 23:43 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-25 23:47 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-26 0:47 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-26 0:36 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-26 8:52 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-28 13:45 ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2005-03-28 21:30 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 10:23 ` Pavel Machek
2005-03-29 10:21 ` Pavel Machek
2005-03-29 10:30 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 10:38 ` Pavel Machek
2005-03-29 10:45 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 10:50 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-29 10:46 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 11:42 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-29 11:39 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 12:15 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-29 12:13 ` Pavel Machek
2005-03-29 12:43 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 13:11 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-29 14:38 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
2005-03-29 13:48 ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2005-03-29 23:36 ` Andrew James Wade
2005-03-29 22:02 ` Bill Davidsen
2005-03-29 22:24 ` Kyle Moffett
2005-03-29 22:46 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-30 21:22 ` Bill Davidsen
2005-03-30 21:49 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-30 22:27 ` Paul Jackson
2005-03-29 10:18 ` Pavel Machek
2005-03-29 10:25 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-29 10:53 ` Martin Mares
2005-03-24 20:54 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 14:25 ` Jean-Luc Cooke
2005-03-24 20:57 ` Jeff Garzik
2005-03-24 21:20 ` Herbert Xu
2005-03-25 5:52 ` Evgeniy Polyakov
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