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From: Trond Myklebust <trond.myklebust@fys.uio.no>
To: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
Cc: ebiederm@xmission.com, serue@us.ibm.com, linuxram@us.ibm.com,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, viro@ftp.linux.org.uk,
	containers@lists.osdl.org, akpm@linux-foundation.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [Devel] Re: [patch 05/10] add "permit user mounts in new namespace" clone flag
Date: Wed, 18 Apr 2007 09:55:05 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1176904505.6796.79.camel@heimdal.trondhjem.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <E1He6C7-0003Xu-00@dorka.pomaz.szeredi.hu>

On Wed, 2007-04-18 at 11:11 +0200, Miklos Szeredi wrote:
> > > I've tried to make this unprivileged mount thing as simple as
> > > possible, and no simpler.  If we can make it even simpler, all the
> > > better.
> > 
> > We are certainly much more complex then the code in plan9 (just
> > read through it) so I think we have room for improvement.
> > 
> > Just for reference what I saw in plan 9 was:
> > - No super user checks in it's mount, unmount, or namespace creation paths.
> > - A flag to deny new mounts but not new bind mounts (for administrative purposes
> >   the comment said).
> > 
> > Our differences from plan9.
> > - suid capable binaries. (SUID please go away).
> > - A history of programs assuming only root could call mount/unmount.
> 
> I hate suid as well.  _The_ motivation behind this patchset was to get
> rid of "fusermount", a suid mount helper for fuse.
> 
> But I don't think suid is going away, and definitely not overnight.
> Also I don't think we want to require auditing userspace before
> enabling user mounts.
> 
> If I understand correctly, your proposal is to get rid of MNT_USER and
> MNT_ALLOWUSERMNT and allow/deny unprivileged mounts and umounts based
> on a boolean sysctl flag and on a check if the target namespace is the
> initial namespace or not.  And maybe add some extra checks which
> prevent ugliness from happening with suid programs.  Is this correct?
> 
> If so, how are we going to make sure this won't break existing
> userspace without doing a full audit of all suid programs in every
> distro that wants this feature?
> 
> Also how are we going to prevent the user from creating millions of
> mounts, and using up all the kernel memory for vfsmounts?

Don't forget that almost all mount flags are per-superblock. How are you
planning on dealing with the case that one user mounts a filesystem
read-only, while another is trying to mount the same one read-write?

Trond


  reply	other threads:[~2007-04-18 13:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 57+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-04-12 16:45 [patch 00/10] (resend) mount ownership and unprivileged mount syscall Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 01/10] add user mounts to the kernel Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 02/10] allow unprivileged umount Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 03/10] account user mounts Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 04/10] add "permit user mounts" flag to namespaces Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 05/10] add "permit user mounts in new namespace" clone flag Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 20:32   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-13  4:16     ` Herbert Poetzl
2007-04-13  7:09       ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-13  4:45     ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-13  7:12       ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-13 13:47         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-13 14:22           ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-16  8:47       ` [Devel] " Ram Pai
2007-04-16  9:32         ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-16  9:49           ` Ram Pai
2007-04-16  9:56             ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-16 15:43               ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-16 15:58                 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-16 19:16                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-16 19:56                     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-17  9:04                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-17 11:09                         ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 18:16                           ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-17 18:36                             ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 19:54                               ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-18  9:11                                 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-18 13:55                                   ` Trond Myklebust [this message]
2007-04-18 14:03                                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-18 14:26                                       ` Trond Myklebust
2007-04-18 15:01                                         ` Christoph Hellwig
2007-04-18 19:00                                           ` Trond Myklebust
2007-04-18 15:06                                         ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-18 17:14                                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-18 18:05                                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-19  9:02                                       ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 14:25                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-17 14:28                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-16 17:14               ` Ram Pai
2007-04-16 17:50                 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 17:07                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-17 17:44                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 18:15                       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-17 18:58                         ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 19:28                       ` Ram Pai
2007-04-17 19:43                         ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 20:25                           ` Ram Pai
2007-04-18  9:19                             ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-18 18:35                               ` Ram Pai
2007-04-18 19:14                                 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-18 19:41                                   ` Ram Pai
2007-04-19  8:36                                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 06/10] propagate error values from clone_mnt Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 07/10] allow unprivileged bind mounts Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 08/10] put declaration of put_filesystem() in fs.h Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 09/10] allow unprivileged mounts Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 10/10] allow unprivileged fuse mounts Miklos Szeredi

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