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From: Miklos Szeredi <miklos@szeredi.hu>
To: akpm@linux-foundation.org, serue@us.ibm.com,
	viro@ftp.linux.org.uk, linuxram@us.ibm.com
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	containers@lists.osdl.org
Subject: [patch 09/10] allow unprivileged mounts
Date: Thu, 12 Apr 2007 18:45:50 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20070412164640.968487761@szeredi.hu> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20070412164541.580374744@szeredi.hu

[-- Attachment #1: unprivileged_mount.patch --]
[-- Type: text/plain, Size: 3748 bytes --]

From: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>

Define a new fs flag FS_SAFE, which denotes, that unprivileged
mounting of this filesystem may not constitute a security problem.

Since most filesystems haven't been designed with unprivileged
mounting in mind, a thorough audit is needed before setting this flag.

Signed-off-by: Miklos Szeredi <mszeredi@suse.cz>
---

Index: linux/fs/namespace.c
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/fs/namespace.c	2007-04-12 14:04:27.000000000 +0200
+++ linux/fs/namespace.c	2007-04-12 14:04:32.000000000 +0200
@@ -784,7 +784,8 @@ asmlinkage long sys_oldumount(char __use
  *  o if it's a sticky directory, it must be owned by the user
  *  o it must not be an append-only file/directory
  */
-static int mount_is_safe(struct nameidata *nd, int *flags)
+static int mount_is_safe(struct nameidata *nd, struct file_system_type *type,
+			 int *flags)
 {
 	struct inode *inode = nd->dentry->d_inode;
 
@@ -794,6 +795,9 @@ static int mount_is_safe(struct nameidat
 	if (!(current->nsproxy->mnt_ns->flags & MNT_NS_PERMIT_USERMOUNTS))
 		return -EPERM;
 
+	if (type && !(type->fs_flags & FS_SAFE))
+		return -EPERM;
+
 	if (!S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISREG(inode->i_mode))
 		return -EPERM;
 
@@ -1025,7 +1029,7 @@ static int do_loopback(struct nameidata 
 	int clone_flags;
 	struct nameidata old_nd;
 	struct vfsmount *mnt = NULL;
-	int err = mount_is_safe(nd, &flags);
+	int err = mount_is_safe(nd, NULL, &flags);
 	if (err)
 		return err;
 	if (!old_name || !*old_name)
@@ -1187,26 +1191,46 @@ out:
  * create a new mount for userspace and request it to be added into the
  * namespace's tree
  */
-static int do_new_mount(struct nameidata *nd, char *type, int flags,
+static int do_new_mount(struct nameidata *nd, char *fstype, int flags,
 			int mnt_flags, char *name, void *data)
 {
+	int err;
 	struct vfsmount *mnt;
+	struct file_system_type *type;
 
-	if (!type || !memchr(type, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
+	if (!fstype || !memchr(fstype, 0, PAGE_SIZE))
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	/* we need capabilities... */
-	if (!capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN))
-		return -EPERM;
+	type = get_fs_type(fstype);
+	if (!type)
+		return -ENODEV;
 
-	mnt = do_kern_mount(type, flags & ~MS_SETUSER, name, data);
-	if (IS_ERR(mnt))
+	err = mount_is_safe(nd, type, &flags);
+	if (err)
+		goto out_put_filesystem;
+
+	if (flags & MS_SETUSER) {
+		err = reserve_user_mount();
+		if (err)
+			goto out_put_filesystem;
+	}
+
+	mnt = vfs_kern_mount(type, flags & ~MS_SETUSER, name, data);
+	put_filesystem(type);
+	if (IS_ERR(mnt)) {
+		if (flags & MS_SETUSER)
+			dec_nr_user_mounts();
 		return PTR_ERR(mnt);
+	}
 
 	if (flags & MS_SETUSER)
-		set_mnt_user(mnt);
+		__set_mnt_user(mnt);
 
 	return do_add_mount(mnt, nd, mnt_flags, NULL);
+
+ out_put_filesystem:
+	put_filesystem(type);
+	return err;
 }
 
 /*
@@ -1236,7 +1260,7 @@ int do_add_mount(struct vfsmount *newmnt
 	if (S_ISLNK(newmnt->mnt_root->d_inode->i_mode))
 		goto unlock;
 
-	/* MNT_USER was set earlier */
+	/* some flags may have been set earlier */
 	newmnt->mnt_flags |= mnt_flags;
 	if ((err = graft_tree(newmnt, nd)))
 		goto unlock;
Index: linux/include/linux/fs.h
===================================================================
--- linux.orig/include/linux/fs.h	2007-04-12 14:04:29.000000000 +0200
+++ linux/include/linux/fs.h	2007-04-12 14:04:32.000000000 +0200
@@ -96,6 +96,7 @@ extern int dir_notify_enable;
 #define FS_REQUIRES_DEV 1 
 #define FS_BINARY_MOUNTDATA 2
 #define FS_HAS_SUBTYPE 4
+#define FS_SAFE 8		/* Safe to mount by unprivileged users */
 #define FS_REVAL_DOT	16384	/* Check the paths ".", ".." for staleness */
 #define FS_RENAME_DOES_D_MOVE	32768	/* FS will handle d_move()
 					 * during rename() internally.

--

  parent reply	other threads:[~2007-04-12 16:54 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 58+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2007-04-12 16:45 [patch 00/10] (resend) mount ownership and unprivileged mount syscall Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 01/10] add user mounts to the kernel Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 02/10] allow unprivileged umount Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 03/10] account user mounts Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 04/10] add "permit user mounts" flag to namespaces Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 05/10] add "permit user mounts in new namespace" clone flag Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 20:32   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-13  4:16     ` Herbert Poetzl
2007-04-13  7:09       ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-13  4:45     ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-13  7:12       ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-13 13:47         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-13 14:22           ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-16  8:47       ` [Devel] " Ram Pai
2007-04-16  9:32         ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-16  9:49           ` Ram Pai
2007-04-16  9:56             ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-16 15:43               ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-16 15:58                 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-16 19:16                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-16 19:56                     ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-17  9:04                       ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-17 11:09                         ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 18:16                           ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-17 18:36                             ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 19:54                               ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-18  9:11                                 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-18 13:55                                   ` Trond Myklebust
2007-04-18 14:03                                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-18 14:26                                       ` Trond Myklebust
2007-04-18 15:01                                         ` Christoph Hellwig
2007-04-18 19:00                                           ` Trond Myklebust
2007-04-18 15:06                                         ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-18 17:14                                   ` Eric W. Biederman
2007-04-18 18:05                                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-19  9:02                                       ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 14:25                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-17 14:28                         ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-16 17:14               ` Ram Pai
2007-04-16 17:50                 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 17:07                   ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-17 17:44                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 18:15                       ` Serge E. Hallyn
2007-04-17 18:58                         ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 19:28                       ` Ram Pai
2007-04-17 19:43                         ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-17 20:25                           ` Ram Pai
2007-04-18  9:19                             ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-18 18:35                               ` Ram Pai
2007-04-18 19:14                                 ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-18 19:41                                   ` Ram Pai
2007-04-19  8:36                                     ` Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 06/10] propagate error values from clone_mnt Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 07/10] allow unprivileged bind mounts Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 08/10] put declaration of put_filesystem() in fs.h Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-12 16:45 ` Miklos Szeredi [this message]
2007-04-12 16:45 ` [patch 10/10] allow unprivileged fuse mounts Miklos Szeredi
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2007-04-16 11:03 [patch 00/10] mount ownership and unprivileged mount syscall (v3) Miklos Szeredi
2007-04-16 11:03 ` [patch 09/10] allow unprivileged mounts Miklos Szeredi

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