* [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount
@ 2026-05-01 18:56 Tony Luck
2026-05-01 23:17 ` Reinette Chatre
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Tony Luck @ 2026-05-01 18:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Borislav Petkov, x86
Cc: Fenghua Yu, Reinette Chatre, Maciej Wieczor-Retman, Peter Newman,
James Morse, Babu Moger, Drew Fustini, Dave Martin, Chen Yu,
linux-kernel, patches, Tony Luck
Sashiko noticed[1] a deadlock in the resctrl mount code.
rdt_get_tree() acquires rdtgroup_mutex before calling kernfs_get_tree(). If
superblock setup fails inside kernfs_get_tree(), the VFS calls kill_sb on
the same thread before the call returns. rdt_kill_sb() unconditionally
attempts to acquire rdtgroup_mutex and deadlock occurs.
Add a boolean rdt_kill_sb_locked flag. Set it for the duration of
kernfs_get_tree() and check in rdt_kill_sb() to determine if locks
are already held.
Fixes: 5ff193fbde20 ("x86/intel_rdt: Add basic resctrl filesystem support")
Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-sonnet-4.6
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260429184858.36423-1-tony.luck%40intel.com [1]
---
fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
index 5dfdaa6f9d8f..8544020ef420 100644
--- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
+++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
@@ -2782,6 +2782,9 @@ static void schemata_list_destroy(void)
}
}
+/* Protected by the serialized mount path (rdtgroup_mutex + resctrl_mounted). */
+static bool rdt_kill_sb_locked;
+
static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
{
struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
@@ -2855,7 +2858,9 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
if (ret)
goto out_mondata;
+ rdt_kill_sb_locked = true;
ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
+ rdt_kill_sb_locked = false;
if (ret < 0)
goto out_psl;
@@ -3173,8 +3178,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
{
struct rdt_resource *r;
- cpus_read_lock();
- mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
+ cpus_read_lock();
+ mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ }
rdt_disable_ctx();
@@ -3189,8 +3196,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
resctrl_arch_disable_mon();
resctrl_mounted = false;
kernfs_kill_sb(sb);
- mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
- cpus_read_unlock();
+ if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ }
}
static struct file_system_type rdt_fs_type = {
--
2.54.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount
2026-05-01 18:56 [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount Tony Luck
@ 2026-05-01 23:17 ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-04 16:25 ` Luck, Tony
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Reinette Chatre @ 2026-05-01 23:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tony Luck, Borislav Petkov, x86
Cc: Fenghua Yu, Maciej Wieczor-Retman, Peter Newman, James Morse,
Babu Moger, Drew Fustini, Dave Martin, Chen Yu, linux-kernel,
patches
Hi Tony,
On 5/1/26 11:56 AM, Tony Luck wrote:
> Sashiko noticed[1] a deadlock in the resctrl mount code.
>
> rdt_get_tree() acquires rdtgroup_mutex before calling kernfs_get_tree(). If
> superblock setup fails inside kernfs_get_tree(), the VFS calls kill_sb on
> the same thread before the call returns. rdt_kill_sb() unconditionally
> attempts to acquire rdtgroup_mutex and deadlock occurs.
Thank you for addressing this.
>
> Add a boolean rdt_kill_sb_locked flag. Set it for the duration of
> kernfs_get_tree() and check in rdt_kill_sb() to determine if locks
> are already held.
>
...
> diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> index 5dfdaa6f9d8f..8544020ef420 100644
> --- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> +++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> @@ -2782,6 +2782,9 @@ static void schemata_list_destroy(void)
> }
> }
>
> +/* Protected by the serialized mount path (rdtgroup_mutex + resctrl_mounted). */
I interpret above to mean that every access to rdt_kill_sb_locked can be expected to
be done with rdtgroup_mutex held ...
> +static bool rdt_kill_sb_locked;
> +
> static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> {
> struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
> @@ -2855,7 +2858,9 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> if (ret)
> goto out_mondata;
>
> + rdt_kill_sb_locked = true;
> ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
> + rdt_kill_sb_locked = false;
> if (ret < 0)
> goto out_psl;
>
> @@ -3173,8 +3178,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> struct rdt_resource *r;
>
> - cpus_read_lock();
> - mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> + if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
> + cpus_read_lock();
> + mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
... but here clearly rdt_kill_sb_locked can be accessed without rdtgroup_mutex held.
It appears that while this change claims that rdt_kill_sb_locked is protected the
implementation instead seems to actually be "this works for the scenarios cared
about here" which I understand to be based on considerations of how the filesystem
code interacts with resctrl callbacks _today_.
> + }
>
> rdt_disable_ctx();
>
> @@ -3189,8 +3196,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
> resctrl_arch_disable_mon();
> resctrl_mounted = false;
> kernfs_kill_sb(sb);
> - mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> - cpus_read_unlock();
> + if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
> + mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> + cpus_read_unlock();
> + }
> }
>
> static struct file_system_type rdt_fs_type = {
Did you or your AI assistant consider running kernfs_get_tree() without rdtgroup_mutex
and CPU hotplug lock held? Consider, for example:
diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
index 36d21652616e..9ee6295d6521 100644
--- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
+++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
@@ -2892,10 +2892,6 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
if (ret)
goto out_mondata;
- ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
- if (ret < 0)
- goto out_psl;
-
if (resctrl_arch_alloc_capable())
resctrl_arch_enable_alloc();
if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
@@ -2911,10 +2907,10 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
RESCTRL_PICK_ANY_CPU);
}
- goto out;
+ mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+ cpus_read_unlock();
+ return kernfs_get_tree(fc);
-out_psl:
- rdt_pseudo_lock_release();
out_mondata:
if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
kernfs_remove(kn_mondata);
This seems simpler by:
* avoiding introduction of additional state (rdt_kill_sb_locked) with unclear protection,
* avoiding double-cleanup on failure (rdt_kill_sb() called and then all rdt_get_tree()'s
failure path),
* maintaining symmetry with rdt_kill_sb() by providing it the state it is
expected to be called with (i.e resctrl_mounted = true).
From what I can tell it is safe to call kernfs_kill_sb() on failure of kernfs_get_tree(),
but this needs to have been be considered as part of this submission anyway.
Oh, maybe there is a new lock ordering issue with this that I am missing?
Reinette
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount
2026-05-01 23:17 ` Reinette Chatre
@ 2026-05-04 16:25 ` Luck, Tony
2026-05-04 17:43 ` Reinette Chatre
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Luck, Tony @ 2026-05-04 16:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Reinette Chatre
Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86, Fenghua Yu, Maciej Wieczor-Retman,
Peter Newman, James Morse, Babu Moger, Drew Fustini, Dave Martin,
Chen Yu, linux-kernel, patches
On Fri, May 01, 2026 at 04:17:18PM -0700, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> Hi Tony,
>
> On 5/1/26 11:56 AM, Tony Luck wrote:
> > Sashiko noticed[1] a deadlock in the resctrl mount code.
> >
> > rdt_get_tree() acquires rdtgroup_mutex before calling kernfs_get_tree(). If
> > superblock setup fails inside kernfs_get_tree(), the VFS calls kill_sb on
> > the same thread before the call returns. rdt_kill_sb() unconditionally
> > attempts to acquire rdtgroup_mutex and deadlock occurs.
>
> Thank you for addressing this.
>
> >
> > Add a boolean rdt_kill_sb_locked flag. Set it for the duration of
> > kernfs_get_tree() and check in rdt_kill_sb() to determine if locks
> > are already held.
> >
>
> ...
>
> > diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> > index 5dfdaa6f9d8f..8544020ef420 100644
> > --- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> > +++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> > @@ -2782,6 +2782,9 @@ static void schemata_list_destroy(void)
> > }
> > }
> >
> > +/* Protected by the serialized mount path (rdtgroup_mutex + resctrl_mounted). */
>
> I interpret above to mean that every access to rdt_kill_sb_locked can be expected to
> be done with rdtgroup_mutex held ...
The comment could be much more descriptive about locking and limited use
case.
> > +static bool rdt_kill_sb_locked;
> > +
> > static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> > {
> > struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
> > @@ -2855,7 +2858,9 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> > if (ret)
> > goto out_mondata;
> >
> > + rdt_kill_sb_locked = true;
> > ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
> > + rdt_kill_sb_locked = false;
> > if (ret < 0)
> > goto out_psl;
> >
> > @@ -3173,8 +3178,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
> > {
> > struct rdt_resource *r;
> >
> > - cpus_read_lock();
> > - mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> > + if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
> > + cpus_read_lock();
> > + mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
>
> ... but here clearly rdt_kill_sb_locked can be accessed without rdtgroup_mutex held.
A much better name for this flag would be "resctrl_mount_in_progress". With
The header comment noting that it is set-and cleared inside
rdtgroup_mutex protected code, it is used only in rdt_kill_sb().
This specific use case seems safe as there are only call chains leading
to rdt_kill_sb():
1) Error cleanup from failure of kernfs_fill_super() within the
call to kernfs_get_tree() [rdtgroup_mutex still held in this
case]
2) From user call to unmount the filesystem. In which case
rdt_get_tree() must have completed successfully. Any new
calls are blocked from changing this flag by the early exit
based on resctrl_mounted.
>
> It appears that while this change claims that rdt_kill_sb_locked is protected the
> implementation instead seems to actually be "this works for the scenarios cared
> about here" which I understand to be based on considerations of how the filesystem
> code interacts with resctrl callbacks _today_.
>
> > + }
> >
> > rdt_disable_ctx();
> >
> > @@ -3189,8 +3196,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
> > resctrl_arch_disable_mon();
> > resctrl_mounted = false;
> > kernfs_kill_sb(sb);
> > - mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> > - cpus_read_unlock();
> > + if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
> > + mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> > + cpus_read_unlock();
> > + }
> > }
> >
> > static struct file_system_type rdt_fs_type = {
>
> Did you or your AI assistant consider running kernfs_get_tree() without rdtgroup_mutex
> and CPU hotplug lock held? Consider, for example:
Not considered. Thanks for the suggestion ... But, see below.
> diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> index 36d21652616e..9ee6295d6521 100644
> --- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> +++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> @@ -2892,10 +2892,6 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> if (ret)
> goto out_mondata;
>
> - ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
> - if (ret < 0)
> - goto out_psl;
> -
> if (resctrl_arch_alloc_capable())
> resctrl_arch_enable_alloc();
> if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
> @@ -2911,10 +2907,10 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> RESCTRL_PICK_ANY_CPU);
> }
>
> - goto out;
> + mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> + cpus_read_unlock();
> + return kernfs_get_tree(fc);
>
> -out_psl:
> - rdt_pseudo_lock_release();
> out_mondata:
> if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
> kernfs_remove(kn_mondata);
>
>
> This seems simpler by:
> * avoiding introduction of additional state (rdt_kill_sb_locked) with unclear protection,
> * avoiding double-cleanup on failure (rdt_kill_sb() called and then all rdt_get_tree()'s
> failure path),
> * maintaining symmetry with rdt_kill_sb() by providing it the state it is
> expected to be called with (i.e resctrl_mounted = true).
All these are excellent points in favor of this approach.
>
> >From what I can tell it is safe to call kernfs_kill_sb() on failure of kernfs_get_tree(),
> but this needs to have been be considered as part of this submission anyway.
Looks OK to me too.
> Oh, maybe there is a new lock ordering issue with this that I am missing?
I can't see any lock issues.
But ... there is a problem. kernfs_get_tree() can fail for many reasons.
Only the specific case of failure in kernfs_get_super() makes the cleanup
call to rdt_kill_sb(). rdt_get_tree() has no way to tell from the error
code from kernfs_get_tree() whether cleanup has been done.
Plausibly I could do some surgery on the kernfs subsystem to make kernfs_get_tree()
take a second argument "bool *did_i_call_kill_sb". Only other user is
the cgroup code. So this might not be too invasive.
Or, I could fix up the comments to justify use of "resctrl_mount_in_progress"
Also fix up rdt_kill_sb() to look like this:
static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
{
if (resctrl_mount_in_progress) {
resctrl_clean_up_failed_mount();
return;
}
... existing unmount path code here ...
}
Or ... do you have some other suggestion?
>
> Reinette
-Tony
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount
2026-05-04 16:25 ` Luck, Tony
@ 2026-05-04 17:43 ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-04 17:52 ` Luck, Tony
0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Reinette Chatre @ 2026-05-04 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Luck, Tony
Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86, Fenghua Yu, Maciej Wieczor-Retman,
Peter Newman, James Morse, Babu Moger, Drew Fustini, Dave Martin,
Chen Yu, linux-kernel, patches
Hi Tony,
On 5/4/26 9:25 AM, Luck, Tony wrote:
> On Fri, May 01, 2026 at 04:17:18PM -0700, Reinette Chatre wrote:
>> Hi Tony,
>>
>> On 5/1/26 11:56 AM, Tony Luck wrote:
>>> Sashiko noticed[1] a deadlock in the resctrl mount code.
>>>
>>> rdt_get_tree() acquires rdtgroup_mutex before calling kernfs_get_tree(). If
>>> superblock setup fails inside kernfs_get_tree(), the VFS calls kill_sb on
>>> the same thread before the call returns. rdt_kill_sb() unconditionally
>>> attempts to acquire rdtgroup_mutex and deadlock occurs.
>>
>> Thank you for addressing this.
>>
>>>
>>> Add a boolean rdt_kill_sb_locked flag. Set it for the duration of
>>> kernfs_get_tree() and check in rdt_kill_sb() to determine if locks
>>> are already held.
>>>
>>
>> ...
>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
>>> index 5dfdaa6f9d8f..8544020ef420 100644
>>> --- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
>>> +++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
>>> @@ -2782,6 +2782,9 @@ static void schemata_list_destroy(void)
>>> }
>>> }
>>>
>>> +/* Protected by the serialized mount path (rdtgroup_mutex + resctrl_mounted). */
>>
>> I interpret above to mean that every access to rdt_kill_sb_locked can be expected to
>> be done with rdtgroup_mutex held ...
>
> The comment could be much more descriptive about locking and limited use
> case.
>
>>> +static bool rdt_kill_sb_locked;
>>> +
>>> static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>>> {
>>> struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
>>> @@ -2855,7 +2858,9 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>>> if (ret)
>>> goto out_mondata;
>>>
>>> + rdt_kill_sb_locked = true;
>>> ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
>>> + rdt_kill_sb_locked = false;
>>> if (ret < 0)
>>> goto out_psl;
>>>
>>> @@ -3173,8 +3178,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
>>> {
>>> struct rdt_resource *r;
>>>
>>> - cpus_read_lock();
>>> - mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
>>> + if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
>>> + cpus_read_lock();
>>> + mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
>>
>> ... but here clearly rdt_kill_sb_locked can be accessed without rdtgroup_mutex held.
>
> A much better name for this flag would be "resctrl_mount_in_progress". With
> The header comment noting that it is set-and cleared inside
> rdtgroup_mutex protected code, it is used only in rdt_kill_sb().
> This specific use case seems safe as there are only call chains leading
> to rdt_kill_sb():
> 1) Error cleanup from failure of kernfs_fill_super() within the
> call to kernfs_get_tree() [rdtgroup_mutex still held in this
> case]
> 2) From user call to unmount the filesystem. In which case
> rdt_get_tree() must have completed successfully. Any new
> calls are blocked from changing this flag by the early exit
> based on resctrl_mounted.
>>
>> It appears that while this change claims that rdt_kill_sb_locked is protected the
>> implementation instead seems to actually be "this works for the scenarios cared
>> about here" which I understand to be based on considerations of how the filesystem
>> code interacts with resctrl callbacks _today_.
>>
>>> + }
>>>
>>> rdt_disable_ctx();
>>>
>>> @@ -3189,8 +3196,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
>>> resctrl_arch_disable_mon();
>>> resctrl_mounted = false;
>>> kernfs_kill_sb(sb);
>>> - mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
>>> - cpus_read_unlock();
>>> + if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
>>> + mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
>>> + cpus_read_unlock();
>>> + }
>>> }
>>>
>>> static struct file_system_type rdt_fs_type = {
>>
>> Did you or your AI assistant consider running kernfs_get_tree() without rdtgroup_mutex
>> and CPU hotplug lock held? Consider, for example:
>
> Not considered. Thanks for the suggestion ... But, see below.
>
>> diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
>> index 36d21652616e..9ee6295d6521 100644
>> --- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
>> +++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
>> @@ -2892,10 +2892,6 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>> if (ret)
>> goto out_mondata;
>>
>> - ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
>> - if (ret < 0)
>> - goto out_psl;
>> -
>> if (resctrl_arch_alloc_capable())
>> resctrl_arch_enable_alloc();
>> if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
>> @@ -2911,10 +2907,10 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>> RESCTRL_PICK_ANY_CPU);
>> }
>>
>> - goto out;
>> + mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
>> + cpus_read_unlock();
>> + return kernfs_get_tree(fc);
>>
>> -out_psl:
>> - rdt_pseudo_lock_release();
>> out_mondata:
>> if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
>> kernfs_remove(kn_mondata);
>>
>>
>> This seems simpler by:
>> * avoiding introduction of additional state (rdt_kill_sb_locked) with unclear protection,
>> * avoiding double-cleanup on failure (rdt_kill_sb() called and then all rdt_get_tree()'s
>> failure path),
>> * maintaining symmetry with rdt_kill_sb() by providing it the state it is
>> expected to be called with (i.e resctrl_mounted = true).
>
> All these are excellent points in favor of this approach.
>>
>> >From what I can tell it is safe to call kernfs_kill_sb() on failure of kernfs_get_tree(),
>> but this needs to have been be considered as part of this submission anyway.
>
> Looks OK to me too.
>
>> Oh, maybe there is a new lock ordering issue with this that I am missing?
>
> I can't see any lock issues.
>
> But ... there is a problem. kernfs_get_tree() can fail for many reasons.
> Only the specific case of failure in kernfs_get_super() makes the cleanup
> call to rdt_kill_sb(). rdt_get_tree() has no way to tell from the error
> code from kernfs_get_tree() whether cleanup has been done.
Thanks for highlighting this.
From what I can tell, kernfs_get_tree() can fail in two places: allocation of superblock
fails, in which case rdt_kill_sb() is not called, or allocation of superblock succeeded but its
initialization failed, in which case rdt_kill_sb() is called.
It seems reasonable to me to expect that rdt_kill_sb() was called if the superblock was
allocated. In this case kernfs_fs_context::new_sb_created is set.
Could kernfs_fs_context::new_sb_created be used instead of kernfs_get_tree() error code to
determine if cleanup has been done?
>
> Plausibly I could do some surgery on the kernfs subsystem to make kernfs_get_tree()
> take a second argument "bool *did_i_call_kill_sb". Only other user is
> the cgroup code. So this might not be too invasive.
It is not clear to me yet that additional flags are needed to support this.
>
> Or, I could fix up the comments to justify use of "resctrl_mount_in_progress"
> Also fix up rdt_kill_sb() to look like this:
>
> static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> if (resctrl_mount_in_progress) {
> resctrl_clean_up_failed_mount();
> return;
> }
>
> ... existing unmount path code here ...
> }
I find the reasoning about safe access to resctrl_mount_in_progress to be very
complicated. It is not clear to me that it is required when considering existing
kernfs_fs_context::new_sb_created.
Reinette
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* RE: [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount
2026-05-04 17:43 ` Reinette Chatre
@ 2026-05-04 17:52 ` Luck, Tony
0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Luck, Tony @ 2026-05-04 17:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chatre, Reinette
Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86@kernel.org, Fenghua Yu,
Wieczor-Retman, Maciej, Peter Newman, James Morse, Babu Moger,
Drew Fustini, Dave Martin, Chen, Yu C,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, patches@lists.linux.dev
> I find the reasoning about safe access to resctrl_mount_in_progress to be very
> complicated. It is not clear to me that it is required when considering existing
> kernfs_fs_context::new_sb_created.
Reinette,
Indeed. Looks like cgroup uses this technique:
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0.1/source/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c#L2297
I'll dig into this.
-Tony
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
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2026-05-01 18:56 [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount Tony Luck
2026-05-01 23:17 ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-04 16:25 ` Luck, Tony
2026-05-04 17:43 ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-04 17:52 ` Luck, Tony
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