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* [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount
@ 2026-05-01 18:56 Tony Luck
  2026-05-01 23:17 ` Reinette Chatre
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Tony Luck @ 2026-05-01 18:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Borislav Petkov, x86
  Cc: Fenghua Yu, Reinette Chatre, Maciej Wieczor-Retman, Peter Newman,
	James Morse, Babu Moger, Drew Fustini, Dave Martin, Chen Yu,
	linux-kernel, patches, Tony Luck

Sashiko noticed[1] a deadlock in the resctrl mount code.

rdt_get_tree() acquires rdtgroup_mutex before calling kernfs_get_tree(). If
superblock setup fails inside kernfs_get_tree(), the VFS calls kill_sb on
the same thread before the call returns.  rdt_kill_sb() unconditionally
attempts to acquire rdtgroup_mutex and deadlock occurs.

Add a boolean rdt_kill_sb_locked flag. Set it for the duration of
kernfs_get_tree() and check in rdt_kill_sb() to determine if locks
are already held.

Fixes: 5ff193fbde20 ("x86/intel_rdt: Add basic resctrl filesystem support")
Assisted-by: GitHub-Copilot:claude-sonnet-4.6
Signed-off-by: Tony Luck <tony.luck@intel.com>
Link: https://sashiko.dev/#/patchset/20260429184858.36423-1-tony.luck%40intel.com [1]
---
 fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c | 17 +++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
index 5dfdaa6f9d8f..8544020ef420 100644
--- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
+++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
@@ -2782,6 +2782,9 @@ static void schemata_list_destroy(void)
 	}
 }
 
+/* Protected by the serialized mount path (rdtgroup_mutex + resctrl_mounted). */
+static bool rdt_kill_sb_locked;
+
 static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
 {
 	struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
@@ -2855,7 +2858,9 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_mondata;
 
+	rdt_kill_sb_locked = true;
 	ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
+	rdt_kill_sb_locked = false;
 	if (ret < 0)
 		goto out_psl;
 
@@ -3173,8 +3178,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
 {
 	struct rdt_resource *r;
 
-	cpus_read_lock();
-	mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+	if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
+		cpus_read_lock();
+		mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+	}
 
 	rdt_disable_ctx();
 
@@ -3189,8 +3196,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
 		resctrl_arch_disable_mon();
 	resctrl_mounted = false;
 	kernfs_kill_sb(sb);
-	mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
-	cpus_read_unlock();
+	if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
+		mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+		cpus_read_unlock();
+	}
 }
 
 static struct file_system_type rdt_fs_type = {
-- 
2.54.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount
  2026-05-01 18:56 [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount Tony Luck
@ 2026-05-01 23:17 ` Reinette Chatre
  2026-05-04 16:25   ` Luck, Tony
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Reinette Chatre @ 2026-05-01 23:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Tony Luck, Borislav Petkov, x86
  Cc: Fenghua Yu, Maciej Wieczor-Retman, Peter Newman, James Morse,
	Babu Moger, Drew Fustini, Dave Martin, Chen Yu, linux-kernel,
	patches

Hi Tony,

On 5/1/26 11:56 AM, Tony Luck wrote:
> Sashiko noticed[1] a deadlock in the resctrl mount code.
> 
> rdt_get_tree() acquires rdtgroup_mutex before calling kernfs_get_tree(). If
> superblock setup fails inside kernfs_get_tree(), the VFS calls kill_sb on
> the same thread before the call returns.  rdt_kill_sb() unconditionally
> attempts to acquire rdtgroup_mutex and deadlock occurs.

Thank you for addressing this.

> 
> Add a boolean rdt_kill_sb_locked flag. Set it for the duration of
> kernfs_get_tree() and check in rdt_kill_sb() to determine if locks
> are already held.
> 

...

> diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> index 5dfdaa6f9d8f..8544020ef420 100644
> --- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> +++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> @@ -2782,6 +2782,9 @@ static void schemata_list_destroy(void)
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +/* Protected by the serialized mount path (rdtgroup_mutex + resctrl_mounted). */

I interpret above to mean that every access to rdt_kill_sb_locked can be expected to
be done with rdtgroup_mutex held ...

> +static bool rdt_kill_sb_locked;
> +
>  static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>  {
>  	struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
> @@ -2855,7 +2858,9 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>  	if (ret)
>  		goto out_mondata;
>  
> +	rdt_kill_sb_locked = true;
>  	ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
> +	rdt_kill_sb_locked = false;
>  	if (ret < 0)
>  		goto out_psl;
>  
> @@ -3173,8 +3178,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
>  {
>  	struct rdt_resource *r;
>  
> -	cpus_read_lock();
> -	mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> +	if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
> +		cpus_read_lock();
> +		mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);

... but here clearly rdt_kill_sb_locked can be accessed without rdtgroup_mutex held.

It appears that while this change claims that rdt_kill_sb_locked is protected the
implementation instead seems to actually be "this works for the scenarios cared
about here" which I understand to be based on considerations of how the filesystem
code interacts with resctrl callbacks _today_.

> +	}
>  
>  	rdt_disable_ctx();
>  
> @@ -3189,8 +3196,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
>  		resctrl_arch_disable_mon();
>  	resctrl_mounted = false;
>  	kernfs_kill_sb(sb);
> -	mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> -	cpus_read_unlock();
> +	if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
> +		mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> +		cpus_read_unlock();
> +	}
>  }
>  
>  static struct file_system_type rdt_fs_type = {

Did you or your AI assistant consider running kernfs_get_tree() without rdtgroup_mutex
and CPU hotplug lock held? Consider, for example:

diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
index 36d21652616e..9ee6295d6521 100644
--- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
+++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
@@ -2892,10 +2892,6 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
 	if (ret)
 		goto out_mondata;
 
-	ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
-	if (ret < 0)
-		goto out_psl;
-
 	if (resctrl_arch_alloc_capable())
 		resctrl_arch_enable_alloc();
 	if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
@@ -2911,10 +2907,10 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
 						   RESCTRL_PICK_ANY_CPU);
 	}
 
-	goto out;
+	mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
+	cpus_read_unlock();
+	return kernfs_get_tree(fc);
 
-out_psl:
-	rdt_pseudo_lock_release();
 out_mondata:
 	if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
 		kernfs_remove(kn_mondata);


This seems simpler by:
* avoiding introduction of additional state (rdt_kill_sb_locked) with unclear protection,
* avoiding double-cleanup on failure (rdt_kill_sb() called and then all rdt_get_tree()'s
  failure path),
* maintaining symmetry with rdt_kill_sb() by providing it the state it is
  expected to be called with (i.e resctrl_mounted = true).

From what I can tell it is safe to call kernfs_kill_sb() on failure of kernfs_get_tree(),
but this needs to have been be considered as part of this submission anyway.

Oh, maybe there is a new lock ordering issue with this that I am missing?

Reinette


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount
  2026-05-01 23:17 ` Reinette Chatre
@ 2026-05-04 16:25   ` Luck, Tony
  2026-05-04 17:43     ` Reinette Chatre
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Luck, Tony @ 2026-05-04 16:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Reinette Chatre
  Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86, Fenghua Yu, Maciej Wieczor-Retman,
	Peter Newman, James Morse, Babu Moger, Drew Fustini, Dave Martin,
	Chen Yu, linux-kernel, patches

On Fri, May 01, 2026 at 04:17:18PM -0700, Reinette Chatre wrote:
> Hi Tony,
> 
> On 5/1/26 11:56 AM, Tony Luck wrote:
> > Sashiko noticed[1] a deadlock in the resctrl mount code.
> > 
> > rdt_get_tree() acquires rdtgroup_mutex before calling kernfs_get_tree(). If
> > superblock setup fails inside kernfs_get_tree(), the VFS calls kill_sb on
> > the same thread before the call returns.  rdt_kill_sb() unconditionally
> > attempts to acquire rdtgroup_mutex and deadlock occurs.
> 
> Thank you for addressing this.
> 
> > 
> > Add a boolean rdt_kill_sb_locked flag. Set it for the duration of
> > kernfs_get_tree() and check in rdt_kill_sb() to determine if locks
> > are already held.
> > 
> 
> ...
> 
> > diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> > index 5dfdaa6f9d8f..8544020ef420 100644
> > --- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> > +++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> > @@ -2782,6 +2782,9 @@ static void schemata_list_destroy(void)
> >  	}
> >  }
> >  
> > +/* Protected by the serialized mount path (rdtgroup_mutex + resctrl_mounted). */
> 
> I interpret above to mean that every access to rdt_kill_sb_locked can be expected to
> be done with rdtgroup_mutex held ...

The comment could be much more descriptive about locking and limited use
case.

> > +static bool rdt_kill_sb_locked;
> > +
> >  static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> >  {
> >  	struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
> > @@ -2855,7 +2858,9 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
> >  	if (ret)
> >  		goto out_mondata;
> >  
> > +	rdt_kill_sb_locked = true;
> >  	ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
> > +	rdt_kill_sb_locked = false;
> >  	if (ret < 0)
> >  		goto out_psl;
> >  
> > @@ -3173,8 +3178,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
> >  {
> >  	struct rdt_resource *r;
> >  
> > -	cpus_read_lock();
> > -	mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> > +	if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
> > +		cpus_read_lock();
> > +		mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> 
> ... but here clearly rdt_kill_sb_locked can be accessed without rdtgroup_mutex held.

A much better name for this flag would be "resctrl_mount_in_progress". With
The header comment noting that it is set-and cleared inside
rdtgroup_mutex protected code, it is used only in rdt_kill_sb().
This specific use case seems safe as there are only call chains leading
to rdt_kill_sb():
	1) Error cleanup from failure of kernfs_fill_super() within the
	   call to kernfs_get_tree() [rdtgroup_mutex still held in this
	   case]
	2) From user call to unmount the filesystem. In which case
	   rdt_get_tree() must have completed successfully. Any new
	   calls are blocked from changing this flag by the early exit
	   based on resctrl_mounted.
> 
> It appears that while this change claims that rdt_kill_sb_locked is protected the
> implementation instead seems to actually be "this works for the scenarios cared
> about here" which I understand to be based on considerations of how the filesystem
> code interacts with resctrl callbacks _today_.
> 
> > +	}
> >  
> >  	rdt_disable_ctx();
> >  
> > @@ -3189,8 +3196,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
> >  		resctrl_arch_disable_mon();
> >  	resctrl_mounted = false;
> >  	kernfs_kill_sb(sb);
> > -	mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> > -	cpus_read_unlock();
> > +	if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
> > +		mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> > +		cpus_read_unlock();
> > +	}
> >  }
> >  
> >  static struct file_system_type rdt_fs_type = {
> 
> Did you or your AI assistant consider running kernfs_get_tree() without rdtgroup_mutex
> and CPU hotplug lock held? Consider, for example:

Not considered. Thanks for the suggestion ... But, see below.

> diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> index 36d21652616e..9ee6295d6521 100644
> --- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> +++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
> @@ -2892,10 +2892,6 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>  	if (ret)
>  		goto out_mondata;
>  
> -	ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
> -	if (ret < 0)
> -		goto out_psl;
> -
>  	if (resctrl_arch_alloc_capable())
>  		resctrl_arch_enable_alloc();
>  	if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
> @@ -2911,10 +2907,10 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>  						   RESCTRL_PICK_ANY_CPU);
>  	}
>  
> -	goto out;
> +	mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
> +	cpus_read_unlock();
> +	return kernfs_get_tree(fc);
>  
> -out_psl:
> -	rdt_pseudo_lock_release();
>  out_mondata:
>  	if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
>  		kernfs_remove(kn_mondata);
> 
> 
> This seems simpler by:
> * avoiding introduction of additional state (rdt_kill_sb_locked) with unclear protection,
> * avoiding double-cleanup on failure (rdt_kill_sb() called and then all rdt_get_tree()'s
>   failure path),
> * maintaining symmetry with rdt_kill_sb() by providing it the state it is
>   expected to be called with (i.e resctrl_mounted = true).

All these are excellent points in favor of this approach.
> 
> >From what I can tell it is safe to call kernfs_kill_sb() on failure of kernfs_get_tree(),
> but this needs to have been be considered as part of this submission anyway.

Looks OK to me too.

> Oh, maybe there is a new lock ordering issue with this that I am missing?

I can't see any lock issues.

But ... there is a problem. kernfs_get_tree() can fail for many reasons.
Only the specific case of failure in kernfs_get_super() makes the cleanup
call to rdt_kill_sb(). rdt_get_tree() has no way to tell from the error
code from kernfs_get_tree() whether cleanup has been done.

Plausibly I could do some surgery on the kernfs subsystem to make kernfs_get_tree()
take a second argument "bool *did_i_call_kill_sb". Only other user is
the cgroup code. So this might not be too invasive.

Or, I could fix up the comments to justify use of "resctrl_mount_in_progress"
Also fix up rdt_kill_sb() to look like this:

static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
{
	if (resctrl_mount_in_progress) {
		resctrl_clean_up_failed_mount();
		return;
	}

	... existing unmount path code here ...
}

Or ... do you have some other suggestion?

> 
> Reinette

-Tony

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount
  2026-05-04 16:25   ` Luck, Tony
@ 2026-05-04 17:43     ` Reinette Chatre
  2026-05-04 17:52       ` Luck, Tony
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Reinette Chatre @ 2026-05-04 17:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Luck, Tony
  Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86, Fenghua Yu, Maciej Wieczor-Retman,
	Peter Newman, James Morse, Babu Moger, Drew Fustini, Dave Martin,
	Chen Yu, linux-kernel, patches

Hi Tony,

On 5/4/26 9:25 AM, Luck, Tony wrote:
> On Fri, May 01, 2026 at 04:17:18PM -0700, Reinette Chatre wrote:
>> Hi Tony,
>>
>> On 5/1/26 11:56 AM, Tony Luck wrote:
>>> Sashiko noticed[1] a deadlock in the resctrl mount code.
>>>
>>> rdt_get_tree() acquires rdtgroup_mutex before calling kernfs_get_tree(). If
>>> superblock setup fails inside kernfs_get_tree(), the VFS calls kill_sb on
>>> the same thread before the call returns.  rdt_kill_sb() unconditionally
>>> attempts to acquire rdtgroup_mutex and deadlock occurs.
>>
>> Thank you for addressing this.
>>
>>>
>>> Add a boolean rdt_kill_sb_locked flag. Set it for the duration of
>>> kernfs_get_tree() and check in rdt_kill_sb() to determine if locks
>>> are already held.
>>>
>>
>> ...
>>
>>> diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
>>> index 5dfdaa6f9d8f..8544020ef420 100644
>>> --- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
>>> +++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
>>> @@ -2782,6 +2782,9 @@ static void schemata_list_destroy(void)
>>>  	}
>>>  }
>>>  
>>> +/* Protected by the serialized mount path (rdtgroup_mutex + resctrl_mounted). */
>>
>> I interpret above to mean that every access to rdt_kill_sb_locked can be expected to
>> be done with rdtgroup_mutex held ...
> 
> The comment could be much more descriptive about locking and limited use
> case.
> 
>>> +static bool rdt_kill_sb_locked;
>>> +
>>>  static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>>>  {
>>>  	struct rdt_fs_context *ctx = rdt_fc2context(fc);
>>> @@ -2855,7 +2858,9 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>>>  	if (ret)
>>>  		goto out_mondata;
>>>  
>>> +	rdt_kill_sb_locked = true;
>>>  	ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
>>> +	rdt_kill_sb_locked = false;
>>>  	if (ret < 0)
>>>  		goto out_psl;
>>>  
>>> @@ -3173,8 +3178,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
>>>  {
>>>  	struct rdt_resource *r;
>>>  
>>> -	cpus_read_lock();
>>> -	mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
>>> +	if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
>>> +		cpus_read_lock();
>>> +		mutex_lock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
>>
>> ... but here clearly rdt_kill_sb_locked can be accessed without rdtgroup_mutex held.
> 
> A much better name for this flag would be "resctrl_mount_in_progress". With
> The header comment noting that it is set-and cleared inside
> rdtgroup_mutex protected code, it is used only in rdt_kill_sb().
> This specific use case seems safe as there are only call chains leading
> to rdt_kill_sb():
> 	1) Error cleanup from failure of kernfs_fill_super() within the
> 	   call to kernfs_get_tree() [rdtgroup_mutex still held in this
> 	   case]
> 	2) From user call to unmount the filesystem. In which case
> 	   rdt_get_tree() must have completed successfully. Any new
> 	   calls are blocked from changing this flag by the early exit
> 	   based on resctrl_mounted.
>>
>> It appears that while this change claims that rdt_kill_sb_locked is protected the
>> implementation instead seems to actually be "this works for the scenarios cared
>> about here" which I understand to be based on considerations of how the filesystem
>> code interacts with resctrl callbacks _today_.
>>
>>> +	}
>>>  
>>>  	rdt_disable_ctx();
>>>  
>>> @@ -3189,8 +3196,10 @@ static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
>>>  		resctrl_arch_disable_mon();
>>>  	resctrl_mounted = false;
>>>  	kernfs_kill_sb(sb);
>>> -	mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
>>> -	cpus_read_unlock();
>>> +	if (!rdt_kill_sb_locked) {
>>> +		mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
>>> +		cpus_read_unlock();
>>> +	}
>>>  }
>>>  
>>>  static struct file_system_type rdt_fs_type = {
>>
>> Did you or your AI assistant consider running kernfs_get_tree() without rdtgroup_mutex
>> and CPU hotplug lock held? Consider, for example:
> 
> Not considered. Thanks for the suggestion ... But, see below.
> 
>> diff --git a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
>> index 36d21652616e..9ee6295d6521 100644
>> --- a/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
>> +++ b/fs/resctrl/rdtgroup.c
>> @@ -2892,10 +2892,6 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>>  	if (ret)
>>  		goto out_mondata;
>>  
>> -	ret = kernfs_get_tree(fc);
>> -	if (ret < 0)
>> -		goto out_psl;
>> -
>>  	if (resctrl_arch_alloc_capable())
>>  		resctrl_arch_enable_alloc();
>>  	if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
>> @@ -2911,10 +2907,10 @@ static int rdt_get_tree(struct fs_context *fc)
>>  						   RESCTRL_PICK_ANY_CPU);
>>  	}
>>  
>> -	goto out;
>> +	mutex_unlock(&rdtgroup_mutex);
>> +	cpus_read_unlock();
>> +	return kernfs_get_tree(fc);
>>  
>> -out_psl:
>> -	rdt_pseudo_lock_release();
>>  out_mondata:
>>  	if (resctrl_arch_mon_capable())
>>  		kernfs_remove(kn_mondata);
>>
>>
>> This seems simpler by:
>> * avoiding introduction of additional state (rdt_kill_sb_locked) with unclear protection,
>> * avoiding double-cleanup on failure (rdt_kill_sb() called and then all rdt_get_tree()'s
>>   failure path),
>> * maintaining symmetry with rdt_kill_sb() by providing it the state it is
>>   expected to be called with (i.e resctrl_mounted = true).
> 
> All these are excellent points in favor of this approach.
>>
>> >From what I can tell it is safe to call kernfs_kill_sb() on failure of kernfs_get_tree(),
>> but this needs to have been be considered as part of this submission anyway.
> 
> Looks OK to me too.
> 
>> Oh, maybe there is a new lock ordering issue with this that I am missing?
> 
> I can't see any lock issues.
> 
> But ... there is a problem. kernfs_get_tree() can fail for many reasons.
> Only the specific case of failure in kernfs_get_super() makes the cleanup
> call to rdt_kill_sb(). rdt_get_tree() has no way to tell from the error
> code from kernfs_get_tree() whether cleanup has been done.

Thanks for highlighting this.

From what I can tell, kernfs_get_tree() can fail in two places: allocation of superblock
fails, in which case rdt_kill_sb() is not called, or allocation of superblock succeeded but its
initialization failed, in which case rdt_kill_sb() is called.

It seems reasonable to me to expect that rdt_kill_sb() was called if the superblock was
allocated. In this case kernfs_fs_context::new_sb_created is set.

Could kernfs_fs_context::new_sb_created be used instead of kernfs_get_tree() error code to
determine if cleanup has been done?

> 
> Plausibly I could do some surgery on the kernfs subsystem to make kernfs_get_tree()
> take a second argument "bool *did_i_call_kill_sb". Only other user is
> the cgroup code. So this might not be too invasive.

It is not clear to me yet that additional flags are needed to support this.

> 
> Or, I could fix up the comments to justify use of "resctrl_mount_in_progress"
> Also fix up rdt_kill_sb() to look like this:
> 
> static void rdt_kill_sb(struct super_block *sb)
> {
> 	if (resctrl_mount_in_progress) {
> 		resctrl_clean_up_failed_mount();
> 		return;
> 	}
> 
> 	... existing unmount path code here ...
> }

I find the reasoning about safe access to resctrl_mount_in_progress to be very
complicated. It is not clear to me that it is required when considering existing
kernfs_fs_context::new_sb_created. 

Reinette

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

* RE: [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount
  2026-05-04 17:43     ` Reinette Chatre
@ 2026-05-04 17:52       ` Luck, Tony
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Luck, Tony @ 2026-05-04 17:52 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Chatre, Reinette
  Cc: Borislav Petkov, x86@kernel.org, Fenghua Yu,
	Wieczor-Retman, Maciej, Peter Newman, James Morse, Babu Moger,
	Drew Fustini, Dave Martin, Chen, Yu C,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, patches@lists.linux.dev

> I find the reasoning about safe access to resctrl_mount_in_progress to be very
> complicated. It is not clear to me that it is required when considering existing
> kernfs_fs_context::new_sb_created. 

Reinette,

Indeed. Looks like cgroup uses this technique:

https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0.1/source/kernel/cgroup/cgroup.c#L2297

I'll dig into this.

-Tony

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-05-04 17:52 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-05-01 18:56 [PATCH] fs/resctrl: Fix deadlock for errors during mount Tony Luck
2026-05-01 23:17 ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-04 16:25   ` Luck, Tony
2026-05-04 17:43     ` Reinette Chatre
2026-05-04 17:52       ` Luck, Tony

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