Re: [kernel-hardening] [PATCH v2] sysctl: allow CLONE_NEWUSER to be disabled

["Serge E. Hallyn" <serge.hallyn@ubuntu.com>]

On Thu, Jan 28, 2016 at 06:38:25AM -0800, Kees Cook wrote:
> There continue to be unexpected security exposures when users have access
> to CLONE_NEWUSER. For admins of systems that do not use user namespaces
> and are running distro kernels with CONFIG_USER_NS enabled, there is
> no way to disable CLONE_NEWUSER. This provides a way for sysadmins to
> disable the feature to reduce their attack surface without needing to
> rebuild their kernels.
> 
> This is inspired by a similar restriction in Grsecurity, but adds
> a sysctl.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org>

Acked-by: Serge Hallyn <serge.hallyn@canonical.com>

> ---
> This is the simplified version of the sysctl.
> ---
>  Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  kernel/sysctl.c                 | 14 ++++++++++++++
>  kernel/user_namespace.c         |  6 ++++++
>  3 files changed, 34 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> index a93b414672a7..dcbd3f99efb3 100644
> --- a/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> +++ b/Documentation/sysctl/kernel.txt
> @@ -85,6 +85,7 @@ show up in /proc/sys/kernel:
>  - tainted
>  - threads-max
>  - unknown_nmi_panic
> +- userns_restrict
>  - watchdog
>  - watchdog_thresh
>  - version
> @@ -930,6 +931,19 @@ example.  If a system hangs up, try pressing the NMI switch.
>  
>  ==============================================================
>  
> +userns_restrict:
> +
> +This toggle indicates whether CLONE_NEWUSER is available. As CLONE_NEWUSER
> +has many unexpected side-effects and security exposures, this allows the
> +sysadmin to disable the feature without needing to rebuild the kernel.
> +
> +When userns_restrict is set to (0), the default, there are no restrictions.
> +
> +When userns_restrict is set to (1), CLONE_NEWUSER is only available to
> +processes that have CAP_SYS_ADMIN, CAP_SETUID, and CAP_SETGID.
> +
> +==============================================================
> +
>  watchdog:
>  
>  This parameter can be used to disable or enable the soft lockup detector
> diff --git a/kernel/sysctl.c b/kernel/sysctl.c
> index 97715fd9e790..9f99c8d9e968 100644
> --- a/kernel/sysctl.c
> +++ b/kernel/sysctl.c
> @@ -112,6 +112,9 @@ extern int sysctl_nr_open_min, sysctl_nr_open_max;
>  #ifndef CONFIG_MMU
>  extern int sysctl_nr_trim_pages;
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
> +extern int sysctl_userns_restrict;
> +#endif
>  
>  /* Constants used for minimum and  maximum */
>  #ifdef CONFIG_LOCKUP_DETECTOR
> @@ -817,6 +820,17 @@ static struct ctl_table kern_table[] = {
>  		.extra2		= &two,
>  	},
>  #endif
> +#ifdef CONFIG_USER_NS
> +	{
> +		.procname	= "userns_restrict",
> +		.data		= &sysctl_userns_restrict,
> +		.maxlen		= sizeof(int),
> +		.mode		= 0644,
> +		.proc_handler	= proc_dointvec_minmax,
> +		.extra1		= &zero,
> +		.extra2		= &one,
> +	},
> +#endif
>  	{
>  		.procname	= "ngroups_max",
>  		.data		= &ngroups_max,
> diff --git a/kernel/user_namespace.c b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> index 9bafc211930c..3cace8637144 100644
> --- a/kernel/user_namespace.c
> +++ b/kernel/user_namespace.c
> @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
>  
>  static struct kmem_cache *user_ns_cachep __read_mostly;
>  static DEFINE_MUTEX(userns_state_mutex);
> +int sysctl_userns_restrict __read_mostly;
>  
>  static bool new_idmap_permitted(const struct file *file,
>  				struct user_namespace *ns, int cap_setid,
> @@ -84,6 +85,11 @@ int create_user_ns(struct cred *new)
>  	    !kgid_has_mapping(parent_ns, group))
>  		return -EPERM;
>  
> +	if (sysctl_userns_restrict && !(capable(CAP_SYS_ADMIN) &&
> +					capable(CAP_SETUID) &&
> +					capable(CAP_SETGID)))
> +		return -EPERM;
> +
>  	ns = kmem_cache_zalloc(user_ns_cachep, GFP_KERNEL);
>  	if (!ns)
>  		return -ENOMEM;
> -- 
> 2.6.3
> 
> 
> -- 
> Kees Cook
> Chrome OS & Brillo Security