[PATCH v1] perf/core: take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON cap

[PATCH v1] perf/core: take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON cap

[Alexey Budankov]

Open access to per-process monitoring for CAP_PERFMON only
privileged processes [1]. Extend ptrace_may_access() check
in perf_events subsystem with perfmon_capable() to simplify
user experience and make monitoring more secure by reducing
attack surface.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/7776fa40-6c65-2aa6-1322-eb3a01201000@linux.intel.com/

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 856d98c36f56..f50d528af444 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11587,7 +11587,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 			goto err_task;
 
 		/*
-		 * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
+		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
 		 *
 		 * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
 		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
@@ -11595,7 +11595,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
 		 */
 		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+		if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
 			goto err_cred;
 	}
 
-- 
2.24.1

Re: [PATCH v1] perf/core: take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON cap

[Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo]

Em Wed, Aug 05, 2020 at 10:56:56AM +0300, Alexey Budankov escreveu:
> 
> Open access to per-process monitoring for CAP_PERFMON only
> privileged processes [1]. Extend ptrace_may_access() check
> in perf_events subsystem with perfmon_capable() to simplify
> user experience and make monitoring more secure by reducing
> attack surface.


Acked-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>

Peter, can you pick up this one? You said it was ok last time we
discussed this.

- Arnaldo
 
> [1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/7776fa40-6c65-2aa6-1322-eb3a01201000@linux.intel.com/
> 
> Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
> ---
>  kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
>  1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
> index 856d98c36f56..f50d528af444 100644
> --- a/kernel/events/core.c
> +++ b/kernel/events/core.c
> @@ -11587,7 +11587,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
>  			goto err_task;
>  
>  		/*
> -		 * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
> +		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
>  		 *
>  		 * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
>  		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
> @@ -11595,7 +11595,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
>  		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
>  		 */
>  		err = -EACCES;
> -		if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
> +		if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
>  			goto err_cred;
>  	}
>  
> -- 
> 2.24.1
> 

-- 

- Arnaldo

[tip: perf/urgent] perf/core: Take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON capability

[tip-bot2 for Alexey Budankov]

The following commit has been merged into the perf/urgent branch of tip:

Commit-ID:     45fd22da97c6125d8d0d35bd1791e7c0c4175279
Gitweb:        https://git.kernel.org/tip/45fd22da97c6125d8d0d35bd1791e7c0c4175279
Author:        Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
AuthorDate:    Wed, 05 Aug 2020 10:56:56 +03:00
Committer:     Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
CommitterDate: Thu, 06 Aug 2020 15:03:20 +02:00

perf/core: Take over CAP_SYS_PTRACE creds to CAP_PERFMON capability

Open access to per-process monitoring for CAP_PERFMON only
privileged processes [1]. Extend ptrace_may_access() check
in perf_events subsystem with perfmon_capable() to simplify
user experience and make monitoring more secure by reducing
attack surface.

[1] https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/7776fa40-6c65-2aa6-1322-eb3a01201000@linux.intel.com/

Signed-off-by: Alexey Budankov <alexey.budankov@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
Acked-by: Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>
Link: https://lore.kernel.org/r/6e8392ff-4732-0012-2949-e1587709f0f6@linux.intel.com
---
 kernel/events/core.c | 4 ++--
 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/kernel/events/core.c b/kernel/events/core.c
index 78e69e1..41e0cef 100644
--- a/kernel/events/core.c
+++ b/kernel/events/core.c
@@ -11689,7 +11689,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 			goto err_task;
 
 		/*
-		 * Reuse ptrace permission checks for now.
+		 * Preserve ptrace permission check for backwards compatibility.
 		 *
 		 * We must hold exec_update_mutex across this and any potential
 		 * perf_install_in_context() call for this new event to
@@ -11697,7 +11697,7 @@ SYSCALL_DEFINE5(perf_event_open,
 		 * perf_event_exit_task() that could imply).
 		 */
 		err = -EACCES;
-		if (!ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
+		if (!perfmon_capable() && !ptrace_may_access(task, PTRACE_MODE_READ_REALCREDS))
 			goto err_cred;
 	}