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From: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
To: stable@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Cc: james.morse@arm.com, catalin.marinas@arm.com
Subject: [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 18/27] arm64: entry: Add non-kpti __bp_harden_el1_vectors for mitigations
Date: Thu, 31 Mar 2022 19:33:51 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20220331183400.73183-19-james.morse@arm.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20220331183400.73183-1-james.morse@arm.com>

commit aff65393fa1401e034656e349abd655cfe272de0 upstream.

kpti is an optional feature, for systems not using kpti a set of
vectors for the spectre-bhb mitigations is needed.

Add another set of vectors, __bp_harden_el1_vectors, that will be
used if a mitigation is needed and kpti is not in use.

The EL1 ventries are repeated verbatim as there is no additional
work needed for entry from EL1.

Reviewed-by: Russell King (Oracle) <rmk+kernel@armlinux.org.uk>
Reviewed-by: Catalin Marinas <catalin.marinas@arm.com>
Signed-off-by: James Morse <james.morse@arm.com>
---
 arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S | 34 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 33 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
index f50539bdf5be..bf6f4513c81f 100644
--- a/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
+++ b/arch/arm64/kernel/entry.S
@@ -1025,10 +1025,11 @@ alternative_else_nop_endif
 	.macro tramp_ventry, vector_start, regsize, kpti
 	.align	7
 1:
-	.if	\kpti == 1
 	.if	\regsize == 64
 	msr	tpidrro_el0, x30	// Restored in kernel_ventry
 	.endif
+
+	.if	\kpti == 1
 	/*
 	 * Defend against branch aliasing attacks by pushing a dummy
 	 * entry onto the return stack and using a RET instruction to
@@ -1111,6 +1112,37 @@ __entry_tramp_data_start:
 #endif /* CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE */
 #endif /* CONFIG_UNMAP_KERNEL_AT_EL0 */
 
+/*
+ * Exception vectors for spectre mitigations on entry from EL1 when
+ * kpti is not in use.
+ */
+	.macro generate_el1_vector
+.Lvector_start\@:
+	kernel_ventry	1, sync_invalid			// Synchronous EL1t
+	kernel_ventry	1, irq_invalid			// IRQ EL1t
+	kernel_ventry	1, fiq_invalid			// FIQ EL1t
+	kernel_ventry	1, error_invalid		// Error EL1t
+
+	kernel_ventry	1, sync				// Synchronous EL1h
+	kernel_ventry	1, irq				// IRQ EL1h
+	kernel_ventry	1, fiq_invalid			// FIQ EL1h
+	kernel_ventry	1, error_invalid		// Error EL1h
+
+	.rept	4
+	tramp_ventry	.Lvector_start\@, 64, kpti=0
+	.endr
+	.rept 4
+	tramp_ventry	.Lvector_start\@, 32, kpti=0
+	.endr
+	.endm
+
+	.pushsection ".entry.text", "ax"
+	.align	11
+ENTRY(__bp_harden_el1_vectors)
+	generate_el1_vector
+END(__bp_harden_el1_vectors)
+	.popsection
+
 /*
  * Special system call wrappers.
  */
-- 
2.30.2


  parent reply	other threads:[~2022-03-31 18:35 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 29+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2022-03-31 18:33 [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 00/27] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 01/27] arm64: arch_timer: Add workaround for ARM erratum 1188873 James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 02/27] arm64: arch_timer: avoid unused function warning James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 03/27] arm64: Add silicon-errata.txt entry for ARM erratum 1188873 James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 04/27] arm64: Make ARM64_ERRATUM_1188873 depend on COMPAT James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 05/27] arm64: Add part number for Neoverse N1 James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 06/27] arm64: Add part number for Arm Cortex-A77 James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 07/27] arm64: Add Neoverse-N2, Cortex-A710 CPU part definition James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 08/27] arm64: Add Cortex-X2 " James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 09/27] arm64: entry.S: Add ventry overflow sanity checks James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 10/27] arm64: entry: Make the trampoline cleanup optional James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 11/27] arm64: entry: Free up another register on kpti's tramp_exit path James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 12/27] arm64: entry: Move the trampoline data page before the text page James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 13/27] arm64: entry: Allow tramp_alias to access symbols after the 4K boundary James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 14/27] arm64: entry: Don't assume tramp_vectors is the start of the vectors James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 15/27] arm64: entry: Move trampoline macros out of ifdef'd section James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 16/27] arm64: entry: Make the kpti trampoline's kpti sequence optional James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 17/27] arm64: entry: Allow the trampoline text to occupy multiple pages James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` James Morse [this message]
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 19/27] arm64: entry: Add vectors that have the bhb mitigation sequences James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 20/27] arm64: entry: Add macro for reading symbol addresses from the trampoline James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 21/27] arm64: Add percpu vectors for EL1 James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 22/27] arm64: proton-pack: Report Spectre-BHB vulnerabilities as part of Spectre-v2 James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 23/27] KVM: arm64: Add templates for BHB mitigation sequences James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 24/27] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 25/27] KVM: arm64: Allow SMCCC_ARCH_WORKAROUND_3 to be discovered and migrated James Morse
2022-03-31 18:33 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 26/27] arm64: add ID_AA64ISAR2_EL1 sys register James Morse
2022-03-31 18:34 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 27/27] arm64: Use the clearbhb instruction in mitigations James Morse
2022-03-31 19:03 ` [stable:PATCH v4.14.274 00/27] arm64: Mitigate spectre style branch history side channels Greg KH

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