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From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	<dionnaglaze@google.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
	<seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 14/14] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests
Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 11:22:22 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230814055222.1056404-15-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230814055222.1056404-1-nikunj@amd.com>

Now that all the required plumbing is done for enabling SNP
Secure TSC feature, add Secure TSC to snp features present list.

The CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC can be used by the guest to query whether
the SNP guest has Secure TSC feature active.

Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
---
 arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c |  2 +-
 arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c      | 10 ++++++++--
 2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
index 014b89c89088..11f951caf2de 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/sev.c
@@ -313,7 +313,7 @@ static void enforce_vmpl0(void)
  * by the guest kernel. As and when a new feature is implemented in the
  * guest kernel, a corresponding bit should be added to the mask.
  */
-#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (0)
+#define SNP_FEATURES_PRESENT (MSR_AMD64_SNP_SECURE_TSC)
 
 void snp_check_features(void)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
index 01abecc9a774..26608b9f2ca7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/mem_encrypt.c
@@ -69,8 +69,14 @@ static void print_mem_encrypt_feature_info(void)
 		pr_cont(" SEV-ES");
 
 	/* Secure Nested Paging */
-	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
-		pr_cont(" SEV-SNP");
+	if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP)) {
+		pr_cont(" SEV-SNP\n");
+		pr_cont("SNP Features active: ");
+
+		/* SNP Secure TSC */
+		if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SECURE_TSC))
+			pr_cont(" SECURE-TSC");
+	}
 
 	pr_cont("\n");
 }
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-08-14  5:55 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-14  5:52 [PATCH v4 00/14] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-11 18:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-12  4:40     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-12  7:45       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-12  8:27         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 02/14] virt: sev-guest: Move mutex to SNP guest device structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 12/14] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] x86/tsc: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2023-08-28  3:47 ` [PATCH v4 00/14] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-04  5:35   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-04  7:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-05 13:57       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-05 14:32         ` Borislav Petkov

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