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From: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
To: <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>, <x86@kernel.org>
Cc: <bp@alien8.de>, <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>,
	<dionnaglaze@google.com>, <pgonda@google.com>,
	<seanjc@google.com>, <pbonzini@redhat.com>, <nikunj@amd.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 02/14] virt: sev-guest: Move mutex to SNP guest device structure
Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 11:22:10 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20230814055222.1056404-3-nikunj@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20230814055222.1056404-1-nikunj@amd.com>

In preparation for providing a new API to the sev-guest driver for sending
an SNP guest message, move the SNP command mutex to the snp_guest_dev
structure.

Signed-off-by: Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>
Reviewed-by: Tom Lendacky <thomas.lendacky@amd.com>
---
 drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c | 21 +++++++++++----------
 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
index 520e2b6613a7..8ba624088d73 100644
--- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
+++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
@@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ struct snp_guest_dev {
 	struct device *dev;
 	struct miscdevice misc;
 
+	/* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */
+	struct mutex cmd_mutex;
+
 	void *certs_data;
 	struct aesgcm_ctx *ctx;
 	/* request and response are in unencrypted memory */
@@ -56,9 +59,6 @@ static u32 vmpck_id;
 module_param(vmpck_id, uint, 0444);
 MODULE_PARM_DESC(vmpck_id, "The VMPCK ID to use when communicating with the PSP.");
 
-/* Mutex to serialize the shared buffer access and command handling. */
-static DEFINE_MUTEX(snp_cmd_mutex);
-
 static inline unsigned int get_ctx_authsize(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
 {
 	if (snp_dev && snp_dev->ctx)
@@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ static inline u64 __snp_get_msg_seqno(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev)
 {
 	u64 count;
 
-	lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);
 
 	/* Read the current message sequence counter from secrets pages */
 	count = *snp_dev->os_area_msg_seqno;
@@ -403,7 +403,7 @@ static int get_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_request_io
 	struct snp_report_req req;
 	int rc, resp_len;
 
-	lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);
 
 	if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -443,7 +443,7 @@ static int get_derived_key(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reque
 	/* Response data is 64 bytes and max authsize for GCM is 16 bytes. */
 	u8 buf[64 + 16];
 
-	lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);
 
 	if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -481,7 +481,7 @@ static int get_ext_report(struct snp_guest_dev *snp_dev, struct snp_guest_reques
 	struct snp_report_resp *resp;
 	int ret, npages = 0, resp_len;
 
-	lockdep_assert_held(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+	lockdep_assert_held(&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);
 
 	if (!arg->req_data || !arg->resp_data)
 		return -EINVAL;
@@ -566,12 +566,12 @@ static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long
 	if (!input.msg_version)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	mutex_lock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+	mutex_lock(&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);
 
 	/* Check if the VMPCK is not empty */
 	if (is_vmpck_empty(snp_dev)) {
 		dev_err_ratelimited(snp_dev->dev, "VMPCK is disabled\n");
-		mutex_unlock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+		mutex_unlock(&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);
 		return -ENOTTY;
 	}
 
@@ -589,7 +589,7 @@ static long snp_guest_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int ioctl, unsigned long
 		break;
 	}
 
-	mutex_unlock(&snp_cmd_mutex);
+	mutex_unlock(&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);
 
 	if (input.exitinfo2 && copy_to_user(argp, &input, sizeof(input)))
 		return -EFAULT;
@@ -708,6 +708,7 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
 		goto e_unmap;
 	}
 
+	mutex_init(&snp_dev->cmd_mutex);
 	platform_set_drvdata(pdev, snp_dev);
 	snp_dev->dev = dev;
 	snp_dev->layout = layout;
-- 
2.34.1


  parent reply	other threads:[~2023-08-14  5:53 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 24+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2023-08-14  5:52 [PATCH v4 00/14] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 01/14] virt: sev-guest: Use AES GCM crypto library Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-10-11 18:56   ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-12  4:40     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-12  7:45       ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-12  8:27         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` Nikunj A Dadhania [this message]
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 03/14] virt: sev-guest: Replace dev_dbg with pr_debug Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 04/14] virt: sev-guest: Add SNP guest request structure Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 05/14] virt: sev-guest: Add vmpck_id to snp_guest_dev struct Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 06/14] x86/sev: Cache the secrets page address Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 07/14] x86/sev: Move and reorganize sev guest request api Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 08/14] x86/mm: Add generic guest initialization hook Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 09/14] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 10/14] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 11/14] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 12/14] x86/kvmclock: Skip kvmclock when Secure TSC is available Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 13/14] x86/tsc: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-14  5:52 ` [PATCH v4 14/14] x86/sev: Enable Secure TSC for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2023-08-28  3:47 ` [PATCH v4 00/14] Add Secure TSC support " Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-04  5:35   ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-04  7:01     ` Borislav Petkov
2023-10-05 13:57       ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2023-10-05 14:32         ` Borislav Petkov

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