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* Re: [PATCH] jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()
@ 2025-02-19  0:39 Qasim Ijaz
  2025-02-19  5:10 ` Greg KH
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Qasim Ijaz @ 2025-02-19  0:39 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Greg KH
  Cc: shaggy, zhaomengmeng, llfamsec, gregkh, ancowi69, jfs-discussion,
	linux-kernel, syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5, stable

On Thu, Feb 13, 2025 at 11:07:07AM +0100, Greg KH wrote:
> On Thu, Feb 13, 2025 at 12:20:25AM +0000, Qasim Ijaz wrote:
> > During the "size_check" label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended 
> > attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs 
> > "ea_get: invalid extended attribute" and calls print_hex_dump().
> > 
> > Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds 
> > INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped:
> > 
> > 	int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
> > 
> > Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper 
> > limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads 
> > "size" to wrap around and become negative (-184549328).
> > 
> > The "size" is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called "len" in 
> > print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned 
> > type), this is then stored inside a variable called 
> > "int remaining", which is then assigned to "int linelen" which 
> > is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump() 
> > the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is 
> > 18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer() 
> > on each iteration:
> > 
> > 	for (i = 0; i < len; i += rowsize) {
> > 		linelen = min(remaining, rowsize);
> > 		remaining -= rowsize;
> > 
> > 		hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize,
> > 				   linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii);
> > 	
> > 		...
> > 	}
> > 	
> > The expected stopping condition (i < len) is effectively broken 
> > since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to 
> > the "ptr+i" being passed to hex_dump_to_buffer() to get closer 
> > to the end of the actual bounds of "ptr", eventually an out of 
> > bounds access is done in hex_dump_to_buffer() in the following 
> > for loop:
> > 
> > 	for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
> > 			if (linebuflen < lx + 2)
> > 				goto overflow2;
> > 			ch = ptr[j];
> > 		...
> > 	}
> > 
> > To fix this we should validate "EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)" 
> > before it is utilised.
> > 
> > Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
> > Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
> > Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e6e7e4279d046613bc5
> > Fixes: d9f9d96136cb ("jfs: xattr: check invalid xattr size more strictly")
> > Signed-off-by: Qasim Ijaz <qasdev00@gmail.com>
> > ---
> >  fs/jfs/xattr.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
> >  1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
> > 
> > diff --git a/fs/jfs/xattr.c b/fs/jfs/xattr.c
> > index 24afbae87225..7575c51cce9b 100644
> > --- a/fs/jfs/xattr.c
> > +++ b/fs/jfs/xattr.c
> > @@ -559,11 +555,16 @@ static int ea_get(struct inode *inode, struct ea_buffer *ea_buf, int min_size)
> >  
> >        size_check:
> >  	if (EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) != ea_size) {
> > -		int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
> > -
> > -		printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
> > -		print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,
> > -				     ea_buf->xattr, size, 1);
> > +		if (unlikely(EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) > INT_MAX)) {
> > +			printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: extended attribute size too large: %u > INT_MAX\n",
> > +			       EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
> > +		} else {
> > +			int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
> > +
> > +			printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
> > +			print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,
> > +				       ea_buf->xattr, size, 1);
> > +		}
> >  		ea_release(inode, ea_buf);
> >  		rc = -EIO;
> >  		goto clean_up;
> > -- 
> > 2.39.5
> > 
> 
> Hi,
> 
> This is the friendly patch-bot of Greg Kroah-Hartman.  You have sent him
> a patch that has triggered this response.  He used to manually respond
> to these common problems, but in order to save his sanity (he kept
> writing the same thing over and over, yet to different people), I was
> created.  Hopefully you will not take offence and will fix the problem
> in your patch and resubmit it so that it can be accepted into the Linux
> kernel tree.
> 
> You are receiving this message because of the following common error(s)
> as indicated below:
> 
> - You have marked a patch with a "Fixes:" tag for a commit that is in an
>   older released kernel, yet you do not have a cc: stable line in the
>   signed-off-by area at all, which means that the patch will not be
>   applied to any older kernel releases.  To properly fix this, please
>   follow the documented rules in the
>   Documentation/process/stable-kernel-rules.rst file for how to resolve
>   this.
> 
> If you wish to discuss this problem further, or you have questions about
> how to resolve this issue, please feel free to respond to this email and
> Greg will reply once he has dug out from the pending patches received
> from other developers.
>
Hi Greg,

Just following up on this patch. I’ve sent v2 with the added CC stable tag. Here’s the link:
https://lore.kernel.org/all/20250213210553.28613-1-qasdev00@gmail.com/

Let me know if any further changes are needed.

Thanks,
Qasim
> thanks,
> 
> greg k-h's patch email bot

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* [PATCH] jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get()
@ 2025-02-13  0:20 Qasim Ijaz
  2025-02-13 10:07 ` Greg KH
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Qasim Ijaz @ 2025-02-13  0:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: shaggy, zhaomengmeng, llfamsec, gregkh, ancowi69
  Cc: jfs-discussion, linux-kernel, syzbot

During the "size_check" label in ea_get(), the code checks if the extended 
attribute list (xattr) size matches ea_size. If not, it logs 
"ea_get: invalid extended attribute" and calls print_hex_dump().

Here, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) returns 4110417968, which exceeds 
INT_MAX (2,147,483,647). Then ea_size is clamped:

	int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));

Although clamp_t aims to bound ea_size between 0 and 4110417968, the upper 
limit is treated as an int, causing an overflow above 2^31 - 1. This leads 
"size" to wrap around and become negative (-184549328).

The "size" is then passed to print_hex_dump() (called "len" in 
print_hex_dump()), it is passed as type size_t (an unsigned 
type), this is then stored inside a variable called 
"int remaining", which is then assigned to "int linelen" which 
is then passed to hex_dump_to_buffer(). In print_hex_dump() 
the for loop, iterates through 0 to len-1, where len is 
18446744073525002176, calling hex_dump_to_buffer() 
on each iteration:

	for (i = 0; i < len; i += rowsize) {
		linelen = min(remaining, rowsize);
		remaining -= rowsize;

		hex_dump_to_buffer(ptr + i, linelen, rowsize, groupsize,
				   linebuf, sizeof(linebuf), ascii);
	
		...
	}
	
The expected stopping condition (i < len) is effectively broken 
since len is corrupted and very large. This eventually leads to 
the "ptr+i" being passed to hex_dump_to_buffer() to get closer 
to the end of the actual bounds of "ptr", eventually an out of 
bounds access is done in hex_dump_to_buffer() in the following 
for loop:

	for (j = 0; j < len; j++) {
			if (linebuflen < lx + 2)
				goto overflow2;
			ch = ptr[j];
		...
	}

To fix this we should validate "EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr)" 
before it is utilised.

Reported-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Tested-by: syzbot <syzbot+4e6e7e4279d046613bc5@syzkaller.appspotmail.com>
Closes: https://syzkaller.appspot.com/bug?extid=4e6e7e4279d046613bc5
Fixes: d9f9d96136cb ("jfs: xattr: check invalid xattr size more strictly")
Signed-off-by: Qasim Ijaz <qasdev00@gmail.com>
---
 fs/jfs/xattr.c | 15 ++++++++++-----
 1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/jfs/xattr.c b/fs/jfs/xattr.c
index 24afbae87225..7575c51cce9b 100644
--- a/fs/jfs/xattr.c
+++ b/fs/jfs/xattr.c
@@ -559,11 +555,16 @@ static int ea_get(struct inode *inode, struct ea_buffer *ea_buf, int min_size)
 
       size_check:
 	if (EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) != ea_size) {
-		int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
-
-		printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
-		print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,
-				     ea_buf->xattr, size, 1);
+		if (unlikely(EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr) > INT_MAX)) {
+			printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: extended attribute size too large: %u > INT_MAX\n",
+			       EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
+		} else {
+			int size = clamp_t(int, ea_size, 0, EALIST_SIZE(ea_buf->xattr));
+
+			printk(KERN_ERR "ea_get: invalid extended attribute\n");
+			print_hex_dump(KERN_ERR, "", DUMP_PREFIX_ADDRESS, 16, 1,
+				       ea_buf->xattr, size, 1);
+		}
 		ea_release(inode, ea_buf);
 		rc = -EIO;
 		goto clean_up;
-- 
2.39.5


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2025-02-19  5:10 UTC | newest]

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2025-02-19  0:39 [PATCH] jfs: fix slab-out-of-bounds read in ea_get() Qasim Ijaz
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