Re: [PATCH RFC v3 08/10] net, pidfs, coredump: only allow coredumping tasks to connect to coredump socket

["Mickaël Salaün" <mic@digikod.net>]

On Tue, May 06, 2025 at 04:51:25PM +0200, Jann Horn wrote:
> On Tue, May 6, 2025 at 9:39 AM Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org> wrote:
> > > ("a kernel socket" is not necessarily the same as "a kernel socket
> > > intended for core dumping")
> >
> > Indeed. The usermodehelper is a kernel protocol. Here it's the task with
> > its own credentials that's connecting to a userspace socket. Which makes
> > this very elegant because it's just userspace IPC. No one is running
> > around with kernel credentials anywhere.
> 
> To be clear: I think your current patch is using special kernel
> privileges in one regard, because kernel_connect() bypasses the
> security_socket_connect() security hook. I think it is a good thing
> that it bypasses security hooks in this way; I think we wouldn't want
> LSMs to get in the way of this special connect(), since the task in
> whose context the connect() call happens is not in control of this
> connection; the system administrator is the one who decided that this
> connect() should happen on core dumps. It is kind of inconsistent
> though that that separate security_unix_stream_connect() LSM hook will
> still be invoked in this case, and we might have to watch out to make
> sure that LSMs won't end up blocking such connections... which I think
> is related to what Mickael was saying on the other thread.

Right

> Landlock
> currently doesn't filter abstract connections at that hook, so for now

Landlock implements this hook since Linux 6.12 and can deny connections
from a sandboxed process to a peer outside the sandbox:
https://docs.kernel.org/userspace-api/landlock.html#ipc-scoping
I was worried that security_unix_stream_connect() would be called with
the task's credential, which would block coredumps from sandboxed tasks.
This would also apply to other LSMs.

> this would only be relevant for SELinux and Smack. I guess those are
> maybe less problematic in this regard because they work on full-system
> policies rather than app-specific policies; but still, with the
> current implementation, SELinux/Smack policies would need to be
> designed to allow processes to connect to the core dumping socket to
> make core dumping work.