[PATCH v5 0/9] VMSCAPE optimization for BHI variant

[PATCH v5 0/9] VMSCAPE optimization for BHI variant

[Pawan Gupta]

v5:
- For BHI seq, limit runtime-patching to loop counts only (Dave).
  Dropped 2 patches that moved the BHB seq to a macro.
- Remove redundant switch cases in vmscape_select_mitigation() (Nikolay).
- Improve commit message (Nikolay).
- Collected tags.

Thank you Dave and Nikolay for great suggestions and the review.

v4: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251119-vmscape-bhb-v4-0-1adad4e69ddc@linux.intel.com
- Move LFENCE to the callsite, out of clear_bhb_loop(). (Dave)
- Make clear_bhb_loop() work for larger BHB. (Dave)
  This now uses hardware enumeration to determine the BHB size to clear.
- Use write_ibpb() instead of indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() when
  IBPB is known to be available. (Dave)
- Use static_call() to simplify mitigation at exit-to-userspace. (Dave)
- Refactor vmscape_select_mitigation(). (Dave)
- Fix vmscape=on which was wrongly behaving as AUTO. (Dave)
- Split the patches. (Dave)
  - Patch 1-4 prepares for making the sequence flexible for VMSCAPE use.
  - Patch 5 trivial rename of variable.
  - Patch 6-8 prepares for deploying BHB mitigation for VMSCAPE.
  - Patch 9 deploys the mitigation.
  - Patch 10-11 fixes ON Vs AUTO mode.

v3: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251027-vmscape-bhb-v3-0-5793c2534e93@linux.intel.com
- s/x86_pred_flush_pending/x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user/ (Sean).
- Removed IBPB & BHB-clear mutual exclusion at exit-to-userspace.
- Collected tags.

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251015-vmscape-bhb-v2-0-91cbdd9c3a96@linux.intel.com
- Added check for IBPB feature in vmscape_select_mitigation(). (David)
- s/vmscape=auto/vmscape=on/ (David)
- Added patch to remove LFENCE from VMSCAPE BHB-clear sequence.
- Rebased to v6.18-rc1.

v1: https://lore.kernel.org/r/20250924-vmscape-bhb-v1-0-da51f0e1934d@linux.intel.com

Hi All,

These patches aim to improve the performance of a recent mitigation for
VMSCAPE[1] vulnerability. This improvement is relevant for BHI variant of
VMSCAPE that affect Alder Lake and newer processors.

The current mitigation approach uses IBPB on kvm-exit-to-userspace for all
affected range of CPUs. This is an overkill for CPUs that are only affected
by the BHI variant. On such CPUs clearing the branch history is sufficient
for VMSCAPE, and also more apt as the underlying issue is due to poisoned
branch history.

Below is the iPerf data for transfer between guest and host, comparing IBPB
and BHB-clear mitigation. BHB-clear shows performance improvement over IBPB
in most cases.

Platform: Emerald Rapids
Baseline: vmscape=off
Target: IBPB at VMexit-to-userspace Vs the new BHB-clear at
	VMexit-to-userspace mitigation (both compared against baseline).

(pN = N parallel connections)

| iPerf user-net | IBPB    | BHB Clear |
|----------------|---------|-----------|
| UDP 1-vCPU_p1  | -12.5%  |   1.3%    |
| TCP 1-vCPU_p1  | -10.4%  |  -1.5%    |
| TCP 1-vCPU_p1  | -7.5%   |  -3.0%    |
| UDP 4-vCPU_p16 | -3.7%   |  -3.7%    |
| TCP 4-vCPU_p4  | -2.9%   |  -1.4%    |
| UDP 4-vCPU_p4  | -0.6%   |   0.0%    |
| TCP 4-vCPU_p4  |  3.5%   |   0.0%    |

| iPerf bridge-net | IBPB    | BHB Clear |
|------------------|---------|-----------|
| UDP 1-vCPU_p1    | -9.4%   |  -0.4%    |
| TCP 1-vCPU_p1    | -3.9%   |  -0.5%    |
| UDP 4-vCPU_p16   | -2.2%   |  -3.8%    |
| TCP 4-vCPU_p4    | -1.0%   |  -1.0%    |
| TCP 4-vCPU_p4    |  0.5%   |   0.5%    |
| UDP 4-vCPU_p4    |  0.0%   |   0.9%    |
| TCP 1-vCPU_p1    |  0.0%   |   0.9%    |

| iPerf vhost-net | IBPB    | BHB Clear |
|-----------------|---------|-----------|
| UDP 1-vCPU_p1   | -4.3%   |   1.0%    |
| TCP 1-vCPU_p1   | -3.8%   |  -0.5%    |
| TCP 1-vCPU_p1   | -2.7%   |  -0.7%    |
| UDP 4-vCPU_p16  | -0.7%   |  -2.2%    |
| TCP 4-vCPU_p4   | -0.4%   |   0.8%    |
| UDP 4-vCPU_p4   |  0.4%   |  -0.7%    |
| TCP 4-vCPU_p4   |  0.0%   |   0.6%    |

[1] https://comsec.ethz.ch/research/microarch/vmscape-exposing-and-exploiting-incomplete-branch-predictor-isolation-in-cloud-environments/

---
Pawan Gupta (9):
      x86/bhi: x86/vmscape: Move LFENCE out of clear_bhb_loop()
      x86/bhi: Make clear_bhb_loop() effective on newer CPUs
      x86/vmscape: Rename x86_ibpb_exit_to_user to x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user
      x86/vmscape: Move mitigation selection to a switch()
      x86/vmscape: Use write_ibpb() instead of indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()
      x86/vmscape: Use static_call() for predictor flush
      x86/vmscape: Deploy BHB clearing mitigation
      x86/vmscape: Fix conflicting attack-vector controls with =force
      x86/vmscape: Add cmdline vmscape=on to override attack vector controls

 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst   |  8 ++++
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt |  4 +-
 arch/x86/Kconfig                                |  1 +
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S                       | 13 +++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h              |  2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h             |  9 ++--
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h            | 11 +++--
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 64 +++++++++++++++++++------
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                              |  4 +-
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c                     |  2 +
 10 files changed, 89 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 6a23ae0a96a600d1d12557add110e0bb6e32730c
change-id: 20250916-vmscape-bhb-d7d469977f2f

Best regards,
-- 
Pawan

[PATCH v5 1/9] x86/bhi: x86/vmscape: Move LFENCE out of clear_bhb_loop()

[Pawan Gupta]

Currently, BHB clearing sequence is followed by an LFENCE to prevent
transient execution of subsequent indirect branches prematurely. However,
LFENCE barrier could be unnecessary in certain cases. For example, when
kernel is using BHI_DIS_S mitigation, and BHB clearing is only needed for
userspace. In such cases, LFENCE is redundant because ring transitions
would provide the necessary serialization.

Below is a quick recap of BHI mitigation options:

  On Alder Lake and newer

  - BHI_DIS_S: Hardware control to mitigate BHI in ring0. This has low
	       performance overhead.
  - Long loop: Alternatively, longer version of BHB clearing sequence
	       can be used to mitigate BHI. It can also be used to mitigate
	       BHI variant of VMSCAPE. This is not yet implemented in
	       Linux.

  On older CPUs

  - Short loop: Clears BHB at kernel entry and VMexit. The "Long loop" is
		effective on older CPUs as well, but should be avoided
		because of unnecessary overhead.

On Alder Lake and newer CPUs, eIBRS isolates the indirect targets between
guest and host. But when affected by the BHI variant of VMSCAPE, a guest's
branch history may still influence indirect branches in userspace. This
also means the big hammer IBPB could be replaced with a cheaper option that
clears the BHB at exit-to-userspace after a VMexit.

In preparation for adding the support for BHB sequence (without LFENCE) on
newer CPUs, move the LFENCE to the caller side after clear_bhb_loop() is
executed. This allows callers to decide whether they need the LFENCE or
not. This does adds a few extra bytes to the call sites, but it obviates
the need for multiple variants of clear_bhb_loop().

Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S            | 5 ++++-
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c          | 2 ++
 3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index ed04a968cc7d0095ab0185b2e3b5beffb7680afd..886f86790b4467347031bc27d3d761d5cc286da1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1528,6 +1528,9 @@ SYM_CODE_END(rewind_stack_and_make_dead)
  * refactored in the future if needed. The .skips are for safety, to ensure
  * that all RETs are in the second half of a cacheline to mitigate Indirect
  * Target Selection, rather than taking the slowpath via its_return_thunk.
+ *
+ * Note, callers should use a speculation barrier like LFENCE immediately after
+ * a call to this function to ensure BHB is cleared before indirect branches.
  */
 SYM_FUNC_START(clear_bhb_loop)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
@@ -1562,7 +1565,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(clear_bhb_loop)
 	sub	$1, %ecx
 	jnz	1b
 .Lret2:	RET
-5:	lfence
+5:
 	pop	%rbp
 	RET
 SYM_FUNC_END(clear_bhb_loop)
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 08ed5a2e46a5fd790bcb1b73feb6469518809c06..ec5ebf96dbb9e240f402f39efc6929ae45ec8f0b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -329,11 +329,11 @@
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 .macro CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
-	ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop; lfence", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_LOOP
 .endm
 
 .macro CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY_VMEXIT
-	ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_VMEXIT
+	ALTERNATIVE "", "call clear_bhb_loop; lfence", X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_BHB_VMEXIT
 .endm
 #else
 #define CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index de5083cb1d3747bba00effca3703a4f6eea80d8d..c1ec14c559119b120edfac079aeb07948e9844b8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -1603,6 +1603,8 @@ static int emit_spectre_bhb_barrier(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip,
 
 		if (emit_call(&prog, func, ip))
 			return -EINVAL;
+		/* Don't speculate past this until BHB is cleared */
+		EMIT_LFENCE();
 		EMIT1(0x59); /* pop rcx */
 		EMIT1(0x58); /* pop rax */
 	}

-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v5 2/9] x86/bhi: Make clear_bhb_loop() effective on newer CPUs

[Pawan Gupta]

As a mitigation for BHI, clear_bhb_loop() executes branches that overwrites
the Branch History Buffer (BHB). On Alder Lake and newer parts this
sequence is not sufficient because it doesn't clear enough entries. This
was not an issue because these CPUs have a hardware control (BHI_DIS_S)
that mitigates BHI in kernel.

BHI variant of VMSCAPE requires isolating branch history between guests and
userspace. Note that there is no equivalent hardware control for userspace.
To effectively isolate branch history on newer CPUs, clear_bhb_loop()
should execute sufficient number of branches to clear a larger BHB.

Dynamically set the loop count of clear_bhb_loop() such that it is
effective on newer CPUs too. Use the hardware control enumeration
X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL to select the appropriate loop count.

Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 8 ++++++--
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 886f86790b4467347031bc27d3d761d5cc286da1..e4863d6d32178f628d994edc06ed6d591916b390 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1536,7 +1536,11 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(clear_bhb_loop)
 	ANNOTATE_NOENDBR
 	push	%rbp
 	mov	%rsp, %rbp
-	movl	$5, %ecx
+
+	/* loop count differs based on BHI_CTRL, see Intel's BHI guidance */
+	ALTERNATIVE "movl $5,  %ecx; movl $5, %edx;",	\
+		    "movl $12, %ecx; movl $7, %edx;", X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL
+
 	ANNOTATE_INTRA_FUNCTION_CALL
 	call	1f
 	jmp	5f
@@ -1557,7 +1561,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(clear_bhb_loop)
 	 * but some Clang versions (e.g. 18) don't like this.
 	 */
 	.skip 32 - 18, 0xcc
-2:	movl	$5, %eax
+2:	movl	%edx, %eax
 3:	jmp	4f
 	nop
 4:	sub	$1, %eax

-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v5 3/9] x86/vmscape: Rename x86_ibpb_exit_to_user to x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user

[Pawan Gupta]

With the upcoming changes x86_ibpb_exit_to_user will also be used when BHB
clearing sequence is used. Rename it cover both the cases.

No functional change.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h  | 6 +++---
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           | 4 ++--
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                   | 2 +-
 4 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
index ce3eb6d5fdf9f2dba59b7bad24afbfafc8c36918..c45858db16c92fc1364fb818185fba7657840991 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -94,11 +94,11 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
 	 */
 	choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc());
 
-	/* Avoid unnecessary reads of 'x86_ibpb_exit_to_user' */
+	/* Avoid unnecessary reads of 'x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user' */
 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER) &&
-	    this_cpu_read(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user)) {
+	    this_cpu_read(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user)) {
 		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
-		this_cpu_write(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user, false);
+		this_cpu_write(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user, false);
 	}
 }
 #define arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index ec5ebf96dbb9e240f402f39efc6929ae45ec8f0b..df60f9cf51b84e5b75e5db70713188d2e6ad0f5d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -531,7 +531,7 @@ void alternative_msr_write(unsigned int msr, u64 val, unsigned int feature)
 		: "memory");
 }
 
-DECLARE_PER_CPU(bool, x86_ibpb_exit_to_user);
+DECLARE_PER_CPU(bool, x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user);
 
 static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 {
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index d7fa03bf51b4517c12cc68e7c441f7589a4983d1..1e9b11198db0fe2483bd17b1327bcfd44a2c1dbf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -113,8 +113,8 @@ EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
  * be needed to before running userspace. That IBPB will flush the branch
  * predictor content.
  */
-DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, x86_ibpb_exit_to_user);
-EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user);
+DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user);
+EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user);
 
 u64 x86_pred_cmd __ro_after_init = PRED_CMD_IBPB;
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index c9c2aa6f4705e1ae257bf94572967a5724a940a7..60123568fba85c8a445f9220d3f4a1d11fd0eb77 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -11397,7 +11397,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * may migrate to.
 	 */
 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER))
-		this_cpu_write(x86_ibpb_exit_to_user, true);
+		this_cpu_write(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user, true);
 
 	/*
 	 * Consume any pending interrupts, including the possible source of

-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v5 4/9] x86/vmscape: Move mitigation selection to a switch()

[Pawan Gupta]

This ensures that all mitigation modes are explicitly handled, while
keeping the mitigation selection for each mode together. This also prepares
for adding BHB-clearing mitigation mode for VMSCAPE.

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 23 +++++++++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 1e9b11198db0fe2483bd17b1327bcfd44a2c1dbf..ecefea3c018117031ea1d1ef8f4fca6e425a936c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -3231,17 +3231,32 @@ early_param("vmscape", vmscape_parse_cmdline);
 
 static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void)
 {
-	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE) ||
-	    !boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
+	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE)) {
 		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
 		return;
 	}
 
-	if (vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO) {
-		if (should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE))
+	if ((vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO) &&
+	    !should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE))
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
+
+	switch (vmscape_mitigation) {
+	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE:
+		break;
+
+	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER:
+		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
+		break;
+
+	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
 			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER;
 		else
 			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
+		break;
+
+	default:
 	}
 }
 

-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v5 5/9] x86/vmscape: Use write_ibpb() instead of indirect_branch_prediction_barrier()

[Pawan Gupta]

indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() is a wrapper to write_ibpb(), which
also checks if the CPU supports IBPB. For VMSCAPE, call to
indirect_branch_prediction_barrier() is only possible when CPU supports
IBPB.

Simply call write_ibpb() directly to avoid unnecessary alternative
patching.

Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h | 2 +-
 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
index c45858db16c92fc1364fb818185fba7657840991..78b143673ca72642149eb2dbf3e3e31370fe6b28 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -97,7 +97,7 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
 	/* Avoid unnecessary reads of 'x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user' */
 	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER) &&
 	    this_cpu_read(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user)) {
-		indirect_branch_prediction_barrier();
+		write_ibpb();
 		this_cpu_write(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user, false);
 	}
 }

-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v5 6/9] x86/vmscape: Use static_call() for predictor flush

[Pawan Gupta]

Adding more mitigation options at exit-to-userspace for VMSCAPE would
usually require a series of checks to decide which mitigation to use. In
this case, the mitigation is done by calling a function, which is decided
at boot. So, adding more feature flags and multiple checks can be avoided
by using static_call() to the mitigating function.

Replace the flag-based mitigation selector with a static_call(). This also
frees the existing X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER.

Suggested-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/Kconfig                     | 1 +
 arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h   | 2 +-
 arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h  | 7 +++----
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 3 +++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c           | 5 ++++-
 arch/x86/kvm/x86.c                   | 2 +-
 6 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index fa3b616af03a2d50eaf5f922bc8cd4e08a284045..066f62f15e67e85fda0f3fd66acabad9a9794ff8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2706,6 +2706,7 @@ config MITIGATION_TSA
 config MITIGATION_VMSCAPE
 	bool "Mitigate VMSCAPE"
 	depends on KVM
+	select HAVE_STATIC_CALL
 	default y
 	help
 	  Enable mitigation for VMSCAPE attacks. VMSCAPE is a hardware security
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
index 4091a776e37aaed67ca93b0a0cd23cc25dbc33d4..02871318c999f94ec8557e5fb0b8fb299960d454 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/cpufeatures.h
@@ -496,7 +496,7 @@
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSA_SQ_NO		(21*32+11) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-SQ */
 #define X86_FEATURE_TSA_L1_NO		(21*32+12) /* AMD CPU not vulnerable to TSA-L1 */
 #define X86_FEATURE_CLEAR_CPU_BUF_VM	(21*32+13) /* Clear CPU buffers using VERW before VMRUN */
-#define X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER	(21*32+14) /* Use IBPB on exit-to-userspace, see VMSCAPE bug */
+/* Free */
 #define X86_FEATURE_ABMC		(21*32+15) /* Assignable Bandwidth Monitoring Counters */
 #define X86_FEATURE_MSR_IMM		(21*32+16) /* MSR immediate form instructions */
 
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
index 78b143673ca72642149eb2dbf3e3e31370fe6b28..783e7cb50caeb6c6fc68e0a5c75ab43e75e37116 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/entry-common.h
@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
 
 #include <linux/randomize_kstack.h>
 #include <linux/user-return-notifier.h>
+#include <linux/static_call_types.h>
 
 #include <asm/nospec-branch.h>
 #include <asm/io_bitmap.h>
@@ -94,10 +95,8 @@ static inline void arch_exit_to_user_mode_prepare(struct pt_regs *regs,
 	 */
 	choose_random_kstack_offset(rdtsc());
 
-	/* Avoid unnecessary reads of 'x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user' */
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER) &&
-	    this_cpu_read(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user)) {
-		write_ibpb();
+	if (unlikely(this_cpu_read(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user))) {
+		static_call_cond(vmscape_predictor_flush)();
 		this_cpu_write(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user, false);
 	}
 }
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index df60f9cf51b84e5b75e5db70713188d2e6ad0f5d..15a2fa8f2f48a066e102263513eff9537ac1d25f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -540,6 +540,9 @@ static inline void indirect_branch_prediction_barrier(void)
 			    :: "rax", "rcx", "rdx", "memory");
 }
 
+#include <linux/static_call_types.h>
+DECLARE_STATIC_CALL(vmscape_predictor_flush, write_ibpb);
+
 /* The Intel SPEC CTRL MSR base value cache */
 extern u64 x86_spec_ctrl_base;
 DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index ecefea3c018117031ea1d1ef8f4fca6e425a936c..aeda00d2539669f21053ac1bbe4cd69861b762b7 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -200,6 +200,9 @@ DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(switch_mm_cond_l1d_flush);
 DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(cpu_buf_vm_clear);
 
+DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL(vmscape_predictor_flush, write_ibpb);
+EXPORT_STATIC_CALL_GPL(vmscape_predictor_flush);
+
 #undef pr_fmt
 #define pr_fmt(fmt)	"mitigations: " fmt
 
@@ -3275,7 +3278,7 @@ static void __init vmscape_update_mitigation(void)
 static void __init vmscape_apply_mitigation(void)
 {
 	if (vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER)
-		setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER);
+		static_call_update(vmscape_predictor_flush, write_ibpb);
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index 60123568fba85c8a445f9220d3f4a1d11fd0eb77..7e55ef3b3203a26be1a138c8fa838a8c5aae0125 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -11396,7 +11396,7 @@ static int vcpu_enter_guest(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
 	 * set for the CPU that actually ran the guest, and not the CPU that it
 	 * may migrate to.
 	 */
-	if (cpu_feature_enabled(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER))
+	if (static_call_query(vmscape_predictor_flush))
 		this_cpu_write(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user, true);
 
 	/*

-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v5 7/9] x86/vmscape: Deploy BHB clearing mitigation

[Pawan Gupta]

IBPB mitigation for VMSCAPE is an overkill on CPUs that are only affected
by the BHI variant of VMSCAPE. On such CPUs, eIBRS already provides
indirect branch isolation between guest and host userspace. However, branch
history from guest may also influence the indirect branches in host
userspace.

To mitigate the BHI aspect, use clear_bhb_loop().

Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst |  4 ++++
 arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h          |  2 ++
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                    | 26 +++++++++++++++++++-------
 3 files changed, 25 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst
index d9b9a2b6c114c05a7325e5f3c9d42129339b870b..dc63a0bac03d43d1e295de0791dd6497d101f986 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst
@@ -86,6 +86,10 @@ The possible values in this file are:
    run a potentially malicious guest and issues an IBPB before the first
    exit to userspace after VM-exit.
 
+ * 'Mitigation: Clear BHB before exit to userspace':
+
+   As above, conditional BHB clearing mitigation is enabled.
+
  * 'Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT':
 
    IBPB is issued on every VM-exit. This occurs when other mitigations like
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 15a2fa8f2f48a066e102263513eff9537ac1d25f..1e8c26c37dbed4256b35101fb41c0e1eb6ef9272 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -388,6 +388,8 @@ extern void write_ibpb(void);
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
 extern void clear_bhb_loop(void);
+#else
+static inline void clear_bhb_loop(void) {}
 #endif
 
 extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index aeda00d2539669f21053ac1bbe4cd69861b762b7..16e54e18cb4e7e9e28c5bee9048886ab685ae5a6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -109,9 +109,8 @@ DEFINE_PER_CPU(u64, x86_spec_ctrl_current);
 EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_spec_ctrl_current);
 
 /*
- * Set when the CPU has run a potentially malicious guest. An IBPB will
- * be needed to before running userspace. That IBPB will flush the branch
- * predictor content.
+ * Set when the CPU has run a potentially malicious guest. Indicates that a
+ * branch predictor flush is needed before running userspace.
  */
 DEFINE_PER_CPU(bool, x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user);
 EXPORT_PER_CPU_SYMBOL_GPL(x86_predictor_flush_exit_to_user);
@@ -3200,13 +3199,15 @@ enum vmscape_mitigations {
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO,
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER,
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
+	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER,
 };
 
 static const char * const vmscape_strings[] = {
-	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE]		= "Vulnerable",
+	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
 	/* [VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO] */
-	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER]	= "Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace",
-	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT]	= "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT",
+	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER]		= "Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace",
+	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT]		= "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT",
+	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER]	= "Mitigation: Clear BHB before exit to userspace",
 };
 
 static enum vmscape_mitigations vmscape_mitigation __ro_after_init =
@@ -3253,7 +3254,15 @@ static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
-		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+		/*
+		 * CPUs with BHI_CTRL(ADL and newer) can avoid the IBPB and use BHB
+		 * clear sequence. These CPUs are only vulnerable to the BHI variant
+		 * of the VMSCAPE attack and does not require an IBPB flush. In
+		 * 32-bit mode BHB clear sequence is not supported.
+		 */
+		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_BHI_CTRL) && IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_64))
+			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER;
+		else if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
 			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER;
 		else
 			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
@@ -3279,6 +3288,8 @@ static void __init vmscape_apply_mitigation(void)
 {
 	if (vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER)
 		static_call_update(vmscape_predictor_flush, write_ibpb);
+	else if (vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER)
+		static_call_update(vmscape_predictor_flush, clear_bhb_loop);
 }
 
 #undef pr_fmt
@@ -3370,6 +3381,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
 		break;
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER:
+	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER:
 		/*
 		 * Hypervisors can be attacked across-threads, warn for SMT when
 		 * STIBP is not already enabled system-wide.

-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v5 8/9] x86/vmscape: Fix conflicting attack-vector controls with =force

[Pawan Gupta]

vmscape=force option currently defaults to AUTO mitigation. This is not
correct because attack-vector controls overrides a mitigation in AUTO mode.
This prevents a user from being able to force VMSCAPE mitigation when it
conflicts with attack-vector controls.

Kernel should deploy a forced mitigation irrespective of attack vectors.
Instead of AUTO, use VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON that wins over attack-vector
controls.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 16e54e18cb4e7e9e28c5bee9048886ab685ae5a6..3b9b1f27cc19d3de061814067a5d8797dfa3858b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -3197,6 +3197,7 @@ static void __init srso_apply_mitigation(void)
 enum vmscape_mitigations {
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE,
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO,
+	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON,
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER,
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT,
 	VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER,
@@ -3205,6 +3206,7 @@ enum vmscape_mitigations {
 static const char * const vmscape_strings[] = {
 	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE]			= "Vulnerable",
 	/* [VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO] */
+	/* [VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON] */
 	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER]		= "Mitigation: IBPB before exit to userspace",
 	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT]		= "Mitigation: IBPB on VMEXIT",
 	[VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_BHB_CLEAR_EXIT_TO_USER]	= "Mitigation: Clear BHB before exit to userspace",
@@ -3224,7 +3226,7 @@ static int __init vmscape_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER;
 	} else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) {
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE);
-		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON;
 	} else {
 		pr_err("Ignoring unknown vmscape=%s option.\n", str);
 	}
@@ -3254,6 +3256,7 @@ static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void)
 		break;
 
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
+	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON:
 		/*
 		 * CPUs with BHI_CTRL(ADL and newer) can avoid the IBPB and use BHB
 		 * clear sequence. These CPUs are only vulnerable to the BHI variant
@@ -3378,6 +3381,7 @@ void cpu_bugs_smt_update(void)
 	switch (vmscape_mitigation) {
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE:
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
+	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON:
 		break;
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
 	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER:

-- 
2.34.1

[PATCH v5 9/9] x86/vmscape: Add cmdline vmscape=on to override attack vector controls

[Pawan Gupta]

In general, individual mitigation controls can be used to override the
attack vector controls. But, nothing exists to select BHB clearing
mitigation for VMSCAPE. The =force option comes close, but with a
side-effect of also forcibly setting the bug, hence deploying the
mitigation on unaffected parts too.

Add a new cmdline option vmscape=on to enable the mitigation based on the
VMSCAPE variant the CPU is affected by.

Reviewed-by: Nikolay Borisov <nik.borisov@suse.com>
Signed-off-by: Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst   | 4 ++++
 Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 +++-
 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c                      | 2 ++
 3 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst
index dc63a0bac03d43d1e295de0791dd6497d101f986..580f288ae8bfc601ff000d6d95d711bb9084459e 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/vmscape.rst
@@ -112,3 +112,7 @@ The mitigation can be controlled via the ``vmscape=`` command line parameter:
 
    Force vulnerability detection and mitigation even on processors that are
    not known to be affected.
+
+ * ``vmscape=on``:
+
+   Choose the mitigation based on the VMSCAPE variant the CPU is affected by.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index 6c42061ca20e581b5192b66c6f25aba38d4f8ff8..d2ccec6e10f3ea094c01083d4c133b837c7fc7d7 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -8104,9 +8104,11 @@
 
 			off		- disable the mitigation
 			ibpb		- use Indirect Branch Prediction Barrier
-					  (IBPB) mitigation (default)
+					  (IBPB) mitigation
 			force		- force vulnerability detection even on
 					  unaffected processors
+			on		- (default) selects IBPB or BHB clear
+					  mitigation based on CPU
 
 	vsyscall=	[X86-64,EARLY]
 			Controls the behavior of vsyscalls (i.e. calls to
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 3b9b1f27cc19d3de061814067a5d8797dfa3858b..bda6048085fbad5605534caceda32eb1df8c29ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -3227,6 +3227,8 @@ static int __init vmscape_parse_cmdline(char *str)
 	} else if (!strcmp(str, "force")) {
 		setup_force_cpu_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE);
 		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON;
+	} else if (!strcmp(str, "on")) {
+		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_ON;
 	} else {
 		pr_err("Ignoring unknown vmscape=%s option.\n", str);
 	}

-- 
2.34.1

Re: [PATCH v5 4/9] x86/vmscape: Move mitigation selection to a switch()

[kernel test robot]

Hi Pawan,

kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:

[auto build test WARNING on 6a23ae0a96a600d1d12557add110e0bb6e32730c]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Pawan-Gupta/x86-bhi-x86-vmscape-Move-LFENCE-out-of-clear_bhb_loop/20251127-061843
base:   6a23ae0a96a600d1d12557add110e0bb6e32730c
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251126-vmscape-bhb-v5-4-02d66e423b00%40linux.intel.com
patch subject: [PATCH v5 4/9] x86/vmscape: Move mitigation selection to a switch()
config: x86_64-allnoconfig (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251127/202511270829.xMEXUXCW-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: clang version 20.1.8 (https://github.com/llvm/llvm-project 87f0227cb60147a26a1eeb4fb06e3b505e9c7261)
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251127/202511270829.xMEXUXCW-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202511270829.xMEXUXCW-lkp@intel.com/

All warnings (new ones prefixed by >>):

>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:3260:2: warning: label at end of compound statement is a C23 extension [-Wc23-extensions]
    3260 |         }
         |         ^
   1 warning generated.


vim +3260 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3231  
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3232  static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void)
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3233  {
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3234  	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE)) {
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3235  		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3236  		return;
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3237  	}
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3238  
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3239  	if ((vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO) &&
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3240  	    !should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE))
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3241  		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3242  
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3243  	switch (vmscape_mitigation) {
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3244  	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE:
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3245  		break;
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3246  
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3247  	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER:
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3248  		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3249  			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3250  		break;
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3251  
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3252  	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3253  		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3254  			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER;
5799d5d8a6c877 David Kaplan 2025-09-12  3255  		else
5799d5d8a6c877 David Kaplan 2025-09-12  3256  			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3257  		break;
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3258  
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3259  	default:
5799d5d8a6c877 David Kaplan 2025-09-12 @3260  	}
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3261  }
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3262  

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki

Re: [PATCH v5 4/9] x86/vmscape: Move mitigation selection to a switch()

[kernel test robot]

Hi Pawan,

kernel test robot noticed the following build warnings:

[auto build test WARNING on 6a23ae0a96a600d1d12557add110e0bb6e32730c]

url:    https://github.com/intel-lab-lkp/linux/commits/Pawan-Gupta/x86-bhi-x86-vmscape-Move-LFENCE-out-of-clear_bhb_loop/20251127-061843
base:   6a23ae0a96a600d1d12557add110e0bb6e32730c
patch link:    https://lore.kernel.org/r/20251126-vmscape-bhb-v5-4-02d66e423b00%40linux.intel.com
patch subject: [PATCH v5 4/9] x86/vmscape: Move mitigation selection to a switch()
config: x86_64-randconfig-122-20251129 (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251130/202511300322.KCG4AuJ9-lkp@intel.com/config)
compiler: gcc-13 (Debian 13.3.0-16) 13.3.0
reproduce (this is a W=1 build): (https://download.01.org/0day-ci/archive/20251130/202511300322.KCG4AuJ9-lkp@intel.com/reproduce)

If you fix the issue in a separate patch/commit (i.e. not just a new version of
the same patch/commit), kindly add following tags
| Reported-by: kernel test robot <lkp@intel.com>
| Closes: https://lore.kernel.org/oe-kbuild-all/202511300322.KCG4AuJ9-lkp@intel.com/

sparse warnings: (new ones prefixed by >>)
>> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:3260:9: sparse: sparse: statement expected after case label

vim +3260 arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c

556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3231  
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3232  static void __init vmscape_select_mitigation(void)
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3233  {
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3234  	if (!boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE)) {
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3235  		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3236  		return;
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3237  	}
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3238  
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3239  	if ((vmscape_mitigation == VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO) &&
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3240  	    !should_mitigate_vuln(X86_BUG_VMSCAPE))
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3241  		vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3242  
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3243  	switch (vmscape_mitigation) {
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3244  	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE:
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3245  		break;
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3246  
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3247  	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER:
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3248  		if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3249  			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3250  		break;
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3251  
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3252  	case VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_AUTO:
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3253  		if (boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3254  			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_IBPB_EXIT_TO_USER;
5799d5d8a6c877 David Kaplan 2025-09-12  3255  		else
5799d5d8a6c877 David Kaplan 2025-09-12  3256  			vmscape_mitigation = VMSCAPE_MITIGATION_NONE;
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3257  		break;
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3258  
0091dd36e9ee51 Pawan Gupta  2025-11-26  3259  	default:
5799d5d8a6c877 David Kaplan 2025-09-12 @3260  	}
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3261  }
556c1ad666ad90 Pawan Gupta  2025-08-14  3262  

-- 
0-DAY CI Kernel Test Service
https://github.com/intel/lkp-tests/wiki