Re: [PATCH] hwrng: virtio: reject invalid used.len from the device

["Michael S. Tsirkin" <mst@redhat.com>]

On Fri, Apr 17, 2026 at 08:47:09PM -0400, Michael Bommarito wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 17, 2026 at 8:31 PM Michael S. Tsirkin <mst@redhat.com> wrote:
> > Actionable meaning what?
> 
> Well, between the BLAKE2 pass and the fact that 99% of guests already
> shouldn't trust what's above, I agree that actionable doesn't mean
> much to most people, not even for breaking KASLR.
> 
> But after doing some research, I realized that SEV-SNP/TDX guests that
> expect lockdown=confidentiality might actually expect otherwise under
> that security model.  Still not a lot to work with, but more than just
> correctness in those cases, and those might be the environments that
> care the most.

Sorry this went over my head. We are talking about a device where guest
trusts host to feed it randomness, enabling it is already a questionable
enterprise for SEV-SNP/TDX. So what does it matter whether guest gets by
data from host directly or by tricking it into feeding its own data to
it?  It's all supposed to be securely mixed with the cpu rng, right?

I am not arguing we should not fix it, I am trying to figure out
the actual security impact.


> > Maybe clamp at sizeof(vi->data) then? 0 might break buggy devices that
> > were working earlier.
> > Or just clamp where it's used, for clarity.
> > And maybe we need the array_index dance, given
> > you are worried about malicious.
> 
> Happy to send a v2 with those changes but I can only test on a 1-2 TDX
> variants at home and don't have access to an EPYC bare metal box, so
> not very confident about your buggy device point


I am not sure why this matters.

-- 
MST