[PATCH net v3] ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg

[PATCH net v3] ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg

[Qi Tang]

ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR}
cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the
on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length.
The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(),
etc.).  An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after
parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is
in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040
bytes from an 8-byte header.  nftables is reachable from an
unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged
slab-out-of-bounds read:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540
   put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540
   udpv6_recvmsg+0xca0/0x1250
   sock_recvmsg+0xdf/0x190
   ____sys_recvmsg+0x1b1/0x620

Add ipv6_get_exthdr_len() which computes the extension header length
and validates it against skb_tail_pointer(skb), returning 0 on
failure.  Extension headers are kept in the linear skb area by
pskb_may_pull() during input, so skb_tail_pointer() is the correct
bound.

Use ipv6_get_exthdr_len() at all non-AH call sites: the five
standalone cmsg blocks (HbH, 2292HbH, 2292DSTOPTS x2, 2292RTHDR)
and the three standard cases in the extension-header walk loop
(DSTOPTS, ROUTING, default).  AH retains an inline bounds check
because its length formula differs ((ptr[1]+2)<<2).

When the walk loop detects a corrupted header, return from the
function instead of continuing to process later socket options.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com>
---
Changes v2 -> v3:
  - Resend as new thread (v2 was incorrectly sent as reply to v1)

Changes v1 -> v2 (Paolo Abeni):
  - Factor repeated bounds-check + put_cmsg into ipv6_get_exthdr_len()
  - Return from the function on corrupted walk-loop entry instead of
    goto + empty label

v2: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260423102255.3752004-1-tpluszz77@gmail.com/
v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260419150344.624673-1-tpluszz77@gmail.com/

 net/ipv6/datagram.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ipv6/datagram.c b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
index 972bf0426d59..0a7b74d5f402 100644
--- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
+++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
@@ -617,6 +617,13 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_common_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 	}
 }
 
+static u16 ipv6_get_exthdr_len(const struct sk_buff *skb, const u8 *ptr)
+{
+	u16 len = (ptr[1] + 1) << 3;
+
+	return (ptr + len <= skb_tail_pointer(skb)) ? len : 0;
+}
+
 void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 				    struct sk_buff *skb)
 {
@@ -643,7 +650,10 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 	/* HbH is allowed only once */
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.hopopts && (opt->flags & IP6SKB_HOPBYHOP)) {
 		u8 *ptr = nh + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
-		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_HOPOPTS, (ptr[1]+1)<<3, ptr);
+		u16 len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+
+		if (len)
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_HOPOPTS, len, ptr);
 	}
 
 	if (opt->lastopt &&
@@ -667,23 +677,31 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 			switch (nexthdr) {
 			case IPPROTO_DSTOPTS:
 				nexthdr = ptr[0];
-				len = (ptr[1] + 1) << 3;
+				len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+				if (!len)
+					return;
 				if (np->rxopt.bits.dstopts)
 					put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_DSTOPTS, len, ptr);
 				break;
 			case IPPROTO_ROUTING:
 				nexthdr = ptr[0];
-				len = (ptr[1] + 1) << 3;
+				len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+				if (!len)
+					return;
 				if (np->rxopt.bits.srcrt)
 					put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_RTHDR, len, ptr);
 				break;
 			case IPPROTO_AH:
 				nexthdr = ptr[0];
 				len = (ptr[1] + 2) << 2;
+				if (ptr + len > skb_tail_pointer(skb))
+					return;
 				break;
 			default:
 				nexthdr = ptr[0];
-				len = (ptr[1] + 1) << 3;
+				len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+				if (!len)
+					return;
 				break;
 			}
 
@@ -705,19 +723,31 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
 	}
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.ohopopts && (opt->flags & IP6SKB_HOPBYHOP)) {
 		u8 *ptr = nh + sizeof(struct ipv6hdr);
-		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292HOPOPTS, (ptr[1]+1)<<3, ptr);
+		u16 len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+
+		if (len)
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292HOPOPTS, len, ptr);
 	}
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.odstopts && opt->dst0) {
 		u8 *ptr = nh + opt->dst0;
-		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292DSTOPTS, (ptr[1]+1)<<3, ptr);
+		u16 len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+
+		if (len)
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292DSTOPTS, len, ptr);
 	}
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.osrcrt && opt->srcrt) {
 		struct ipv6_rt_hdr *rthdr = (struct ipv6_rt_hdr *)(nh + opt->srcrt);
-		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292RTHDR, (rthdr->hdrlen+1) << 3, rthdr);
+		u16 len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, (u8 *)rthdr);
+
+		if (len)
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292RTHDR, len, rthdr);
 	}
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.odstopts && opt->dst1) {
 		u8 *ptr = nh + opt->dst1;
-		put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292DSTOPTS, (ptr[1]+1)<<3, ptr);
+		u16 len = ipv6_get_exthdr_len(skb, ptr);
+
+		if (len)
+			put_cmsg(msg, SOL_IPV6, IPV6_2292DSTOPTS, len, ptr);
 	}
 	if (np->rxopt.bits.rxorigdstaddr) {
 		struct sockaddr_in6 sin6;
-- 
2.47.3

Re: [PATCH net v3] ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg

[Paolo Abeni]

On 4/23/26 12:32 PM, Qi Tang wrote:
> ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() builds IPV6_{HOPOPTS,DSTOPTS,RTHDR}
> cmsgs (and their IPV6_2292* legacy counterparts) by trusting the
> on-wire hdrlen byte (ptr[1]) when computing the put_cmsg() length.
> The length was validated only at parse time (ipv6_parse_hopopts(),
> etc.).  An nftables payload-write expression can rewrite hdrlen after
> parsing and before the skb reaches recvmsg; the write itself is
> in-bounds but put_cmsg() then reads up to ((hdrlen+1) << 3) = 2040
> bytes from an 8-byte header.  nftables is reachable from an
> unprivileged user namespace, so this is an unprivileged
> slab-out-of-bounds read:
> 
>   BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540
>    put_cmsg+0x3ac/0x540
>    udpv6_recvmsg+0xca0/0x1250
>    sock_recvmsg+0xdf/0x190
>    ____sys_recvmsg+0x1b1/0x620
> 
> Add ipv6_get_exthdr_len() which computes the extension header length
> and validates it against skb_tail_pointer(skb), returning 0 on
> failure.  Extension headers are kept in the linear skb area by
> pskb_may_pull() during input, so skb_tail_pointer() is the correct
> bound.
> 
> Use ipv6_get_exthdr_len() at all non-AH call sites: the five
> standalone cmsg blocks (HbH, 2292HbH, 2292DSTOPTS x2, 2292RTHDR)
> and the three standard cases in the extension-header walk loop
> (DSTOPTS, ROUTING, default).  AH retains an inline bounds check
> because its length formula differs ((ptr[1]+2)<<2).
> 
> When the walk loop detects a corrupted header, return from the
> function instead of continuing to process later socket options.
> 
> Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
> Signed-off-by: Qi Tang <tpluszz77@gmail.com>
> ---
> Changes v2 -> v3:
>   - Resend as new thread (v2 was incorrectly sent as reply to v1)
> 
> Changes v1 -> v2 (Paolo Abeni):
>   - Factor repeated bounds-check + put_cmsg into ipv6_get_exthdr_len()
>   - Return from the function on corrupted walk-loop entry instead of
>     goto + empty label
> 
> v2: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260423102255.3752004-1-tpluszz77@gmail.com/
> v1: https://lore.kernel.org/netdev/20260419150344.624673-1-tpluszz77@gmail.com/
> 
>  net/ipv6/datagram.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
>  1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/ipv6/datagram.c b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
> index 972bf0426d59..0a7b74d5f402 100644
> --- a/net/ipv6/datagram.c
> +++ b/net/ipv6/datagram.c
> @@ -617,6 +617,13 @@ void ip6_datagram_recv_common_ctl(struct sock *sk, struct msghdr *msg,
>  	}
>  }
>  
> +static u16 ipv6_get_exthdr_len(const struct sk_buff *skb, const u8 *ptr)
> +{
> +	u16 len = (ptr[1] + 1) << 3;

Sashiko notes that you should validate even this offset (1) before
accessing it.

You may also consider switching to pskb_may_pull().

/P

Re: [PATCH net v3] ipv6: validate extension header length before copying to cmsg

[Qi Tang]

On Tue, Apr 28, 2026, Paolo Abeni <pabeni@redhat.com> wrote:
> > +static u16 ipv6_get_exthdr_len(const struct sk_buff *skb, const u8 *ptr)
> > +{
> > +	u16 len = (ptr[1] + 1) << 3;
>
> Sashiko notes that you should validate even this offset (1) before
> accessing it.

Good catch.  I will add a "ptr + 2 > skb_tail_pointer(skb)" check
before reading ptr[1], in both the helper and the inline AH path.

> You may also consider switching to pskb_may_pull().

I considered this but would prefer to keep skb_tail_pointer().
Two reasons:

1. ipv6_parse_hopopts() / dst_opts_rcv() / ipv6_rthdr_rcv() already
   pskb_may_pull() the full extension header during input parsing,
   so by the time ip6_datagram_recv_specific_ctl() runs the headers
   are guaranteed to be in the linear area; another pskb_may_pull()
   would be a no-op.

2. When pskb_may_pull() does have work to do, __pskb_pull_tail() can
   call pskb_expand_head() and reallocate skb->head, which would
   invalidate the caller's `ptr` (computed as nh + offset).

WDYT?  Happy to switch if I'm missing something.

Thanks,
Qi