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From: DaeMyung Kang <charsyam@gmail.com>
To: Namjae Jeon <linkinjeon@kernel.org>, Hyunchul Lee <hyc.lee@gmail.com>
Cc: linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	DaeMyung Kang <charsyam@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v2 3/3] ntfs: validate attribute name bounds before returning it
Date: Sat,  9 May 2026 15:12:37 +0900	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260509061237.3233714-4-charsyam@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260508153410.2624801-1-charsyam@gmail.com>

ntfs_attr_find() validates a named attribute before comparing it with the
requested name, but that check is currently after the AT_UNUSED handling.
When callers enumerate attributes with AT_UNUSED, ntfs_attr_find() can
return a malformed named attribute before checking whether name_offset
and name_length stay within the attribute record.

Some enumeration callers use the returned attribute name pointer
directly.  For example, one path passes (attr + name_offset, name_length)
to ntfs_attr_iget(), where the name can later be copied according to
name_length.  A malformed on-disk name_offset/name_length pair should not
be exposed to those callers.

Move the existing name bounds validation before returning attributes
during AT_UNUSED enumeration, and write it as an offset/remaining-size
check so the subtraction cannot underflow.  Extract the converted values
into local variables (name_offset, attr_len, name_size) to make the
intent explicit and avoid repeating the endian conversions inside the
bounds check.  This keeps matching attributes on the same checked path
while also covering attribute enumeration.

A small userspace ASAN model with attr length=32, name_offset=124 and
name_length=8 reproduces a heap-buffer-overflow read in the old
enumeration path.  With this change the same malformed attribute is
rejected before the name pointer is returned to the caller.

Fixes: 1da177e4c3f4 ("Linux-2.6.12-rc2")
Signed-off-by: DaeMyung Kang <charsyam@gmail.com>
---
 fs/ntfs/attrib.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++--------
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)

diff --git a/fs/ntfs/attrib.c b/fs/ntfs/attrib.c
index 97b660eaa00c..1a0e1f9e0853 100644
--- a/fs/ntfs/attrib.c
+++ b/fs/ntfs/attrib.c
@@ -672,6 +672,9 @@ static int ntfs_attr_find(const __le32 type, const __le16 *name,
 	__le16 *upcase = vol->upcase;
 	u32 upcase_len = vol->upcase_len;
 	unsigned int space;
+	u16 name_offset;
+	u32 attr_len;
+	u32 name_size;
 
 	/*
 	 * Iterate over attributes in mft record starting at @ctx->attr, or the
@@ -699,6 +702,20 @@ static int ntfs_attr_find(const __le32 type, const __le16 *name,
 			return -ENOENT;
 		if (unlikely(!a->length))
 			break;
+		if (a->name_length) {
+			name_offset = le16_to_cpu(a->name_offset);
+			attr_len = le32_to_cpu(a->length);
+			name_size = a->name_length * sizeof(__le16);
+
+			if (name_offset > attr_len ||
+			    attr_len - name_offset < name_size) {
+				ntfs_error(vol->sb,
+					   "Corrupt attribute name in MFT record %llu\n",
+					   ctx->ntfs_ino->mft_no);
+				break;
+			}
+		}
+
 		if (type == AT_UNUSED)
 			return 0;
 		if (a->type != type)
@@ -712,14 +729,6 @@ static int ntfs_attr_find(const __le32 type, const __le16 *name,
 			if (a->name_length)
 				return -ENOENT;
 		} else {
-			if (a->name_length && ((le16_to_cpu(a->name_offset) +
-					       a->name_length * sizeof(__le16)) >
-						le32_to_cpu(a->length))) {
-				ntfs_error(vol->sb, "Corrupt attribute name in MFT record %llu\n",
-					   ctx->ntfs_ino->mft_no);
-				break;
-			}
-
 			if (!ntfs_are_names_equal(name, name_len,
 					(__le16 *)((u8 *)a + le16_to_cpu(a->name_offset)),
 					a->name_length, ic, upcase, upcase_len)) {
-- 
2.43.0


      parent reply	other threads:[~2026-05-09  6:12 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 11+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-08 15:34 [PATCH 0/3] ntfs: harden MFT record and attribute parsing DaeMyung Kang
2026-05-08 15:34 ` [PATCH 1/3] ntfs: validate MFT attrs_offset against bytes_in_use DaeMyung Kang
2026-05-08 15:34 ` [PATCH 2/3] ntfs: fix MFT bitmap scan 2^32 boundary check DaeMyung Kang
2026-05-09  4:03   ` Namjae Jeon
2026-05-09  6:14     ` CharSyam
2026-05-08 15:34 ` [PATCH 3/3] ntfs: validate attribute name bounds before returning it DaeMyung Kang
2026-05-09  6:12 ` [PATCH v2 0/3] ntfs: harden MFT record and attribute parsing DaeMyung Kang
2026-05-09 15:44   ` Namjae Jeon
2026-05-09  6:12 ` [PATCH v2 1/3] ntfs: validate MFT attrs_offset against bytes_in_use DaeMyung Kang
2026-05-09  6:12 ` [PATCH v2 2/3] ntfs: fix MFT bitmap scan 2^32 boundary check DaeMyung Kang
2026-05-09  6:12 ` DaeMyung Kang [this message]

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