From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@kernel.org>
To: Namhyung Kim <namhyung@kernel.org>
Cc: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
James Clark <james.clark@linaro.org>,
Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>, Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>,
Adrian Hunter <adrian.hunter@intel.com>,
Kan Liang <kan.liang@linux.intel.com>,
Clark Williams <williams@redhat.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, linux-perf-users@vger.kernel.org,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>,
sashiko-bot@kernel.org,
David Carrillo-Cisneros <davidcc@google.com>,
"Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context)" <noreply@anthropic.com>
Subject: [PATCH 19/28] perf header: Validate feature section size and add read path bounds checking
Date: Sun, 10 May 2026 00:34:10 -0300 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260510033424.255812-20-acme@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260510033424.255812-1-acme@kernel.org>
From: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
Harden feature section parsing against crafted perf.data files:
1. perf_header__process_sections() reads the feature section table
and passes each section's offset and size directly to the
processing callbacks without validating them against the actual
file size. A crafted section size would make all downstream
bounds checks against ff->size ineffective since they compare
against the untrusted, inflated bound. Add an fstat() check
with S_ISREG() guard and verify that each section's offset +
size does not extend past EOF.
2. __do_read_buf() validates reads against ff->size (section size),
but __do_read_fd() had no such check, so a malformed perf.data
with an understated section size could cause reads past the end
of the current section into the next section's data. Add the
bounds check in __do_read(), the common caller of both helpers,
so it is enforced uniformly for both the fd and buf paths.
Track the section-relative offset in __do_read_fd() so the
check works for the fd path. Reject negative sizes which on
32-bit can occur when a u32 >= 0x80000000 is passed as ssize_t.
3. do_read_string() relied on file data being null-padded. Add
explicit null-termination (buf[len-1] = '\0') after reading
and validate length (>= 1, fits within section) before
allocating, so callers like process_cpu_topology() never
receive an unterminated string.
4. Initialize feat_fd.offset to 0 (section-relative) instead of
section->offset (file-absolute) so the bounds tracking is
consistent with __do_read()'s section-relative comparison.
Adjust process_build_id() to use lseek() for its file-absolute
offset needs since it cannot rely on ff->offset for that.
5. Propagate ff->size to perf_file_section__fprintf_info() so its
reads are also bounded.
Reported-by: sashiko-bot@kernel.org # Running on a local machine
Cc: David Carrillo-Cisneros <davidcc@google.com>
Cc: Ian Rogers <irogers@google.com>
Cc: Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>
Assisted-by: Claude Opus 4.6 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Signed-off-by: Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo <acme@redhat.com>
---
| 62 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
--git a/tools/perf/util/header.c b/tools/perf/util/header.c
index f4008878bd7eda04..a8655a784eaa5ba9 100644
--- a/tools/perf/util/header.c
+++ b/tools/perf/util/header.c
@@ -233,23 +233,32 @@ static int __do_read_fd(struct feat_fd *ff, void *addr, ssize_t size)
if (ret != size)
return ret < 0 ? (int)ret : -1;
+ ff->offset += size;
return 0;
}
static int __do_read_buf(struct feat_fd *ff, void *addr, ssize_t size)
{
- if (size > (ssize_t)ff->size - ff->offset)
- return -1;
-
memcpy(addr, ff->buf + ff->offset, size);
ff->offset += size;
return 0;
-
}
static int __do_read(struct feat_fd *ff, void *addr, ssize_t size)
{
+ /*
+ * Reject negative sizes, which on 32-bit can occur when a
+ * u32 >= 0x80000000 is passed as ssize_t. The cast to
+ * ssize_t is safe because perf_header__process_sections()
+ * validates that each section fits within the file size
+ * before any feature callback reaches here, and only
+ * feature sections (metadata like build IDs, topology, etc.)
+ * use this path — these cannot legitimately approach 2GB.
+ */
+ if (size < 0 || size > (ssize_t)ff->size - ff->offset)
+ return -1;
+
if (!ff->buf)
return __do_read_fd(ff, addr, size);
return __do_read_buf(ff, addr, size);
@@ -289,16 +298,22 @@ static char *do_read_string(struct feat_fd *ff)
if (do_read_u32(ff, &len))
return NULL;
+ /* At least the null terminator. */
+ if (len < 1 || len > ff->size - ff->offset)
+ return NULL;
+
buf = malloc(len);
if (!buf)
return NULL;
if (!__do_read(ff, buf, len)) {
/*
- * strings are padded by zeroes
- * thus the actual strlen of buf
- * may be less than len
+ * do_write_string() writes len including the null
+ * terminator, padded to NAME_ALIGN. Ensure the
+ * string is always null-terminated even if the file
+ * data has been tampered with.
*/
+ buf[len - 1] = '\0';
return buf;
}
@@ -2775,7 +2790,12 @@ static int process_tracing_data(struct feat_fd *ff __maybe_unused, void *data __
static int process_build_id(struct feat_fd *ff, void *data __maybe_unused)
{
- if (perf_header__read_build_ids(ff->ph, ff->fd, ff->offset, ff->size))
+ off_t offset = lseek(ff->fd, 0, SEEK_CUR);
+
+ if (offset == (off_t)-1)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (perf_header__read_build_ids(ff->ph, ff->fd, offset, ff->size))
pr_debug("Failed to read buildids, continuing...\n");
return 0;
}
@@ -4152,6 +4172,7 @@ static int perf_file_section__fprintf_info(struct perf_file_section *section,
ff = (struct feat_fd) {
.fd = fd,
.ph = ph,
+ .size = section->size,
};
if (!feat_ops[feat].full_only || hd->full)
@@ -4512,6 +4533,7 @@ int perf_header__process_sections(struct perf_header *header, int fd,
int sec_size;
int feat;
int err;
+ struct stat st;
nr_sections = bitmap_weight(header->adds_features, HEADER_FEAT_BITS);
if (!nr_sections)
@@ -4529,7 +4551,29 @@ int perf_header__process_sections(struct perf_header *header, int fd,
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
+ if (fstat(fd, &st) < 0) {
+ pr_err("Failed to stat the perf data file\n");
+ err = -1;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
+
for_each_set_bit(feat, header->adds_features, header->last_feat) {
+ /*
+ * FIXME: block devices have st_size == 0, so we skip
+ * bounds checking entirely. Historically perf never
+ * prevented using a block device as input, but it
+ * probably should — there's no valid use case for it
+ * and it bypasses all file-size validation.
+ */
+ if (S_ISREG(st.st_mode) &&
+ (sec->offset > (u64)st.st_size ||
+ sec->size > (u64)st.st_size - sec->offset)) {
+ pr_err("Feature %s (%d) section extends past EOF (offset=%" PRIu64 ", size=%" PRIu64 ", file=%" PRIu64 ")\n",
+ header_feat__name(feat), feat,
+ sec->offset, sec->size, (u64)st.st_size);
+ err = -1;
+ goto out_free;
+ }
err = process(sec++, header, feat, fd, data);
if (err < 0)
goto out_free;
@@ -4756,7 +4800,7 @@ static int perf_file_section__process(struct perf_file_section *section,
.fd = fd,
.ph = ph,
.size = section->size,
- .offset = section->offset,
+ .offset = 0,
};
if (lseek(fd, section->offset, SEEK_SET) == (off_t)-1) {
--
2.54.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-05-10 3:36 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 30+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-05-10 3:33 [PATCH 00/28] perf: Harden perf.data parsing against crafted/corrupted files Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:33 ` [PATCH 01/28] perf session: Add minimum event size validation table Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-11 19:01 ` Ian Rogers
2026-05-10 3:33 ` [PATCH 02/28] perf tools: Fix event_contains() macro to verify full field extent Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:33 ` [PATCH 03/28] perf zstd: Fix compression error path in zstd_compress_stream_to_records() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:33 ` [PATCH 04/28] perf zstd: Fix multi-iteration decompression and error handling Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:33 ` [PATCH 05/28] perf session: Fix PERF_RECORD_READ swap and dump for variable-length events Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:33 ` [PATCH 06/28] perf session: Align auxtrace_info priv size before byte-swapping Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:33 ` [PATCH 07/28] perf session: Add validated swap infrastructure with null-termination checks Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:33 ` [PATCH 08/28] perf session: Use bounded copy for PERF_RECORD_TIME_CONV Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 09/28] perf session: Validate HEADER_ATTR alignment and attr.size before swapping Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 10/28] perf session: Validate nr fields against event size on both swap and common paths Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 11/28] perf header: Byte-swap build ID event pid and bounds check section entries Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 12/28] perf cpumap: Reject RANGE_CPUS with start_cpu > end_cpu Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 13/28] perf auxtrace: Harden auxtrace_error event handling Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 14/28] perf session: Add byte-swap and bounds check for PERF_RECORD_BPF_METADATA events Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 15/28] perf header: Validate null-termination in PERF_RECORD_EVENT_UPDATE string fields Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 16/28] perf tools: Bounds check perf_event_attr fields against attr.size before printing Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 17/28] perf header: Propagate feature section processing errors Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 18/28] perf header: Validate f_attr.ids section before use in perf_session__read_header() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo [this message]
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 20/28] perf header: Sanity check HEADER_EVENT_DESC attr.size before swap Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 21/28] perf header: Validate bitmap size before allocating in do_read_bitmap() Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 22/28] perf session: Add byte-swap for PERF_RECORD_COMPRESSED2 events Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 23/28] perf tools: Harden compressed event processing Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 24/28] perf session: Check for decompression buffer size overflow Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 25/28] perf session: Bound nr_cpus_avail and validate sample CPU Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 26/28] perf timechart: Bounds check cpu_id and fix topology_map allocation Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 27/28] perf kwork: Bounds check work->cpu before indexing cpus_runtime[] Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
2026-05-10 3:34 ` [PATCH 28/28] perf test: Add truncated perf.data robustness test Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo
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