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From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
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Cc: ross.philipson@gmail.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
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	ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	daniel.kiper@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v16 02/38] tpm: Move TPM1 specific definitions to the command header
Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 14:13:34 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260515211410.31440-3-ross.philipson@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260515211410.31440-1-ross.philipson@gmail.com>

Gather all the TPM1 definitions and structures in the internal header
file drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h into the command header. In addition, bring
in the single RNG structure from tpm-interface.c.

The definitions moved to these files correspond to the TCG specification
for TPM 1 family:

TPM 1.2 Main Specification
 -  https://trustedcomputinggroup.org/resource/tpm-main-specification/

Co-developed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Co-developed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>
---
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h      | 102 --------------------------------
 drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c |   5 --
 include/linux/tpm_command.h | 115 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 3 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 107 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
index 87d68ddf270a..043d78a9617a 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm.h
@@ -52,105 +52,9 @@ enum tpm_addr {
 	TPM_ADDR = 0x4E,
 };
 
-#define TPM_WARN_RETRY          0x800
-#define TPM_WARN_DOING_SELFTEST 0x802
-#define TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED     0x6
-#define TPM_ERR_DISABLED        0x7
-#define TPM_ERR_FAILEDSELFTEST  0x1C
-#define TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT 38
-
-#define TPM_TAG_RQU_COMMAND 193
-
 /* TPM2 specific constants. */
 #define TPM2_SPACE_BUFFER_SIZE		16384 /* 16 kB */
 
-struct	stclear_flags_t {
-	__be16	tag;
-	u8	deactivated;
-	u8	disableForceClear;
-	u8	physicalPresence;
-	u8	physicalPresenceLock;
-	u8	bGlobalLock;
-} __packed;
-
-struct tpm1_version {
-	u8 major;
-	u8 minor;
-	u8 rev_major;
-	u8 rev_minor;
-} __packed;
-
-struct tpm1_version2 {
-	__be16 tag;
-	struct tpm1_version version;
-} __packed;
-
-struct	timeout_t {
-	__be32	a;
-	__be32	b;
-	__be32	c;
-	__be32	d;
-} __packed;
-
-struct duration_t {
-	__be32	tpm_short;
-	__be32	tpm_medium;
-	__be32	tpm_long;
-} __packed;
-
-struct permanent_flags_t {
-	__be16	tag;
-	u8	disable;
-	u8	ownership;
-	u8	deactivated;
-	u8	readPubek;
-	u8	disableOwnerClear;
-	u8	allowMaintenance;
-	u8	physicalPresenceLifetimeLock;
-	u8	physicalPresenceHWEnable;
-	u8	physicalPresenceCMDEnable;
-	u8	CEKPUsed;
-	u8	TPMpost;
-	u8	TPMpostLock;
-	u8	FIPS;
-	u8	operator;
-	u8	enableRevokeEK;
-	u8	nvLocked;
-	u8	readSRKPub;
-	u8	tpmEstablished;
-	u8	maintenanceDone;
-	u8	disableFullDALogicInfo;
-} __packed;
-
-typedef union {
-	struct	permanent_flags_t perm_flags;
-	struct	stclear_flags_t	stclear_flags;
-	__u8	owned;
-	__be32	num_pcrs;
-	struct tpm1_version version1;
-	struct tpm1_version2 version2;
-	__be32	manufacturer_id;
-	struct timeout_t  timeout;
-	struct duration_t duration;
-} cap_t;
-
-enum tpm_capabilities {
-	TPM_CAP_FLAG = 4,
-	TPM_CAP_PROP = 5,
-	TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_1 = 0x06,
-	TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_2 = 0x1A,
-};
-
-enum tpm_sub_capabilities {
-	TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR = 0x101,
-	TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER = 0x103,
-	TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM = 0x108,
-	TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL = 0x109,
-	TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER = 0x111,
-	TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT = 0x115,
-	TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION = 0x120,
-};
-
 enum tpm2_pt_props {
 	TPM2_PT_NONE = 0x00000000,
 	TPM2_PT_GROUP = 0x00000100,
@@ -225,12 +129,6 @@ enum tpm2_pt_props {
 	TPM2_PT_AUDIT_COUNTER_1 = TPM2_PT_VAR + 20,
 };
 
-/* 128 bytes is an arbitrary cap. This could be as large as TPM_BUFSIZE - 18
- * bytes, but 128 is still a relatively large number of random bytes and
- * anything much bigger causes users of struct tpm_cmd_t to start getting
- * compiler warnings about stack frame size. */
-#define TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA	128
-
 extern const struct class tpm_class;
 extern const struct class tpmrm_class;
 extern dev_t tpm_devt;
diff --git a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
index 664ca1fff2e8..96f189b5fd6f 100644
--- a/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
+++ b/drivers/char/tpm/tpm1-cmd.c
@@ -504,11 +504,6 @@ ssize_t tpm1_getcap(struct tpm_chip *chip, u32 subcap_id, cap_t *cap,
 }
 EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(tpm1_getcap);
 
-struct tpm1_get_random_out {
-	__be32 rng_data_len;
-	u8 rng_data[TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA];
-} __packed;
-
 /**
  * tpm1_get_random() - get random bytes from the TPM's RNG
  * @chip:	a &struct tpm_chip instance
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_command.h b/include/linux/tpm_command.h
index 174b043d8bbc..30d01953a6f8 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm_command.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm_command.h
@@ -36,6 +36,121 @@ enum tpm_command_ordinals {
 	TPM_ORD_UNSEAL			= 24,
 };
 
+enum tpm_capabilities {
+	TPM_CAP_FLAG		= 4,
+	TPM_CAP_PROP		= 5,
+	TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_1	= 0x06,
+	TPM_CAP_VERSION_1_2	= 0x1A,
+};
+
+enum tpm_sub_capabilities {
+	TPM_CAP_PROP_PCR		= 0x101,
+	TPM_CAP_PROP_MANUFACTURER	= 0x103,
+	TPM_CAP_FLAG_PERM		= 0x108,
+	TPM_CAP_FLAG_VOL		= 0x109,
+	TPM_CAP_PROP_OWNER		= 0x111,
+	TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_TIMEOUT	= 0x115,
+	TPM_CAP_PROP_TIS_DURATION	= 0x120,
+};
+
+/* Return Codes */
+enum tpm_return_codes {
+	TPM_BASE_MASK			= 0,
+	TPM_NON_FATAL_MASK		= 0x00000800,
+	TPM_SUCCESS			= TPM_BASE_MASK + 0,
+	TPM_ERR_DEACTIVATED		= TPM_BASE_MASK + 6,
+	TPM_ERR_DISABLED		= TPM_BASE_MASK + 7,
+	TPM_ERR_FAIL			= TPM_BASE_MASK + 9,
+	TPM_ERR_FAILEDSELFTEST		= TPM_BASE_MASK + 28,
+	TPM_ERR_INVALID_POSTINIT	= TPM_BASE_MASK + 38,
+	TPM_ERR_INVALID_FAMILY		= TPM_BASE_MASK + 55,
+	TPM_WARN_RETRY			= TPM_BASE_MASK + TPM_NON_FATAL_MASK + 0,
+	TPM_WARN_DOING_SELFTEST		= TPM_BASE_MASK + TPM_NON_FATAL_MASK + 2,
+};
+
+struct	stclear_flags_t {
+	__be16 tag;
+	u8 deactivated;
+	u8 disableForceClear;
+	u8 physicalPresence;
+	u8 physicalPresenceLock;
+	u8 bGlobalLock;
+} __packed;
+
+struct tpm1_version {
+	u8 major;
+	u8 minor;
+	u8 rev_major;
+	u8 rev_minor;
+} __packed;
+
+struct tpm1_version2 {
+	__be16 tag;
+	struct tpm1_version version;
+} __packed;
+
+struct	timeout_t {
+	__be32 a;
+	__be32 b;
+	__be32 c;
+	__be32 d;
+} __packed;
+
+struct duration_t {
+	__be32 tpm_short;
+	__be32 tpm_medium;
+	__be32 tpm_long;
+} __packed;
+
+struct permanent_flags_t {
+	__be16 tag;
+	u8 disable;
+	u8 ownership;
+	u8 deactivated;
+	u8 readPubek;
+	u8 disableOwnerClear;
+	u8 allowMaintenance;
+	u8 physicalPresenceLifetimeLock;
+	u8 physicalPresenceHWEnable;
+	u8 physicalPresenceCMDEnable;
+	u8 CEKPUsed;
+	u8 TPMpost;
+	u8 TPMpostLock;
+	u8 FIPS;
+	u8 operator;
+	u8 enableRevokeEK;
+	u8 nvLocked;
+	u8 readSRKPub;
+	u8 tpmEstablished;
+	u8 maintenanceDone;
+	u8 disableFullDALogicInfo;
+} __packed;
+
+typedef union {
+	struct permanent_flags_t perm_flags;
+	struct stclear_flags_t stclear_flags;
+	__u8 owned;
+	__be32 num_pcrs;
+	struct tpm1_version version1;
+	struct tpm1_version2 version2;
+	__be32 manufacturer_id;
+	struct timeout_t timeout;
+	struct duration_t duration;
+} cap_t;
+
+/*
+ * 128 bytes is an arbitrary cap. This could be as large as TPM_BUFSIZE - 18
+ * bytes, but 128 is still a relatively large number of random bytes and
+ * anything much bigger causes users of struct tpm_cmd_t to start getting
+ * compiler warnings about stack frame size.
+ */
+#define TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA		128
+
+struct tpm1_get_random_out {
+	__be32 rng_data_len;
+	u8 rng_data[TPM_MAX_RNG_DATA];
+} __packed;
+
 /* Other constants */
 #define SRKHANDLE                       0x40000000
 #define TPM_NONCE_SIZE                  20
-- 
2.47.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-05-15 21:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-15 21:13 [PATCH v16 00/38] x86: Secure Launch support for Intel TXT Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 01/38] tpm: Initial step to reorganize TPM public headers Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:03   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 23:05     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-05-15 23:10       ` Dave Hansen
2026-05-15 23:51       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2026-05-15 23:14   ` [PATCH v16 02/38] tpm: Move TPM1 specific definitions to the command header Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 03/38] tpm: Move TPM2 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:15   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 04/38] tpm: Move TPM common base " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:22   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 05/38] tpm: Move platform specific definitions to the new PTP header Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 06/38] tpm: Remove main TPM header from TPM event log header Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 07/38] tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 08/38] tpm-buf: Remove chip parameter from tpm_buf_append_handle() Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 09/38] tpm-buf: Implement managed allocations Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 10/38] tpm-buf: Add TPM buffer support header for standalone reuse Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 11/38] tpm/tpm_tis: Close all localities Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 12/38] tpm/tpm_tis: Address positive localities in tpm_tis_request_locality() Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 13/38] tpm/tpm_tis: Allow locality to be set to a different value Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 14/38] tpm/sysfs: Show locality used by kernel Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 15/38] Documentation/security: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 22:02   ` Randy Dunlap
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 16/38] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 17/38] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 18/38] x86/efi: Secure Launch Resource Table EFI definitions " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 19/38] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 20/38] x86/txt: Intel Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT) definitions Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 21/38] lib/crypto: Add SHA1 support for pre-boot environments Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 22/38] lib/crypto: Add SHA512 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 23/38] x86: Allow WARN_trap() macro to be included in " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 24/38] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 25/38] x86/boot: Slight refactor of the 5 level paging logic Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 26/38] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 27/38] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 28/38] x86: Add early SHA-384/512 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 29/38] x86/tpm: Early startup TPM PCR extending driver Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 22:32   ` Dave Hansen
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 30/38] x86/slaunch: Add MLE header and Secure Launch entrypoint to the core kernel Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 31/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch kernel early boot initialization Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 32/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 33/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 34/38] kexec/slaunch: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 35/38] reboot/slaunch: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 36/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 37/38] x86/efistub: EFI stub DRTM support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 38/38] x86/boot: Legacy boot " Ross Philipson

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