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From: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>
To: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, x86@kernel.org,
	linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org, linux-doc@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-crypto@vger.kernel.org, kexec@lists.infradead.org,
	linux-efi@vger.kernel.org, iommu@lists.linux.dev
Cc: ross.philipson@gmail.com, dpsmith@apertussolutions.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, mingo@redhat.com, bp@alien8.de,
	hpa@zytor.com, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, ardb@kernel.org,
	mjg59@srcf.ucam.org, James.Bottomley@hansenpartnership.com,
	peterhuewe@gmx.de, jarkko@kernel.org, jgg@ziepe.ca,
	luto@amacapital.net, nivedita@alum.mit.edu,
	herbert@gondor.apana.org.au, davem@davemloft.net, corbet@lwn.net,
	ebiederm@xmission.com, dwmw2@infradead.org,
	baolu.lu@linux.intel.com, kanth.ghatraju@oracle.com,
	daniel.kiper@oracle.com, andrew.cooper3@citrix.com,
	trenchboot-devel@googlegroups.com
Subject: [PATCH v16 04/38] tpm: Move TPM common base definitions to the command header
Date: Fri, 15 May 2026 14:13:36 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260515211410.31440-5-ross.philipson@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260515211410.31440-1-ross.philipson@gmail.com>

These are top level definitions shared by both TPM 1 and 2
family chips. This includes core definitions like TPM localities,
common crypto algorithm IDs, and the base TPM command header.

Co-developed-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Smith <dpsmith@apertussolutions.com>
Co-developed-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Alec Brown <alec.r.brown@oracle.com>
Signed-off-by: Ross Philipson <ross.philipson@gmail.com>
---
 include/linux/tpm.h         | 50 +--------------------
 include/linux/tpm_command.h | 89 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 90 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/linux/tpm.h b/include/linux/tpm.h
index 8551b24c2bff..3630b2ea6aef 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm.h
@@ -27,49 +27,12 @@
 
 #include <linux/tpm_command.h>
 
-#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE 20	/* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
-
-#define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE	SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
-#define TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS	8
-
 struct tpm_chip;
 struct trusted_key_payload;
 struct trusted_key_options;
 /* opaque structure, holds auth session parameters like the session key */
 struct tpm2_auth;
 
-/* if you add a new hash to this, increment TPM_MAX_HASHES below */
-enum tpm_algorithms {
-	TPM_ALG_ERROR		= 0x0000,
-	TPM_ALG_SHA1		= 0x0004,
-	TPM_ALG_AES		= 0x0006,
-	TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH	= 0x0008,
-	TPM_ALG_SHA256		= 0x000B,
-	TPM_ALG_SHA384		= 0x000C,
-	TPM_ALG_SHA512		= 0x000D,
-	TPM_ALG_NULL		= 0x0010,
-	TPM_ALG_SM3_256		= 0x0012,
-	TPM_ALG_ECC		= 0x0023,
-	TPM_ALG_CFB		= 0x0043,
-};
-
-/*
- * maximum number of hashing algorithms a TPM can have.  This is
- * basically a count of every hash in tpm_algorithms above
- */
-#define TPM_MAX_HASHES	5
-
-struct tpm_digest {
-	u16 alg_id;
-	u8 digest[TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
-} __packed;
-
-struct tpm_bank_info {
-	u16 alg_id;
-	u16 digest_size;
-	u16 crypto_id;
-};
-
 enum TPM_OPS_FLAGS {
 	TPM_OPS_AUTO_STARTUP = BIT(0),
 };
@@ -127,7 +90,7 @@ struct tpm_chip_seqops {
 	const struct seq_operations *seqops;
 };
 
-/* fixed define for the curve we use which is NIST_P256 */
+/* Fixed define for the curve we use which is NIST_P256 */
 #define EC_PT_SZ	32
 
 /*
@@ -209,8 +172,6 @@ struct tpm_chip {
 #endif
 };
 
-#define TPM_HEADER_SIZE		10
-
 static inline enum tpm2_mso_type tpm2_handle_mso(u32 handle)
 {
 	return handle >> 24;
@@ -239,15 +200,6 @@ enum tpm_chip_flags {
 
 #define to_tpm_chip(d) container_of(d, struct tpm_chip, dev)
 
-struct tpm_header {
-	__be16 tag;
-	__be32 length;
-	union {
-		__be32 ordinal;
-		__be32 return_code;
-	};
-} __packed;
-
 enum tpm_buf_flags {
 	/* the capacity exceeded: */
 	TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW	= BIT(0),
diff --git a/include/linux/tpm_command.h b/include/linux/tpm_command.h
index 9dd903dd6b5c..96edebd9610f 100644
--- a/include/linux/tpm_command.h
+++ b/include/linux/tpm_command.h
@@ -427,4 +427,93 @@ struct tpm2_context {
 	__be16 blob_size;
 } __packed;
 
+/*
+ * == TPM Common Defs ==
+ */
+
+#define TPM_DIGEST_SIZE		20	/* Max TPM v1.2 PCR size */
+#define TPM_BUFSIZE		4096
+
+/*
+ * SHA-512 is, as of today, the largest digest in the TCG algorithm repository.
+ */
+#define TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE	SHA512_DIGEST_SIZE
+
+/*
+ * A TPM name digest i.e., TPMT_HA, is a concatenation of TPM_ALG_ID of the
+ * name algorithm and hash of TPMT_PUBLIC.
+ */
+#define TPM2_MAX_NAME_SIZE	(TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE + 2)
+
+/*
+ * Fixed define for the size of a name.  This is actually HASHALG size
+ * plus 2, so 32 for SHA256
+ */
+#define TPM2_NULL_NAME_SIZE	34
+
+/*
+ * The maximum number of PCR banks.
+ */
+#define TPM2_MAX_PCR_BANKS	8
+
+/* If you add a new hash to this, increment TPM_MAX_HASHES below */
+enum tpm_algorithms {
+	TPM_ALG_ERROR		= 0x0000,
+	TPM_ALG_SHA1		= 0x0004,
+	TPM_ALG_AES		= 0x0006,
+	TPM_ALG_KEYEDHASH	= 0x0008,
+	TPM_ALG_SHA256		= 0x000B,
+	TPM_ALG_SHA384		= 0x000C,
+	TPM_ALG_SHA512		= 0x000D,
+	TPM_ALG_NULL		= 0x0010,
+	TPM_ALG_SM3_256		= 0x0012,
+	TPM_ALG_ECC		= 0x0023,
+	TPM_ALG_CFB		= 0x0043,
+};
+
+/*
+ * The locality (0 - 4) for a TPM, as defined in section 3.2 of the
+ * Client Platform Profile Specification.
+ */
+enum tpm_localities {
+	TPM_LOCALITY_0		= 0, /* Static RTM */
+	TPM_LOCALITY_1		= 1, /* Dynamic OS */
+	TPM_LOCALITY_2		= 2, /* DRTM Environment */
+	TPM_LOCALITY_3		= 3, /* Aux Components */
+	TPM_LOCALITY_4		= 4, /* CPU DRTM Establishment */
+	TPM_MAX_LOCALITY	= TPM_LOCALITY_4
+};
+
+/*
+ * Structure to represent active PCR algorithm banks usable by the
+ * TPM chip.
+ */
+struct tpm_bank_info {
+	u16 alg_id;
+	u16 digest_size;
+	u16 crypto_id;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of hashing algorithms a TPM can have.  This is
+ * basically a count of every hash in tpm_algorithms above
+ */
+#define TPM_MAX_HASHES		5
+
+struct tpm_digest {
+	u16 alg_id;
+	u8 digest[TPM2_MAX_DIGEST_SIZE];
+} __packed;
+
+#define TPM_HEADER_SIZE		10
+
+struct tpm_header {
+	__be16 tag;
+	__be32 length;
+	union {
+		__be32 ordinal;
+		__be32 return_code;
+	};
+} __packed;
+
 #endif
-- 
2.47.3


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-05-15 21:14 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 48+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-05-15 21:13 [PATCH v16 00/38] x86: Secure Launch support for Intel TXT Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 01/38] tpm: Initial step to reorganize TPM public headers Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:03   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 23:05     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-05-15 23:10       ` Dave Hansen
2026-05-15 23:51       ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 02/38] tpm: Move TPM1 specific definitions to the command header Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:14   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 03/38] tpm: Move TPM2 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 23:15   ` Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` Ross Philipson [this message]
2026-05-15 23:22   ` [PATCH v16 04/38] tpm: Move TPM common base " Jarkko Sakkinen
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 05/38] tpm: Move platform specific definitions to the new PTP header Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 06/38] tpm: Remove main TPM header from TPM event log header Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 07/38] tpm-buf: Merge TPM_BUF_BOUNDARY_ERROR and TPM_BUF_OVERFLOW Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 08/38] tpm-buf: Remove chip parameter from tpm_buf_append_handle() Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 09/38] tpm-buf: Implement managed allocations Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 10/38] tpm-buf: Add TPM buffer support header for standalone reuse Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 11/38] tpm/tpm_tis: Close all localities Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 12/38] tpm/tpm_tis: Address positive localities in tpm_tis_request_locality() Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 13/38] tpm/tpm_tis: Allow locality to be set to a different value Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 14/38] tpm/sysfs: Show locality used by kernel Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 15/38] Documentation/security: Secure Launch kernel documentation Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 22:02   ` Randy Dunlap
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 16/38] x86: Secure Launch Kconfig Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 17/38] x86: Secure Launch Resource Table header file Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 18/38] x86/efi: Secure Launch Resource Table EFI definitions " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 19/38] x86: Secure Launch main " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 20/38] x86/txt: Intel Trusted eXecution Technology (TXT) definitions Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 21/38] lib/crypto: Add SHA1 support for pre-boot environments Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 22/38] lib/crypto: Add SHA512 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 23/38] x86: Allow WARN_trap() macro to be included in " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 24/38] x86/msr: Add variable MTRR base/mask and x2apic ID registers Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 25/38] x86/boot: Slight refactor of the 5 level paging logic Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 26/38] x86: Add early SHA-1 support for Secure Launch early measurements Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:13 ` [PATCH v16 27/38] x86: Add early SHA-256 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 28/38] x86: Add early SHA-384/512 " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 29/38] x86/tpm: Early startup TPM PCR extending driver Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 22:32   ` Dave Hansen
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 30/38] x86/slaunch: Add MLE header and Secure Launch entrypoint to the core kernel Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 31/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch kernel early boot initialization Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 32/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch kernel late " Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 33/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch SMP bringup support Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 34/38] kexec/slaunch: Secure Launch kexec SEXIT support Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 35/38] reboot/slaunch: Secure Launch SEXIT support on reboot paths Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 36/38] x86/slaunch: Secure Launch late initcall platform module Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 37/38] x86/efistub: EFI stub DRTM support for Secure Launch Ross Philipson
2026-05-15 21:14 ` [PATCH v16 38/38] x86/boot: Legacy boot " Ross Philipson

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