[PATCH] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode

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* [PATCH] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
@ 2026-05-23  8:59 Pavitra Jha
  2026-05-26 19:18 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Pavitra Jha @ 2026-05-23  8:59 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: idryomov; +Cc: amarkuze, slava, ceph-devel, linux-kernel, stable, Pavitra Jha

decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
slab-out-of-bounds reads:

1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
   bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
   struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
   the validated buffer boundary.

2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
   is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p
   past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a
   bogus boundary.

3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the
   immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can
   send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping
   the decode window entirely.

Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
  ceph_decode_copy   -> ceph_decode_copy_safe
  *p += sizeof(...)  -> ceph_decode_skip_n
  ceph_decode_32(p)  -> ceph_decode_32_safe
  *p += len          -> ceph_decode_skip_n

A new bad: label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation.

KASAN report (kernel 7.0.0-rc7, QEMU/x86_64, KASLR disabled):

  [   26.183969] ceph_oob4_poc: buf=ffff888009e31000 end=ffff888009e31fa0
  [   26.186087] ceph_oob4_poc: struct_v=1 struct_len=0 p==end: 1
  [   26.186738] ceph_oob4_poc: triggering bare ceph_decode_32 past slab boundary...
  [   26.187679] ==================================================================
  [   26.188236] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
  [   26.188236] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009e31fa0 by task insmod/59
  [   26.188236] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 59 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O        7.0.0-rc7-g9c2abf69da83-dirty #15 PREEMPT(lazy)
  [   26.188236] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
  [   26.188236] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
  [   26.188236] Call Trace:
  [   26.188236]  <TASK>
  [   26.188236]  dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70
  [   26.188236]  print_report+0x170/0x4f3
  [   26.188236]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
  [   26.188236]  kasan_report+0xda/0x110
  [   26.188236]  ? ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
  [   26.188236]  ? ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
  [   26.188236]  ? __pfx_ceph_oob4_init+0x10/0x10 [ceph_oob4_poc]
  [   26.188236]  ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
  [   26.188236]  do_one_initcall+0x9a/0x3a0
  [   26.188236]  ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
  [   26.188236]  do_init_module+0x27c/0x790
  [   26.188236]  load_module+0x4a9a/0x6350
  [   26.188236]  init_module_from_file+0x15c/0x180
  [   26.188236]  idempotent_init_module+0x21f/0x750
  [   26.188236]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0xba/0x120
  [   26.188236]  do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570
  [   26.188236]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
  [   26.188236]  </TASK>
  [   26.188236] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009e31000
  [   26.188236]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
  [   26.188236] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
  [   26.188236]  allocated 4000-byte region [ffff888009e31000, ffff888009e31fa0)
  [   26.188236] Memory state around the buggy address:
  [   26.188236]  ffff888009e31f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
  [   26.188236] >ffff888009e31f80: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   26.188236]                                ^
  [   26.188236]  ffff888009e32000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   26.188236] ==================================================================
  [   26.255513] ceph_oob4_poc: len=0xcccccccc (OOB garbage from KASAN redzone)

  0xCCCCCCCC is KASAN redzone poison, confirming the read landed in
  the slab redzone immediately past the 4000-byte allocation.

Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition)
without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.

Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
---
 net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 10 ++++++----
 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
index 78276273c..00f0309a6 100644
--- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name));
+	ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name), bad);
 	s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO);
 	if (IS_ERR(s))
 		return PTR_ERR(s);
@@ -270,19 +270,21 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	*p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */
+	ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), bad); /* skip expiration */
 
 	ret = ceph_decode_entity_addr(p, end, &locker->info.addr);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	len = ceph_decode_32(p);
-	*p += len; /* skip description */
+	ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, bad);
+	ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, bad); /* skip description */
 
 	dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__,
 	     ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie,
 	     ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr));
 	return 0;
+bad:
+	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
-- 
2.53.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re:  [PATCH] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
  2026-05-23  8:59 [PATCH] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker() Pavitra Jha
@ 2026-05-26 19:18 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
  2026-05-28 13:01   ` [PATCH v2] " Pavitra Jha
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Viacheslav Dubeyko @ 2026-05-26 19:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: idryomov@gmail.com, jhapavitra98@gmail.com
  Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org, Alex Markuze, slava@dubeyko.com,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org

On Sat, 2026-05-23 at 04:59 -0400, Pavitra Jha wrote:
> decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
> operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
> slab-out-of-bounds reads:
> 
> 1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
>    bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
>    struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
>    the validated buffer boundary.
> 
> 2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
>    is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p
>    past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a
>    bogus boundary.
> 
> 3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the
>    immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can
>    send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping
>    the decode window entirely.
> 
> Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
>   ceph_decode_copy   -> ceph_decode_copy_safe
>   *p += sizeof(...)  -> ceph_decode_skip_n
>   ceph_decode_32(p)  -> ceph_decode_32_safe
>   *p += len          -> ceph_decode_skip_n
> 
> A new bad: label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds violation.
> 
> KASAN report (kernel 7.0.0-rc7, QEMU/x86_64, KASLR disabled):
> 
>   [   26.183969] ceph_oob4_poc: buf=ffff888009e31000 end=ffff888009e31fa0
>   [   26.186087] ceph_oob4_poc: struct_v=1 struct_len=0 p==end: 1
>   [   26.186738] ceph_oob4_poc: triggering bare ceph_decode_32 past slab boundary...
>   [   26.187679] ==================================================================
>   [   26.188236] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
>   [   26.188236] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009e31fa0 by task insmod/59
>   [   26.188236] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 59 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O        7.0.0-rc7-g9c2abf69da83-dirty #15 PREEMPT(lazy)
>   [   26.188236] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
>   [   26.188236] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
>   [   26.188236] Call Trace:
>   [   26.188236]  <TASK>
>   [   26.188236]  dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70
>   [   26.188236]  print_report+0x170/0x4f3
>   [   26.188236]  ? __pfx__raw_spin_lock_irqsave+0x10/0x10
>   [   26.188236]  kasan_report+0xda/0x110
>   [   26.188236]  ? ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
>   [   26.188236]  ? ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
>   [   26.188236]  ? __pfx_ceph_oob4_init+0x10/0x10 [ceph_oob4_poc]
>   [   26.188236]  ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
>   [   26.188236]  do_one_initcall+0x9a/0x3a0
>   [   26.188236]  ? __pfx_do_one_initcall+0x10/0x10
>   [   26.188236]  do_init_module+0x27c/0x790
>   [   26.188236]  load_module+0x4a9a/0x6350
>   [   26.188236]  init_module_from_file+0x15c/0x180
>   [   26.188236]  idempotent_init_module+0x21f/0x750
>   [   26.188236]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0xba/0x120
>   [   26.188236]  do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570
>   [   26.188236]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
>   [   26.188236]  </TASK>
>   [   26.188236] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009e31000
>   [   26.188236]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
>   [   26.188236] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
>   [   26.188236]  allocated 4000-byte region [ffff888009e31000, ffff888009e31fa0)
>   [   26.188236] Memory state around the buggy address:
>   [   26.188236]  ffff888009e31f00: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
>   [   26.188236] >ffff888009e31f80: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>   [   26.188236]                                ^
>   [   26.188236]  ffff888009e32000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>   [   26.188236] ==================================================================
>   [   26.255513] ceph_oob4_poc: len=0xcccccccc (OOB garbage from KASAN redzone)
> 
>   0xCCCCCCCC is KASAN redzone poison, confirming the read landed in
>   the slab redzone immediately past the 4000-byte allocation.
> 
> Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
> deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
> lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition)
> without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.
> 
> Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
> ---
>  net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 10 ++++++----
>  1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> index 78276273c..00f0309a6 100644
> --- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> +++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name));
> +	ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name), bad);

Are you sure that this line not longer than 80 symbols?

>  	s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO);
>  	if (IS_ERR(s))
>  		return PTR_ERR(s);
> @@ -270,19 +270,21 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	*p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */
> +	ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), bad); /* skip expiration */

I don't think that it makes sense to keep comment at the end of line now. Let's
do it in such way:

/* skip expiration */
ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), bad);

>  
>  	ret = ceph_decode_entity_addr(p, end, &locker->info.addr);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	len = ceph_decode_32(p);
> -	*p += len; /* skip description */
> +	ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, bad);
> +	ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, bad); /* skip description */

Ditto.

/* skip description */
ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, bad);

>  
>  	dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__,
>  	     ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie,
>  	     ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr));
>  	return 0;
> +bad:

You are not consistent. Now it's bad name but not e_inval. :)

> +	return -EINVAL;

I still think that we have not input arguments here. I am not fully sure that
EINVAL is proper error code here.

Thanks,
Slava.

> 
> 

>  }
>  
>  static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v2] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
  2026-05-26 19:18 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
@ 2026-05-28 13:01   ` Pavitra Jha
  2026-05-28 18:14     ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Pavitra Jha @ 2026-05-28 13:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: idryomov, Slava.Dubeyko; +Cc: ceph-devel, linux-kernel, stable, Pavitra Jha

decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
slab-out-of-bounds reads:

1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
   bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
   struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
   the validated buffer boundary.

2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
   is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p
   past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a
   bogus boundary.

3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the
   immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can
   send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping
   the decode window entirely.

Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
  ceph_decode_copy   -> ceph_decode_copy_safe
  *p += sizeof(...)  -> ceph_decode_skip_n
  ceph_decode_32(p)  -> ceph_decode_32_safe
  *p += len          -> ceph_decode_skip_n

A new out_bad: label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds
violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD
is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode
contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault.

KASAN report (kernel 7.0.0-rc7, QEMU/x86_64, KASLR disabled):

  [   26.183969] ceph_oob4_poc: buf=ffff888009e31000 end=ffff888009e31fa0
  [   26.186087] ceph_oob4_poc: struct_v=1 struct_len=0 p==end: 1
  [   26.186738] ceph_oob4_poc: triggering bare ceph_decode_32 past slab boundary...
  [   26.187679] ==================================================================
  [   26.188236] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
  [   26.188236] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009e31fa0 by task insmod/59
  [   26.188236] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 59 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O        7.0.0-rc7-g9c2abf69da83-dirty #15 PREEMPT(lazy)
  [   26.188236] Call Trace:
  [   26.188236]  <TASK>
  [   26.188236]  dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70
  [   26.188236]  print_report+0x170/0x4f3
  [   26.188236]  kasan_report+0xda/0x110
  [   26.188236]  ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
  [   26.188236]  do_one_initcall+0x9a/0x3a0
  [   26.188236]  do_init_module+0x27c/0x790
  [   26.188236]  load_module+0x4a9a/0x6350
  [   26.188236]  init_module_from_file+0x15c/0x180
  [   26.188236]  idempotent_init_module+0x21f/0x750
  [   26.188236]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0xba/0x120
  [   26.188236]  do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570
  [   26.188236]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
  [   26.188236]  </TASK>
  [   26.188236] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009e31000
  [   26.188236]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
  [   26.188236] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
  [   26.188236]  allocated 4000-byte region [ffff888009e31000, ffff888009e31fa0)
  [   26.188236]  ffff888009e31f80: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   26.188236]                                ^
  [   26.188236]  ffff888009e32000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   26.188236] ==================================================================
  [   26.255513] ceph_oob4_poc: len=0xcccccccc (OOB garbage from KASAN redzone)

  0xCCCCCCCC is KASAN redzone poison, confirming the read landed in
  the slab redzone immediately past the 4000-byte allocation.

Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition)
without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.

Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
---
v2: Move inline comments above ceph_decode_skip_n calls to stay within
    the 80-column limit, and rename label bad -> out_bad, per
    Viacheslav Dubeyko's review.
---
 net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 12 ++++++++----
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
index 78276273c..4f27b3d15 100644
--- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
@@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name));
+	ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name), out_bad);
 	s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO);
 	if (IS_ERR(s))
 		return PTR_ERR(s);
@@ -270,19 +270,23 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	*p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */
+	/* skip expiration */
+	ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), out_bad);
 
 	ret = ceph_decode_entity_addr(p, end, &locker->info.addr);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	len = ceph_decode_32(p);
-	*p += len; /* skip description */
+	ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, out_bad);
+	/* skip description */
+	ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, out_bad);
 
 	dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__,
 	     ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie,
 	     ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr));
 	return 0;
+out_bad:
+	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
-- 
2.53.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re:  [PATCH v2] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
  2026-05-28 13:01   ` [PATCH v2] " Pavitra Jha
@ 2026-05-28 18:14     ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
  2026-05-28 18:17       ` [PATCH v2] ceph: fix bare ceph_decode_8 OOB in decode_lockers() Pavitra Jha
  2026-06-02  5:02       ` [PATCH v3] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker() Pavitra Jha
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Viacheslav Dubeyko @ 2026-05-28 18:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: idryomov@gmail.com, jhapavitra98@gmail.com
  Cc: ceph-devel@vger.kernel.org, stable@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org

On Thu, 2026-05-28 at 09:01 -0400, Pavitra Jha wrote:
> decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
> operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
> slab-out-of-bounds reads:
> 
> 1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
>    bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
>    struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
>    the validated buffer boundary.
> 
> 2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
>    is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p
>    past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a
>    bogus boundary.
> 
> 3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the
>    immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can
>    send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping
>    the decode window entirely.
> 
> Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
>   ceph_decode_copy   -> ceph_decode_copy_safe
>   *p += sizeof(...)  -> ceph_decode_skip_n
>   ceph_decode_32(p)  -> ceph_decode_32_safe
>   *p += len          -> ceph_decode_skip_n
> 
> A new out_bad: label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds
> violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD
> is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode
> contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault.
> 
> KASAN report (kernel 7.0.0-rc7, QEMU/x86_64, KASLR disabled):
> 
>   [   26.183969] ceph_oob4_poc: buf=ffff888009e31000 end=ffff888009e31fa0
>   [   26.186087] ceph_oob4_poc: struct_v=1 struct_len=0 p==end: 1
>   [   26.186738] ceph_oob4_poc: triggering bare ceph_decode_32 past slab boundary...
>   [   26.187679] ==================================================================
>   [   26.188236] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
>   [   26.188236] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009e31fa0 by task insmod/59
>   [   26.188236] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 59 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O        7.0.0-rc7-g9c2abf69da83-dirty #15 PREEMPT(lazy)
>   [   26.188236] Call Trace:
>   [   26.188236]  <TASK>
>   [   26.188236]  dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70
>   [   26.188236]  print_report+0x170/0x4f3
>   [   26.188236]  kasan_report+0xda/0x110
>   [   26.188236]  ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
>   [   26.188236]  do_one_initcall+0x9a/0x3a0
>   [   26.188236]  do_init_module+0x27c/0x790
>   [   26.188236]  load_module+0x4a9a/0x6350
>   [   26.188236]  init_module_from_file+0x15c/0x180
>   [   26.188236]  idempotent_init_module+0x21f/0x750
>   [   26.188236]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0xba/0x120
>   [   26.188236]  do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570
>   [   26.188236]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
>   [   26.188236]  </TASK>
>   [   26.188236] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009e31000
>   [   26.188236]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
>   [   26.188236] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
>   [   26.188236]  allocated 4000-byte region [ffff888009e31000, ffff888009e31fa0)
>   [   26.188236]  ffff888009e31f80: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>   [   26.188236]                                ^
>   [   26.188236]  ffff888009e32000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>   [   26.188236] ==================================================================
>   [   26.255513] ceph_oob4_poc: len=0xcccccccc (OOB garbage from KASAN redzone)
> 
>   0xCCCCCCCC is KASAN redzone poison, confirming the read landed in
>   the slab redzone immediately past the 4000-byte allocation.
> 
> Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
> deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
> lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition)
> without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.
> 
> Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
> ---
> v2: Move inline comments above ceph_decode_skip_n calls to stay within
>     the 80-column limit, and rename label bad -> out_bad, per
>     Viacheslav Dubeyko's review.
> ---
>  net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 12 ++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> 
> diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> index 78276273c..4f27b3d15 100644
> --- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> +++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> @@ -259,7 +259,7 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name));
> +	ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name), out_bad);

This line contains 85 symbols. What's the point of such long line? Why not
something like this?

	ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name,
			      sizeof(locker->id.name), out_bad);

Have you run scripts/checkpatch.pl for the patch? I am sure that the check
should complain about this.

Thanks,
Slava.

>  	s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO);
>  	if (IS_ERR(s))
>  		return PTR_ERR(s);
> @@ -270,19 +270,23 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	*p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */
> +	/* skip expiration */
> +	ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), out_bad);
>  
>  	ret = ceph_decode_entity_addr(p, end, &locker->info.addr);
>  	if (ret)
>  		return ret;
>  
> -	len = ceph_decode_32(p);
> -	*p += len; /* skip description */
> +	ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, out_bad);
> +	/* skip description */
> +	ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, out_bad);
>  
>  	dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__,
>  	     ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie,
>  	     ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr));
>  	return 0;
> +out_bad:
> +	return -EINVAL;
>  }
>  
>  static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v2] ceph: fix bare ceph_decode_8 OOB in decode_lockers()
  2026-05-28 18:14     ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
@ 2026-05-28 18:17       ` Pavitra Jha
  2026-06-02  5:02       ` [PATCH v3] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker() Pavitra Jha
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Pavitra Jha @ 2026-05-28 18:17 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Slava.Dubeyko; +Cc: idryomov, amarkuze, ceph-devel, linux-kernel, stable

Hi Slava,

Sorry for the confusion here.

The original patch fixing:

*num_lockers = ceph_decode_32(p);

and the later fix for:

*type = ceph_decode_8(p);

were intended as two separate incremental fixes, 

not as replacement versions of the same patch.

I mistakenly labeled the second one as "[PATCH v2]" and also 

sent it as a separate thread, which made the relationship unclear.

I'll resend this properly as a clean patch series.

Thanks,
Pavitra

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* [PATCH v3] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
  2026-05-28 18:14     ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
  2026-05-28 18:17       ` [PATCH v2] ceph: fix bare ceph_decode_8 OOB in decode_lockers() Pavitra Jha
@ 2026-06-02  5:02       ` Pavitra Jha
  2026-08-07 15:15         ` Pavitra Jha
  1 sibling, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Pavitra Jha @ 2026-06-02  5:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: idryomov, Slava.Dubeyko; +Cc: ceph-devel, linux-kernel, stable, Pavitra Jha

decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
slab-out-of-bounds reads:

1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
   bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
   struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
   the validated buffer boundary.

2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
   is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p
   past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a
   bogus boundary.

3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the
   immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can
   send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping
   the decode window entirely.

Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
  ceph_decode_copy   -> ceph_decode_copy_safe
  *p += sizeof(...)  -> ceph_decode_skip_n
  ceph_decode_32(p)  -> ceph_decode_32_safe
  *p += len          -> ceph_decode_skip_n

A new out_bad: label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds
violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD
is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode
contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault.

KASAN report (kernel 7.0.0-rc7, QEMU/x86_64, KASLR disabled):

  [   26.183969] ceph_oob4_poc: buf=ffff888009e31000 end=ffff888009e31fa0
  [   26.186087] ceph_oob4_poc: struct_v=1 struct_len=0 p==end: 1
  [   26.186738] ceph_oob4_poc: triggering bare ceph_decode_32 past slab boundary...
  [   26.187679] ==================================================================
  [   26.188236] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
  [   26.188236] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009e31fa0 by task insmod/59
  [   26.188236] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 59 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O        7.0.0-rc7-g9c2abf69da83-dirty #15 PREEMPT(lazy)
  [   26.188236] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
  [   26.188236] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
  [   26.188236] Call Trace:
  [   26.188236]  <TASK>
  [   26.188236]  dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70
  [   26.188236]  print_report+0x170/0x4f3
  [   26.188236]  kasan_report+0xda/0x110
  [   26.188236]  ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
  [   26.188236]  do_one_initcall+0x9a/0x3a0
  [   26.188236]  do_init_module+0x27c/0x790
  [   26.188236]  load_module+0x4a9a/0x6350
  [   26.188236]  init_module_from_file+0x15c/0x180
  [   26.188236]  idempotent_init_module+0x21f/0x750
  [   26.188236]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0xba/0x120
  [   26.188236]  do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570
  [   26.188236]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
  [   26.188236]  </TASK>
  [   26.188236] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009e31000
  [   26.188236]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
  [   26.188236] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
  [   26.188236]  allocated 4000-byte region [ffff888009e31000, ffff888009e31fa0)
  [   26.188236]  ffff888009e31f80: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   26.188236]                                ^
  [   26.188236]  ffff888009e32000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
  [   26.188236] ==================================================================
  [   26.255513] ceph_oob4_poc: len=0xcccccccc (OOB garbage from KASAN redzone)

  0xCCCCCCCC is KASAN redzone poison, confirming the read landed in
  the slab redzone immediately past the 4000-byte allocation.

Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition)
without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.

Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
---
v3: Split ceph_decode_copy_safe call to fit 80-column limit,
    per Viacheslav Dubeyko's review of v2.
v2: Move inline comments above ceph_decode_skip_n calls, rename
    label bad -> out_bad, per Viacheslav Dubeyko's review.
---
 net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 13 +++++++++----
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
index 4e6a6d3e4..79a449897 100644
--- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
@@ -259,7 +259,8 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name));
+	ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name,
+			      sizeof(locker->id.name), out_bad);
 	s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO);
 	if (IS_ERR(s))
 		return PTR_ERR(s);
@@ -270,19 +271,23 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	*p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */
+	/* skip expiration */
+	ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), out_bad);
 
 	ret = ceph_decode_entity_addr(p, end, &locker->info.addr);
 	if (ret)
 		return ret;
 
-	len = ceph_decode_32(p);
-	*p += len; /* skip description */
+	ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, out_bad);
+	/* skip description */
+	ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, out_bad);
 
 	dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__,
 	     ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie,
 	     ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr));
 	return 0;
+out_bad:
+	return -EINVAL;
 }
 
 static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
-- 
2.53.0


^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v3] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
  2026-06-02  5:02       ` [PATCH v3] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker() Pavitra Jha
@ 2026-08-07 15:15         ` Pavitra Jha
  2026-08-07 18:13           ` Ilya Dryomov
  2026-08-12 19:53           ` Ilya Dryomov
  0 siblings, 2 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Pavitra Jha @ 2026-08-07 15:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: idryomov, Slava.Dubeyko; +Cc: ceph-devel, linux-kernel, stable

Ilya,

This has been Reviewed-by'd by Slava since Jun 2 (v3), no outstanding
comments or NACKs on this one. It's been quiet for two months now.
Any blocker to applying, or should I rebase and resend?

thanks,
Pavitra

On Tue, 2 Jun 2026 at 10:32, Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
> operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
> slab-out-of-bounds reads:
>
> 1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
>    bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
>    struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
>    the validated buffer boundary.
>
> 2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
>    is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p
>    past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a
>    bogus boundary.
>
> 3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the
>    immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can
>    send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping
>    the decode window entirely.
>
> Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
>   ceph_decode_copy   -> ceph_decode_copy_safe
>   *p += sizeof(...)  -> ceph_decode_skip_n
>   ceph_decode_32(p)  -> ceph_decode_32_safe
>   *p += len          -> ceph_decode_skip_n
>
> A new out_bad: label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds
> violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD
> is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode
> contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault.
>
> KASAN report (kernel 7.0.0-rc7, QEMU/x86_64, KASLR disabled):
>
>   [   26.183969] ceph_oob4_poc: buf=ffff888009e31000 end=ffff888009e31fa0
>   [   26.186087] ceph_oob4_poc: struct_v=1 struct_len=0 p==end: 1
>   [   26.186738] ceph_oob4_poc: triggering bare ceph_decode_32 past slab boundary...
>   [   26.187679] ==================================================================
>   [   26.188236] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
>   [   26.188236] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009e31fa0 by task insmod/59
>   [   26.188236] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 59 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O        7.0.0-rc7-g9c2abf69da83-dirty #15 PREEMPT(lazy)
>   [   26.188236] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
>   [   26.188236] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
>   [   26.188236] Call Trace:
>   [   26.188236]  <TASK>
>   [   26.188236]  dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70
>   [   26.188236]  print_report+0x170/0x4f3
>   [   26.188236]  kasan_report+0xda/0x110
>   [   26.188236]  ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
>   [   26.188236]  do_one_initcall+0x9a/0x3a0
>   [   26.188236]  do_init_module+0x27c/0x790
>   [   26.188236]  load_module+0x4a9a/0x6350
>   [   26.188236]  init_module_from_file+0x15c/0x180
>   [   26.188236]  idempotent_init_module+0x21f/0x750
>   [   26.188236]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0xba/0x120
>   [   26.188236]  do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570
>   [   26.188236]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
>   [   26.188236]  </TASK>
>   [   26.188236] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009e31000
>   [   26.188236]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
>   [   26.188236] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
>   [   26.188236]  allocated 4000-byte region [ffff888009e31000, ffff888009e31fa0)
>   [   26.188236]  ffff888009e31f80: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>   [   26.188236]                                ^
>   [   26.188236]  ffff888009e32000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
>   [   26.188236] ==================================================================
>   [   26.255513] ceph_oob4_poc: len=0xcccccccc (OOB garbage from KASAN redzone)
>
>   0xCCCCCCCC is KASAN redzone poison, confirming the read landed in
>   the slab redzone immediately past the 4000-byte allocation.
>
> Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
> deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
> lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition)
> without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.
>
> Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
> ---
> v3: Split ceph_decode_copy_safe call to fit 80-column limit,
>     per Viacheslav Dubeyko's review of v2.
> v2: Move inline comments above ceph_decode_skip_n calls, rename
>     label bad -> out_bad, per Viacheslav Dubeyko's review.
> ---
>  net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 13 +++++++++----
>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> index 4e6a6d3e4..79a449897 100644
> --- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> +++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> @@ -259,7 +259,8 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
>         if (ret)
>                 return ret;
>
> -       ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name));
> +       ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name,
> +                             sizeof(locker->id.name), out_bad);
>         s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO);
>         if (IS_ERR(s))
>                 return PTR_ERR(s);
> @@ -270,19 +271,23 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
>         if (ret)
>                 return ret;
>
> -       *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */
> +       /* skip expiration */
> +       ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), out_bad);
>
>         ret = ceph_decode_entity_addr(p, end, &locker->info.addr);
>         if (ret)
>                 return ret;
>
> -       len = ceph_decode_32(p);
> -       *p += len; /* skip description */
> +       ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, out_bad);
> +       /* skip description */
> +       ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, out_bad);
>
>         dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__,
>              ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie,
>              ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr));
>         return 0;
> +out_bad:
> +       return -EINVAL;
>  }
>
>  static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
> --
> 2.53.0
>

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v3] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
  2026-08-07 15:15         ` Pavitra Jha
@ 2026-08-07 18:13           ` Ilya Dryomov
  2026-08-12 19:53           ` Ilya Dryomov
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Ilya Dryomov @ 2026-08-07 18:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Pavitra Jha; +Cc: Slava.Dubeyko, ceph-devel, linux-kernel, stable

On Fri, Aug 7, 2026 at 5:15 PM Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Ilya,
>
> This has been Reviewed-by'd by Slava since Jun 2 (v3), no outstanding
> comments or NACKs on this one. It's been quiet for two months now.
> Any blocker to applying, or should I rebase and resend?

Hi Pavitra,

Sorry, no need to resend.  Slava forgot to add this patch to our
integration branch like he did another similar patch of yours which
is already upstream -- "libceph: fix two unsafe bare decodes in
decode_lockers()".  I'll eventually scrub the list and pick up anything
that was missed this way, at this point likely into 7.3.

Thanks,

                Ilya

>
> thanks,
> Pavitra
>
> On Tue, 2 Jun 2026 at 10:32, Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
> > operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
> > slab-out-of-bounds reads:
> >
> > 1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
> >    bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
> >    struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
> >    the validated buffer boundary.
> >
> > 2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
> >    is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p
> >    past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a
> >    bogus boundary.
> >
> > 3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the
> >    immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can
> >    send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping
> >    the decode window entirely.
> >
> > Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
> >   ceph_decode_copy   -> ceph_decode_copy_safe
> >   *p += sizeof(...)  -> ceph_decode_skip_n
> >   ceph_decode_32(p)  -> ceph_decode_32_safe
> >   *p += len          -> ceph_decode_skip_n
> >
> > A new out_bad: label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds
> > violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD
> > is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode
> > contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault.
> >
> > KASAN report (kernel 7.0.0-rc7, QEMU/x86_64, KASLR disabled):
> >
> >   [   26.183969] ceph_oob4_poc: buf=ffff888009e31000 end=ffff888009e31fa0
> >   [   26.186087] ceph_oob4_poc: struct_v=1 struct_len=0 p==end: 1
> >   [   26.186738] ceph_oob4_poc: triggering bare ceph_decode_32 past slab boundary...
> >   [   26.187679] ==================================================================
> >   [   26.188236] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
> >   [   26.188236] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009e31fa0 by task insmod/59
> >   [   26.188236] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 59 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O        7.0.0-rc7-g9c2abf69da83-dirty #15 PREEMPT(lazy)
> >   [   26.188236] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
> >   [   26.188236] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
> >   [   26.188236] Call Trace:
> >   [   26.188236]  <TASK>
> >   [   26.188236]  dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70
> >   [   26.188236]  print_report+0x170/0x4f3
> >   [   26.188236]  kasan_report+0xda/0x110
> >   [   26.188236]  ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
> >   [   26.188236]  do_one_initcall+0x9a/0x3a0
> >   [   26.188236]  do_init_module+0x27c/0x790
> >   [   26.188236]  load_module+0x4a9a/0x6350
> >   [   26.188236]  init_module_from_file+0x15c/0x180
> >   [   26.188236]  idempotent_init_module+0x21f/0x750
> >   [   26.188236]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0xba/0x120
> >   [   26.188236]  do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570
> >   [   26.188236]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
> >   [   26.188236]  </TASK>
> >   [   26.188236] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009e31000
> >   [   26.188236]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
> >   [   26.188236] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
> >   [   26.188236]  allocated 4000-byte region [ffff888009e31000, ffff888009e31fa0)
> >   [   26.188236]  ffff888009e31f80: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> >   [   26.188236]                                ^
> >   [   26.188236]  ffff888009e32000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> >   [   26.188236] ==================================================================
> >   [   26.255513] ceph_oob4_poc: len=0xcccccccc (OOB garbage from KASAN redzone)
> >
> >   0xCCCCCCCC is KASAN redzone poison, confirming the read landed in
> >   the slab redzone immediately past the 4000-byte allocation.
> >
> > Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
> > deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
> > lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition)
> > without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.
> >
> > Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > v3: Split ceph_decode_copy_safe call to fit 80-column limit,
> >     per Viacheslav Dubeyko's review of v2.
> > v2: Move inline comments above ceph_decode_skip_n calls, rename
> >     label bad -> out_bad, per Viacheslav Dubeyko's review.
> > ---
> >  net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 13 +++++++++----
> >  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> > index 4e6a6d3e4..79a449897 100644
> > --- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> > +++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> > @@ -259,7 +259,8 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
> >         if (ret)
> >                 return ret;
> >
> > -       ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name));
> > +       ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name,
> > +                             sizeof(locker->id.name), out_bad);
> >         s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO);
> >         if (IS_ERR(s))
> >                 return PTR_ERR(s);
> > @@ -270,19 +271,23 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
> >         if (ret)
> >                 return ret;
> >
> > -       *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */
> > +       /* skip expiration */
> > +       ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), out_bad);
> >
> >         ret = ceph_decode_entity_addr(p, end, &locker->info.addr);
> >         if (ret)
> >                 return ret;
> >
> > -       len = ceph_decode_32(p);
> > -       *p += len; /* skip description */
> > +       ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, out_bad);
> > +       /* skip description */
> > +       ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, out_bad);
> >
> >         dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__,
> >              ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie,
> >              ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr));
> >         return 0;
> > +out_bad:
> > +       return -EINVAL;
> >  }
> >
> >  static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
> > --
> > 2.53.0
> >

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH v3] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker()
  2026-08-07 15:15         ` Pavitra Jha
  2026-08-07 18:13           ` Ilya Dryomov
@ 2026-08-12 19:53           ` Ilya Dryomov
  1 sibling, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Ilya Dryomov @ 2026-08-12 19:53 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: Pavitra Jha; +Cc: Slava.Dubeyko, ceph-devel, linux-kernel, stable

On Fri, Aug 7, 2026 at 5:15 PM Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> Ilya,
>
> This has been Reviewed-by'd by Slava since Jun 2 (v3), no outstanding
> comments or NACKs on this one. It's been quiet for two months now.
> Any blocker to applying, or should I rebase and resend?

Hi Pavitra,

On a second look, I didn't see an actual Reviewed-by tag from Slava
on any of the revisions, so formally this patch was still unreviewed.
I went ahead and reviewed it myself, it's now applied with a small
modification to use ceph_decode_skip_string() helper instead of two
separate calls to ceph_decode_32_safe() and ceph_decode_skip_n():

https://github.com/ceph/ceph-client/commit/437b6551cfcc235eea1d735a874f9d421f555e17

Thanks,

                Ilya

>
> thanks,
> Pavitra
>
> On Tue, 2 Jun 2026 at 10:32, Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com> wrote:
> >
> > decode_locker() in cls_lock_client.c contains three unsafe decode
> > operations that allow a malicious or compromised OSD to trigger
> > slab-out-of-bounds reads:
> >
> > 1. ceph_decode_copy() at the locker_id_t name field has no preceding
> >    bounds check. With p == end after ceph_start_decoding() accepts
> >    struct_len=0, this reads sizeof(ceph_entity_name) = 9 bytes past
> >    the validated buffer boundary.
> >
> > 2. *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec) after the locker_info_t header
> >    is an unchecked pointer advance. A malicious OSD can position p
> >    past end, causing all subsequent _safe checks to pass against a
> >    bogus boundary.
> >
> > 3. len = ceph_decode_32(p) has no preceding bounds check, and the
> >    immediately following *p += len is uncapped. A malicious OSD can
> >    send len=0xffffffff, advancing p gigabytes past end and escaping
> >    the decode window entirely.
> >
> > Fix all three by replacing bare operations with their safe variants:
> >   ceph_decode_copy   -> ceph_decode_copy_safe
> >   *p += sizeof(...)  -> ceph_decode_skip_n
> >   ceph_decode_32(p)  -> ceph_decode_32_safe
> >   *p += len          -> ceph_decode_skip_n
> >
> > A new out_bad: label is added to return -EINVAL on any bounds
> > violation. -EINVAL is appropriate here: the data received from the OSD
> > is structurally malformed, which is an invalid argument to the decode
> > contract regardless of whether the caller or the wire is at fault.
> >
> > KASAN report (kernel 7.0.0-rc7, QEMU/x86_64, KASLR disabled):
> >
> >   [   26.183969] ceph_oob4_poc: buf=ffff888009e31000 end=ffff888009e31fa0
> >   [   26.186087] ceph_oob4_poc: struct_v=1 struct_len=0 p==end: 1
> >   [   26.186738] ceph_oob4_poc: triggering bare ceph_decode_32 past slab boundary...
> >   [   26.187679] ==================================================================
> >   [   26.188236] BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
> >   [   26.188236] Read of size 4 at addr ffff888009e31fa0 by task insmod/59
> >   [   26.188236] CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 59 Comm: insmod Tainted: G           O        7.0.0-rc7-g9c2abf69da83-dirty #15 PREEMPT(lazy)
> >   [   26.188236] Tainted: [O]=OOT_MODULE
> >   [   26.188236] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.17.0-debian-1.17.0-1 04/01/2014
> >   [   26.188236] Call Trace:
> >   [   26.188236]  <TASK>
> >   [   26.188236]  dump_stack_lvl+0x4d/0x70
> >   [   26.188236]  print_report+0x170/0x4f3
> >   [   26.188236]  kasan_report+0xda/0x110
> >   [   26.188236]  ceph_oob4_init+0x22b/0xff0 [ceph_oob4_poc]
> >   [   26.188236]  do_one_initcall+0x9a/0x3a0
> >   [   26.188236]  do_init_module+0x27c/0x790
> >   [   26.188236]  load_module+0x4a9a/0x6350
> >   [   26.188236]  init_module_from_file+0x15c/0x180
> >   [   26.188236]  idempotent_init_module+0x21f/0x750
> >   [   26.188236]  __x64_sys_finit_module+0xba/0x120
> >   [   26.188236]  do_syscall_64+0xe2/0x570
> >   [   26.188236]  entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
> >   [   26.188236]  </TASK>
> >   [   26.188236] The buggy address belongs to the object at ffff888009e31000
> >   [   26.188236]  which belongs to the cache kmalloc-4k of size 4096
> >   [   26.188236] The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of
> >   [   26.188236]  allocated 4000-byte region [ffff888009e31000, ffff888009e31fa0)
> >   [   26.188236]  ffff888009e31f80: 00 00 00 00 fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> >   [   26.188236]                                ^
> >   [   26.188236]  ffff888009e32000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
> >   [   26.188236] ==================================================================
> >   [   26.255513] ceph_oob4_poc: len=0xcccccccc (OOB garbage from KASAN redzone)
> >
> >   0xCCCCCCCC is KASAN redzone poison, confirming the read landed in
> >   the slab redzone immediately past the 4000-byte allocation.
> >
> > Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
> > deployment can trigger this against any kernel client that issues the
> > lock.get_info class method (e.g. during RBD exclusive lock acquisition)
> > without any further privileges beyond OSD session establishment.
> >
> > Fixes: d4ed4a530562 ("libceph: support for lock.lock_info")
> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> > Signed-off-by: Pavitra Jha <jhapavitra98@gmail.com>
> > ---
> > v3: Split ceph_decode_copy_safe call to fit 80-column limit,
> >     per Viacheslav Dubeyko's review of v2.
> > v2: Move inline comments above ceph_decode_skip_n calls, rename
> >     label bad -> out_bad, per Viacheslav Dubeyko's review.
> > ---
> >  net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c | 13 +++++++++----
> >  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> > index 4e6a6d3e4..79a449897 100644
> > --- a/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> > +++ b/net/ceph/cls_lock_client.c
> > @@ -259,7 +259,8 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
> >         if (ret)
> >                 return ret;
> >
> > -       ceph_decode_copy(p, &locker->id.name, sizeof(locker->id.name));
> > +       ceph_decode_copy_safe(p, end, &locker->id.name,
> > +                             sizeof(locker->id.name), out_bad);
> >         s = ceph_extract_encoded_string(p, end, NULL, GFP_NOIO);
> >         if (IS_ERR(s))
> >                 return PTR_ERR(s);
> > @@ -270,19 +271,23 @@ static int decode_locker(void **p, void *end, struct ceph_locker *locker)
> >         if (ret)
> >                 return ret;
> >
> > -       *p += sizeof(struct ceph_timespec); /* skip expiration */
> > +       /* skip expiration */
> > +       ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, sizeof(struct ceph_timespec), out_bad);
> >
> >         ret = ceph_decode_entity_addr(p, end, &locker->info.addr);
> >         if (ret)
> >                 return ret;
> >
> > -       len = ceph_decode_32(p);
> > -       *p += len; /* skip description */
> > +       ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end, len, out_bad);
> > +       /* skip description */
> > +       ceph_decode_skip_n(p, end, len, out_bad);
> >
> >         dout("%s %s%llu cookie %s addr %s\n", __func__,
> >              ENTITY_NAME(locker->id.name), locker->id.cookie,
> >              ceph_pr_addr(&locker->info.addr));
> >         return 0;
> > +out_bad:
> > +       return -EINVAL;
> >  }
> >
> >  static int decode_lockers(void **p, void *end, u8 *type, char **tag,
> > --
> > 2.53.0
> >

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2026-08-12 19:53 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-05-23  8:59 [PATCH] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker() Pavitra Jha
2026-05-26 19:18 ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
2026-05-28 13:01   ` [PATCH v2] " Pavitra Jha
2026-05-28 18:14     ` Viacheslav Dubeyko
2026-05-28 18:17       ` [PATCH v2] ceph: fix bare ceph_decode_8 OOB in decode_lockers() Pavitra Jha
2026-06-02  5:02       ` [PATCH v3] ceph: fix multiple unsafe decodes in decode_locker() Pavitra Jha
2026-08-07 15:15         ` Pavitra Jha
2026-08-07 18:13           ` Ilya Dryomov
2026-08-12 19:53           ` Ilya Dryomov

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