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From: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
To: LKML <linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org>
Cc: "Mathieu Desnoyers" <mathieu.desnoyers@efficios.com>,
	"André Almeida" <andrealmeid@igalia.com>,
	"Sebastian Andrzej Siewior" <bigeasy@linutronix.de>,
	"Carlos O'Donell" <carlos@redhat.com>,
	"Peter Zijlstra" <peterz@infradead.org>,
	"Florian Weimer" <fweimer@redhat.com>,
	"Rich Felker" <dalias@aerifal.cx>,
	"Torvald Riegel" <triegel@redhat.com>,
	"Darren Hart" <dvhart@infradead.org>,
	"Ingo Molnar" <mingo@kernel.org>,
	"Davidlohr Bueso" <dave@stgolabs.net>,
	"Arnd Bergmann" <arnd@arndb.de>,
	"Liam R . Howlett" <Liam.Howlett@oracle.com>,
	"Uros Bizjak" <ubizjak@gmail.com>,
	"Thomas Weißschuh" <linux@weissschuh.net>,
	"Mark Brown" <broonie@kernel.org>,
	"Richard Weinberger" <richard@nod.at>
Subject: [patch V5 14/16] Documentation: futex: Add a note about robust list race condition
Date: Tue, 02 Jun 2026 11:10:16 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260602090535.936286833@kernel.org> (raw)
In-Reply-To: 20260602084648.462672743@kernel.org

From: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>

Add a note to the documentation giving a brief explanation why doing a
robust futex release in userspace is racy, what should be done to avoid
it and provide links to read more.

[ tglx: Fixed a few typos ]

Signed-off-by: André Almeida <andrealmeid@igalia.com>
Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@kernel.org>
Link: https://patch.msgid.link/20260329-tonyk-vdso_test-v2-1-b7db810e44a1@igalia.com

---
 Documentation/locking/robust-futex-ABI.rst |   44 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 44 insertions(+)
--- a/Documentation/locking/robust-futex-ABI.rst
+++ b/Documentation/locking/robust-futex-ABI.rst
@@ -153,6 +153,9 @@ manipulating this list), the user code m
  3) release the futex lock, and
  4) clear the 'lock_op_pending' word.
 
+Please note that the removal of a robust futex purely in userspace is
+racy. Refer to the next chapter to learn more and how to avoid this.
+
 On exit, the kernel will consider the address stored in
 'list_op_pending' and the address of each 'lock word' found by walking
 the list starting at 'head'.  For each such address, if the bottom 30
@@ -182,3 +185,44 @@ The kernel exit code will silently stop
 When the kernel sees a list entry whose 'lock word' doesn't have the
 current threads TID in the lower 30 bits, it does nothing with that
 entry, and goes on to the next entry.
+
+Robust release is racy
+----------------------
+
+The removal of a robust futex from the list is racy when doing it solely in
+userspace. Quoting Thomas Gleixner for the explanation:
+
+  The robust futex unlock mechanism is racy in respect to the clearing of the
+  robust_list_head::list_op_pending pointer because unlock and clearing the
+  pointer are not atomic. The race window is between the unlock and clearing
+  the pending op pointer. If the task is forced to exit in this window, exit
+  will access a potentially invalid pending op pointer when cleaning up the
+  robust list. That happens if another task manages to unmap the object
+  containing the lock before the cleanup, which results in an UAF. In the
+  worst case this UAF can lead to memory corruption when unrelated content
+  has been mapped to the same address by the time the access happens.
+
+A full in-depth analysis can be read at
+https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20260316162316.356674433@kernel.org/
+
+To overcome that, the kernel needs to participate in the lock release operation.
+This ensures that the release happens "atomically" with regard to releasing
+the lock and removing the address from ``list_op_pending``. If the release is
+interrupted by a signal, the kernel will also verify if it interrupted the
+release operation.
+
+For the contended unlock case, where other threads are waiting for the lock
+release, there's the ``FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK`` operation feature flag for the
+``futex()`` system call, which must be used with one of the following
+operations: ``FUTEX_WAKE``, ``FUTEX_WAKE_BITSET`` or ``FUTEX_UNLOCK_PI``.
+The kernel will release the lock (set the futex word to zero), clean the
+``list_op_pending`` field. Then, it will proceed with the normal wake path.
+
+For the non-contended path, there's still a race between checking the futex word
+and clearing the ``list_op_pending`` field. To solve this without the need of a
+complete system call, userspace should call the virtual syscall
+``__vdso_futex_robust_listXX_try_unlock()`` (where XX is either 32 or 64,
+depending on the size of the pointer). If the vDSO call succeeds, it means that
+it released the lock and cleared ``list_op_pending``. If it fails, that means
+that there are waiters for this lock and a call to ``futex()`` syscall with
+``FUTEX_ROBUST_UNLOCK`` is needed.


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-06-02  9:10 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-02  9:09 [patch V5 00/16] futex: Address the robust futex unlock race for real Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:09 ` [patch V5 01/16] percpu: Sanitize __percpu_qual include hell Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:25   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:09 ` [patch V5 02/16] futex: Move futex task related data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:25   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:09 ` [patch V5 03/16] futex: Make futex_mm_init() void Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:25   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:09 ` [patch V5 04/16] futex: Move futex related mm_struct data into a struct Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:25   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:09 ` [patch V5 05/16] futex: Provide UABI defines for robust list entry modifiers Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:25   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:09 ` [patch V5 06/16] uaccess: Provide unsafe_atomic_store_release_user() Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:24   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:09 ` [patch V5 07/16] x86: Select ARCH_MEMORY_ORDER_TSO Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:24   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:09 ` [patch V5 08/16] futex: Cleanup UAPI defines Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:24   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:09 ` [patch V5 09/16] futex: Add support for unlocking robust futexes Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03  8:22   ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-06-03  9:30     ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-06-03 14:40     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03  8:35   ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-06-03 14:24   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:09 ` [patch V5 10/16] futex: Add robust futex unlock IP range Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:24   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:10 ` [patch V5 11/16] futex: Provide infrastructure to plug the non contended robust futex unlock race Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03  8:42   ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-06-03  9:14   ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-06-03 14:47     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03  9:23   ` Peter Zijlstra
2026-06-03 14:42     ` Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:24   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:10 ` [patch V5 12/16] x86/vdso: Prepare for robust futex unlock support Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:24   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:10 ` [patch V5 13/16] x86/vdso: Implement __vdso_futex_robust_try_unlock() Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:24   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02  9:10 ` Thomas Gleixner [this message]
2026-06-03 14:24   ` [tip: locking/core] Documentation: futex: Add a note about robust list race condition tip-bot2 for André Almeida
2026-06-02  9:10 ` [patch V5 15/16] selftests: futex: Add tests for robust release operations Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-03 14:24   ` [tip: locking/core] " tip-bot2 for André Almeida
2026-06-02  9:10 ` [patch V5 16/16] [RFC] vdso, x86: Expose vdso.so.dbg through sysfs Thomas Gleixner
2026-06-02 10:39   ` Thomas Weißschuh
2026-06-02 20:02     ` Thomas Gleixner

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