* [PATCH v3 0/3] f2fs: support encrypted inline data
@ 2026-06-15 12:55 LiaoYuanhong-vivo
2026-06-15 12:55 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] fscrypt: prepare software keys for filesystem-managed data units LiaoYuanhong-vivo
` (3 more replies)
0 siblings, 4 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: LiaoYuanhong-vivo @ 2026-06-15 12:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jaegeuk Kim, Chao Yu, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan, Eric Biggers,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, open list:F2FS FILE SYSTEM, open list,
open list:DOCUMENTATION,
open list:FSCRYPT: FILE SYSTEM LEVEL ENCRYPTION SUPPORT
Cc: LiaoYuanhong-vivo
F2FS currently disables inline data for encrypted regular files because the
inline payload is stored in the inode block and does not go through the
regular bio-based fscrypt path. This wastes space for small encrypted
files on Android devices using F2FS inlinecrypt.
This series adds an encrypted_inline_data on-disk feature for F2FS.
With this feature enabled, encrypted regular files may keep small contents
in the inode block. The inline payload is encrypted before being stored in
the inode and decrypted back into page-cache plaintext on read.
The fscrypt changes are scoped to filesystem-managed data-unit crypto.
F2FS first asks fscrypt whether the inode's key/policy supports this path.
It prepares the software transform only when encrypted inline payloads are
read or written. Inlinecrypt support is limited to v2 IV_INO_LBLK_64 and
IV_INO_LBLK_32 policies, including the hardware-wrapped key configurations
supported by fscrypt. Per-file inlinecrypt keys and DIRECT_KEY policies
are not supported for encrypted inline data.
The basic encrypted inline-data tests pass. The test creates encrypted
small files and verifies that they retain inline data. It also checks
normal read/write correctness and confirms from the raw inode block that
the inline payload does not contain plaintext.
Changes in v3:
- Support fscrypt's v2 IV_INO_LBLK_64/32 hardware-wrapped key
configurations.
- Drop DIRECT_KEY support for encrypted inline data.
- Refresh comments and documentation for the updated key support matrix.
LiaoYuanhong-vivo (3):
fscrypt: prepare software keys for filesystem-managed data units
f2fs: support encrypted inline data
Documentation: f2fs: document encrypted inline data
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-fs-f2fs | 5 +-
Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst | 30 ++++
fs/crypto/crypto.c | 47 +++++++
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 3 +-
fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 174 ++++++++++++++++++++++++
fs/f2fs/Kconfig | 14 ++
fs/f2fs/data.c | 8 +-
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 37 ++++-
fs/f2fs/file.c | 24 +++-
fs/f2fs/inline.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++--
fs/f2fs/super.c | 12 ++
fs/f2fs/sysfs.c | 8 ++
include/linux/fscrypt.h | 24 ++++
13 files changed, 497 insertions(+), 23 deletions(-)
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 1/3] fscrypt: prepare software keys for filesystem-managed data units
2026-06-15 12:55 [PATCH v3 0/3] f2fs: support encrypted inline data LiaoYuanhong-vivo
@ 2026-06-15 12:55 ` LiaoYuanhong-vivo
2026-06-15 12:55 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] f2fs: support encrypted inline data LiaoYuanhong-vivo
` (2 subsequent siblings)
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: LiaoYuanhong-vivo @ 2026-06-15 12:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Eric Biggers, Theodore Y. Ts'o, Jaegeuk Kim,
open list:FSCRYPT: FILE SYSTEM LEVEL ENCRYPTION SUPPORT,
open list
Cc: LiaoYuanhong-vivo
Some filesystems store small data regions inside filesystem metadata rather
than submitting them through the normal bio path. F2FS inline data is one
such case. When encrypted file contents normally use blk-crypto, these
filesystem-managed regions still need software fscrypt handling because no
data bio is submitted for them.
Add helpers for this case. fscrypt_supports_data_unit_inplace() lets a
filesystem check whether an inode's current key and policy can support this
path without preparing a software transform.
fscrypt_prepare_data_unit_inplace() prepares the transform when the
filesystem actually needs to read or write such a region.
fscrypt_crypt_data_unit_inplace() encrypts or decrypts an in-page region by
fscrypt data-unit size.
Inlinecrypt support is limited to v2 IV_INO_LBLK_64 and IV_INO_LBLK_32
policies, including hardware-wrapped key configurations supported by
fscrypt. Per-file inlinecrypt keys and DIRECT_KEY policies are not
supported for this path.
Signed-off-by: LiaoYuanhong-vivo <liaoyuanhong@vivo.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Support fscrypt's v2 IV_INO_LBLK_64/32 hardware-wrapped key
configurations.
- Drop DIRECT_KEY support.
fs/crypto/crypto.c | 47 ++++++++++
fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h | 3 +-
fs/crypto/keysetup.c | 174 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
include/linux/fscrypt.h | 24 +++++
4 files changed, 247 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/fs/crypto/crypto.c b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
index 570a2231c945..c4f3ad8f82c9 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/crypto.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/crypto.c
@@ -208,6 +208,53 @@ struct page *fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct folio *folio,
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks);
+/**
+ * fscrypt_crypt_data_unit_inplace() - En/decrypt data units in-place
+ * @inode: The inode to which these data units belong
+ * @page: The page containing the data units to en/decrypt
+ * @len: Size of the region to en/decrypt. This must be a multiple of
+ * FSCRYPT_CONTENTS_ALIGNMENT.
+ * @offs: Byte offset within @page at which the region begins
+ * @index: Fscrypt data unit index of the start of the region
+ * @encrypt: True to encrypt, false to decrypt
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success; -errno on failure
+ */
+int fscrypt_crypt_data_unit_inplace(const struct inode *inode,
+ struct page *page, unsigned int len,
+ unsigned int offs, u64 index, bool encrypt)
+{
+ const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode);
+ unsigned int du_size;
+ unsigned int i;
+ int err;
+
+ /*
+ * Pairs with the smp_store_release() that publishes ->tfm after the
+ * software transform has been fully initialized.
+ */
+ if (!ci || !smp_load_acquire(&ci->ci_enc_key.tfm))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ du_size = 1U << ci->ci_data_unit_bits;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(len <= 0))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!IS_ALIGNED(len | offs, FSCRYPT_CONTENTS_ALIGNMENT)))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i += du_size, index++) {
+ unsigned int todo = min(du_size, len - i);
+
+ err = fscrypt_crypt_data_unit(ci,
+ encrypt ? FS_ENCRYPT : FS_DECRYPT,
+ index, page, page, todo, offs + i);
+ if (err)
+ return err;
+ }
+ return 0;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL(fscrypt_crypt_data_unit_inplace);
+
/**
* fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace() - Encrypt a filesystem block in-place
* @inode: The inode to which this block belongs
diff --git a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
index 8d3c278a7591..b5c0b881fd4b 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
+++ b/fs/crypto/fscrypt_private.h
@@ -236,7 +236,8 @@ struct fscrypt_symlink_data {
* @tfm: crypto API transform object
* @blk_key: key for blk-crypto
*
- * Normally only one of the fields will be non-NULL.
+ * Most users need only one prepared form. Inline-crypto users that also need
+ * filesystem-layer software crypto for non-bio data regions may prepare both.
*/
struct fscrypt_prepared_key {
struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm;
diff --git a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
index ce327bfdada4..399b442578cc 100644
--- a/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
+++ b/fs/crypto/keysetup.c
@@ -400,6 +400,180 @@ static int fscrypt_setup_v2_file_key(struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
return 0;
}
+static int fscrypt_prepare_data_unit_inplace_software_key(
+ struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key,
+ const u8 *raw_key,
+ const struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci)
+{
+ struct crypto_sync_skcipher *tfm;
+
+ /* Pairs with the smp_store_release() below. */
+ if (smp_load_acquire(&prep_key->tfm))
+ return 0;
+ tfm = fscrypt_allocate_skcipher(ci->ci_mode, raw_key, ci->ci_inode);
+ if (IS_ERR(tfm))
+ return PTR_ERR(tfm);
+ /* Pairs with the smp_load_acquire() above and other ->tfm readers. */
+ smp_store_release(&prep_key->tfm, tfm);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int fscrypt_prepare_per_mode_data_unit_inplace_key(
+ struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci,
+ struct fscrypt_master_key *mk,
+ struct fscrypt_prepared_key *keys,
+ u8 hkdf_context, bool include_fs_uuid)
+{
+ const struct super_block *sb = ci->ci_inode->i_sb;
+ struct fscrypt_mode *mode = ci->ci_mode;
+ const u8 mode_num = mode - fscrypt_modes;
+ struct fscrypt_prepared_key *prep_key;
+ u8 mode_key[FSCRYPT_MAX_RAW_KEY_SIZE];
+ u8 hkdf_info[sizeof(mode_num) + sizeof(sb->s_uuid)];
+ unsigned int hkdf_infolen = 0;
+ int err;
+
+ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(mode_num > FSCRYPT_MODE_MAX))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ prep_key = &keys[mode_num];
+
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(mode_num) != 1);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(sb->s_uuid) != 16);
+ BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(hkdf_info) != 17);
+ hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen++] = mode_num;
+ if (include_fs_uuid) {
+ memcpy(&hkdf_info[hkdf_infolen], &sb->s_uuid,
+ sizeof(sb->s_uuid));
+ hkdf_infolen += sizeof(sb->s_uuid);
+ }
+
+ fscrypt_hkdf_expand(&mk->mk_secret.hkdf, hkdf_context, hkdf_info,
+ hkdf_infolen, mode_key, mode->keysize);
+ err = fscrypt_prepare_data_unit_inplace_software_key(prep_key,
+ mode_key, ci);
+ memzero_explicit(mode_key, mode->keysize);
+ if (!err)
+ ci->ci_enc_key = *prep_key;
+ return err;
+}
+
+/**
+ * fscrypt_supports_data_unit_inplace() - check data-unit crypto support
+ * @inode: an encrypted regular file inode
+ *
+ * Check whether filesystem-managed data regions can use fscrypt contents
+ * encryption for this inode. This path is limited to v2 IV_INO_LBLK
+ * policies, including hardware-wrapped key configurations supported by
+ * fscrypt. Per-file inlinecrypt keys and DIRECT_KEY policies are
+ * unsupported.
+ */
+bool fscrypt_supports_data_unit_inplace(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode);
+ struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
+ u8 flags;
+ bool supported;
+
+ if (!ci)
+ return false;
+ /*
+ * Pairs with the smp_store_release() that publishes ->tfm after the
+ * software transform has been fully initialized.
+ */
+ if (smp_load_acquire(&ci->ci_enc_key.tfm))
+ return true;
+ if (!fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(ci))
+ return false;
+
+ mk = ci->ci_master_key;
+ if (!mk)
+ return false;
+
+ down_read(&mk->mk_sem);
+ if (!mk->mk_present ||
+ ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2) {
+ supported = false;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ flags = ci->ci_policy.v2.flags;
+ supported = flags & (FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64 |
+ FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32);
+out:
+ up_read(&mk->mk_sem);
+ return supported;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_supports_data_unit_inplace);
+
+/**
+ * fscrypt_prepare_data_unit_inplace() - prepare software data-unit crypto
+ * @inode: an encrypted regular file inode
+ *
+ * Prepare the software transform used by filesystem-managed data regions that
+ * need fscrypt contents encryption but do not go through a data bio. If the
+ * inode already uses filesystem-layer encryption, the normal contents key is
+ * already prepared. If the inode uses blk-crypto with a v2 IV_INO_LBLK
+ * policy, this prepares the corresponding software transform for the
+ * filesystem-managed data region.
+ */
+int fscrypt_prepare_data_unit_inplace(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct fscrypt_inode_info *ci = fscrypt_get_inode_info_raw(inode);
+ struct fscrypt_master_key *mk;
+ u8 flags;
+ int err = 0;
+
+ if (!ci)
+ return -ENOKEY;
+ /*
+ * Pairs with the smp_store_release() that publishes ->tfm after the
+ * software transform has been fully initialized.
+ */
+ if (smp_load_acquire(&ci->ci_enc_key.tfm))
+ return 0;
+ if (!fscrypt_using_inline_encryption(ci))
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ mk = ci->ci_master_key;
+ if (!mk)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ down_read(&mk->mk_sem);
+ if (!mk->mk_present) {
+ err = -ENOKEY;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+ if (ci->ci_policy.version != FSCRYPT_POLICY_V2) {
+ err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ goto out_unlock;
+ }
+
+ mutex_lock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex);
+ /* Pairs with fscrypt_prepare_data_unit_inplace_software_key(). */
+ if (smp_load_acquire(&ci->ci_enc_key.tfm))
+ goto out_mutex;
+
+ flags = ci->ci_policy.v2.flags;
+ if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_64) {
+ err = fscrypt_prepare_per_mode_data_unit_inplace_key(ci, mk,
+ mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_64_keys,
+ HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_64_KEY, true);
+ } else if (flags & FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_IV_INO_LBLK_32) {
+ err = fscrypt_prepare_per_mode_data_unit_inplace_key(ci, mk,
+ mk->mk_iv_ino_lblk_32_keys,
+ HKDF_CONTEXT_IV_INO_LBLK_32_KEY, true);
+ } else {
+ err = -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+out_mutex:
+ mutex_unlock(&fscrypt_mode_key_setup_mutex);
+out_unlock:
+ up_read(&mk->mk_sem);
+ return err;
+}
+EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(fscrypt_prepare_data_unit_inplace);
+
/*
* Check whether the size of the given master key (@mk) is appropriate for the
* encryption settings which a particular file will use (@ci).
diff --git a/include/linux/fscrypt.h b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
index 54712ec61ffb..2702bf1018c1 100644
--- a/include/linux/fscrypt.h
+++ b/include/linux/fscrypt.h
@@ -346,6 +346,12 @@ void fscrypt_enqueue_decrypt_work(struct work_struct *);
struct page *fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct folio *folio,
size_t len, size_t offs, gfp_t gfp_flags);
+
+bool fscrypt_supports_data_unit_inplace(const struct inode *inode);
+int fscrypt_prepare_data_unit_inplace(const struct inode *inode);
+int fscrypt_crypt_data_unit_inplace(const struct inode *inode,
+ struct page *page, unsigned int len,
+ unsigned int offs, u64 index, bool encrypt);
int fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode, struct page *page,
unsigned int len, unsigned int offs,
u64 lblk_num);
@@ -519,6 +525,24 @@ static inline struct page *fscrypt_encrypt_pagecache_blocks(struct folio *folio,
return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
}
+static inline bool fscrypt_supports_data_unit_inplace(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return false;
+}
+
+static inline int fscrypt_prepare_data_unit_inplace(const struct inode *inode)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
+static inline int fscrypt_crypt_data_unit_inplace(const struct inode *inode,
+ struct page *page, unsigned int len,
+ unsigned int offs, u64 index,
+ bool encrypt)
+{
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+}
+
static inline int fscrypt_encrypt_block_inplace(const struct inode *inode,
struct page *page,
unsigned int len,
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 2/3] f2fs: support encrypted inline data
2026-06-15 12:55 [PATCH v3 0/3] f2fs: support encrypted inline data LiaoYuanhong-vivo
2026-06-15 12:55 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] fscrypt: prepare software keys for filesystem-managed data units LiaoYuanhong-vivo
@ 2026-06-15 12:55 ` LiaoYuanhong-vivo
2026-06-15 12:55 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] Documentation: f2fs: document " LiaoYuanhong-vivo
2026-06-15 19:37 ` [PATCH v3 0/3] f2fs: support " Eric Biggers
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: LiaoYuanhong-vivo @ 2026-06-15 12:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jaegeuk Kim, Chao Yu, open list:F2FS FILE SYSTEM, open list
Cc: LiaoYuanhong-vivo
F2FS normally disables inline data for encrypted regular files because the
inline payload is stored in the inode block and does not pass through the
regular fscrypt data I/O path. This wastes space for small encrypted files
on filesystems that otherwise use inline_data.
Add encrypted inline data support for encrypted regular files. When the
encrypted_inline_data on-disk feature is enabled, inline payloads of
encrypted regular files are stored as ciphertext in the inode block. They
are decrypted into page-cache plaintext on read and encrypted before being
copied back into the inode block on write.
F2FS keeps the on-disk format decision separate from fscrypt key
capability. It uses fscrypt_supports_data_unit_inplace() when deciding
whether a new file may keep inline_data. It calls
fscrypt_prepare_data_unit_inplace() only when the encrypted inline payload
is actually read or written.
Update inline-data size checks to use the encrypted inline capacity, since
the stored payload is rounded to the fscrypt contents alignment. If an
encrypted inline-data file is truncated from a non-zero offset, convert it
to normal data blocks first and then use the normal truncate path.
Recovery copies inline payloads as on-disk bytes.
Signed-off-by: LiaoYuanhong-vivo <liaoyuanhong@vivo.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Follow the updated fscrypt key support matrix.
- Clean up the inline-data conversion error path.
fs/f2fs/Kconfig | 14 +++++
fs/f2fs/data.c | 8 +--
fs/f2fs/f2fs.h | 37 ++++++++++++-
fs/f2fs/file.c | 24 ++++++++-
fs/f2fs/inline.c | 134 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
fs/f2fs/super.c | 12 +++++
fs/f2fs/sysfs.c | 8 +++
7 files changed, 217 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/Kconfig b/fs/f2fs/Kconfig
index 5916a02fb46d..0220f23be56d 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/Kconfig
+++ b/fs/f2fs/Kconfig
@@ -92,6 +92,20 @@ config F2FS_FAULT_INJECTION
If unsure, say N.
+config F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTED_INLINE_DATA
+ bool "F2FS encrypted inline data support"
+ depends on F2FS_FS && FS_ENCRYPTION
+ help
+ Allow encrypted regular files to keep inline data inside the inode
+ while encrypting that inode-managed payload in software.
+
+ This does not change normal data block encryption. Normal data
+ blocks continue to use the existing fscrypt path, such as blk-crypto
+ when inline encryption is enabled.
+
+ Filesystems carrying the encrypted_inline_data incompat feature
+ require this option in order to be mounted correctly.
+
config F2FS_FS_COMPRESSION
bool "F2FS compression feature"
depends on F2FS_FS
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/data.c b/fs/f2fs/data.c
index 657fd5986c73..9371ffa7c96d 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/data.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/data.c
@@ -3700,7 +3700,7 @@ static int prepare_write_begin(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
/* f2fs_lock_op avoids race between write CP and convert_inline_page */
if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode)) {
- if (pos + len > MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode))
+ if (pos + len > f2fs_max_inline_data(inode))
flag = F2FS_GET_BLOCK_DEFAULT;
f2fs_map_lock(sbi, &lc, flag);
locked = true;
@@ -3720,8 +3720,10 @@ static int prepare_write_begin(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi,
set_new_dnode(&dn, inode, ifolio, ifolio, 0);
if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode)) {
- if (pos + len <= MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode)) {
- f2fs_do_read_inline_data(folio, ifolio);
+ if (pos + len <= f2fs_max_inline_data(inode)) {
+ err = f2fs_do_read_inline_data(folio, ifolio);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_DATA_EXIST);
if (inode->i_nlink)
folio_set_f2fs_inline(ifolio);
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
index 832b2f8beb11..0a2d75baf23e 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
+++ b/fs/f2fs/f2fs.h
@@ -276,6 +276,7 @@ struct f2fs_mount_info {
#define F2FS_FEATURE_RO 0x00004000
#define F2FS_FEATURE_DEVICE_ALIAS 0x00008000
#define F2FS_FEATURE_PACKED_SSA 0x00010000
+#define F2FS_FEATURE_ENCRYPTED_INLINE_DATA 0x00020000
#define __F2FS_HAS_FEATURE(raw_super, mask) \
((raw_super->feature & cpu_to_le32(mask)) != 0)
@@ -4502,7 +4503,7 @@ extern struct kmem_cache *f2fs_inode_entry_slab;
bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode);
bool f2fs_sanity_check_inline_data(struct inode *inode, struct folio *ifolio);
bool f2fs_may_inline_dentry(struct inode *inode);
-void f2fs_do_read_inline_data(struct folio *folio, struct folio *ifolio);
+int f2fs_do_read_inline_data(struct folio *folio, struct folio *ifolio);
void f2fs_truncate_inline_inode(struct inode *inode, struct folio *ifolio,
u64 from);
int f2fs_read_inline_data(struct inode *inode, struct folio *folio);
@@ -4595,6 +4596,39 @@ static inline bool f2fs_encrypted_file(struct inode *inode)
return IS_ENCRYPTED(inode) && S_ISREG(inode->i_mode);
}
+static inline bool f2fs_sb_has_encrypted_inline_data(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi);
+
+static inline bool f2fs_uses_encrypted_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTED_INLINE_DATA
+ /*
+ * When the filesystem allows encrypted inline data, inline payloads
+ * in encrypted regular files are interpreted as ciphertext.
+ */
+ return f2fs_sb_has_encrypted_inline_data(F2FS_I_SB(inode)) &&
+ f2fs_encrypted_file(inode);
+#else
+ return false;
+#endif
+}
+
+static inline unsigned int f2fs_max_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ unsigned int max_bytes = MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode);
+
+ /*
+ * Encrypted inline data is rounded up to the fscrypt contents
+ * alignment before being stored back into the inode. This is an
+ * on-disk layout constraint, so it must not depend on whether the
+ * inode's key has been prepared yet.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTED_INLINE_DATA
+ if (f2fs_uses_encrypted_inline_data(inode))
+ max_bytes = round_down(max_bytes, FSCRYPT_CONTENTS_ALIGNMENT);
+#endif
+ return max_bytes;
+}
+
static inline void f2fs_set_encrypted_inode(struct inode *inode)
{
#ifdef CONFIG_FS_ENCRYPTION
@@ -4827,6 +4861,7 @@ F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(compression, COMPRESSION);
F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(readonly, RO);
F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(device_alias, DEVICE_ALIAS);
F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(packed_ssa, PACKED_SSA);
+F2FS_FEATURE_FUNCS(encrypted_inline_data, ENCRYPTED_INLINE_DATA);
#ifdef CONFIG_BLK_DEV_ZONED
static inline bool f2fs_zone_is_seq(struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi, int devi,
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/file.c b/fs/f2fs/file.c
index 71385ca4163d..ec243bb9039b 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/file.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/file.c
@@ -825,12 +825,32 @@ int f2fs_do_truncate_blocks(struct inode *inode, u64 from, bool lock)
}
if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode)) {
+ if (f2fs_uses_encrypted_inline_data(inode) && from) {
+ f2fs_folio_put(ifolio, true);
+ if (lock)
+ f2fs_unlock_op(sbi, &lc);
+
+ err = f2fs_convert_inline_inode(inode);
+
+ if (lock)
+ f2fs_lock_op(sbi, &lc);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+
+ ifolio = f2fs_get_inode_folio(sbi, inode->i_ino);
+ if (IS_ERR(ifolio)) {
+ err = PTR_ERR(ifolio);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ goto truncate_blocks;
+ }
f2fs_truncate_inline_inode(inode, ifolio, from);
f2fs_folio_put(ifolio, true);
truncate_page = true;
goto out;
}
+truncate_blocks:
set_new_dnode(&dn, inode, ifolio, NULL, 0);
err = f2fs_get_dnode_of_data(&dn, free_from, LOOKUP_NODE_RA);
if (err) {
@@ -1147,7 +1167,7 @@ int f2fs_setattr(struct mnt_idmap *idmap, struct dentry *dentry,
if (attr->ia_valid & ATTR_SIZE) {
loff_t old_size = i_size_read(inode);
- if (attr->ia_size > MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode)) {
+ if (attr->ia_size > f2fs_max_inline_data(inode)) {
/*
* should convert inline inode before i_size_write to
* keep smaller than inline_data size with inline flag.
@@ -5007,7 +5027,7 @@ static int f2fs_preallocate_blocks(struct kiocb *iocb, struct iov_iter *iter,
if (f2fs_has_inline_data(inode)) {
/* If the data will fit inline, don't bother. */
- if (pos + count <= MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode))
+ if (pos + count <= f2fs_max_inline_data(inode))
return 0;
ret = f2fs_convert_inline_inode(inode);
if (ret)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/inline.c b/fs/f2fs/inline.c
index 099f72089701..85846f2e7866 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/inline.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/inline.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ static bool support_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
return false;
if (!S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && !S_ISLNK(inode->i_mode))
return false;
- if (i_size_read(inode) > MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode))
+ if (i_size_read(inode) > f2fs_max_inline_data(inode))
return false;
return true;
}
@@ -31,6 +31,9 @@ bool f2fs_may_inline_data(struct inode *inode)
if (!support_inline_data(inode))
return false;
+ if (f2fs_uses_encrypted_inline_data(inode))
+ return fscrypt_supports_data_unit_inplace(inode);
+
return !f2fs_post_read_required(inode);
}
@@ -65,7 +68,9 @@ bool f2fs_sanity_check_inline_data(struct inode *inode, struct folio *ifolio)
* been synchronized to inmem fields.
*/
return (S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) &&
- (file_is_encrypt(inode) || file_is_verity(inode) ||
+ ((file_is_encrypt(inode) &&
+ !f2fs_sb_has_encrypted_inline_data(F2FS_I_SB(inode))) ||
+ file_is_verity(inode) ||
(F2FS_I(inode)->i_flags & F2FS_COMPR_FL)));
}
@@ -80,22 +85,66 @@ bool f2fs_may_inline_dentry(struct inode *inode)
return true;
}
-void f2fs_do_read_inline_data(struct folio *folio, struct folio *ifolio)
+int f2fs_do_read_inline_data(struct folio *folio, struct folio *ifolio)
{
struct inode *inode = folio->mapping->host;
+ unsigned int len = min_t(loff_t, i_size_read(inode),
+ f2fs_max_inline_data(inode));
if (folio_test_uptodate(folio))
- return;
+ return 0;
f2fs_bug_on(F2FS_I_SB(inode), folio->index);
- folio_zero_segment(folio, MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode), folio_size(folio));
+ if (f2fs_uses_encrypted_inline_data(inode)) {
+ struct page *tmp_page;
+ void *kaddr;
+ int err;
+
+ folio_zero_segment(folio, 0, folio_size(folio));
+
+ /*
+ * Decrypt through a temporary page because inline data occupies
+ * only a byte range inside the inode folio.
+ */
+ tmp_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOFS | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!tmp_page)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ len = round_up(len, FSCRYPT_CONTENTS_ALIGNMENT);
+ if (len) {
+ err = fscrypt_prepare_data_unit_inplace(inode);
+ if (err) {
+ __free_page(tmp_page);
+ return err;
+ }
+ memcpy_to_page(tmp_page, 0, inline_data_addr(inode, ifolio),
+ len);
+ err = fscrypt_crypt_data_unit_inplace(inode, tmp_page,
+ len, 0, 0,
+ false);
+ if (err) {
+ __free_page(tmp_page);
+ return err;
+ }
+ }
- /* Copy the whole inline data block */
- memcpy_to_folio(folio, 0, inline_data_addr(inode, ifolio),
- MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode));
+ kaddr = kmap_local_page(tmp_page);
+ memcpy_to_folio(folio, 0, kaddr,
+ min_t(loff_t, i_size_read(inode),
+ f2fs_max_inline_data(inode)));
+ kunmap_local(kaddr);
+ __free_page(tmp_page);
+ } else {
+ folio_zero_segment(folio, MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode),
+ folio_size(folio));
+ /* Copy the whole inline data block */
+ memcpy_to_folio(folio, 0, inline_data_addr(inode, ifolio),
+ MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode));
+ }
if (!folio_test_uptodate(folio))
folio_mark_uptodate(folio);
+ return 0;
}
void f2fs_truncate_inline_inode(struct inode *inode, struct folio *ifolio,
@@ -119,6 +168,7 @@ void f2fs_truncate_inline_inode(struct inode *inode, struct folio *ifolio,
int f2fs_read_inline_data(struct inode *inode, struct folio *folio)
{
struct folio *ifolio;
+ int ret = 0;
ifolio = f2fs_get_inode_folio(F2FS_I_SB(inode), inode->i_ino);
if (IS_ERR(ifolio)) {
@@ -134,7 +184,13 @@ int f2fs_read_inline_data(struct inode *inode, struct folio *folio)
if (folio->index)
folio_zero_segment(folio, 0, folio_size(folio));
else
- f2fs_do_read_inline_data(folio, ifolio);
+ ret = f2fs_do_read_inline_data(folio, ifolio);
+
+ if (!folio->index && ret) {
+ f2fs_folio_put(ifolio, true);
+ folio_unlock(folio);
+ return ret;
+ }
if (!folio_test_uptodate(folio))
folio_mark_uptodate(folio);
@@ -186,7 +242,12 @@ int f2fs_convert_inline_folio(struct dnode_of_data *dn, struct folio *folio)
f2fs_bug_on(F2FS_F_SB(folio), folio_test_writeback(folio));
- f2fs_do_read_inline_data(folio, dn->inode_folio);
+ err = f2fs_do_read_inline_data(folio, dn->inode_folio);
+ if (err) {
+ f2fs_truncate_data_blocks_range(dn, 1);
+ f2fs_put_dnode(dn);
+ return err;
+ }
folio_mark_dirty(folio);
/* clear dirty state */
@@ -267,6 +328,8 @@ int f2fs_write_inline_data(struct inode *inode, struct folio *folio)
{
struct f2fs_sb_info *sbi = F2FS_I_SB(inode);
struct folio *ifolio;
+ void *inline_addr;
+ int err = 0;
ifolio = f2fs_get_inode_folio(sbi, inode->i_ino);
if (IS_ERR(ifolio))
@@ -280,8 +343,50 @@ int f2fs_write_inline_data(struct inode *inode, struct folio *folio)
f2fs_bug_on(F2FS_I_SB(inode), folio->index);
f2fs_folio_wait_writeback(ifolio, NODE, true, true);
- memcpy_from_folio(inline_data_addr(inode, ifolio),
- folio, 0, MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode));
+ inline_addr = inline_data_addr(inode, ifolio);
+
+ if (f2fs_uses_encrypted_inline_data(inode)) {
+ struct page *tmp_page;
+ void *kaddr;
+ unsigned int len = min_t(loff_t, i_size_read(inode),
+ f2fs_max_inline_data(inode));
+
+ tmp_page = alloc_page(GFP_NOFS | __GFP_ZERO);
+ if (!tmp_page) {
+ err = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ len = round_up(len, FSCRYPT_CONTENTS_ALIGNMENT);
+ if (len) {
+ err = fscrypt_prepare_data_unit_inplace(inode);
+ if (err) {
+ __free_page(tmp_page);
+ goto out;
+ }
+ kaddr = kmap_local_page(tmp_page);
+ memcpy_from_folio(kaddr, folio, 0,
+ min_t(loff_t, i_size_read(inode),
+ f2fs_max_inline_data(inode)));
+ kunmap_local(kaddr);
+ err = fscrypt_crypt_data_unit_inplace(inode, tmp_page,
+ len, 0, 0,
+ true);
+ }
+ if (!err) {
+ memset(inline_addr, 0, MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode));
+ if (len) {
+ kaddr = kmap_local_page(tmp_page);
+ memcpy(inline_addr, kaddr, len);
+ kunmap_local(kaddr);
+ }
+ }
+ __free_page(tmp_page);
+ if (err)
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ memcpy_from_folio(inline_addr, folio, 0, MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode));
+ }
folio_mark_dirty(ifolio);
f2fs_clear_page_cache_dirty_tag(folio);
@@ -290,8 +395,9 @@ int f2fs_write_inline_data(struct inode *inode, struct folio *folio)
set_inode_flag(inode, FI_DATA_EXIST);
folio_clear_f2fs_inline(ifolio);
+out:
f2fs_folio_put(ifolio, true);
- return 0;
+ return err;
}
int f2fs_recover_inline_data(struct inode *inode, struct folio *nfolio)
@@ -826,7 +932,7 @@ int f2fs_inline_data_fiemap(struct inode *inode,
return PTR_ERR(ifolio);
f2fs_folio_wait_writeback(ifolio, NODE, true, true);
}
- ilen = min_t(size_t, MAX_INLINE_DATA(inode), i_size_read(inode));
+ ilen = min_t(size_t, f2fs_max_inline_data(inode), i_size_read(inode));
if (start >= ilen)
goto out;
if (start + len < ilen)
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/super.c b/fs/f2fs/super.c
index c6afdbd6e1cd..9eddcde7939c 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/super.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/super.c
@@ -1549,6 +1549,18 @@ static int f2fs_check_opt_consistency(struct fs_context *fc,
return -EINVAL;
}
+ if (f2fs_sb_has_encrypted_inline_data(sbi)) {
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTED_INLINE_DATA)) {
+ f2fs_err(sbi,
+ "encrypted_inline_data requires CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTED_INLINE_DATA");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (!f2fs_sb_has_encrypt(sbi)) {
+ f2fs_err(sbi, "encrypted inline_data requires encryption feature");
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+
/*
* The BLKZONED feature indicates that the drive was formatted with
* zone alignment optimization. This is optional for host-aware
diff --git a/fs/f2fs/sysfs.c b/fs/f2fs/sysfs.c
index 665687244c93..600eaee75926 100644
--- a/fs/f2fs/sysfs.c
+++ b/fs/f2fs/sysfs.c
@@ -1399,6 +1399,9 @@ F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(pin_file);
F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(linear_lookup);
#endif
F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(packed_ssa);
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTED_INLINE_DATA
+F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(encrypted_inline_data);
+#endif
F2FS_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(fserror);
#define ATTR_LIST(name) (&f2fs_attr_##name.attr)
@@ -1567,6 +1570,9 @@ static struct attribute *f2fs_feat_attrs[] = {
BASE_ATTR_LIST(linear_lookup),
#endif
BASE_ATTR_LIST(packed_ssa),
+#ifdef CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTED_INLINE_DATA
+ BASE_ATTR_LIST(encrypted_inline_data),
+#endif
BASE_ATTR_LIST(fserror),
NULL,
};
@@ -1604,6 +1610,7 @@ F2FS_SB_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(compression, COMPRESSION);
F2FS_SB_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(readonly, RO);
F2FS_SB_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(device_alias, DEVICE_ALIAS);
F2FS_SB_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(packed_ssa, PACKED_SSA);
+F2FS_SB_FEATURE_RO_ATTR(encrypted_inline_data, ENCRYPTED_INLINE_DATA);
static struct attribute *f2fs_sb_feat_attrs[] = {
ATTR_LIST(sb_encryption),
@@ -1622,6 +1629,7 @@ static struct attribute *f2fs_sb_feat_attrs[] = {
ATTR_LIST(sb_readonly),
ATTR_LIST(sb_device_alias),
ATTR_LIST(sb_packed_ssa),
+ ATTR_LIST(sb_encrypted_inline_data),
NULL,
};
ATTRIBUTE_GROUPS(f2fs_sb_feat);
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [PATCH v3 3/3] Documentation: f2fs: document encrypted inline data
2026-06-15 12:55 [PATCH v3 0/3] f2fs: support encrypted inline data LiaoYuanhong-vivo
2026-06-15 12:55 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] fscrypt: prepare software keys for filesystem-managed data units LiaoYuanhong-vivo
2026-06-15 12:55 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] f2fs: support encrypted inline data LiaoYuanhong-vivo
@ 2026-06-15 12:55 ` LiaoYuanhong-vivo
2026-06-15 19:37 ` [PATCH v3 0/3] f2fs: support " Eric Biggers
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: LiaoYuanhong-vivo @ 2026-06-15 12:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jaegeuk Kim, Chao Yu, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan,
open list:F2FS FILE SYSTEM, open list, open list:DOCUMENTATION
Cc: LiaoYuanhong-vivo
Document the F2FS encrypted_inline_data feature, including the on-disk
feature requirement, the CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTED_INLINE_DATA dependency,
how inline payloads are encrypted and decrypted, and the truncate behavior.
Also document the supported key combinations. Files using filesystem-layer
encryption reuse the normal software transform. Inlinecrypt is supported
for v2 IV_INO_LBLK_64/32 policies, including hardware-wrapped key
configurations supported by fscrypt. Per-file inlinecrypt keys and
DIRECT_KEY policies are not supported for encrypted inline data.
List encrypted_inline_data in the supported F2FS feature sysfs
documentation.
Signed-off-by: LiaoYuanhong-vivo <liaoyuanhong@vivo.com>
---
Changes in v3:
- Update the documented key support matrix.
Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-fs-f2fs | 5 +++--
Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-fs-f2fs b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-fs-f2fs
index 27d5e88facbe..dad483fb2fc1 100644
--- a/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-fs-f2fs
+++ b/Documentation/ABI/testing/sysfs-fs-f2fs
@@ -258,7 +258,8 @@ Description: Expand /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/features to meet sysfs rule.
encryption, block_zoned (aka blkzoned), extra_attr,
project_quota (aka projquota), inode_checksum,
flexible_inline_xattr, quota_ino, inode_crtime, lost_found,
- verity, sb_checksum, casefold, readonly, compression.
+ verity, sb_checksum, casefold, readonly, compression,
+ encrypted_inline_data.
Note that, pin_file is moved into /sys/fs/f2fs/features/.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/features/
@@ -271,7 +272,7 @@ Description: Shows all enabled kernel features.
inode_crtime, lost_found, verity, sb_checksum,
casefold, readonly, compression, test_dummy_encryption_v2,
atomic_write, pin_file, encrypted_casefold, linear_lookup,
- fserror.
+ fserror, encrypted_inline_data.
What: /sys/fs/f2fs/<disk>/inject_rate
Date: May 2016
diff --git a/Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst b/Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst
index 5bc37a1c4e51..651e84e8dd98 100644
--- a/Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst
+++ b/Documentation/filesystems/f2fs.rst
@@ -420,6 +420,36 @@ lookup_mode=%s Control the directory lookup behavior for casefolded
================== ========================================
======================== ============================================================
+Encrypted inline data
+=====================
+
+F2FS normally disables inline data for encrypted regular files, since inline
+data is stored inside the inode block and does not pass through the regular
+block I/O path. When a filesystem is formatted with the encrypted_inline_data
+feature, encrypted regular files may keep small file contents in the inode
+block. The inline payload is encrypted with fscrypt contents-key semantics
+before it is written to the inode, and it is decrypted back to page-cache
+plaintext when it is read.
+
+This feature requires the encrypt feature on disk and kernel support for
+CONFIG_F2FS_FS_ENCRYPTED_INLINE_DATA. It is intended to be used together with
+the inline_data mount option. Files using filesystem-layer encryption reuse the
+normal software contents-key transform. When the normal encrypted file
+contents path uses blk-crypto, encrypted inline data is supported for v2
+IV_INO_LBLK_64/32 policies, including hardware-wrapped key configurations
+supported by fscrypt. Per-file inlinecrypt keys and DIRECT_KEY policies are
+not supported for encrypted inline data.
+
+Encrypted inline data is stored in fscrypt contents-aligned units. Therefore,
+the maximum plaintext size that can stay inline may be slightly smaller than the
+ordinary inline data capacity. If an encrypted inline-data file is truncated
+from a non-zero offset, F2FS first converts the inline payload to normal data
+blocks and then applies the truncate operation.
+
+Recovery copies inline payloads as on-disk bytes. Encryption and decryption are
+performed only when moving data between the inode inline area and page-cache
+plaintext.
+
Debugfs Entries
===============
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v3 0/3] f2fs: support encrypted inline data
2026-06-15 12:55 [PATCH v3 0/3] f2fs: support encrypted inline data LiaoYuanhong-vivo
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2026-06-15 12:55 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] Documentation: f2fs: document " LiaoYuanhong-vivo
@ 2026-06-15 19:37 ` Eric Biggers
3 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Eric Biggers @ 2026-06-15 19:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: LiaoYuanhong-vivo
Cc: Jaegeuk Kim, Chao Yu, Jonathan Corbet, Shuah Khan,
Theodore Y. Ts'o, open list:F2FS FILE SYSTEM, open list,
open list:DOCUMENTATION,
open list:FSCRYPT: FILE SYSTEM LEVEL ENCRYPTION SUPPORT,
linux-ext4
[+Cc linux-ext4@vger.kernel.org]
On Mon, Jun 15, 2026 at 08:55:12PM +0800, LiaoYuanhong-vivo wrote:
> F2FS currently disables inline data for encrypted regular files because the
> inline payload is stored in the inode block and does not go through the
> regular bio-based fscrypt path. This wastes space for small encrypted
> files on Android devices using F2FS inlinecrypt.
>
> This series adds an encrypted_inline_data on-disk feature for F2FS.
> With this feature enabled, encrypted regular files may keep small contents
> in the inode block. The inline payload is encrypted before being stored in
> the inode and decrypted back into page-cache plaintext on read.
>
> The fscrypt changes are scoped to filesystem-managed data-unit crypto.
> F2FS first asks fscrypt whether the inode's key/policy supports this path.
> It prepares the software transform only when encrypted inline payloads are
> read or written. Inlinecrypt support is limited to v2 IV_INO_LBLK_64 and
> IV_INO_LBLK_32 policies, including the hardware-wrapped key configurations
> supported by fscrypt. Per-file inlinecrypt keys and DIRECT_KEY policies
> are not supported for encrypted inline data.
I still think we should hold off on this, for the reasons I gave at
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260515184124.GA4903@quark/
As soon as you start using hardware-wrapped keys this will become
irrelevant, as it can't be used in that case. I see you added "support"
for that case anyway by deriving contents encryption keys from the
sw_secret. But that bypasses the security model, which isn't okay.
I'm also working to simplify ext4 and f2fs's file contents encryption
implementation by standardizing on blk-crypto. That aligns well with
what btrfs encryption is going to do as well. So this isn't a great
time to be making f2fs's file contents encryption implementation even
more complex by going in a different direction.
If there was demand for this feature from the ext4 side for
general-purpose Linux distros as well, that would make it a bit more
appealing, as it would show broader demand. But with the proposal being
f2fs-specific and effectively just for Android devices that *don't* use
wrapped keys, that feels too narrow for the added complexity.
This proposal also lacks test cases in xfstests and/or Android's
vts_kernel_encryption_test that verify that the inline data is actually
being encrypted correctly. Those tests are essential, and we *must not*
add new file contents encryption implementations without such tests.
- Eric
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-06-15 19:37 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 5+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-06-15 12:55 [PATCH v3 0/3] f2fs: support encrypted inline data LiaoYuanhong-vivo
2026-06-15 12:55 ` [PATCH v3 1/3] fscrypt: prepare software keys for filesystem-managed data units LiaoYuanhong-vivo
2026-06-15 12:55 ` [PATCH v3 2/3] f2fs: support encrypted inline data LiaoYuanhong-vivo
2026-06-15 12:55 ` [PATCH v3 3/3] Documentation: f2fs: document " LiaoYuanhong-vivo
2026-06-15 19:37 ` [PATCH v3 0/3] f2fs: support " Eric Biggers
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