[PATCH v2 0/8] crypto: qce - Fix crypto self-test failures

[PATCH v2 0/8] crypto: qce - Fix crypto self-test failures

[Bartosz Golaszewski]

This extends the initial submission from Kuldeep.

The QCE hardware crypto engine has several limitations that cause it to
produce incorrect results or stall on certain inputs. This series fixes
several bugs and adds workaround allowing the deiver to pass crypto
self-tests.

The failures addressed are:

- HMAC self-test failures for empty messages
- AES-XTS returning success on zero-length input (should be -EINVAL)
- AES-CTR: partial final block causes the engine to stall, output IV
  derivation was incorrect
- AES-XTS with key1 == key2 is not supported by the CE
- AES-CCM: partial final block and fragmented payload both stall the
  engine

All fixes were tested on an SM8650 QRD board with
CONFIG_CRYPTO_SELFTESTS=y and CONFIG_CRYPTO_SELFTESTS_FULL=y.

Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
---
Changes in v2:
- Add fixes for the full suite of crypto self-tests
- Add Fixes and Cc tags
- Link to v1: https://patch.msgid.link/20260610-qce_selftest_fix-v1-0-1b0504783a46@oss.qualcomm.com/

---
Bartosz Golaszewski (6):
      crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms
      crypto: qce - Fix HMAC self-test failures for empty messages
      crypto: qce - Reject empty messages for AES-XTS
      crypto: qce - Use a fallback for AES-CTR with a partial final block
      crypto: qce - Use a fallback for CCM with a partial final block
      crypto: qce - Use fallback for CCM with a fragmented payload

Kuldeep Singh (2):
      crypto: qce - Fix CTR-AES for partial block requests
      crypto: qce - Fix xts-aes-qce for weak keys

 drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c     |  72 +++++++++++---------------
 drivers/crypto/qce/cipher.h   |   1 +
 drivers/crypto/qce/common.c   |  27 +++-------
 drivers/crypto/qce/common.h   |   7 +--
 drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h  |   1 -
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c      |  93 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h      |   1 +
 drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c | 116 ++++++++++++++----------------------------
 8 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 156 deletions(-)
---
base-commit: 7f5e2941e7dccc9dfaaa23d0548a40039772a284
change-id: 20260610-qce-fix-self-tests-492ffd2ef955

Best regards,
-- 
Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>

[PATCH v2 1/8] crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms

[Bartosz Golaszewski]

Remove algorithms that are either unsafe or deprecated and have no
in-kernel users that cannot be served by the ARM CE implementations.

AES-ECB reveals plaintext patterns (identical plaintext blocks produce
identical ciphertext blocks) and should not be exposed as a hardware-
accelerated primitive. DES, Triple DES and HMAC-SHA1 have been
deprecated for years.

Remove ecb(aes), cbc(des), ecb(des3_ede), cbc(des3_ede), hmac(sha1) and
all AEAD variants built on these primitives. Also clean up the - now dead
- code, flags and constants.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c     | 40 -------------------------
 drivers/crypto/qce/common.c   | 27 ++++-------------
 drivers/crypto/qce/common.h   |  7 +----
 drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h  |  1 -
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c      |  9 ------
 drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c | 69 +------------------------------------------
 6 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 145 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
index 03b8042da9a1b4aebdc775ad8ab912abc7b2383d..6a511e5d7f6290a1df0093e463f39f5f2db25f88 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
@@ -592,7 +592,6 @@ static int qce_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int
 	struct qce_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
 	struct crypto_authenc_keys authenc_keys;
 	unsigned long flags = to_aead_tmpl(tfm)->alg_flags;
-	u32 _key[6];
 	int err;
 
 	err = crypto_authenc_extractkeys(&authenc_keys, key, keylen);
@@ -607,21 +606,6 @@ static int qce_aead_setkey(struct crypto_aead *tfm, const u8 *key, unsigned int
 		err = verify_aead_des_key(tfm, authenc_keys.enckey, authenc_keys.enckeylen);
 		if (err)
 			return err;
-	} else if (IS_3DES(flags)) {
-		err = verify_aead_des3_key(tfm, authenc_keys.enckey, authenc_keys.enckeylen);
-		if (err)
-			return err;
-		/*
-		 * The crypto engine does not support any two keys
-		 * being the same for triple des algorithms. The
-		 * verify_skcipher_des3_key does not check for all the
-		 * below conditions. Schedule fallback in this case.
-		 */
-		memcpy(_key, authenc_keys.enckey, DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE);
-		if (!((_key[0] ^ _key[2]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[3])) ||
-		    !((_key[2] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[3] ^ _key[5])) ||
-		    !((_key[0] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[5])))
-			ctx->need_fallback = true;
 	} else if (IS_AES(flags)) {
 		/* No random key sizes */
 		if (authenc_keys.enckeylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 &&
@@ -693,22 +677,6 @@ struct qce_aead_def {
 };
 
 static const struct qce_aead_def aead_def[] = {
-	{
-		.flags          = QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC,
-		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des))",
-		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-des-qce",
-		.blocksize      = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize         = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.maxauthsize	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags          = QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC,
-		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha1),cbc(des3_ede))",
-		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha1-cbc-3des-qce",
-		.blocksize      = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize         = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.maxauthsize	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	},
 	{
 		.flags          = QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
 		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des))",
@@ -717,14 +685,6 @@ static const struct qce_aead_def aead_def[] = {
 		.ivsize         = DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
 		.maxauthsize	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
 	},
-	{
-		.flags          = QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
-		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des3_ede))",
-		.drv_name       = "authenc-hmac-sha256-cbc-3des-qce",
-		.blocksize      = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize         = DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.maxauthsize	= SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
-	},
 	{
 		.flags          =  QCE_ALG_AES | QCE_MODE_CBC | QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
 		.name           = "authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(aes))",
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/common.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/common.c
index 54a78a57f63028f01870a3edeb8e390f523bb190..b1f8cf7e0d22ff3c19bb92bdc0154ed403f4c2f1 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/common.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/common.c
@@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ static u32 qce_auth_cfg(unsigned long flags, u32 key_size, u32 auth_size)
 			cfg |= AUTH_KEY_SZ_AES256 << AUTH_KEY_SIZE_SHIFT;
 	}
 
-	if (IS_SHA1(flags) || IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags))
+	if (IS_SHA1(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_SIZE_SHA1 << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
 	else if (IS_SHA256(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_SIZE_SHA256 << AUTH_SIZE_SHIFT;
@@ -126,7 +126,7 @@ static u32 qce_auth_cfg(unsigned long flags, u32 key_size, u32 auth_size)
 
 	if (IS_SHA1(flags) || IS_SHA256(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_MODE_HASH << AUTH_MODE_SHIFT;
-	else if (IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
+	else if (IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_MODE_HMAC << AUTH_MODE_SHIFT;
 	else if (IS_CCM(flags))
 		cfg |= AUTH_MODE_CCM << AUTH_MODE_SHIFT;
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_ahash(struct crypto_async_request *async_req)
 	else
 		qce_cpu_to_be32p_array(auth, rctx->digest, digestsize);
 
-	iv_words = (IS_SHA1(rctx->flags) || IS_SHA1_HMAC(rctx->flags)) ? 5 : 8;
+	iv_words = IS_SHA1(rctx->flags) ? 5 : 8;
 	qce_write_array(qce, REG_AUTH_IV0, (u32 *)auth, iv_words);
 
 	if (rctx->first_blk)
@@ -243,15 +243,12 @@ static u32 qce_encr_cfg(unsigned long flags, u32 aes_key_size)
 
 	if (IS_AES(flags))
 		cfg |= ENCR_ALG_AES << ENCR_ALG_SHIFT;
-	else if (IS_DES(flags) || IS_3DES(flags))
+	else if (IS_DES(flags))
 		cfg |= ENCR_ALG_DES << ENCR_ALG_SHIFT;
 
 	if (IS_DES(flags))
 		cfg |= ENCR_KEY_SZ_DES << ENCR_KEY_SZ_SHIFT;
 
-	if (IS_3DES(flags))
-		cfg |= ENCR_KEY_SZ_3DES << ENCR_KEY_SZ_SHIFT;
-
 	switch (flags & QCE_MODE_MASK) {
 	case QCE_MODE_ECB:
 		cfg |= ENCR_MODE_ECB << ENCR_MODE_SHIFT;
@@ -343,9 +340,6 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_skcipher(struct crypto_async_request *async_req)
 	if (IS_DES(flags)) {
 		enciv_words = 2;
 		enckey_words = 2;
-	} else if (IS_3DES(flags)) {
-		enciv_words = 2;
-		enckey_words = 6;
 	} else if (IS_AES(flags)) {
 		if (IS_XTS(flags))
 			qce_xtskey(qce, ctx->enc_key, ctx->enc_keylen,
@@ -393,10 +387,6 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_skcipher(struct crypto_async_request *async_req)
 #endif
 
 #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DEV_QCE_AEAD
-static const u32 std_iv_sha1[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
-	SHA1_H0, SHA1_H1, SHA1_H2, SHA1_H3, SHA1_H4, 0, 0, 0
-};
-
 static const u32 std_iv_sha256[SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE / sizeof(u32)] = {
 	SHA256_H0, SHA256_H1, SHA256_H2, SHA256_H3,
 	SHA256_H4, SHA256_H5, SHA256_H6, SHA256_H7
@@ -473,13 +463,8 @@ static int qce_setup_regs_aead(struct crypto_async_request *async_req)
 	/* Write initial authentication IV only for HMAC algorithms */
 	if (IS_SHA_HMAC(rctx->flags)) {
 		/* Write default authentication iv */
-		if (IS_SHA1_HMAC(rctx->flags)) {
-			auth_ivsize = SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
-			memcpy(authiv, std_iv_sha1, auth_ivsize);
-		} else if (IS_SHA256_HMAC(rctx->flags)) {
-			auth_ivsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
-			memcpy(authiv, std_iv_sha256, auth_ivsize);
-		}
+		auth_ivsize = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE;
+		memcpy(authiv, std_iv_sha256, auth_ivsize);
 		authiv_words = auth_ivsize / sizeof(u32);
 		qce_write_array(qce, REG_AUTH_IV0, (u32 *)authiv, authiv_words);
 	} else if (IS_CCM(rctx->flags)) {
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/common.h b/drivers/crypto/qce/common.h
index 02e63ad9f24557c2238caa70b0ec521d49da4f13..c96d907d524725e7738d199a1d345d943d2ca360 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/common.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/common.h
@@ -34,13 +34,11 @@
 
 /* cipher algorithms */
 #define QCE_ALG_DES			BIT(0)
-#define QCE_ALG_3DES			BIT(1)
 #define QCE_ALG_AES			BIT(2)
 
 /* hash and hmac algorithms */
 #define QCE_HASH_SHA1			BIT(3)
 #define QCE_HASH_SHA256			BIT(4)
-#define QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC		BIT(5)
 #define QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC		BIT(6)
 #define QCE_HASH_AES_CMAC		BIT(7)
 
@@ -59,17 +57,14 @@
 #define QCE_DECRYPT			BIT(31)
 
 #define IS_DES(flags)			(flags & QCE_ALG_DES)
-#define IS_3DES(flags)			(flags & QCE_ALG_3DES)
 #define IS_AES(flags)			(flags & QCE_ALG_AES)
 
 #define IS_SHA1(flags)			(flags & QCE_HASH_SHA1)
 #define IS_SHA256(flags)		(flags & QCE_HASH_SHA256)
-#define IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags)		(flags & QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC)
 #define IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags)		(flags & QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC)
 #define IS_CMAC(flags)			(flags & QCE_HASH_AES_CMAC)
 #define IS_SHA(flags)			(IS_SHA1(flags) || IS_SHA256(flags))
-#define IS_SHA_HMAC(flags)		\
-		(IS_SHA1_HMAC(flags) || IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags))
+#define IS_SHA_HMAC(flags)		IS_SHA256_HMAC(flags)
 
 #define IS_CBC(mode)			(mode & QCE_MODE_CBC)
 #define IS_ECB(mode)			(mode & QCE_MODE_ECB)
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h b/drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h
index d59ed279890621a8e2e6f4cdb20692dbf39f1461..11a6f3db3ffd05b97a2b9fc0989d954a904c4cd5 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/regs-v5.h
@@ -285,7 +285,6 @@
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_SHIFT		3
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_MASK		GENMASK(5, 3)
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_DES			0
-#define ENCR_KEY_SZ_3DES		1
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_AES128		0
 #define ENCR_KEY_SZ_AES256		2
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
index a3a1a205aaf8559a04809936e2a3b7d564c16c53..dc962296139da334c00237e44290356023cd7420 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
@@ -430,15 +430,6 @@ static const struct qce_ahash_def ahash_def[] = {
 		.statesize	= sizeof(struct qce_sha_saved_state),
 		.std_iv		= std_iv_sha256,
 	},
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_HASH_SHA1_HMAC,
-		.name		= "hmac(sha1)",
-		.drv_name	= "hmac-sha1-qce",
-		.digestsize	= SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE,
-		.blocksize	= SHA1_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.statesize	= sizeof(struct qce_sha_saved_state),
-		.std_iv		= std_iv_sha1,
-	},
 	{
 		.flags		= QCE_HASH_SHA256_HMAC,
 		.name		= "hmac(sha256)",
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
index 1fef315a7105c869e7fc6a60719087b721e78bb3..eff80ad5cb943c5b2e1e293c723bb1b31102b006 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
@@ -224,36 +224,6 @@ static int qce_des_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *ablk, const u8 *key,
 	return 0;
 }
 
-static int qce_des3_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *ablk, const u8 *key,
-			   unsigned int keylen)
-{
-	struct qce_cipher_ctx *ctx = crypto_skcipher_ctx(ablk);
-	u32 _key[6];
-	int err;
-
-	err = verify_skcipher_des3_key(ablk, key);
-	if (err)
-		return err;
-
-	/*
-	 * The crypto engine does not support any two keys
-	 * being the same for triple des algorithms. The
-	 * verify_skcipher_des3_key does not check for all the
-	 * below conditions. Return -ENOKEY in case any two keys
-	 * are the same. Revisit to see if a fallback cipher
-	 * is needed to handle this condition.
-	 */
-	memcpy(_key, key, DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE);
-	if (!((_key[0] ^ _key[2]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[3])) ||
-	    !((_key[2] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[3] ^ _key[5])) ||
-	    !((_key[0] ^ _key[4]) | (_key[1] ^ _key[5])))
-		return -ENOKEY;
-
-	ctx->enc_keylen = keylen;
-	memcpy(ctx->enc_key, key, keylen);
-	return 0;
-}
-
 static int qce_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, int encrypt)
 {
 	struct crypto_skcipher *tfm = crypto_skcipher_reqtfm(req);
@@ -359,15 +329,6 @@ struct qce_skcipher_def {
 };
 
 static const struct qce_skcipher_def skcipher_def[] = {
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_AES | QCE_MODE_ECB,
-		.name		= "ecb(aes)",
-		.drv_name	= "ecb-aes-qce",
-		.blocksize	= AES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= 0,
-		.min_keysize	= AES_MIN_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= AES_MAX_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
 	{
 		.flags		= QCE_ALG_AES | QCE_MODE_CBC,
 		.name		= "cbc(aes)",
@@ -405,33 +366,6 @@ static const struct qce_skcipher_def skcipher_def[] = {
 		.min_keysize	= DES_KEY_SIZE,
 		.max_keysize	= DES_KEY_SIZE,
 	},
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_DES | QCE_MODE_CBC,
-		.name		= "cbc(des)",
-		.drv_name	= "cbc-des-qce",
-		.blocksize	= DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= DES_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.min_keysize	= DES_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= DES_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_ECB,
-		.name		= "ecb(des3_ede)",
-		.drv_name	= "ecb-3des-qce",
-		.blocksize	= DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= 0,
-		.min_keysize	= DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
-	{
-		.flags		= QCE_ALG_3DES | QCE_MODE_CBC,
-		.name		= "cbc(des3_ede)",
-		.drv_name	= "cbc-3des-qce",
-		.blocksize	= DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.ivsize		= DES3_EDE_BLOCK_SIZE,
-		.min_keysize	= DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
-		.max_keysize	= DES3_EDE_KEY_SIZE,
-	},
 };
 
 static int qce_skcipher_register_one(const struct qce_skcipher_def *def,
@@ -455,8 +389,7 @@ static int qce_skcipher_register_one(const struct qce_skcipher_def *def,
 	alg->ivsize			= def->ivsize;
 	alg->min_keysize		= def->min_keysize;
 	alg->max_keysize		= def->max_keysize;
-	alg->setkey			= IS_3DES(def->flags) ? qce_des3_setkey :
-					  IS_DES(def->flags) ? qce_des_setkey :
+	alg->setkey			= IS_DES(def->flags) ? qce_des_setkey :
 					  qce_skcipher_setkey;
 	alg->encrypt			= qce_skcipher_encrypt;
 	alg->decrypt			= qce_skcipher_decrypt;

-- 
2.47.3

[PATCH v2 2/8] crypto: qce - Fix HMAC self-test failures for empty messages

[Bartosz Golaszewski]

BAM DMA cannot process zero-length transfers. For plain hashes this is
handled by returning the precomputed hash of the empty message
(tmpl->hash_zero), but for keyed HMAC the result depends on the key and
cannot be a constant. As a result, hmac(sha256) produced an incorrect
digest for an empty message and the crypto self-tests failed.

Allocate a software fallback ahash for the HMAC transforms and use it to
compute the digest whenever the message is empty (in both the .final()
and .digest() paths). The fallback is allocated in a dedicated cra_init
for the HMAC algorithms and is excluded from matching the crypto engine's
own algorithm to avoid recursion. It is kept keyed in sync with the
hardware transform in .setkey().

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: ec8f5d8f6f76 ("crypto: qce - Qualcomm crypto engine driver")
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c | 84 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h |  1 +
 2 files changed, 84 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
index dc962296139da334c00237e44290356023cd7420..00e1a8f6d4ec905cfb035db958a71566b1abb0a7 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.c
@@ -274,6 +274,36 @@ static int qce_ahash_update(struct ahash_request *req)
 	return qce->async_req_enqueue(tmpl->qce, &req->base);
 }
 
+/*
+ * BAM DMA cannot handle zero-length transfers. For plain hashes the result of
+ * an empty message is a known constant (hash_zero), for keyed HMAC it depends
+ * on the key, so compute it with the software fallback.
+ */
+static int qce_ahash_hmac_zero(struct ahash_request *req)
+{
+	struct crypto_ahash *tfm = crypto_ahash_reqtfm(req);
+	struct qce_sha_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(crypto_ahash_tfm(tfm));
+	struct ahash_request *subreq;
+	struct crypto_wait wait;
+	struct scatterlist sg;
+	int ret;
+
+	subreq = ahash_request_alloc(ctx->fallback, GFP_ATOMIC);
+	if (!subreq)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	crypto_init_wait(&wait);
+	ahash_request_set_callback(subreq, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MAY_BACKLOG,
+				   crypto_req_done, &wait);
+	sg_init_one(&sg, NULL, 0);
+	ahash_request_set_crypt(subreq, &sg, req->result, 0);
+
+	ret = crypto_wait_req(crypto_ahash_digest(subreq), &wait);
+
+	ahash_request_free(subreq);
+	return ret;
+}
+
 static int qce_ahash_final(struct ahash_request *req)
 {
 	struct qce_sha_reqctx *rctx = ahash_request_ctx_dma(req);
@@ -284,6 +314,8 @@ static int qce_ahash_final(struct ahash_request *req)
 		if (tmpl->hash_zero)
 			memcpy(req->result, tmpl->hash_zero,
 					tmpl->alg.ahash.halg.digestsize);
+		else if (IS_SHA_HMAC(rctx->flags))
+			return qce_ahash_hmac_zero(req);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -321,6 +353,8 @@ static int qce_ahash_digest(struct ahash_request *req)
 		if (tmpl->hash_zero)
 			memcpy(req->result, tmpl->hash_zero,
 					tmpl->alg.ahash.halg.digestsize);
+		else if (IS_SHA_HMAC(rctx->flags))
+			return qce_ahash_hmac_zero(req);
 		return 0;
 	}
 
@@ -344,6 +378,17 @@ static int qce_ahash_hmac_setkey(struct crypto_ahash *tfm, const u8 *key,
 	blocksize = crypto_tfm_alg_blocksize(crypto_ahash_tfm(tfm));
 	memset(ctx->authkey, 0, sizeof(ctx->authkey));
 
+	/*
+	 * Keep the software fallback keyed in sync - it is used for empty
+	 * messages, which the DMA engine cannot process.
+	 */
+	crypto_ahash_clear_flags(ctx->fallback, CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	crypto_ahash_set_flags(ctx->fallback,
+			       crypto_ahash_get_flags(tfm) & CRYPTO_TFM_REQ_MASK);
+	ret = crypto_ahash_setkey(ctx->fallback, key, keylen);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
 	if (keylen <= blocksize) {
 		memcpy(ctx->authkey, key, keylen);
 		return 0;
@@ -401,6 +446,36 @@ static int qce_ahash_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
 	return 0;
 }
 
+static int qce_ahash_hmac_cra_init(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct qce_sha_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+	struct crypto_ahash *fallback;
+	int ret;
+
+	ret = qce_ahash_cra_init(tfm);
+	if (ret)
+		return ret;
+
+	/*
+	 * The fallback is used to compute HMACs of empty messages, which the
+	 * DMA engine cannot process.
+	 */
+	fallback = crypto_alloc_ahash(crypto_tfm_alg_name(tfm), 0,
+				      CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK);
+	if (IS_ERR(fallback))
+		return PTR_ERR(fallback);
+
+	ctx->fallback = fallback;
+	return 0;
+}
+
+static void qce_ahash_hmac_cra_exit(struct crypto_tfm *tfm)
+{
+	struct qce_sha_ctx *ctx = crypto_tfm_ctx(tfm);
+
+	crypto_free_ahash(ctx->fallback);
+}
+
 struct qce_ahash_def {
 	unsigned long flags;
 	const char *name;
@@ -479,7 +554,14 @@ static int qce_ahash_register_one(const struct qce_ahash_def *def,
 	base->cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct qce_sha_ctx);
 	base->cra_alignmask = 0;
 	base->cra_module = THIS_MODULE;
-	base->cra_init = qce_ahash_cra_init;
+
+	if (IS_SHA_HMAC(def->flags)) {
+		base->cra_flags |= CRYPTO_ALG_NEED_FALLBACK;
+		base->cra_init = qce_ahash_hmac_cra_init;
+		base->cra_exit = qce_ahash_hmac_cra_exit;
+	} else {
+		base->cra_init = qce_ahash_cra_init;
+	}
 
 	strscpy(base->cra_name, def->name);
 	strscpy(base->cra_driver_name, def->drv_name);
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h
index a22695361f1654cc94325ec5d886a158fa4bfb9c..5ba6b786f450cbae52988cb39cd68d5795fd19db 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/sha.h
@@ -18,6 +18,7 @@
 
 struct qce_sha_ctx {
 	u8 authkey[QCE_SHA_MAX_BLOCKSIZE];
+	struct crypto_ahash *fallback;
 };
 
 /**

-- 
2.47.3

[PATCH v2 3/8] crypto: qce - Reject empty messages for AES-XTS

[Bartosz Golaszewski]

XTS is not defined for an empty plaintext: it requires at least one full
block of data. The driver treated a zero-length request as a successful
no-op, so the crypto self-tests "unexpectedly succeeded" when -EINVAL
was expected.

Return -EINVAL for empty XTS requests while keeping the no-op behavior
for the other ciphers, which the crypto engine simply cannot process due
to its DMA not supporting zero-length transfers.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f08789462255 ("crypto: qce - Return error for zero length messages")
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c | 6 +++++-
 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
index eff80ad5cb943c5b2e1e293c723bb1b31102b006..68b83e3ae088ae42a7fb2a2f0c2e132acf62e849 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
@@ -239,8 +239,12 @@ static int qce_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, int encrypt)
 	keylen = IS_XTS(rctx->flags) ? ctx->enc_keylen >> 1 : ctx->enc_keylen;
 
 	/* CE does not handle 0 length messages */
-	if (!req->cryptlen)
+	if (!req->cryptlen) {
+		/* XTS requires at least one full block of data */
+		if (IS_XTS(rctx->flags))
+			return -EINVAL;
 		return 0;
+	}
 
 	/*
 	 * ECB and CBC algorithms require message lengths to be

-- 
2.47.3

[PATCH v2 4/8] crypto: qce - Fix CTR-AES for partial block requests

[Bartosz Golaszewski]

From: Kuldeep Singh <kuldeep.singh@oss.qualcomm.com>

In CTR mode, the IV acts as the initial counter block.
APer NIST SP 800-38A, after a CTR mode operation the next unused counter
value is:

IV_next = IV_in + ceil(cryptlen / AES_BLOCK_SIZE)

The skcipher requires req->iv to hold this updated counter on
completion, ensuring chained requests produce correct results.

Referring to Crypto6.0 documentation, Section 2.2.5 says:
"The count value increments automatically once per block of data (in
AES, a block is 16 bytes) based on the value in the
CRYPTO_ENCR_CNTR_MASK registers."

QCE increments internal counter register once per full 16-byte block(for
ctr-aes) is processed. In case of partial request length, the hardware
uses the current counter to generate keystreams but does not increment
the counter register afterwards. So the counter value written in
CRYPTO_ENCR_CNTRn_IVn later once read by software is one less than the
expected value.

Crypto selftest framework capture this scenario with test vector
4 comprising of a 499-byte payload (31 full blocks + 3 partial bytes).
Error:
[    5.606169] alg: skcipher: ctr-aes-qce encryption test failed (wrong output IV) on test vector 4, cfg="in-place (one sglist)"
[    5.606176] 00000000: e7 82 1d b8 53 11 ac 47 e2 7d 18 d6 71 0c a7 61
[    5.606192] alg: self-tests for ctr(aes) using ctr-aes-qce failed (rc=-22)
Expected iv_out: 0x62 (iv_in + 32)
Obtained iv_out: 0x61 (iv_in + 31, partial block not counted)

To fix this, just increase the counter value for partial block requests
by 1 and for the full block size requests, don't take any action as
expected value is already returned by the hardware.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 3e806a12d10a ("crypto: qce - update the skcipher IV")
Signed-off-by: Kuldeep Singh <kuldeep.singh@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
index 68b83e3ae088ae42a7fb2a2f0c2e132acf62e849..379b45d2cd952a39c387e84af71238b53f7737e9 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
 #include <linux/types.h>
 #include <linux/errno.h>
 #include <crypto/aes.h>
+#include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/des.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
 
@@ -34,6 +35,7 @@ static void qce_skcipher_done(void *data)
 	struct qce_device *qce = tmpl->qce;
 	struct qce_result_dump *result_buf = qce->dma.result_buf;
 	enum dma_data_direction dir_src, dir_dst;
+	unsigned int blocks;
 	u32 status;
 	int error;
 	bool diff_dst;
@@ -57,7 +59,21 @@ static void qce_skcipher_done(void *data)
 	if (error < 0)
 		dev_dbg(qce->dev, "skcipher operation error (%x)\n", status);
 
-	memcpy(rctx->iv, result_buf->encr_cntr_iv, rctx->ivsize);
+	if (IS_CTR(rctx->flags)) {
+		/*
+		 * QCE hardware does not increment the counter for a partial
+		 * final block. Increment it in software so that iv_out
+		 * reflects the correct next counter value expected by the CTR
+		 * mode.
+		 */
+		blocks = DIV_ROUND_UP(rctx->cryptlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE);
+
+		while (blocks--)
+			crypto_inc(rctx->iv, rctx->ivsize);
+	} else {
+		memcpy(rctx->iv, result_buf->encr_cntr_iv, rctx->ivsize);
+	}
+
 	qce->async_req_done(tmpl->qce, error);
 }
 

-- 
2.47.3

[PATCH v2 5/8] crypto: qce - Use a fallback for AES-CTR with a partial final block

[Bartosz Golaszewski]

ctr(aes) is registered with a block size of 1, so the crypto API hands
the driver requests whose length is not a multiple of the AES block
size. The crypto engine, however, stalls waiting for a full block of
input in that case, leaving the operation incomplete and failing the
request (and the crypto self-tests) with a hardware operation error.

Route AES-CTR requests with a partial final block to the software
fallback, which already handles the other cases the engine cannot.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: bb5c863b3d3c ("crypto: qce - fix ctr-aes-qce block, chunk sizes")
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c | 3 +++
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
index 379b45d2cd952a39c387e84af71238b53f7737e9..cf34278da30b1ffccf230ed194faae2352cb8550 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
@@ -277,9 +277,12 @@ static int qce_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, int encrypt)
 	 * AES-XTS request with len > QCE_SECTOR_SIZE and
 	 * is not a multiple of it.(Revisit this condition to check if it is
 	 * needed in all versions of CE)
+	 * AES-CTR with a partial final block (the CE stalls waiting for a full
+	 * block of input).
 	 */
 	if (IS_AES(rctx->flags) &&
 	    ((keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256) ||
+	    (IS_CTR(rctx->flags) && !IS_ALIGNED(req->cryptlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) ||
 	    (IS_XTS(rctx->flags) && ((req->cryptlen <= aes_sw_max_len) ||
 	    (req->cryptlen > QCE_SECTOR_SIZE &&
 	    req->cryptlen % QCE_SECTOR_SIZE))))) {

-- 
2.47.3

[PATCH v2 6/8] crypto: qce - Fix xts-aes-qce for weak keys

[Bartosz Golaszewski]

From: Kuldeep Singh <kuldeep.singh@oss.qualcomm.com>

The QCE hardware does not support AES XTS mode when key1 and key2 are
equal. The driver was handling this by unconditionally rejecting the
keys with -ENOKEY(-126), regardless of whether FIPS mode is active or
the FORBID_WEAK_KEYS flag is set.
[    5.599170] alg: skcipher: xts-aes-qce setkey failed on test vector 0; expected_error=0, actual_error=-126, flags=0x1
[    5.599184] alg: self-tests for xts(aes) using xts-aes-qce failed (rc=-126)

In general for weak keys,
- If FIPS mode is active or FORBID_WEAK_KEYS is set: return -EINVAL.
- In non-FIPS mode, Accept the key and encrypt successfully.

Since QCE was returning -ENOKEY for non-FIPS mode whereas the
expectation is to encrypt content and return success, the selftest saw a
mismatch and failed.

There are two problems in QCE behavior:
  * -ENOKEY is returned instead of -EINVAL for the FIPS/weak-key
    rejection case.
  * key1 == key2 is rejected even in non-FIPS mode

Fix xts-aes-qce behavior by using generic helper xts_verify_key() to
reject keys early with -EINVAL for FIPS mode active(or FORBID_WEAK_KEYS
set). For non-FIPS mode, since QCE hardware cannot accept the keys, use
software fallback mechanism to encrypt the data.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: f0d078dd6c49 ("crypto: qce - Return unsupported if key1 and key 2 are same for AES XTS algorithm")
Signed-off-by: Kuldeep Singh <kuldeep.singh@oss.qualcomm.com>
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/cipher.h   |  1 +
 drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c | 20 +++++++++++++-------
 2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/cipher.h b/drivers/crypto/qce/cipher.h
index 850f257d00f3aca0397adc1f703aea690c754d60..daea07551118d444d2f749588bdfe2ae2c6c553f 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/cipher.h
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/cipher.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 struct qce_cipher_ctx {
 	u8 enc_key[QCE_MAX_KEY_SIZE];
 	unsigned int enc_keylen;
+	bool use_fallback;
 	struct crypto_skcipher *fallback;
 };
 
diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
index cf34278da30b1ffccf230ed194faae2352cb8550..e152a5b559c373b1bd6730a019bbd55609bc45d1 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/skcipher.c
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <crypto/algapi.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/des.h>
 #include <crypto/internal/skcipher.h>
+#include <crypto/xts.h>
 
 #include "cipher.h"
 
@@ -196,14 +197,17 @@ static int qce_skcipher_setkey(struct crypto_skcipher *ablk, const u8 *key,
 	if (!key || !keylen)
 		return -EINVAL;
 
-	/*
-	 * AES XTS key1 = key2 not supported by crypto engine.
-	 * Revisit to request a fallback cipher in this case.
-	 */
 	if (IS_XTS(flags)) {
+		ret = xts_verify_key(ablk, key, keylen);
+		if (ret)
+			return ret;
 		__keylen = keylen >> 1;
-		if (!memcmp(key, key + __keylen, __keylen))
-			return -ENOKEY;
+		/*
+		 * QCE does not support key1 == key2 for XTS.
+		 * Use fallback cipher in this case.
+		 */
+		ctx->use_fallback = !crypto_memneq(key, key + __keylen,
+						       __keylen);
 	} else {
 		__keylen = keylen;
 	}
@@ -279,13 +283,15 @@ static int qce_skcipher_crypt(struct skcipher_request *req, int encrypt)
 	 * needed in all versions of CE)
 	 * AES-CTR with a partial final block (the CE stalls waiting for a full
 	 * block of input).
+	 * AES-XTS with key1 == key2 (not supported by the CE).
 	 */
 	if (IS_AES(rctx->flags) &&
 	    ((keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_128 && keylen != AES_KEYSIZE_256) ||
 	    (IS_CTR(rctx->flags) && !IS_ALIGNED(req->cryptlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE)) ||
 	    (IS_XTS(rctx->flags) && ((req->cryptlen <= aes_sw_max_len) ||
 	    (req->cryptlen > QCE_SECTOR_SIZE &&
-	    req->cryptlen % QCE_SECTOR_SIZE))))) {
+	    req->cryptlen % QCE_SECTOR_SIZE))) ||
+	    (IS_XTS(rctx->flags) && ctx->use_fallback))) {
 		skcipher_request_set_tfm(&rctx->fallback_req, ctx->fallback);
 		skcipher_request_set_callback(&rctx->fallback_req,
 					      req->base.flags,

-- 
2.47.3

[PATCH v2 7/8] crypto: qce - Use a fallback for CCM with a partial final block

[Bartosz Golaszewski]

CCM builds on AES-CTR for encryption, and the crypto engine stalls on a
partial final block just as it does for plain ctr(aes): a payload whose
length is not a multiple of the AES block size leaves the operation
incomplete and fails with a hardware operation error. This was caught by
the ccm(aes) crypto self-tests.

Force the software fallback for CCM requests whose message length is not
block aligned, reusing the driver's existing need_fallback mechanism.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9363efb4181c ("crypto: qce - Add support for AEAD algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
index 6a511e5d7f6290a1df0093e463f39f5f2db25f88..46d3e3eb53b271e2ce755847bbcc83f81b9bda7e 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
@@ -516,6 +516,14 @@ static int qce_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int encrypt)
 			ctx->need_fallback = true;
 	}
 
+	/*
+	 * CCM uses AES-CTR internally and the CE stalls on a partial final
+	 * block, so a payload that is not a multiple of the block size has to
+	 * be handled by the fallback.
+	 */
+	if (IS_CCM(rctx->flags) && !IS_ALIGNED(rctx->cryptlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
+		ctx->need_fallback = true;
+
 	/* If fallback is needed, schedule and exit */
 	if (ctx->need_fallback) {
 		/* Reset need_fallback in case the same ctx is used for another transaction */

-- 
2.47.3

[PATCH v2 8/8] crypto: qce - Use fallback for CCM with a fragmented payload

[Bartosz Golaszewski]

The crypto engine reliably processes CCM only when the message payload
is a single contiguous buffer. The associated data is already linearized
into a bounce buffer before being submitted, but when the payload itself
is split across multiple scatterlist entries the engine stalls waiting
for input and the request fails with a hardware operation error. This
was uncovered by the crypto self-tests, which feed the algorithms
randomly fragmented buffers.

Detect a payload that spans more than one scatterlist entry (in either
the source or the destination, skipping past the associated data) and
route the request to the software fallback.

Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Fixes: 9363efb4181c ("crypto: qce - Add support for AEAD algorithms")
Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
---
 drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c | 24 +++++++++++++++++++++++-
 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
index 46d3e3eb53b271e2ce755847bbcc83f81b9bda7e..2f4bb4fcd8265a0f7c2f568dfb8915b8c6b8ecee 100644
--- a/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
+++ b/drivers/crypto/qce/aead.c
@@ -500,7 +500,8 @@ static int qce_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int encrypt)
 	struct qce_aead_reqctx *rctx = aead_request_ctx_dma(req);
 	struct qce_aead_ctx *ctx = crypto_aead_ctx(tfm);
 	struct qce_alg_template *tmpl = to_aead_tmpl(tfm);
-	unsigned int blocksize = crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm);
+	unsigned int blocksize = crypto_aead_blocksize(tfm), authsize;
+	struct scatterlist __sg[2], *msg_sg;
 
 	rctx->flags  = tmpl->alg_flags;
 	rctx->flags |= encrypt ? QCE_ENCRYPT : QCE_DECRYPT;
@@ -524,6 +525,27 @@ static int qce_aead_crypt(struct aead_request *req, int encrypt)
 	if (IS_CCM(rctx->flags) && !IS_ALIGNED(rctx->cryptlen, AES_BLOCK_SIZE))
 		ctx->need_fallback = true;
 
+	/*
+	 * The CE reliably processes CCM only when the message payload is a
+	 * single contiguous buffer. The associated data is linearized into a
+	 * bounce buffer before being handed to the engine, but a fragmented
+	 * payload makes the engine stall waiting for input, so route those
+	 * requests to the fallback.
+	 */
+	if (IS_CCM(rctx->flags) && rctx->cryptlen) {
+		authsize = ctx->authsize;
+
+		msg_sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(__sg, req->src, req->assoclen);
+		if (sg_nents_for_len(msg_sg, rctx->cryptlen +
+				     (encrypt ? 0 : authsize)) > 1)
+			ctx->need_fallback = true;
+
+		msg_sg = scatterwalk_ffwd(__sg, req->dst, req->assoclen);
+		if (sg_nents_for_len(msg_sg, rctx->cryptlen +
+				     (encrypt ? authsize : 0)) > 1)
+			ctx->need_fallback = true;
+	}
+
 	/* If fallback is needed, schedule and exit */
 	if (ctx->need_fallback) {
 		/* Reset need_fallback in case the same ctx is used for another transaction */

-- 
2.47.3

Re: [PATCH v2 1/8] crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms

[Eric Biggers]

On Mon, Jun 15, 2026 at 05:49:52PM +0200, Bartosz Golaszewski wrote:
> Remove algorithms that are either unsafe or deprecated and have no
> in-kernel users that cannot be served by the ARM CE implementations.
> 
> AES-ECB reveals plaintext patterns (identical plaintext blocks produce
> identical ciphertext blocks) and should not be exposed as a hardware-
> accelerated primitive. DES, Triple DES and HMAC-SHA1 have been
> deprecated for years.
> 
> Remove ecb(aes), cbc(des), ecb(des3_ede), cbc(des3_ede), hmac(sha1) and
> all AEAD variants built on these primitives. Also clean up the - now dead
> - code, flags and constants.
> 
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>

What is the rationale for still supporting the following?

    sha1
    ecb(des)
    authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des))

- Eric

Re: [PATCH v2 1/8] crypto: qce - Remove unsafe/deprecated algorithms

[Bartosz Golaszewski]

On Tue, 16 Jun 2026 07:18:20 +0200, Eric Biggers <ebiggers@kernel.org> said:
> On Mon, Jun 15, 2026 at 05:49:52PM +0200, Bartosz Golaszewski wrote:
>> Remove algorithms that are either unsafe or deprecated and have no
>> in-kernel users that cannot be served by the ARM CE implementations.
>>
>> AES-ECB reveals plaintext patterns (identical plaintext blocks produce
>> identical ciphertext blocks) and should not be exposed as a hardware-
>> accelerated primitive. DES, Triple DES and HMAC-SHA1 have been
>> deprecated for years.
>>
>> Remove ecb(aes), cbc(des), ecb(des3_ede), cbc(des3_ede), hmac(sha1) and
>> all AEAD variants built on these primitives. Also clean up the - now dead
>> - code, flags and constants.
>>
>> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>> Signed-off-by: Bartosz Golaszewski <bartosz.golaszewski@oss.qualcomm.com>
>
> What is the rationale for still supporting the following?
>
>     sha1
>     ecb(des)
>     authenc(hmac(sha256),cbc(des))
>

No, I should have removed those too. I'll update it in v3.

Bart