From: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 bpf-next 1/3] security: pass inode_init_security xattrs via struct lsm_xattrs
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 14:39:53 -0400 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260630183956.281293-2-dwindsor@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260630183956.281293-1-dwindsor@gmail.com>
inode_init_security receives the LSM xattr array and its count as
separate parameters. For better compatibility with the bpf verifier,
update inode_init_security and its callers to consolidate these
parameters into a single context object: struct lsm_xattrs.
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
---
include/linux/evm.h | 9 +++++----
include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h | 4 ++--
include/linux/lsm_hooks.h | 16 +++++++---------
include/linux/security.h | 5 +++++
security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c | 8 +++++---
security/security.c | 24 ++++++++++++------------
security/selinux/hooks.c | 4 ++--
security/smack/smack_lsm.c | 27 ++++++++++++---------------
8 files changed, 50 insertions(+), 47 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/linux/evm.h b/include/linux/evm.h
index 913f4573b203..528f360f3308 100644
--- a/include/linux/evm.h
+++ b/include/linux/evm.h
@@ -12,6 +12,8 @@
#include <linux/integrity.h>
#include <linux/xattr.h>
+struct lsm_xattrs;
+
#ifdef CONFIG_EVM
extern int evm_set_key(void *key, size_t keylen);
extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
@@ -21,8 +23,8 @@ extern enum integrity_status evm_verifyxattr(struct dentry *dentry,
int evm_fix_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
const char *xattr_value, size_t xattr_value_len);
int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs,
- int *xattr_count);
+ const struct qstr *qstr,
+ struct lsm_xattrs *xattrs);
extern bool evm_revalidate_status(const char *xattr_name);
extern int evm_protected_xattr_if_enabled(const char *req_xattr_name);
extern int evm_read_protected_xattrs(struct dentry *dentry, u8 *buffer,
@@ -63,8 +65,7 @@ static inline int evm_fix_hmac(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
static inline int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr,
- struct xattr *xattrs,
- int *xattr_count)
+ struct lsm_xattrs *xattrs)
{
return 0;
}
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
index 65c9609ec207..5b2de7865ce8 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hook_defs.h
@@ -116,8 +116,8 @@ LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_alloc_security, struct inode *inode)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_free_security, struct inode *inode)
LSM_HOOK(void, LSM_RET_VOID, inode_free_security_rcu, void *inode_security)
LSM_HOOK(int, -EOPNOTSUPP, inode_init_security, struct inode *inode,
- struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs,
- int *xattr_count)
+ struct inode *dir, const struct qstr *qstr,
+ struct lsm_xattrs *xattrs)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_init_security_anon, struct inode *inode,
const struct qstr *name, const struct inode *context_inode)
LSM_HOOK(int, 0, inode_create, struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry,
diff --git a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
index b4f8cad53ddb..7afe06a8d4c6 100644
--- a/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
+++ b/include/linux/lsm_hooks.h
@@ -200,20 +200,18 @@ extern struct lsm_static_calls_table static_calls_table __ro_after_init;
/**
* lsm_get_xattr_slot - Return the next available slot and increment the index
- * @xattrs: array storing LSM-provided xattrs
- * @xattr_count: number of already stored xattrs (updated)
+ * @ctx: xattr state shared by inode_init_security hooks
*
- * Retrieve the first available slot in the @xattrs array to fill with an xattr,
- * and increment @xattr_count.
+ * Retrieve the first available slot in the @ctx->xattrs array to fill with an
+ * xattr, and increment @ctx->xattr_count.
*
- * Return: The slot to fill in @xattrs if non-NULL, NULL otherwise.
+ * Return: The slot to fill in @ctx->xattrs if non-NULL, NULL otherwise.
*/
-static inline struct xattr *lsm_get_xattr_slot(struct xattr *xattrs,
- int *xattr_count)
+static inline struct xattr *lsm_get_xattr_slot(struct lsm_xattrs *ctx)
{
- if (unlikely(!xattrs))
+ if (unlikely(!ctx || !ctx->xattrs))
return NULL;
- return &xattrs[(*xattr_count)++];
+ return &ctx->xattrs[ctx->xattr_count++];
}
#endif /* ! __LINUX_LSM_HOOKS_H */
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index 153e9043058f..0be590c40689 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -68,6 +68,11 @@ struct watch;
struct watch_notification;
struct lsm_ctx;
+struct lsm_xattrs {
+ struct xattr *xattrs;
+ unsigned int xattr_count;
+};
+
/* Default (no) options for the capable function */
#define CAP_OPT_NONE 0x0
/* If capable should audit the security request */
diff --git a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
index b59e3f121b8a..b7158fc63543 100644
--- a/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
+++ b/security/integrity/evm/evm_main.c
@@ -1062,14 +1062,16 @@ static int evm_inode_copy_up_xattr(struct dentry *src, const char *name)
* evm_inode_init_security - initializes security.evm HMAC value
*/
int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
- const struct qstr *qstr, struct xattr *xattrs,
- int *xattr_count)
+ const struct qstr *qstr,
+ struct lsm_xattrs *lsm_xattrs)
{
struct evm_xattr *xattr_data;
struct xattr *xattr, *evm_xattr;
+ struct xattr *xattrs;
bool evm_protected_xattrs = false;
int rc;
+ xattrs = lsm_xattrs ? lsm_xattrs->xattrs : NULL;
if (!(evm_initialized & EVM_INIT_HMAC) || !xattrs)
return 0;
@@ -1087,7 +1089,7 @@ int evm_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
if (!evm_protected_xattrs)
return 0;
- evm_xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
+ evm_xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(lsm_xattrs);
/*
* Array terminator (xattr name = NULL) must be the first non-filled
* xattr slot.
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 71aea8fdf014..2ad7f09c1a61 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1333,8 +1333,8 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const initxattrs initxattrs, void *fs_data)
{
struct lsm_static_call *scall;
- struct xattr *new_xattrs = NULL;
- int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP, xattr_count = 0;
+ struct lsm_xattrs xattrs = {};
+ int ret = -EOPNOTSUPP;
if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
return 0;
@@ -1344,15 +1344,15 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
if (initxattrs) {
/* Allocate +1 as terminator. */
- new_xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 1,
- sizeof(*new_xattrs), GFP_NOFS);
- if (!new_xattrs)
+ xattrs.xattrs = kcalloc(blob_sizes.lbs_xattr_count + 1,
+ sizeof(*xattrs.xattrs), GFP_NOFS);
+ if (!xattrs.xattrs)
return -ENOMEM;
}
lsm_for_each_hook(scall, inode_init_security) {
- ret = scall->hl->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr, new_xattrs,
- &xattr_count);
+ ret = scall->hl->hook.inode_init_security(inode, dir, qstr,
+ &xattrs);
if (ret && ret != -EOPNOTSUPP)
goto out;
/*
@@ -1364,14 +1364,14 @@ int security_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
}
/* If initxattrs() is NULL, xattr_count is zero, skip the call. */
- if (!xattr_count)
+ if (!xattrs.xattr_count)
goto out;
- ret = initxattrs(inode, new_xattrs, fs_data);
+ ret = initxattrs(inode, xattrs.xattrs, fs_data);
out:
- for (; xattr_count > 0; xattr_count--)
- kfree(new_xattrs[xattr_count - 1].value);
- kfree(new_xattrs);
+ for (; xattrs.xattr_count > 0; xattrs.xattr_count--)
+ kfree(xattrs.xattrs[xattrs.xattr_count - 1].value);
+ kfree(xattrs.xattrs);
return (ret == -EOPNOTSUPP) ? 0 : ret;
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_inode_init_security);
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 1a713d96206f..6bba6b212e17 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -2962,7 +2962,7 @@ static int selinux_dentry_create_files_as(struct dentry *dentry, int mode,
static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr,
- struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
+ struct lsm_xattrs *xattrs)
{
const struct cred_security_struct *crsec = selinux_cred(current_cred());
struct superblock_security_struct *sbsec;
@@ -2992,7 +2992,7 @@ static int selinux_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
!(sbsec->flags & SBLABEL_MNT))
return -EOPNOTSUPP;
- xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
+ xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs);
if (xattr) {
rc = security_sid_to_context_force(newsid,
&context, &clen);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
index ff115068c5c0..4501078430ca 100644
--- a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -981,10 +981,10 @@ smk_rule_transmutes(struct smack_known *subject,
}
static int
-xattr_dupval(struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count,
+xattr_dupval(struct lsm_xattrs *xattrs,
const char *name, const void *value, unsigned int vallen)
{
- struct xattr * const xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs, xattr_count);
+ struct xattr * const xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs);
if (!xattr)
return 0;
@@ -1003,14 +1003,13 @@ xattr_dupval(struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count,
* @inode: the newly created inode
* @dir: containing directory object
* @qstr: unused
- * @xattrs: where to put the attributes
- * @xattr_count: current number of LSM-provided xattrs (updated)
+ * @xattrs: where to put attributes and update count
*
* Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
*/
static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
const struct qstr *qstr,
- struct xattr *xattrs, int *xattr_count)
+ struct lsm_xattrs *xattrs)
{
struct task_smack *tsp = smack_cred(current_cred());
struct inode_smack * const issp = smack_inode(inode);
@@ -1057,21 +1056,19 @@ static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
- if (xattr_dupval(xattrs, xattr_count,
- XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE,
- TRANS_TRUE,
- TRANS_TRUE_SIZE
- ))
+ if (xattr_dupval(xattrs,
+ XATTR_SMACK_TRANSMUTE,
+ TRANS_TRUE,
+ TRANS_TRUE_SIZE))
rc = -ENOMEM;
}
}
if (rc == 0)
- if (xattr_dupval(xattrs, xattr_count,
- XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX,
- issp->smk_inode->smk_known,
- strlen(issp->smk_inode->smk_known)
- ))
+ if (xattr_dupval(xattrs,
+ XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX,
+ issp->smk_inode->smk_known,
+ strlen(issp->smk_inode->smk_known)))
rc = -ENOMEM;
instant_inode:
issp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
--
2.53.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-06-30 18:40 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-06-30 18:39 [PATCH v4 bpf-next 0/3] bpf: add bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc for atomic inode labeling David Windsor
2026-06-30 18:39 ` David Windsor [this message]
2026-06-30 18:39 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 2/3] " David Windsor
2026-06-30 18:46 ` David Windsor
2026-06-30 19:20 ` Paul Moore
2026-07-01 6:09 ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-07-01 12:55 ` Paul Moore
2026-07-01 15:09 ` Paul Moore
2026-06-30 18:39 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 3/3] selftests/bpf: add tests for bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc David Windsor
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