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From: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
To: Alexei Starovoitov <ast@kernel.org>,
	Daniel Borkmann <daniel@iogearbox.net>,
	Andrii Nakryiko <andrii@kernel.org>,
	Martin KaFai Lau <martin.lau@linux.dev>,
	Eduard Zingerman <eddyz87@gmail.com>, Song Liu <song@kernel.org>,
	Yonghong Song <yonghong.song@linux.dev>,
	John Fastabend <john.fastabend@gmail.com>,
	KP Singh <kpsingh@kernel.org>, Jiri Olsa <jolsa@kernel.org>,
	Kumar Kartikeya Dwivedi <memxor@gmail.com>,
	Emil Tsalapatis <emil@etsalapatis.com>,
	Matt Bobrowski <mattbobrowski@google.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E . Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>,
	Stephen Smalley <stephen.smalley.work@gmail.com>,
	Ondrej Mosnacek <omosnace@redhat.com>,
	Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.ibm.com>,
	Roberto Sassu <roberto.sassu@huawei.com>,
	Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>,
	Eric Snowberg <eric.snowberg@oracle.com>,
	Alexander Viro <viro@zeniv.linux.org.uk>,
	Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>, Jan Kara <jack@suse.cz>,
	Shuah Khan <shuah@kernel.org>
Cc: bpf@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-fsdevel@vger.kernel.org, linux-integrity@vger.kernel.org,
	selinux@vger.kernel.org, linux-kselftest@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
Subject: [PATCH v4 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: add bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc for atomic inode labeling
Date: Tue, 30 Jun 2026 14:39:54 -0400	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260630183956.281293-3-dwindsor@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260630183956.281293-1-dwindsor@gmail.com>

Add bpf_init_inode_xattr() kfunc for BPF LSM programs to atomically set
xattrs via the inode_init_security hook using lsm_get_xattr_slot(). The
hook now passes its xattr state as a single struct lsm_xattrs object,
which the kfunc takes directly.

The kfunc is only usable from lsm/inode_init_security programs: no other
hook exposes a struct lsm_xattrs argument, so the verifier rejects calls
from elsewhere. Restrict the xattr names that may be set via this kfunc
to the bpf.* namespace.

BPF reserves BPF_LSM_INODE_INIT_XATTRS slots via lbs_xattr_count, and the
kfunc enforces that BPF never consumes more slots than it reserved,
returning -ENOSPC once the budget is exhausted.

A previous attempt [1] required a kmalloc string output protocol for
the xattr name. Since commit 6bcdfd2cac55 ("security: Allow all LSMs to
provide xattrs for inode_init_security hook") [2], the xattr name is no
longer allocated; it is a static constant.

Link: https://kernsec.org/pipermail/linux-security-module-archive/2022-October/034878.html [1]
Link: https://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/torvalds/linux.git/commit/?id=6bcdfd2cac55 [2]
Signed-off-by: David Windsor <dwindsor@gmail.com>
---
 fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c      | 79 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 include/linux/bpf_lsm.h |  3 ++
 kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c    |  1 +
 security/bpf/hooks.c    |  1 +
 4 files changed, 84 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c b/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
index 768aca2dc0f0..c4023c82f21e 100644
--- a/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
+++ b/fs/bpf_fs_kfuncs.c
@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
 #include <linux/fsnotify.h>
 #include <linux/file.h>
 #include <linux/kernfs.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
 #include <linux/mm.h>
 #include <linux/xattr.h>
 
@@ -374,6 +375,83 @@ __bpf_kfunc struct inode *bpf_real_inode(struct dentry *dentry)
 	return d_real_inode(dentry);
 }
 
+static int bpf_xattrs_used(const struct lsm_xattrs *ctx)
+{
+	const size_t prefix_len = sizeof(XATTR_BPF_LSM_SUFFIX) - 1;
+	unsigned int i, n = 0;
+
+	for (i = 0; i < ctx->xattr_count; i++) {
+		const char *name = ctx->xattrs[i].name;
+
+		if (name && !strncmp(name, XATTR_BPF_LSM_SUFFIX, prefix_len))
+			n++;
+	}
+	return n;
+}
+
+/**
+ * bpf_init_inode_xattr - set an xattr on a new inode from inode_init_security
+ * @xattrs: inode_init_security xattr state from the hook context
+ * @name__str: xattr name (e.g., "bpf.file_label")
+ * @value_p: dynptr containing the xattr value
+ *
+ * Only callable from lsm/inode_init_security programs.
+ *
+ * Return: 0 on success, negative error on failure.
+ */
+__bpf_kfunc int bpf_init_inode_xattr(struct lsm_xattrs *xattrs,
+				     const char *name__str,
+				     const struct bpf_dynptr *value_p)
+{
+	struct bpf_dynptr_kern *value_ptr = (struct bpf_dynptr_kern *)value_p;
+	size_t name_len;
+	void *xattr_value;
+	struct xattr *xattr;
+	const void *value;
+	u32 value_len;
+
+	if (!xattrs || !xattrs->xattrs || !name__str)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (bpf_xattrs_used(xattrs) >= BPF_LSM_INODE_INIT_XATTRS)
+		return -ENOSPC;
+
+	name_len = strlen(name__str);
+	if (name_len == 0 || name_len > XATTR_NAME_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+	if (strncmp(name__str, XATTR_BPF_LSM_SUFFIX,
+		    sizeof(XATTR_BPF_LSM_SUFFIX) - 1))
+		return -EPERM;
+
+	value_len = __bpf_dynptr_size(value_ptr);
+	if (value_len == 0 || value_len > XATTR_SIZE_MAX)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	value = __bpf_dynptr_data(value_ptr, value_len);
+	if (!value)
+		return -EINVAL;
+
+	/* Combine xattr value + name into one allocation. */
+	xattr_value = kmalloc(value_len + name_len + 1, GFP_NOFS);
+	if (!xattr_value)
+		return -ENOMEM;
+
+	memcpy(xattr_value, value, value_len);
+	memcpy(xattr_value + value_len, name__str, name_len);
+	((char *)xattr_value)[value_len + name_len] = '\0';
+
+	xattr = lsm_get_xattr_slot(xattrs);
+	if (!xattr) {
+		kfree(xattr_value);
+		return -ENOSPC;
+	}
+
+	xattr->value = xattr_value;
+	xattr->name = (const char *)xattr_value + value_len;
+	xattr->value_len = value_len;
+
+	return 0;
+}
+
 __bpf_kfunc_end_defs();
 
 BTF_KFUNCS_START(bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids)
@@ -385,6 +463,7 @@ BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_get_file_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_set_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_remove_dentry_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)
 BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_real_inode, KF_SLEEPABLE | KF_RET_NULL)
+BTF_ID_FLAGS(func, bpf_init_inode_xattr, KF_SLEEPABLE)
 BTF_KFUNCS_END(bpf_fs_kfunc_set_ids)
 
 static int bpf_fs_kfuncs_filter(const struct bpf_prog *prog, u32 kfunc_id)
diff --git a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
index 143775a27a2a..b655c708818e 100644
--- a/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
+++ b/include/linux/bpf_lsm.h
@@ -19,6 +19,9 @@
 #include <linux/lsm_hook_defs.h>
 #undef LSM_HOOK
 
+/* max bpf xattrs per inode */
+#define BPF_LSM_INODE_INIT_XATTRS 4
+
 struct bpf_storage_blob {
 	struct bpf_local_storage __rcu *storage;
 };
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
index 564071a92d7d..1c3f84a92420 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/bpf_lsm.c
@@ -315,6 +315,7 @@ BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_create)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_free_security)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_getattr)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_getxattr)
+BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_init_security)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_mknod)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_need_killpriv)
 BTF_ID(func, bpf_lsm_inode_post_setxattr)
diff --git a/security/bpf/hooks.c b/security/bpf/hooks.c
index 40efde233f3a..d7c44c5c0e30 100644
--- a/security/bpf/hooks.c
+++ b/security/bpf/hooks.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@ static int __init bpf_lsm_init(void)
 
 struct lsm_blob_sizes bpf_lsm_blob_sizes __ro_after_init = {
 	.lbs_inode = sizeof(struct bpf_storage_blob),
+	.lbs_xattr_count = BPF_LSM_INODE_INIT_XATTRS,
 };
 
 DEFINE_LSM(bpf) = {
-- 
2.53.0


  parent reply	other threads:[~2026-06-30 18:40 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 9+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-06-30 18:39 [PATCH v4 bpf-next 0/3] bpf: add bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc for atomic inode labeling David Windsor
2026-06-30 18:39 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 1/3] security: pass inode_init_security xattrs via struct lsm_xattrs David Windsor
2026-06-30 18:39 ` David Windsor [this message]
2026-06-30 18:46   ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 2/3] bpf: add bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc for atomic inode labeling David Windsor
2026-06-30 19:20   ` Paul Moore
2026-07-01  6:09     ` Alexei Starovoitov
2026-07-01 12:55       ` Paul Moore
2026-07-01 15:09         ` Paul Moore
2026-06-30 18:39 ` [PATCH v4 bpf-next 3/3] selftests/bpf: add tests for bpf_init_inode_xattr kfunc David Windsor

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