From: Sriram Nambakam <snambakam@linux.microsoft.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 22/42] kexec: block legacy kexec_load when VBS is active
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 04:03:04 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260805110324.25067-23-snambakam@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260805110324.25067-1-snambakam@linux.microsoft.com>
Legacy kexec_load accepts raw memory segments and bypasses the
file-based VBS validation path. Reject non-crash usage when a VBS
backend is registered to prevent untrusted payload staging.
Crash dumps (KEXEC_ON_CRASH) are still permitted since they serve a
different purpose and do not replace the running kernel.
Returns -EKEYREJECTED so userspace can distinguish VBS policy denial
from permission errors.
---
kernel/kexec.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/kernel/kexec.c b/kernel/kexec.c
index 90756dc6339b..049afe1e1f5d 100644
--- a/kernel/kexec.c
+++ b/kernel/kexec.c
@@ -16,6 +16,7 @@
#include <linux/syscalls.h>
#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/vbs.h>
#include "kexec_internal.h"
@@ -205,6 +206,15 @@ static inline int kexec_load_check(unsigned long nr_segments,
int image_type = (flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH) ?
KEXEC_TYPE_CRASH : KEXEC_TYPE_DEFAULT;
int result;
+ bool crash_kexec = !!(flags & KEXEC_ON_CRASH);
+
+ /*
+ * Legacy kexec_load accepts raw memory segments and bypasses the
+ * file-based VBS validation path. Reject non-crash usage when VBS
+ * is active to prevent untrusted payload staging.
+ */
+ if (vbs_available() && !crash_kexec)
+ return -EKEYREJECTED;
/* We only trust the superuser with rebooting the system. */
if (!kexec_load_permitted(image_type))
--
2.55.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-05 11:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-05 11:02 [RFC PATCH v1 00/42] VBS/VSM-on-KVM: VBS integration for KVM VM planes Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/42] Fix merge issue - Remove duplicate definition for kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/42] Fix compilation Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/42] Fix compile error Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/42] Fix compile errors Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/42] Initial support for VM Planes - Add kernel config for CONFIG_VM_PLANES - Parse vm plane config from initrd for plane configuration - Make hypercalls to allocate memory for the vm planes Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/42] Use vcpu count from the plane configuration Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/42] skip processing plane configuration for plane 0 - plane 0 is the boot plane Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/42] Add plane config param to specify kernel image format Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/42] Activate the VM Planes through the Hypervisor - Using KVM as the VMM Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/42] allow the command line to be specified for kernels in other planes Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/42] Various changes to support VM Planes Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/42] Add a Virtualization Based Security (VBS) framework. - Add backends for AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX, Arm CCA and KVM Planes. - Support VTL on Hyper-V in addition to Planes on KVM Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/42] Add a inter-plane communication mechanism through KVM. - model this to use a single page similar to SEV-SNP Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/42] KVM: Add per-plane memory attribute support for cross-plane EPT protection Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/42] KVM: x86: Add KVM_HC_VBS_VTL_CALL hypercall for VBS inter-plane calls Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/42] vbs: Add HEKI kernel sealing and fix KVM plane memory attribute guards Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/42] vbs: Add module authentication via VBS/HEKI Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/42] vbs: Add kexec validation and make module auth non-fatal Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/42] Merge branch 'master' into vm-planes Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/42] kvm: x86: fix merged plane API/stat build regressions Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/42] KVM: x86: exit VM planes and VBS hypercalls to userspace Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` Sriram Nambakam [this message]
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/42] kvm: x86: fix merged plane API/stat build regressions Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/42] KVM: planes: expose memory-attribute setting to in-kernel callers Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/42] vm_planes: drop unused per-plane vcpu_count Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/42] drivers/virt: add VBS secure-plane park loop Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/42] KVM: planes: add arch-neutral in-kernel plane switch helper Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 28/42] KVM: x86: add VBS VTL call/return and cross-plane set-mem-attrs hypercalls Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 29/42] init/vm_planes: set up planes from rootfs_initcall and load ELF payloads Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 30/42] security/vbs: run backend probe and HEKI seal at rootfs_initcall Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 31/42] security/vbs: pin the VTL call hypercall to CPU0 Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 32/42] security/vbs: add secure-plane monitor backend Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 33/42] drivers/virt: rename VBS park loop to secure_monitor Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 34/42] x86/realmode: skip the sub-1M trampoline for the VBS secure plane Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 35/42] KVM: x86: deny normal-plane access to secure-plane memory Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 36/42] KVM: plane: handle KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION on the plane fd Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 37/42] KVM: selftests: run plane tests with a split IRQ chip Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 38/42] kvm: x86: drop obsolete kvm_cache_regs.h Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 39/42] kvm: arch: finalize plane hooks and kvm_arch_vcpu_create signature Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 40/42] kvm: x86: use kvm_vcpu scheduling-state accessors and struct stat fields Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 41/42] kvm: x86: finalize per-plane APIC state and CPUID placement Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 42/42] kvm: planes: reconcile core plane state, UAPI and hypercall exit Sriram Nambakam
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