From: Sriram Nambakam <snambakam@linux.microsoft.com>
To: kvm@vger.kernel.org
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [RFC PATCH v1 28/42] KVM: x86: add VBS VTL call/return and cross-plane set-mem-attrs hypercalls
Date: Wed, 5 Aug 2026 04:03:10 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <20260805110324.25067-29-snambakam@linux.microsoft.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260805110324.25067-1-snambakam@linux.microsoft.com>
Add the in-kernel handling for the VBS secure-plane hypercalls so the
plane switch happens without bouncing through userspace:
- KVM_HC_VBS_VTL_CALL: the normal plane (plane 0) records the
calling-area GPA and switches to the secure plane. While the secure
plane is still booting the call is parked (vtl_call_pending) and
delivered once the plane parks itself; once ready (vtl_plane_ready)
the GPA is delivered directly via kvm_vcpu_switch_plane().
- KVM_HC_VBS_VTL_RETURN: the secure plane parks and hands control back
to plane 0, marking itself ready and delivering any pending call.
- KVM_HC_VBS_SET_MEM_ATTRS: the secure plane applies cross-plane EPT
restrictions to a lower plane via kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes()
(rejected from plane 0).
Track the per-CPU bootstrap state (vtl_plane_ready, vtl_call_pending,
vtl_call_ca) in kvm_vcpu_common and assign the new hypercall numbers
KVM_HC_VBS_VTL_RETURN (16) and KVM_HC_VBS_SET_MEM_ATTRS (17).
Signed-off-by: Sriram Nambakam <snambakam@linux.microsoft.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/x86.c | 139 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
include/linux/kvm_host.h | 17 +++++
include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h | 2 +
3 files changed, 156 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
index eb82dde62399..3c73ab1dcfe8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/x86.c
@@ -10588,9 +10588,145 @@ int ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpl,
vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_hypercall;
return 0;
}
+ case KVM_HC_VBS_VTL_CALL:
+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_PLANES
+ /*
+ * Runtime VBS/VTL call from the normal world (plane 0) into the
+ * secure plane. Serviced in-kernel by switching to the secure
+ * plane (plane 1) — no userspace round trip. This is
+ * arch-neutral: it works for both Intel (VMX) and AMD (SVM), and
+ * mirrors the SEV-SNP in-kernel VMPL switch. a0 carries the
+ * guest-physical address of the shared calling area.
+ *
+ * Two cases:
+ * - Secure plane already booted and parked in its dispatch loop
+ * (vtl_plane_ready): deliver the calling-area GPA directly in
+ * RAX (its pending VTL return value) and switch to it.
+ * - Secure plane not booted yet (bootstrap): record the call as
+ * pending and switch to the secure plane so it boots; it will
+ * pick up the pending GPA when it reaches its first VTL return.
+ *
+ * If there is no secure plane configured at all, fall through to
+ * the userspace path so QEMU can service the call.
+ */
+ if (vcpu->plane_level == 0) {
+ struct kvm_vcpu_common *common = vcpu->common;
+ struct kvm_vcpu *secure = common->vcpus[1];
+
+ if (secure) {
+ common->vtl_call_ca = a0;
+
+ if (common->vtl_plane_ready) {
+ /* Parked in vtl_return: deliver now. */
+ kvm_rax_write(secure, a0);
+ common->vtl_call_pending = false;
+ } else {
+ /* Still booting: deliver on readiness. */
+ common->vtl_call_pending = true;
+ }
+
+ if (kvm_vcpu_switch_plane(vcpu, secure) == 1) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ ret = -KVM_EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_VM_PLANES */
+ goto vtl_userspace_exit;
+ case KVM_HC_VBS_VTL_RETURN:
+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_PLANES
+ /*
+ * The secure plane (plane >0) hands control back to plane 0
+ * in-kernel. This covers three situations:
+ * - Bootstrap "ready": the secure plane has just booted and is
+ * issuing its first VTL return to announce it is parked.
+ * - Normal completion: it has finished servicing a VTL call;
+ * the result is already in the shared calling area.
+ * - A call that arrived while the secure plane was still booting
+ * is now delivered (vtl_call_pending) by returning its
+ * calling-area GPA in RAX and keeping the secure plane running.
+ * a0 is an optional status carried for tracing only.
+ */
+ if (vcpu->plane_level == 0) {
+ ret = -KVM_EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ struct kvm_vcpu_common *common = vcpu->common;
+
+ common->vtl_plane_ready = true;
+
+ if (common->vtl_call_pending) {
+ /*
+ * Deliver the call that triggered the secure
+ * plane's boot: return its calling-area GPA and
+ * stay in the secure plane to service it. The
+ * GPA is delivered as this hypercall's return
+ * value (RAX) via the normal completion path; do
+ * not write RAX directly here, as the completion
+ * handler would overwrite it with hypercall.ret.
+ */
+ common->vtl_call_pending = false;
+ ret = common->vtl_call_ca;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (kvm_vcpu_switch_plane(vcpu, common->vcpus[0]) == 1) {
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_VM_PLANES */
+ ret = -KVM_EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ case KVM_HC_VBS_SET_MEM_ATTRS:
+#if defined(CONFIG_VM_PLANES) && defined(CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES)
+ /*
+ * The secure plane (plane >0) enforces EPT permissions on the
+ * normal plane's memory. It cannot issue the host
+ * KVM_SET_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES ioctl, so it asks KVM to do it via
+ * this hypercall. Only a higher-privilege plane may call it.
+ *
+ * a0 = guest-physical address (page aligned)
+ * a1 = region size in bytes (page aligned)
+ * a2 = access bits to retain for lower planes:
+ * bit0 read (implicit), bit1 write, bit2 exec
+ * (matches VBS_MEM_READ/WRITE/EXEC)
+ */
+ if (vcpu->plane_level == 0) {
+ ret = -KVM_EPERM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (!PAGE_ALIGNED(a0) || !PAGE_ALIGNED(a1) || a1 == 0 ||
+ a0 + a1 < a0) {
+ ret = -KVM_EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ } else {
+ unsigned long attrs = 0;
+ gfn_t start = a0 >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+ gfn_t end = (a0 + a1) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
+
+ if (!(a2 & BIT(1)))
+ attrs |= KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_NO_WRITE;
+ if (!(a2 & BIT(2)))
+ attrs |= KVM_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTE_NO_EXEC;
+
+ if (kvm_vm_set_mem_attributes(vcpu->kvm, start, end,
+ attrs))
+ ret = -KVM_EINVAL;
+ else
+ ret = 0;
+ goto out;
+ }
+#else
+ ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
+ goto out;
+#endif /* CONFIG_VM_PLANES && CONFIG_KVM_GENERIC_MEMORY_ATTRIBUTES */
case KVM_HC_VM_PLANES_CONFIG:
case KVM_HC_VM_PLANES_ACTIVATE:
- case KVM_HC_VBS_VTL_CALL: {
+ vtl_userspace_exit:
ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
if (!user_exit_on_hypercall(vcpu->kvm, nr))
break;
@@ -10609,7 +10745,6 @@ int ____kvm_emulate_hypercall(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, int cpl,
WARN_ON_ONCE(vcpu->run->hypercall.flags & KVM_EXIT_HYPERCALL_MBZ);
vcpu->arch.complete_userspace_io = complete_hypercall;
return 0;
- }
default:
ret = -KVM_ENOSYS;
break;
diff --git a/include/linux/kvm_host.h b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
index c6cf2b6c0076..f14d78fd8cd3 100644
--- a/include/linux/kvm_host.h
+++ b/include/linux/kvm_host.h
@@ -386,6 +386,23 @@ struct kvm_vcpu_common {
bool plane_switch;
+#ifdef CONFIG_VM_PLANES
+ /*
+ * VBS/VTL secure-plane bootstrap state (per logical CPU).
+ *
+ * @vtl_plane_ready: the secure plane has booted and parked itself in
+ * its dispatch loop (issued its first VTL return).
+ * @vtl_call_pending: a normal-plane VTL call has been registered but
+ * not yet delivered to the secure plane (used while
+ * the secure plane is still booting).
+ * @vtl_call_ca: guest-physical address of the pending call's
+ * shared calling area.
+ */
+ bool vtl_plane_ready;
+ bool vtl_call_pending;
+ u64 vtl_call_ca;
+#endif
+
struct kvm_vcpu_arch_common arch;
};
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h b/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
index 1703238952fb..eec4fce6b33a 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/kvm_para.h
@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
#define KVM_HC_VM_PLANES_CONFIG 13
#define KVM_HC_VM_PLANES_ACTIVATE 14
#define KVM_HC_VBS_VTL_CALL 15
+#define KVM_HC_VBS_VTL_RETURN 16
+#define KVM_HC_VBS_SET_MEM_ATTRS 17
/*
* hypercalls use architecture specific
--
2.55.0
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2026-08-05 11:04 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 43+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2026-08-05 11:02 [RFC PATCH v1 00/42] VBS/VSM-on-KVM: VBS integration for KVM VM planes Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 01/42] Fix merge issue - Remove duplicate definition for kvm_arch_has_irq_bypass Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 02/42] Fix compilation Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 03/42] Fix compile error Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 04/42] Fix compile errors Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 05/42] Initial support for VM Planes - Add kernel config for CONFIG_VM_PLANES - Parse vm plane config from initrd for plane configuration - Make hypercalls to allocate memory for the vm planes Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 06/42] Use vcpu count from the plane configuration Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 07/42] skip processing plane configuration for plane 0 - plane 0 is the boot plane Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 08/42] Add plane config param to specify kernel image format Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 09/42] Activate the VM Planes through the Hypervisor - Using KVM as the VMM Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 10/42] allow the command line to be specified for kernels in other planes Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 11/42] Various changes to support VM Planes Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 12/42] Add a Virtualization Based Security (VBS) framework. - Add backends for AMD SEV-SNP, Intel TDX, Arm CCA and KVM Planes. - Support VTL on Hyper-V in addition to Planes on KVM Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 13/42] Add a inter-plane communication mechanism through KVM. - model this to use a single page similar to SEV-SNP Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 14/42] KVM: Add per-plane memory attribute support for cross-plane EPT protection Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 15/42] KVM: x86: Add KVM_HC_VBS_VTL_CALL hypercall for VBS inter-plane calls Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 16/42] vbs: Add HEKI kernel sealing and fix KVM plane memory attribute guards Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:02 ` [RFC PATCH v1 17/42] vbs: Add module authentication via VBS/HEKI Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 18/42] vbs: Add kexec validation and make module auth non-fatal Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 19/42] Merge branch 'master' into vm-planes Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 20/42] kvm: x86: fix merged plane API/stat build regressions Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 21/42] KVM: x86: exit VM planes and VBS hypercalls to userspace Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 22/42] kexec: block legacy kexec_load when VBS is active Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 23/42] kvm: x86: fix merged plane API/stat build regressions Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 24/42] KVM: planes: expose memory-attribute setting to in-kernel callers Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 25/42] vm_planes: drop unused per-plane vcpu_count Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 26/42] drivers/virt: add VBS secure-plane park loop Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 27/42] KVM: planes: add arch-neutral in-kernel plane switch helper Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` Sriram Nambakam [this message]
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 29/42] init/vm_planes: set up planes from rootfs_initcall and load ELF payloads Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 30/42] security/vbs: run backend probe and HEKI seal at rootfs_initcall Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 31/42] security/vbs: pin the VTL call hypercall to CPU0 Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 32/42] security/vbs: add secure-plane monitor backend Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 33/42] drivers/virt: rename VBS park loop to secure_monitor Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 34/42] x86/realmode: skip the sub-1M trampoline for the VBS secure plane Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 35/42] KVM: x86: deny normal-plane access to secure-plane memory Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 36/42] KVM: plane: handle KVM_CHECK_EXTENSION on the plane fd Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 37/42] KVM: selftests: run plane tests with a split IRQ chip Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 38/42] kvm: x86: drop obsolete kvm_cache_regs.h Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 39/42] kvm: arch: finalize plane hooks and kvm_arch_vcpu_create signature Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 40/42] kvm: x86: use kvm_vcpu scheduling-state accessors and struct stat fields Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 41/42] kvm: x86: finalize per-plane APIC state and CPUID placement Sriram Nambakam
2026-08-05 11:03 ` [RFC PATCH v1 42/42] kvm: planes: reconcile core plane state, UAPI and hypercall exit Sriram Nambakam
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