Re: [PATCH v15 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests

[Nikunj A Dadhania <nikunj@amd.com>]

On 12/10/2024 5:13 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 10, 2024 at 10:32:23AM +0530, Nikunj A. Dadhania wrote:
>> Do you also want to terminate the offending guest?
>>
>> ES_UNSUPPORTED return will do that.
> 
> I guess that would be too harsh. I guess a warn and a ES_OK should be fine for
> now.

Yes, that will be better.

>> This is changing the behavior for SEV-ES and SNP guests(non SECURE_TSC), TSC
>> MSR reads are converted to RDTSC. This is a good optimization. But just
>> wanted to bring up the subtle impact.
> 
> That RDTSC happens still in the guest, right? But in its #VC handler. Versus it
> being a HV GHCB protocol call. 

Yes, and the change is working fine, I have verified it.

> I guess this conversion should be a separate
> patch in case there's some issues like the HV intercepting RDTSC... i.e.,
> VMEXIT_RDTSC.

I tried instrumenting code to intercept RDTSC and RDTSCP, KVM does not handle
EXIT_RDTSC and the guest (including non-secure guests) crashes pretty early with
the following in the host kernel log:

kvm_amd: kvm [2153024]: vcpu0, guest rIP: 0xbbea5fc2 svm: unexpected exit reason
0x6e

> We should probably handle that case too and then fallback to the GHCB call. Or
> is there a catch 22 I'm missing here...

Regards,
Nikunj