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From: "Nikunj A. Dadhania" <nikunj@amd.com>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org, thomas.lendacky@amd.com,
	x86@kernel.org, kvm@vger.kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	tglx@linutronix.de, dave.hansen@linux.intel.com,
	pgonda@google.com, seanjc@google.com, pbonzini@redhat.com
Subject: Re: [PATCH v15 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines
Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2024 15:30:13 +0530	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <fef7abe1-29ce-4818-b8b5-988e5e6a2027@amd.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20241203141950.GCZ08ThrMOHmDFeaa2@fat_crate.local>



On 12/3/2024 7:49 PM, Borislav Petkov wrote:
> On Tue, Dec 03, 2024 at 02:30:33PM +0530, Nikunj A Dadhania wrote:
 
>> @@ -2667,3 +2662,179 @@ static int __init sev_sysfs_init(void)
>>  }
>>  arch_initcall(sev_sysfs_init);
>>  #endif // CONFIG_SYSFS
>> +
>> +static void free_shared_pages(void *buf, size_t sz)
>> +{
>> +	unsigned int npages = PAGE_ALIGN(sz) >> PAGE_SHIFT;
>> +	int ret;
>> +
>> +	if (!buf)
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	ret = set_memory_encrypted((unsigned long)buf, npages);
>> +	if (ret) {
>> +		WARN_ONCE(ret, "failed to restore encryption mask (leak it)\n");
> 
> Looking at where this lands:
> 
> set_memory_encrypted
> |-> __set_memory_enc_dec
> 
> and that doing now:
> 
>         if (cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_MEM_ENCRYPT)) {
>                 if (!down_read_trylock(&mem_enc_lock))
>                         return -EBUSY;
> 
> 
> after
> 
> 859e63b789d6 ("x86/tdx: Convert shared memory back to private on kexec")
> 
> we probably should pay attention to this here firing and maybe turning that
> _trylock() into a normal down_read*
> 
> Anyway, just something to pay attention to in the future.

Yes, will keep an eye.

> 
>> +		return;
>> +	}
>> +
>> +	__free_pages(virt_to_page(buf), get_order(sz));
>> +}
> 
> ...
> 
>> +struct snp_msg_desc *snp_msg_alloc(void)
>> +{
>> +	struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc;
>> +	void __iomem *mem;
>> +
>> +	BUILD_BUG_ON(sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg) > PAGE_SIZE);
>> +
>> +	mdesc = kzalloc(sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL);
> 
> The above ones use GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT. What's the difference?

The above ones I have retained old code.

GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT allocation are accounted in kmemcg and the below note from[1]
----------------------------------------------------------------------------
Untrusted allocations triggered from userspace should be a subject of kmem
accounting and must have __GFP_ACCOUNT bit set. There is the handy
GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT shortcut for GFP_KERNEL allocations that should be accounted.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------

For mdesc, I had kept it similar to snp_dev allocation, that is why it is 
having GFP_KERNEL.

        snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
        if (!snp_dev)
-               goto e_unmap;
-
-       mdesc = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL);

Let me know if mdesc allocation need to be GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT.

>> +void snp_msg_free(struct snp_msg_desc *mdesc)
>> +{
>> +	if (!mdesc)
>> +		return;
>> +
>> +	mdesc->vmpck = NULL;
>> +	mdesc->os_area_msg_seqno = NULL;
> 
> 	memset(mdesc, ...);
> 
> at the end instead of those assignments.

Sure.

> 
>> +	kfree(mdesc->ctx);
>> +
>> +	free_shared_pages(mdesc->response, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
>> +	free_shared_pages(mdesc->request, sizeof(struct snp_guest_msg));
>> +	iounmap((__force void __iomem *)mdesc->secrets);
> 
> 
>> +	kfree(mdesc);
>> +}
>> +EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(snp_msg_free);
>> diff --git a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
>> index b699771be029..5268511bc9b8 100644
>> --- a/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
>> +++ b/drivers/virt/coco/sev-guest/sev-guest.c
> 
> ...
> 
>> @@ -993,115 +898,57 @@ static int __init sev_guest_probe(struct platform_device *pdev)
>>  	if (!cc_platform_has(CC_ATTR_GUEST_SEV_SNP))
>>  		return -ENODEV;
>>  
>> -	if (!dev->platform_data)
>> -		return -ENODEV;
>> -
>> -	data = (struct sev_guest_platform_data *)dev->platform_data;
>> -	mapping = ioremap_encrypted(data->secrets_gpa, PAGE_SIZE);
>> -	if (!mapping)
>> -		return -ENODEV;
>> -
>> -	secrets = (__force void *)mapping;
>> -
>> -	ret = -ENOMEM;
>>  	snp_dev = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_guest_dev), GFP_KERNEL);
>>  	if (!snp_dev)
>> -		goto e_unmap;
>> -
>> -	mdesc = devm_kzalloc(&pdev->dev, sizeof(struct snp_msg_desc), GFP_KERNEL);
>> -	if (!mdesc)
>> -		goto e_unmap;
>> -
>> -	/* Adjust the default VMPCK key based on the executing VMPL level */
>> -	if (vmpck_id == -1)
>> -		vmpck_id = snp_vmpl;
>> +		return -ENOMEM;
>>  
>> -	ret = -EINVAL;
>> -	mdesc->vmpck = get_vmpck(vmpck_id, secrets, &mdesc->os_area_msg_seqno);
>> -	if (!mdesc->vmpck) {
>> -		dev_err(dev, "Invalid VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id);
>> -		goto e_unmap;
>> -	}
>> +	mdesc = snp_msg_alloc();
>> +	if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(mdesc))
>> +		return -ENOMEM;
>>  
>> -	/* Verify that VMPCK is not zero. */
>> -	if (is_vmpck_empty(mdesc)) {
>> -		dev_err(dev, "Empty VMPCK%d communication key\n", vmpck_id);
>> -		goto e_unmap;
>> -	}
>> +	ret = snp_msg_init(mdesc, vmpck_id);
>> +	if (ret)
>> +		return -EIO;
> 
> You just leaked mdesc here.

Right

> Audit all your error paths.

Sure I will audit and send updated patch.

Regards
Nikunj


1) https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/v6.12/core-api/memory-allocation.html

  parent reply	other threads:[~2024-12-04 10:00 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 96+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2024-12-03  9:00 [PATCH v15 00/13] Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 01/13] x86/sev: Carve out and export SNP guest messaging init routines Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03 14:19   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 14:35     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03 14:50       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03 14:52         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-04  9:30     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-04 10:00     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania [this message]
2024-12-04 20:02       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-05  6:23         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-06 20:27           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-07  0:27             ` Dionna Amalie Glaze
2024-12-09 15:36               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-09  6:16             ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-09 15:38               ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10  6:38                 ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-04 19:06   ` Francesco Lavra
2025-01-06  4:14     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 02/13] x86/sev: Relocate SNP guest messaging routines to common code Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-04 20:20   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-05  6:25     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 03/13] x86/sev: Add Secure TSC support for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-05 11:55   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-06  4:19     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-16 16:06   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-17  6:12     ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2025-01-04 20:26   ` Francesco Lavra
2025-01-06  4:34     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 04/13] x86/sev: Change TSC MSR behavior for Secure TSC enabled guests Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-09 15:57   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10  5:02     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-10 11:43       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 16:44         ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 14:29       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-10 16:59         ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-11 19:00         ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:01           ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-11 22:22             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-11 22:43               ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 05/13] x86/sev: Prevent RDTSC/RDTSCP interception " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 11:53   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 06/13] x86/sev: Prevent GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR " Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 12:11   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 17:13     ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-10 17:18       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-12  4:53         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-17 10:57           ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-18  5:20             ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-24 11:53               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-01  8:44                 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-01 16:10                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02  5:03                     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02  9:07                       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02  9:30                         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 14:45                           ` Tom Lendacky
2025-01-02 14:54                             ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-10 17:22       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 07/13] x86/sev: Mark Secure TSC as reliable clocksource Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-11 20:32   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-12  5:07     ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 08/13] x86/cpu/amd: Do not print FW_BUG for Secure TSC Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-17 11:10   ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-18  5:21     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 09/13] tsc: Use the GUEST_TSC_FREQ MSR for discovering TSC frequency Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-16 16:31   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-17  6:27     ` Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-17  7:05       ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-17  7:57         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-30 11:29   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-01  8:56     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-01 16:15       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02  5:10         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02  9:17           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 10:01             ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02 10:45               ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 13:10                 ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-03 12:04                   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 13:59                     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-04 10:28                       ` Borislav Petkov
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 10/13] tsc: Upgrade TSC clocksource rating Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-30 11:36   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02  5:20     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02  9:32       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 10:09         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-03 12:06           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-03 14:03             ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 11/13] tsc: Switch to native sched clock Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 12/13] x86/kvmclock: Abort SecureTSC enabled guest when kvmclock is selected Nikunj A Dadhania
2024-12-16 16:36   ` Tom Lendacky
2024-12-30 17:04   ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-01  9:44     ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-01 16:19       ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02  5:34         ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2025-01-02  9:25           ` Borislav Petkov
2025-01-02 10:06             ` Nikunj A. Dadhania
2024-12-03  9:00 ` [PATCH v15 13/13] x86/sev: Allow Secure TSC feature for SNP guests Nikunj A Dadhania

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