[PATCH v2] libceph: reject monitor replies with oversized data segment

[PATCH v2] libceph: reject monitor replies with oversized data segment

[Dhiraj Mishra]

Monitor messages can be allocated from preallocated reply messages or
with ceph_msg_new(), both of which may provide only front-buffer storage
and no data items.  The messenger receive path copies the wire header
into the selected ceph_msg and later uses hdr.data_len to decide whether
to initialize a data cursor.

If a malicious or compromised monitor advertises a non-zero data segment
for one of these front-only replies, the receive path can call
ceph_msg_data_cursor_init() with length greater than msg->data_length and
hit its BUG_ON() checks, crashing the client kernel.

I verified the issue against v7.1-rc1-123-ge75a43c7cec4.  The msgr2
trigger path is present since commit cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph:
implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)"), which is contained
in v5.11-rc1 and later.  The monitor allocator pattern is older, but I
have not tested older msgr1-only kernels.

A concrete trigger is a monitor connection over msgr2 after
CEPH_CON_S_OPEN where a FRAME_TAG_MESSAGE contains a monitor reply type
handled by mon_alloc_msg(), a valid front_len for that message type and
data_len = 1.  CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP is one such example: the message is
allocated with ceph_msg_new(), leaving msg->data_length and
msg->num_data_items as zero.

Reject monitor replies whose wire data segment is larger than the data
backing allocated for the selected ceph_msg, mirroring the existing OSD
reply hardening.

Fixes: cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)")
Signed-off-by: Dhiraj Mishra <mishra.dhiraj95@gmail.com>
---
v2:
  - Resend as an inline plain-text patch.
  - Add full email address to the From and Signed-off-by identities.
  - Add ceph-devel and LKML to the recipient list when sending.

 net/ceph/mon_client.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/ceph/mon_client.c b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
index d2cdc8ee3155..7f2293122bba 100644
--- a/net/ceph/mon_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
@@ -712,6 +712,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_generic_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
 	struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private;
 	struct ceph_mon_generic_request *req;
 	u64 tid = le64_to_cpu(hdr->tid);
+	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
 	struct ceph_msg *m;
 
 	mutex_lock(&monc->mutex);
@@ -720,6 +721,16 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_generic_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
 		dout("get_generic_reply %lld dne\n", tid);
 		*skip = 1;
 		m = NULL;
+	} else if (!req->reply) {
+		pr_warn("%s tid %llu missing reply buffer, skipping\n",
+			__func__, tid);
+		*skip = 1;
+		m = NULL;
+	} else if (data_len > req->reply->data_length) {
+		pr_warn("%s tid %llu data %u > preallocated %zu, skipping\n",
+			__func__, tid, data_len, req->reply->data_length);
+		*skip = 1;
+		m = NULL;
 	} else {
 		dout("get_generic_reply %lld got %p\n", tid, req->reply);
 		*skip = 0;
@@ -1499,6 +1510,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
 	struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private;
 	int type = le16_to_cpu(hdr->type);
 	int front_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->front_len);
+	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
 	struct ceph_msg *m = NULL;
 
 	*skip = 0;
@@ -1544,6 +1556,15 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
 		ceph_msg_put(m);
 		m = ceph_msg_new(type, front_len, GFP_NOFS, false);
 	}
+	if (m && data_len > m->data_length) {
+		pr_warn("%s data %u > prealloc %zu (%u#%llu), skipping\n",
+			__func__, data_len, m->data_length,
+			(unsigned int)con->peer_name.type,
+			le64_to_cpu(con->peer_name.num));
+		ceph_msg_put(m);
+		m = NULL;
+		*skip = 1;
+	}
 
 	return m;
 }
-- 
2.49.0

Re: [PATCH v2] libceph: reject monitor replies with oversized data segment

[Viacheslav Dubeyko]

On Fri, 2026-05-01 at 23:37 +0400, Dhiraj Mishra wrote:
> Monitor messages can be allocated from preallocated reply messages or
> with ceph_msg_new(), both of which may provide only front-buffer storage
> and no data items.  The messenger receive path copies the wire header
> into the selected ceph_msg and later uses hdr.data_len to decide whether
> to initialize a data cursor.
> 
> If a malicious or compromised monitor advertises a non-zero data segment
> for one of these front-only replies, the receive path can call
> ceph_msg_data_cursor_init() with length greater than msg->data_length and
> hit its BUG_ON() checks, crashing the client kernel.
> 
> I verified the issue against v7.1-rc1-123-ge75a43c7cec4.  The msgr2
> trigger path is present since commit cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph:
> implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)"), which is contained
> in v5.11-rc1 and later.  The monitor allocator pattern is older, but I
> have not tested older msgr1-only kernels.
> 
> A concrete trigger is a monitor connection over msgr2 after
> CEPH_CON_S_OPEN where a FRAME_TAG_MESSAGE contains a monitor reply type
> handled by mon_alloc_msg(), a valid front_len for that message type and
> data_len = 1.  CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP is one such example: the message is
> allocated with ceph_msg_new(), leaving msg->data_length and
> msg->num_data_items as zero.
> 
> Reject monitor replies whose wire data segment is larger than the data
> backing allocated for the selected ceph_msg, mirroring the existing OSD
> reply hardening.
> 
> Fixes: cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)")
> Signed-off-by: Dhiraj Mishra <mishra.dhiraj95@gmail.com>
> ---
> v2:
>   - Resend as an inline plain-text patch.
>   - Add full email address to the From and Signed-off-by identities.
>   - Add ceph-devel and LKML to the recipient list when sending.
> 
>  net/ceph/mon_client.c | 21 +++++++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 21 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/net/ceph/mon_client.c b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
> index d2cdc8ee3155..7f2293122bba 100644
> --- a/net/ceph/mon_client.c
> +++ b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
> @@ -712,6 +712,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_generic_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  	struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private;
>  	struct ceph_mon_generic_request *req;
>  	u64 tid = le64_to_cpu(hdr->tid);
> +	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
>  	struct ceph_msg *m;
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&monc->mutex);
> @@ -720,6 +721,16 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_generic_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  		dout("get_generic_reply %lld dne\n", tid);
>  		*skip = 1;
>  		m = NULL;
> +	} else if (!req->reply) {

The req->reply is set unconditionally when the generic request is allocated and
submitted; it is never NULL when req is found in the tree. It looks like a dead
code.

> +		pr_warn("%s tid %llu missing reply buffer, skipping\n",
> +			__func__, tid);
> +		*skip = 1;
> +		m = NULL;
> +	} else if (data_len > req->reply->data_length) {
> +		pr_warn("%s tid %llu data %u > preallocated %zu, skipping\n",
> +			__func__, tid, data_len, req->reply->data_length);

As far as I can see, other pr_err() calls in this file never show function name.
So, it's not consistent with common style of the module.

A malicious monitor can send a flood of oversized frames at line rate. Probably,
we need to consider pr_warn_ratelimited().

> +		*skip = 1;
> +		m = NULL;
>  	} else {
>  		dout("get_generic_reply %lld got %p\n", tid, req->reply);
>  		*skip = 0;
> @@ -1499,6 +1510,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  	struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private;
>  	int type = le16_to_cpu(hdr->type);
>  	int front_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->front_len);
> +	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
>  	struct ceph_msg *m = NULL;
>  
>  	*skip = 0;
> @@ -1544,6 +1556,15 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  		ceph_msg_put(m);
>  		m = ceph_msg_new(type, front_len, GFP_NOFS, false);
>  	}

I would like to see an empty line between these code blocks.

> +	if (m && data_len > m->data_length) {
> +		pr_warn("%s data %u > prealloc %zu (%u#%llu), skipping\n",
> +			__func__, data_len, m->data_length,
> +			(unsigned int)con->peer_name.type,
> +			le64_to_cpu(con->peer_name.num));
> +		ceph_msg_put(m);
> +		m = NULL;
> +		*skip = 1;
> +	}

I don't quite follow to the purpose of this code block. As far as I can see, we
have:

	case CEPH_MSG_STATFS_REPLY:
	case CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK:
		return get_generic_reply(con, hdr, skip);

What is the purpose of this?

Thanks,
Slava.

>  
>  	return m;
>  }

[PATCH v3] libceph: reject monitor replies with oversized data segment

[Dhiraj Mishra]

Monitor messages can be allocated from preallocated reply messages or
with ceph_msg_new(), both of which may provide only front-buffer storage
and no data items.  The messenger receive path copies the wire header
into the selected ceph_msg and later uses hdr.data_len to decide whether
to initialize a data cursor.

If a malicious or compromised monitor advertises a non-zero data segment
for one of these front-only replies, the receive path can call
ceph_msg_data_cursor_init() with length greater than msg->data_length and
hit its BUG_ON() checks, crashing the client kernel.

I verified the issue against v7.1-rc1-123-ge75a43c7cec4.  The msgr2
trigger path is present since commit cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph:
implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)"), which is contained
in v5.11-rc1 and later.  The monitor allocator pattern is older, but I
have not tested older msgr1-only kernels.

A concrete trigger is a monitor connection over msgr2 after
CEPH_CON_S_OPEN where a FRAME_TAG_MESSAGE contains a monitor reply type
handled by mon_alloc_msg(), a valid front_len for that message type and
data_len = 1.  CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP is one such example: the message is
allocated with ceph_msg_new(), leaving msg->data_length and
msg->num_data_items as zero.

Reject monitor replies whose wire data segment is larger than the data
backing allocated for the selected ceph_msg, mirroring the existing OSD
reply hardening.

Fixes: cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)")
Signed-off-by: Dhiraj Mishra <mishra.dhiraj95@gmail.com>
---
v3:
  - Remove the impossible !req->reply check for generic requests.
  - Use pr_warn_ratelimited() for malicious-monitor log spam resistance.
  - Avoid adding __func__ to the new mon_client warnings.
  - Add a blank line between the front_len and data_len checks.

v2:
  - Resend as an inline plain-text patch.
  - Add full email address to the From and Signed-off-by identities.
  - Add ceph-devel and LKML to the recipient list when sending.

 net/ceph/mon_client.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/ceph/mon_client.c b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
index d2cdc8ee3155..9f1c7ca42f36 100644
--- a/net/ceph/mon_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
@@ -712,6 +712,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_generic_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
 	struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private;
 	struct ceph_mon_generic_request *req;
 	u64 tid = le64_to_cpu(hdr->tid);
+	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
 	struct ceph_msg *m;
 
 	mutex_lock(&monc->mutex);
@@ -720,6 +721,11 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_generic_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
 		dout("get_generic_reply %lld dne\n", tid);
 		*skip = 1;
 		m = NULL;
+	} else if (data_len > req->reply->data_length) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("mon generic reply tid %llu data %u > preallocated %zu, skipping\n",
+				    tid, data_len, req->reply->data_length);
+		*skip = 1;
+		m = NULL;
 	} else {
 		dout("get_generic_reply %lld got %p\n", tid, req->reply);
 		*skip = 0;
@@ -1499,6 +1505,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
 	struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private;
 	int type = le16_to_cpu(hdr->type);
 	int front_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->front_len);
+	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
 	struct ceph_msg *m = NULL;
 
 	*skip = 0;
@@ -1545,5 +1552,15 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
 		m = ceph_msg_new(type, front_len, GFP_NOFS, false);
 	}
 
+	if (m && data_len > m->data_length) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("mon message data %u > prealloc %zu (%u#%llu), skipping\n",
+				    data_len, m->data_length,
+				    (unsigned int)con->peer_name.type,
+				    le64_to_cpu(con->peer_name.num));
+		ceph_msg_put(m);
+		m = NULL;
+		*skip = 1;
+	}
+
 	return m;
 }

Re: [PATCH v3] libceph: reject monitor replies with oversized data segment

[Raphael Zimmer]

On 02.05.26 7:22 AM, Dhiraj Mishra wrote:
> Monitor messages can be allocated from preallocated reply messages or
> with ceph_msg_new(), both of which may provide only front-buffer storage
> and no data items.  The messenger receive path copies the wire header
> into the selected ceph_msg and later uses hdr.data_len to decide whether
> to initialize a data cursor.
> 
> If a malicious or compromised monitor advertises a non-zero data segment
> for one of these front-only replies, the receive path can call
> ceph_msg_data_cursor_init() with length greater than msg->data_length and
> hit its BUG_ON() checks, crashing the client kernel.
> 
> I verified the issue against v7.1-rc1-123-ge75a43c7cec4.  The msgr2
> trigger path is present since commit cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph:
> implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)"), which is contained
> in v5.11-rc1 and later.  The monitor allocator pattern is older, but I
> have not tested older msgr1-only kernels.
> 
> A concrete trigger is a monitor connection over msgr2 after
> CEPH_CON_S_OPEN where a FRAME_TAG_MESSAGE contains a monitor reply type
> handled by mon_alloc_msg(), a valid front_len for that message type and
> data_len = 1.  CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP is one such example: the message is
> allocated with ceph_msg_new(), leaving msg->data_length and
> msg->num_data_items as zero.
> 
> Reject monitor replies whose wire data segment is larger than the data
> backing allocated for the selected ceph_msg, mirroring the existing OSD
> reply hardening.
> 
> Fixes: cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)")
> Signed-off-by: Dhiraj Mishra <mishra.dhiraj95@gmail.com>
> ---
> v3:
>   - Remove the impossible !req->reply check for generic requests.
>   - Use pr_warn_ratelimited() for malicious-monitor log spam resistance.
>   - Avoid adding __func__ to the new mon_client warnings.
>   - Add a blank line between the front_len and data_len checks.
> 
> v2:
>   - Resend as an inline plain-text patch.
>   - Add full email address to the From and Signed-off-by identities.
>   - Add ceph-devel and LKML to the recipient list when sending.
> 
>  net/ceph/mon_client.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/net/ceph/mon_client.c b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
> index d2cdc8ee3155..9f1c7ca42f36 100644
> --- a/net/ceph/mon_client.c
> +++ b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
> @@ -712,6 +712,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_generic_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  	struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private;
>  	struct ceph_mon_generic_request *req;
>  	u64 tid = le64_to_cpu(hdr->tid);
> +	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
>  	struct ceph_msg *m;
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&monc->mutex);
> @@ -720,6 +721,11 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_generic_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  		dout("get_generic_reply %lld dne\n", tid);
>  		*skip = 1;
>  		m = NULL;
> +	} else if (data_len > req->reply->data_length) {
> +		pr_warn_ratelimited("mon generic reply tid %llu data %u > preallocated %zu, skipping\n",
> +				    tid, data_len, req->reply->data_length);
> +		*skip = 1;
> +		m = NULL;
>  	} else {
>  		dout("get_generic_reply %lld got %p\n", tid, req->reply);
>  		*skip = 0;
> @@ -1499,6 +1505,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  	struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private;
>  	int type = le16_to_cpu(hdr->type);
>  	int front_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->front_len);
> +	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
>  	struct ceph_msg *m = NULL;
>  
>  	*skip = 0;
> @@ -1545,5 +1552,15 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  		m = ceph_msg_new(type, front_len, GFP_NOFS, false);
>  	}
>  
> +	if (m && data_len > m->data_length) {
> +		pr_warn_ratelimited("mon message data %u > prealloc %zu (%u#%llu), skipping\n",
> +				    data_len, m->data_length,
> +				    (unsigned int)con->peer_name.type,
> +				    le64_to_cpu(con->peer_name.num));
> +		ceph_msg_put(m);
> +		m = NULL;
> +		*skip = 1;
> +	}
> +
>  	return m;
>  }

Hi Dhiraj,
as far as I can see, the same issue can also occur on MDS connections
here:
https://elixir.bootlin.com/linux/v7.0.1/source/fs/ceph/mds_client.c#L6477
I guess a similar check should also be added there. Maybe this can be
done in one patch.

Best regards,
Raphael

[PATCH v4] libceph, ceph: reject oversized mon and MDS data segments

[Dhiraj Mishra]

Monitor and MDS messages can be allocated with only front-buffer storage
and no data items.  The messenger receive path copies the wire header
into the selected ceph_msg and later uses hdr.data_len to decide whether
to initialize a data cursor.

If a malicious or compromised peer advertises a non-zero data segment for
one of these front-only messages, the receive path can call
ceph_msg_data_cursor_init() with length greater than msg->data_length and
hit its BUG_ON() checks, crashing the client kernel.

I verified the monitor issue against v7.1-rc1-123-ge75a43c7cec4.  The
msgr2 trigger path is present since commit cd1a677cad99 ("libceph,
ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)"), which is
contained in v5.11-rc1 and later.  The allocator patterns are older, but
I have not tested older msgr1-only kernels.

A concrete monitor trigger is a monitor connection over msgr2 after
CEPH_CON_S_OPEN where a FRAME_TAG_MESSAGE contains a monitor reply type
handled by mon_alloc_msg(), a valid front_len for that message type and
data_len = 1.  CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP is one such example: the message is
allocated with ceph_msg_new(), leaving msg->data_length and
msg->num_data_items as zero.

The MDS allocation path has the same issue: mds_alloc_msg() allocates the
incoming message with ceph_msg_new(type, front_len, GFP_NOFS, false),
leaving msg->data_length as zero for a front-only message selected from
an attacker-controlled wire header.

Reject monitor and MDS messages whose wire data segment is larger than
the data backing allocated for the selected ceph_msg, mirroring the
existing OSD reply hardening.

Fixes: 53ded495c6ac ("libceph: define mds_alloc_msg() method")
Fixes: cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)")
Signed-off-by: Dhiraj Mishra <mishra.dhiraj95@gmail.com>
---
v4:
  - Add the same oversized data_len guard to the MDS allocation path.

v3:
  - Remove the impossible !req->reply check for generic requests.
  - Use pr_warn_ratelimited() for malicious-monitor log spam resistance.
  - Avoid adding __func__ to the new mon_client warnings.
  - Add a blank line between the front_len and data_len checks.

v2:
  - Resend as an inline plain-text patch.
  - Add full email address to the From and Signed-off-by identities.
  - Add ceph-devel and LKML to the recipient list when sending.

 fs/ceph/mds_client.c  | 13 +++++++++++++
 net/ceph/mon_client.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)

diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
index ed17e0023705..3b92d37983d1 100644
--- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
+++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
@@ -6543,9 +6543,12 @@ static int mds_handle_auth_bad_method(struct ceph_connection *con,
 static struct ceph_msg *mds_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
 				struct ceph_msg_header *hdr, int *skip)
 {
+	struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private;
+	struct ceph_client *cl = s->s_mdsc->fsc->client;
 	struct ceph_msg *msg;
 	int type = (int) le16_to_cpu(hdr->type);
 	int front_len = (int) le32_to_cpu(hdr->front_len);
+	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
 
 	if (con->in_msg)
 		return con->in_msg;
@@ -6558,6 +6561,16 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mds_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
 		return NULL;
 	}
 
+	if (data_len > msg->data_length) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited_client(cl,
+					   "mds%d message data %u > prealloc %zu, skipping\n",
+					   s->s_mds, data_len,
+					   msg->data_length);
+		ceph_msg_put(msg);
+		*skip = 1;
+		return NULL;
+	}
+
 	return msg;
 }
 
diff --git a/net/ceph/mon_client.c b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
index d2cdc8ee3155..9f1c7ca42f36 100644
--- a/net/ceph/mon_client.c
+++ b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
@@ -712,6 +712,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_generic_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
 	struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private;
 	struct ceph_mon_generic_request *req;
 	u64 tid = le64_to_cpu(hdr->tid);
+	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
 	struct ceph_msg *m;
 
 	mutex_lock(&monc->mutex);
@@ -720,6 +721,11 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_generic_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
 		dout("get_generic_reply %lld dne\n", tid);
 		*skip = 1;
 		m = NULL;
+	} else if (data_len > req->reply->data_length) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("mon generic reply tid %llu data %u > preallocated %zu, skipping\n",
+				    tid, data_len, req->reply->data_length);
+		*skip = 1;
+		m = NULL;
 	} else {
 		dout("get_generic_reply %lld got %p\n", tid, req->reply);
 		*skip = 0;
@@ -1499,6 +1505,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
 	struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private;
 	int type = le16_to_cpu(hdr->type);
 	int front_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->front_len);
+	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
 	struct ceph_msg *m = NULL;
 
 	*skip = 0;
@@ -1545,5 +1552,15 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
 		m = ceph_msg_new(type, front_len, GFP_NOFS, false);
 	}
 
+	if (m && data_len > m->data_length) {
+		pr_warn_ratelimited("mon message data %u > prealloc %zu (%u#%llu), skipping\n",
+				    data_len, m->data_length,
+				    (unsigned int)con->peer_name.type,
+				    le64_to_cpu(con->peer_name.num));
+		ceph_msg_put(m);
+		m = NULL;
+		*skip = 1;
+	}
+
 	return m;
 }

Re: [PATCH v4] libceph, ceph: reject oversized mon and MDS data segments

[Viacheslav Dubeyko]

On Mon, 2026-05-04 at 13:16 +0400, Dhiraj Mishra wrote:
> Monitor and MDS messages can be allocated with only front-buffer storage
> and no data items.  The messenger receive path copies the wire header
> into the selected ceph_msg and later uses hdr.data_len to decide whether
> to initialize a data cursor.
> 
> If a malicious or compromised peer advertises a non-zero data segment for
> one of these front-only messages, the receive path can call
> ceph_msg_data_cursor_init() with length greater than msg->data_length and
> hit its BUG_ON() checks, crashing the client kernel.
> 
> I verified the monitor issue against v7.1-rc1-123-ge75a43c7cec4.  The
> msgr2 trigger path is present since commit cd1a677cad99 ("libceph,
> ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)"), which is
> contained in v5.11-rc1 and later.  The allocator patterns are older, but
> I have not tested older msgr1-only kernels.
> 
> A concrete monitor trigger is a monitor connection over msgr2 after
> CEPH_CON_S_OPEN where a FRAME_TAG_MESSAGE contains a monitor reply type
> handled by mon_alloc_msg(), a valid front_len for that message type and
> data_len = 1.  CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP is one such example: the message is
> allocated with ceph_msg_new(), leaving msg->data_length and
> msg->num_data_items as zero.
> 
> The MDS allocation path has the same issue: mds_alloc_msg() allocates the
> incoming message with ceph_msg_new(type, front_len, GFP_NOFS, false),
> leaving msg->data_length as zero for a front-only message selected from
> an attacker-controlled wire header.
> 
> Reject monitor and MDS messages whose wire data segment is larger than
> the data backing allocated for the selected ceph_msg, mirroring the
> existing OSD reply hardening.
> 
> Fixes: 53ded495c6ac ("libceph: define mds_alloc_msg() method")
> Fixes: cd1a677cad99 ("libceph, ceph: implement msgr2.1 protocol (crc and secure modes)")
> Signed-off-by: Dhiraj Mishra <mishra.dhiraj95@gmail.com>
> ---
> v4:
>   - Add the same oversized data_len guard to the MDS allocation path.
> 
> v3:
>   - Remove the impossible !req->reply check for generic requests.
>   - Use pr_warn_ratelimited() for malicious-monitor log spam resistance.
>   - Avoid adding __func__ to the new mon_client warnings.
>   - Add a blank line between the front_len and data_len checks.
> 
> v2:
>   - Resend as an inline plain-text patch.
>   - Add full email address to the From and Signed-off-by identities.
>   - Add ceph-devel and LKML to the recipient list when sending.
> 
>  fs/ceph/mds_client.c  | 13 +++++++++++++
>  net/ceph/mon_client.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
>  2 files changed, 30 insertions(+)
> 
> diff --git a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> index ed17e0023705..3b92d37983d1 100644
> --- a/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> +++ b/fs/ceph/mds_client.c
> @@ -6543,9 +6543,12 @@ static int mds_handle_auth_bad_method(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  static struct ceph_msg *mds_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  				struct ceph_msg_header *hdr, int *skip)
>  {
> +	struct ceph_mds_session *s = con->private;
> +	struct ceph_client *cl = s->s_mdsc->fsc->client;
>  	struct ceph_msg *msg;
>  	int type = (int) le16_to_cpu(hdr->type);
>  	int front_len = (int) le32_to_cpu(hdr->front_len);
> +	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
>  
>  	if (con->in_msg)
>  		return con->in_msg;
> @@ -6558,6 +6561,16 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mds_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  		return NULL;
>  	}
>  
> +	if (data_len > msg->data_length) {
> +		pr_warn_ratelimited_client(cl,
> +					   "mds%d message data %u > prealloc %zu, skipping\n",
> +					   s->s_mds, data_len,
> +					   msg->data_length);
> +		ceph_msg_put(msg);
> +		*skip = 1;
> +		return NULL;
> +	}
> +
>  	return msg;
>  }
>  
> diff --git a/net/ceph/mon_client.c b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
> index d2cdc8ee3155..9f1c7ca42f36 100644
> --- a/net/ceph/mon_client.c
> +++ b/net/ceph/mon_client.c
> @@ -712,6 +712,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_generic_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  	struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private;
>  	struct ceph_mon_generic_request *req;
>  	u64 tid = le64_to_cpu(hdr->tid);
> +	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
>  	struct ceph_msg *m;
>  
>  	mutex_lock(&monc->mutex);
> @@ -720,6 +721,11 @@ static struct ceph_msg *get_generic_reply(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  		dout("get_generic_reply %lld dne\n", tid);
>  		*skip = 1;
>  		m = NULL;
> +	} else if (data_len > req->reply->data_length) {
> +		pr_warn_ratelimited("mon generic reply tid %llu data %u > preallocated %zu, skipping\n",
> +				    tid, data_len, req->reply->data_length);
> +		*skip = 1;
> +		m = NULL;
>  	} else {
>  		dout("get_generic_reply %lld got %p\n", tid, req->reply);
>  		*skip = 0;
> @@ -1499,6 +1505,7 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  	struct ceph_mon_client *monc = con->private;
>  	int type = le16_to_cpu(hdr->type);
>  	int front_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->front_len);
> +	u32 data_len = le32_to_cpu(hdr->data_len);
>  	struct ceph_msg *m = NULL;
>  
>  	*skip = 0;
> @@ -1545,5 +1552,15 @@ static struct ceph_msg *mon_alloc_msg(struct ceph_connection *con,
>  		m = ceph_msg_new(type, front_len, GFP_NOFS, false);
>  	}
>  
> +	if (m && data_len > m->data_length) {
> +		pr_warn_ratelimited("mon message data %u > prealloc %zu (%u#%llu), skipping\n",
> +				    data_len, m->data_length,
> +				    (unsigned int)con->peer_name.type,
> +				    le64_to_cpu(con->peer_name.num));
> +		ceph_msg_put(m);
> +		m = NULL;
> +		*skip = 1;
> +	}
> +

I still don't see the answer on my question. We have:

	case CEPH_MSG_STATFS_REPLY:
	case CEPH_MSG_MON_COMMAND_ACK:
		return get_generic_reply(con, hdr, skip);

I had impression that this code was related to get_generic_reply() case. But it
looks like that I am not correct here.

If it is not related to this, then we need to rework this code to integrate
suggested new functionality into the whole logic:

	if (!m) {
		pr_info("alloc_msg unknown type %d\n", type);
		*skip = 1;
	} else if (front_len > m->front_alloc_len) {
		pr_warn("mon_alloc_msg front %d > prealloc %d (%u#%llu)\n",
			front_len, m->front_alloc_len,
			(unsigned int)con->peer_name.type,
			le64_to_cpu(con->peer_name.num));
		ceph_msg_put(m);
		m = ceph_msg_new(type, front_len, GFP_NOFS, false);
	}

Thanks,
Slava.


>  	return m;
>  }