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From: Ryan Mallon <rmallon@gmail.com>
To: Dan Rosenberg <dan.j.rosenberg@gmail.com>
Cc: George Spelvin <linux@horizon.com>,
	akpm@linux-foundation.org, eldad@fogrefinery.com,
	jkosina@suse.cz, linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH] printk: Check real user/group id for %pK
Date: Mon, 30 Sep 2013 10:56:13 +1000	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <5248CC2D.1080000@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <5248C8A1.3090302@gmail.com>

On 30/09/13 10:41, Dan Rosenberg wrote:
> On 09/29/2013 07:41 PM, George Spelvin wrote:
>>> Right, so the pppd application is actually doing the correct thing.
>> And a CAP_SYSLOG setuid binary that *doesn't* DTRT seems like a more
>> immediate security hole than leaking kernel addresses.  After all
>> kptr_restrict is optional precisely because the benefit is marginal.
>>
>> The interesting question is what credentials make sense for %pK outside
>> of a seq_printf().  Does it even make sense in a generic printk?  In that
>> case, it's the permission of the syslogd that matters rather than the
>> process generating the message.
>>
>>> Will wait and see what others have to say.
>> Me, too.  Dan in particular.
> 
> Firstly, I wouldn't recommend applying %pK's to printk usage.

Sorry, the patch description should say 'vsprintf: ' not 'printk: '.
Posting too early in the morning :-).

> Removing
> all addresses from the kernel syslog compromises its usefulness in
> debugging basically anything at all. Additionally, many printk calls are
> performed from a context where a capability check would yield
> unpredictable (or at least meaningless) results. If you want to restrict
> access to the kernel syslog by unprivileged users, that should be done
> by enabling CONFIG_DMESG_RESTRICT, which was written for this purpose.

Agreed.

> With that out of the way, I don't have a strong opinion on how to handle
> this case. The proposed patch solves the problem but may break setuid
> applications that expect to be able to read /proc/kallsyms contents
> based on euid (and implicitly, capabilities) alone. But then again,
> these mythical setuid applications are probably broken in some
> situations anyway, because what happens if /proc/kallsyms is set to "2"
> (unconditionally replace addresses with 0's)? I also can't think of a
> better solution.

Okay, this was just the simplest solution I could come up with that
fixed the issue for me. Is that a tentative acked/reviewed-by? :-).

~Ryan



  reply	other threads:[~2013-09-30  0:56 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2013-09-29 22:35 [PATCH] printk: Check real user/group id for %pK Ryan Mallon
2013-09-29 23:15 ` George Spelvin
2013-09-29 23:26   ` Ryan Mallon
2013-09-29 23:41     ` George Spelvin
2013-09-30  0:41       ` Dan Rosenberg
2013-09-30  0:56         ` Ryan Mallon [this message]
2013-09-30  0:59           ` Dan Rosenberg

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