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From: David Howells <dhowells@redhat.com>
To: jmorris@namei.org
Cc: dhowells@redhat.com, torvalds@linux-foundation.org,
	keyrings@vger.kernel.org, linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [GIT PULL] KEYS: Fixes
Date: Tue, 17 Oct 2017 23:57:33 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <866.1508281053@warthog.procyon.org.uk> (raw)

Hi James,

Can you pull this collection of fixes for Linux keyrings and pass them along
to Linus.  They include:

 (1) Fix a bunch of places where kernel drivers may access revoked user-type
     keys and don't do it correctly.

 (2) Fix some ecryptfs bits.

 (3) Fix big_key to require CONFIG_CRYPTO.

 (4) Fix a couple of bugs in the asymmetric key type.

 (5) Fix a race between updating and finding negative keys.

 (6) Prevent add_key() from updating uninstantiated keys.

 (7) Make loading of key flags and expiry time atomic when not holding locks.

The patches can be found here also:

	http://git.kernel.org/cgit/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git/log/?h=keys-fixes

Tagged thusly:

	git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git
	keys-fixes-20171017

Thanks,
David
---
The following changes since commit 9e66317d3c92ddaab330c125dfe9d06eee268aff:

  Linux 4.14-rc3 (2017-10-01 14:54:54 -0700)

are available in the git repository at:

  git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/dhowells/linux-fs.git tags/keys-fixes-20171017

for you to fetch changes up to 3580759723c16ec68e71fd1269909f56d2a4866a:

  pkcs7: Prevent NULL pointer dereference, since sinfo is not always set. (2017-10-17 23:25:35 +0100)

----------------------------------------------------------------
Keyrings fixes

----------------------------------------------------------------
Arnd Bergmann (1):
      security/keys: BIG_KEY requires CONFIG_CRYPTO

Chun-Yi Lee (2):
      KEYS: Fix the wrong index when checking the existence of second id
      KEYS: checking the input id parameters before finding asymmetric key

David Howells (2):
      KEYS: Fix race between updating and finding a negative key
      KEYS: don't let add_key() update an uninstantiated key

Eric Biggers (10):
      KEYS: encrypted: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
      FS-Cache: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
      lib/digsig: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
      fscrypt: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
      ecryptfs: fix dereference of NULL user_key_payload
      ecryptfs: fix out-of-bounds read of key payload
      ecryptfs: move key payload accessor functions into keystore.c
      KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in key_validate()
      KEYS: Load key expiry time atomically in keyring_search_iterator()
      KEYS: load key flags and expiry time atomically in proc_keys_show()

Eric Sesterhenn (1):
      pkcs7: Prevent NULL pointer dereference, since sinfo is not always set.

 crypto/asymmetric_keys/asymmetric_type.c |  4 +-
 crypto/asymmetric_keys/pkcs7_parser.c    |  3 ++
 fs/crypto/keyinfo.c                      |  5 +++
 fs/ecryptfs/ecryptfs_kernel.h            | 44 -------------------
 fs/ecryptfs/keystore.c                   | 73 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
 fs/fscache/object-list.c                 |  7 +++
 include/linux/key.h                      | 47 ++++++++++++--------
 lib/digsig.c                             |  6 +++
 net/dns_resolver/dns_key.c               |  2 +-
 security/keys/Kconfig                    |  1 +
 security/keys/big_key.c                  |  4 +-
 security/keys/encrypted-keys/encrypted.c |  9 +++-
 security/keys/gc.c                       |  8 ++--
 security/keys/key.c                      | 41 +++++++++++++-----
 security/keys/keyctl.c                   |  9 ++--
 security/keys/keyring.c                  | 14 +++---
 security/keys/permission.c               |  7 +--
 security/keys/proc.c                     | 31 ++++++++------
 security/keys/process_keys.c             |  2 +-
 security/keys/request_key.c              |  7 ++-
 security/keys/request_key_auth.c         |  2 +-
 security/keys/trusted.c                  |  2 +-
 security/keys/user_defined.c             |  4 +-
 23 files changed, 215 insertions(+), 117 deletions(-)

             reply	other threads:[~2017-10-17 22:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 6+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2017-10-17 22:57 David Howells [this message]
2017-10-17 23:23 ` [GIT PULL] KEYS: Fixes Eric Biggers
  -- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2017-10-18  8:23 David Howells
2016-11-25  1:32 [GIT PULL] Keys fixes James Morris
2016-10-27  4:37 James Morris
2016-07-18  2:06 [GIT PULL] KEYS fixes James Morris

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