* Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree [not found] <162427270623162@kroah.com> @ 2021-06-21 14:29 ` Borislav Petkov 2021-06-21 18:42 ` Andy Lutomirski 0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: Borislav Petkov @ 2021-06-21 14:29 UTC (permalink / raw) To: gregkh, luto; +Cc: dave.hansen, riel, tglx, stable, linux-kernel On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 12:51:46PM +0200, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote: > > The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. > If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm > tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit > id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>. > > thanks, > > greg k-h > > ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ > > From d8778e393afa421f1f117471144f8ce6deb6953a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 > From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> > Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 16:36:19 +0200 > Subject: [PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a > user buffer > > Both Intel and AMD consider it to be architecturally valid for XRSTOR to > fail with #PF but nonetheless change the register state. The actual > conditions under which this might occur are unclear [1], but it seems > plausible that this might be triggered if one sibling thread unmaps a page > and invalidates the shared TLB while another sibling thread is executing > XRSTOR on the page in question. > > __fpu__restore_sig() can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers > are preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using the > fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx mechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but > modify the registers. > > If this happens, then there is a window in which __fpu__restore_sig() > could schedule out and the victim task could schedule back in without > reloading its own FPU registers. This would result in part of the FPU > state that __fpu__restore_sig() was attempting to load leaking into the > victim task's user-visible state. > > Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this > situation from corrupting any state. > > [1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex > microarchitectural conditions". > > Fixes: 1d731e731c4c ("x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig()") > Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> > Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> > Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> > Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> > Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> > Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org > Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608144345.758116583@linutronix.de > > diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c > index d5bc96a536c2..4ab9aeb9a963 100644 > --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c > +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c > @@ -369,6 +369,25 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size) > fpregs_unlock(); > return 0; > } > + > + /* > + * The above did an FPU restore operation, restricted to > + * the user portion of the registers, and failed, but the > + * microcode might have modified the FPU registers > + * nevertheless. > + * > + * If the FPU registers do not belong to current, then > + * invalidate the FPU register state otherwise the task might > + * preempt current and return to user space with corrupted > + * FPU registers. > + * > + * In case current owns the FPU registers then no further > + * action is required. The fixup below will handle it > + * correctly. > + */ > + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) > + __cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state(); > + > fpregs_unlock(); > } else { So I'm looking at this and 5.4.127 has: if (!ret) { fpregs_mark_activate(); fpregs_unlock(); return 0; } fpregs_deactivate(fpu); <--- fpregs_unlock(); i.e., an unconditional fpu invalidation there. Which got removed by: 98265c17efa9 ("x86/fpu/xstate: Preserve supervisor states for the slow path in __fpu__restore_sig()") in 5.7. so that Fixes: commit above which points to a 5.1 kernel is probably wrong-ish. amluto? -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree 2021-06-21 14:29 ` FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree Borislav Petkov @ 2021-06-21 18:42 ` Andy Lutomirski 2021-06-21 19:34 ` Borislav Petkov 0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread From: Andy Lutomirski @ 2021-06-21 18:42 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Borislav Petkov, gregkh; +Cc: dave.hansen, riel, tglx, stable, linux-kernel On 6/21/21 7:29 AM, Borislav Petkov wrote: > On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 12:51:46PM +0200, gregkh@linuxfoundation.org wrote: >> >> The patch below does not apply to the 5.4-stable tree. >> If someone wants it applied there, or to any other stable or longterm >> tree, then please email the backport, including the original git commit >> id to <stable@vger.kernel.org>. >> >> thanks, >> >> greg k-h >> >> ------------------ original commit in Linus's tree ------------------ >> >> From d8778e393afa421f1f117471144f8ce6deb6953a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 >> From: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> >> Date: Tue, 8 Jun 2021 16:36:19 +0200 >> Subject: [PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a >> user buffer >> >> Both Intel and AMD consider it to be architecturally valid for XRSTOR to >> fail with #PF but nonetheless change the register state. The actual >> conditions under which this might occur are unclear [1], but it seems >> plausible that this might be triggered if one sibling thread unmaps a page >> and invalidates the shared TLB while another sibling thread is executing >> XRSTOR on the page in question. >> >> __fpu__restore_sig() can execute XRSTOR while the hardware registers >> are preserved on behalf of a different victim task (using the >> fpu_fpregs_owner_ctx mechanism), and, in theory, XRSTOR could fail but >> modify the registers. >> >> If this happens, then there is a window in which __fpu__restore_sig() >> could schedule out and the victim task could schedule back in without >> reloading its own FPU registers. This would result in part of the FPU >> state that __fpu__restore_sig() was attempting to load leaking into the >> victim task's user-visible state. >> >> Invalidate preserved FPU registers on XRSTOR failure to prevent this >> situation from corrupting any state. >> >> [1] Frequent readers of the errata lists might imagine "complex >> microarchitectural conditions". >> >> Fixes: 1d731e731c4c ("x86/fpu: Add a fastpath to __fpu__restore_sig()") >> Signed-off-by: Andy Lutomirski <luto@kernel.org> >> Signed-off-by: Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de> >> Signed-off-by: Borislav Petkov <bp@suse.de> >> Acked-by: Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com> >> Acked-by: Rik van Riel <riel@surriel.com> >> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org >> Link: https://lkml.kernel.org/r/20210608144345.758116583@linutronix.de >> >> diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c >> index d5bc96a536c2..4ab9aeb9a963 100644 >> --- a/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c >> +++ b/arch/x86/kernel/fpu/signal.c >> @@ -369,6 +369,25 @@ static int __fpu__restore_sig(void __user *buf, void __user *buf_fx, int size) >> fpregs_unlock(); >> return 0; >> } >> + >> + /* >> + * The above did an FPU restore operation, restricted to >> + * the user portion of the registers, and failed, but the >> + * microcode might have modified the FPU registers >> + * nevertheless. >> + * >> + * If the FPU registers do not belong to current, then >> + * invalidate the FPU register state otherwise the task might >> + * preempt current and return to user space with corrupted >> + * FPU registers. >> + * >> + * In case current owns the FPU registers then no further >> + * action is required. The fixup below will handle it >> + * correctly. >> + */ >> + if (test_thread_flag(TIF_NEED_FPU_LOAD)) >> + __cpu_invalidate_fpregs_state(); >> + >> fpregs_unlock(); >> } else { > > So I'm looking at this and 5.4.127 has: > > if (!ret) { > fpregs_mark_activate(); > fpregs_unlock(); > return 0; > } > fpregs_deactivate(fpu); <--- > fpregs_unlock(); > > i.e., an unconditional fpu invalidation there. Which got removed by: > > 98265c17efa9 ("x86/fpu/xstate: Preserve supervisor states for the slow path in __fpu__restore_sig()") > > in 5.7. > > so that Fixes: commit above which points to a 5.1 kernel is probably wrong-ish. > > amluto? > I agree. The fixes line is indeed wrong, and the (horribly misnamed) fpu_deactivate() call did the right thing. ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
* Re: FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree 2021-06-21 18:42 ` Andy Lutomirski @ 2021-06-21 19:34 ` Borislav Petkov 0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread From: Borislav Petkov @ 2021-06-21 19:34 UTC (permalink / raw) To: Andy Lutomirski; +Cc: gregkh, dave.hansen, riel, tglx, stable, linux-kernel On Mon, Jun 21, 2021 at 11:42:01AM -0700, Andy Lutomirski wrote: > I agree. The fixes line is indeed wrong, and the (horribly misnamed) > fpu_deactivate() call did the right thing. Thanks! @gregkh, then, you can ignore that one for 5.4. -- Regards/Gruss, Boris. SUSE Software Solutions Germany GmbH, GF: Felix Imendörffer, HRB 36809, AG Nürnberg ^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
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2021-06-21 14:29 ` FAILED: patch "[PATCH] x86/fpu: Invalidate FPU state after a failed XRSTOR from a" failed to apply to 5.4-stable tree Borislav Petkov
2021-06-21 18:42 ` Andy Lutomirski
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