* [PATCH v5 01/12] x86/bugs: Rename GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION to MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
[not found] <20231019181158.1982205-1-leitao@debian.org>
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 02/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBPB_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY Breno Leitao
` (10 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Peter Zijlstra, Pawan Gupta
Cc: leit, open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related[1]. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.
The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.
Rename the Kconfig entry from GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION to
MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE.
[1] Link: https://lore.kernel.org/lkml/20231011044252.42bplzjsam3qsasz@treble/
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index d4a73d12780a..d0a9f5a5c8a4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2566,7 +2566,7 @@ config SLS
against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
larger.
-config GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION
+config MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
default n
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index bb0ab8466b91..3c7e27b58f0e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -671,7 +671,7 @@ enum gds_mitigations {
GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
};
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE)
static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
#else
static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [PATCH v5 02/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBPB_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
[not found] <20231019181158.1982205-1-leitao@debian.org>
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 01/12] x86/bugs: Rename GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION to MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 03/12] x86/bugs: Rename CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING to MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING Breno Leitao
` (9 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Peter Zijlstra, Pawan Gupta
Cc: leit, open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.
The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.
Rename the Kconfig entry from CPU_IBPB_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 11 ++++++-----
3 files changed, 8 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index d0a9f5a5c8a4..b8965bb7443b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2533,7 +2533,7 @@ config CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
Only enable this when you are debugging call thunks as this
creates a noticeable runtime overhead. If unsure say N.
-config CPU_IBPB_ENTRY
+config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
bool "Enable IBPB on kernel entry"
depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64
default y
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index f93e9b96927a..0676b077207c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@
* where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
*/
.macro __UNTRAIN_RET ibpb_feature, call_depth_insns
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)
+#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)
VALIDATE_UNRET_END
ALTERNATIVE_3 "", \
CALL_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 3c7e27b58f0e..1de4791091ca 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -994,10 +994,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB)) {
pr_err("WARNING: CPU does not support IBPB.\n");
goto do_cmd_auto;
- } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+ } else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
} else {
- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
goto do_cmd_auto;
}
break;
@@ -1023,7 +1023,8 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY))
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
- else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY) && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
+ else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY) &&
+ boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_IBPB;
}
@@ -2482,13 +2483,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
break;
case SRSO_CMD_IBPB:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)) {
if (has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB;
}
} else {
- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY.\n");
}
break;
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [PATCH v5 03/12] x86/bugs: Rename CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING to MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
[not found] <20231019181158.1982205-1-leitao@debian.org>
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 01/12] x86/bugs: Rename GDS_FORCE_MITIGATION to MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 02/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBPB_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 04/12] x86/bugs: Rename PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION Breno Leitao
` (8 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Peter Zijlstra, Pawan Gupta, Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor,
Nick Desaulniers, Nicolas Schier
Cc: leit, Rick Edgecombe, Kees Cook, Kim Phillips, Kirill A. Shutemov,
Juergen Gross, Kai Huang, David Woodhouse, Paolo Bonzini,
Brian Gerst, Taehee Yoo, Ingo Molnar, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.
The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.
Rename the Kconfig entry from CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING to
MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 4 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/current.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 10 +++++-----
arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 6 +++---
scripts/Makefile.lib | 2 +-
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
9 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index b8965bb7443b..4d64519311c4 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2502,7 +2502,7 @@ config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
help
Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
-config CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+config MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
bool "Mitigate RSB underflow with call depth tracking"
depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
select HAVE_DYNAMIC_FTRACE_NO_PATCHABLE
@@ -2522,7 +2522,7 @@ config CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
config CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG
bool "Enable call thunks and call depth tracking debugging"
- depends on CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+ depends on MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
select FUNCTION_ALIGNMENT_32B
default n
help
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/current.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/current.h
index a1168e7b69e5..d4ff517cfbd1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/current.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/current.h
@@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ struct pcpu_hot {
struct task_struct *current_task;
int preempt_count;
int cpu_number;
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
u64 call_depth;
#endif
unsigned long top_of_stack;
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 702d93fdd10e..c1d3a5795618 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
# define DISABLE_UNRET (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
# define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING 0
#else
# define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING (1 << (X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH & 31))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 0676b077207c..64d9f0e87419 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@
# define CALL_THUNKS_DEBUG_INC_CTXSW
#endif
-#if defined(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) && !defined(COMPILE_OFFSETS)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) && !defined(COMPILE_OFFSETS)
#include <asm/asm-offsets.h>
@@ -309,7 +309,7 @@
.macro CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
ALTERNATIVE "", \
__stringify(ASM_INCREMENT_CALL_DEPTH), X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH
#endif
@@ -357,7 +357,7 @@ extern void entry_ibpb(void);
extern void (*x86_return_thunk)(void);
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
extern void call_depth_return_thunk(void);
#define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT \
@@ -371,12 +371,12 @@ DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ret_count);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_stuffs_count);
DECLARE_PER_CPU(u64, __x86_ctxsw_count);
#endif
-#else /* !CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
#define CALL_DEPTH_ACCOUNT ""
-#endif /* CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
index 6913b372ccf7..a98020bf31bb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/asm-offsets.c
@@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ static void __used common(void)
OFFSET(TSS_sp2, tss_struct, x86_tss.sp2);
OFFSET(X86_top_of_stack, pcpu_hot, top_of_stack);
OFFSET(X86_current_task, pcpu_hot, current_task);
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
OFFSET(X86_call_depth, pcpu_hot, call_depth);
#endif
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CRYPTO_ARIA_AESNI_AVX_X86_64)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 1de4791091ca..b906ed4f3091 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1003,15 +1003,15 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
break;
case RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) &&
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) &&
spectre_v2_enabled == SPECTRE_V2_RETPOLINE) {
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_STUFF;
} else {
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING))
pr_err("WARNING: retbleed=stuff depends on spectre_v2=retpoline\n");
else
- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING.\n");
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING.\n");
goto do_cmd_auto;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index db813113e637..910fd231b7d2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_thunk_array)
#include <asm/GEN-for-each-reg.h>
#undef GEN
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
.macro CALL_THUNK reg
.align RETPOLINE_THUNK_SIZE
@@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ __EXPORT_THUNK(entry_untrain_ret)
#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
.align 64
SYM_FUNC_START(call_depth_return_thunk)
@@ -350,7 +350,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(call_depth_return_thunk)
int3
SYM_FUNC_END(call_depth_return_thunk)
-#endif /* CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
/*
* This function name is magical and is used by -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index 68d0134bdbf9..cc44c95c49cc 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -254,7 +254,7 @@ objtool := $(objtree)/tools/objtool/objtool
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_JUMP_LABEL_HACK) += --hacks=jump_label
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_NOINSTR_HACK) += --hacks=noinstr
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) += --hacks=skylake
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING) += --hacks=skylake
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) += --ibt
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_FINEIBT) += --cfi
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_OBJTOOL) += --mcount
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index fafe9be7a6f4..3d61b2432991 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@
# define DISABLE_UNRET (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
# define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING 0
#else
# define DISABLE_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING (1 << (X86_FEATURE_CALL_DEPTH & 31))
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [PATCH v5 04/12] x86/bugs: Rename PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
[not found] <20231019181158.1982205-1-leitao@debian.org>
` (2 preceding siblings ...)
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 03/12] x86/bugs: Rename CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING to MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE Breno Leitao
` (7 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Jonathan Corbet, Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra
Cc: leit, Kirill A. Shutemov, Mike Rapoport, David Hildenbrand,
Ingo Molnar, Nikunj A Dadhania, Yu-cheng Yu, Rick Edgecombe,
Juergen Gross, Kim Phillips, Andrew Morton, Kemeng Shi,
Matthew Wilcox (Oracle), Peter Xu, Guo Ren, Kefeng Wang,
Helge Deller, Catalin Marinas, Alexander Potapenko,
Masahiro Yamada, Brian Gerst, David Woodhouse, Usama Arif,
Ard Biesheuvel, Tom Lendacky, Hugh Dickins,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT),
open list:DOCUMENTATION
CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.
The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.
Rename the Kconfig entry from PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to
MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst | 6 +++---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h | 18 +++++++++---------
arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h | 3 ++-
arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c | 8 ++++----
arch/x86/mm/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/mm/tlb.c | 10 +++++-----
include/linux/pti.h | 2 +-
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
23 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst b/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst
index 4b858a9bad8d..3241b081f1ad 100644
--- a/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst
+++ b/Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst
@@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ comments in pti.c).
This approach helps to ensure that side-channel attacks leveraging
the paging structures do not function when PTI is enabled. It can be
-enabled by setting CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile time.
-Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with the
-'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).
+enabled by setting CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=y at compile
+time. Once enabled at compile-time, it can be disabled at boot with
+the 'nopti' or 'pti=' kernel parameters (see kernel-parameters.txt).
Page Table Management
=====================
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 4d64519311c4..46885150efd2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2463,7 +2463,7 @@ menuconfig SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
if SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS
-config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+config MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode"
default y
depends on (X86_64 || X86_PAE)
diff --git a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
index 08f93b0401bb..2aa29ef490dc 100644
--- a/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
+++ b/arch/x86/boot/compressed/ident_map_64.c
@@ -8,8 +8,8 @@
* Copyright (C) 2016 Kees Cook
*/
-/* No PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION support needed either: */
-#undef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+/* No MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION support needed either: */
+#undef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
#include "error.h"
#include "misc.h"
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index f6907627172b..ace89d5c1ddd 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -142,7 +142,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
.endif
.endm
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
/*
* PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION PGDs are 8k. Flip bit 12 to switch between the two
@@ -269,7 +269,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
.Lend_\@:
.endm
-#else /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=n: */
+#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION=n: */
.macro SWITCH_TO_KERNEL_CR3 scratch_reg:req
.endm
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
index 3bdc22d7e78f..9cb225607413 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S
@@ -1134,7 +1134,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(error_return)
*
* Registers:
* %r14: Used to save/restore the CR3 of the interrupted context
- * when PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is in use. Do not clobber.
+ * when MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION is in use. Do not clobber.
*/
SYM_CODE_START(asm_exc_nmi)
UNWIND_HINT_IRET_ENTRY
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index c1d3a5795618..fb604ec95a5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
# define DISABLE_LA57 (1<<(X86_FEATURE_LA57 & 31))
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
# define DISABLE_PTI 0
#else
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
index c7ec5bb88334..dcd836b59beb 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgalloc.h
@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ static inline void paravirt_release_p4d(unsigned long pfn) {}
*/
extern gfp_t __userpte_alloc_gfp;
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
/*
* Instead of one PGD, we acquire two PGDs. Being order-1, it is
* both 8k in size and 8k-aligned. That lets us just flip bit 12
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h
index 9e7c0b719c3c..dabafba957ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable-3level.h
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ static inline void native_set_pmd(pmd_t *pmdp, pmd_t pmd)
static inline void native_set_pud(pud_t *pudp, pud_t pud)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
pud.p4d.pgd = pti_set_user_pgtbl(&pudp->p4d.pgd, pud.p4d.pgd);
#endif
pxx_xchg64(pud, pudp, native_pud_val(pud));
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
index 57bab91bbf50..b23d0c162573 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable.h
@@ -908,7 +908,7 @@ static inline int is_new_memtype_allowed(u64 paddr, unsigned long size,
pmd_t *populate_extra_pmd(unsigned long vaddr);
pte_t *populate_extra_pte(unsigned long vaddr);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
pgd_t __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd);
/*
@@ -922,12 +922,12 @@ static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
return pgd;
return __pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgdp, pgd);
}
-#else /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
static inline pgd_t pti_set_user_pgtbl(pgd_t *pgdp, pgd_t pgd)
{
return pgd;
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
@@ -1130,7 +1130,7 @@ static inline int p4d_bad(p4d_t p4d)
{
unsigned long ignore_flags = _KERNPG_TABLE | _PAGE_USER;
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
ignore_flags |= _PAGE_NX;
return (p4d_flags(p4d) & ~ignore_flags) != 0;
@@ -1176,7 +1176,7 @@ static inline int pgd_bad(pgd_t pgd)
if (!pgtable_l5_enabled())
return 0;
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
ignore_flags |= _PAGE_NX;
return (pgd_flags(pgd) & ~ignore_flags) != _KERNPG_TABLE;
@@ -1421,9 +1421,9 @@ static inline bool pgdp_maps_userspace(void *__ptr)
#define pgd_leaf pgd_large
static inline int pgd_large(pgd_t pgd) { return 0; }
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
/*
- * All top-level PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION page tables are order-1 pages
+ * All top-level MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION page tables are order-1 pages
* (8k-aligned and 8k in size). The kernel one is at the beginning 4k and
* the user one is in the last 4k. To switch between them, you
* just need to flip the 12th bit in their addresses.
@@ -1468,7 +1468,7 @@ static inline p4d_t *user_to_kernel_p4dp(p4d_t *p4dp)
{
return ptr_clear_bit(p4dp, PTI_PGTABLE_SWITCH_BIT);
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
/*
* clone_pgd_range(pgd_t *dst, pgd_t *src, int count);
@@ -1483,7 +1483,7 @@ static inline p4d_t *user_to_kernel_p4dp(p4d_t *p4dp)
static inline void clone_pgd_range(pgd_t *dst, pgd_t *src, int count)
{
memcpy(dst, src, count * sizeof(pgd_t));
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
if (!static_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
return;
/* Clone the user space pgd as well */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
index a629b1b9f65a..8108d68d146c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pgtable_64.h
@@ -143,7 +143,8 @@ static inline void native_set_p4d(p4d_t *p4dp, p4d_t p4d)
{
pgd_t pgd;
- if (pgtable_l5_enabled() || !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION)) {
+ if (pgtable_l5_enabled() ||
+ !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION)) {
WRITE_ONCE(*p4dp, p4d);
return;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
index d8cccadc83a6..e5f204b9b33d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/processor-flags.h
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@
#define CR3_NOFLUSH 0
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
# define X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT 11
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h
index 07375b476c4f..ab167c96b9ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/pti.h
@@ -3,7 +3,7 @@
#define _ASM_X86_PTI_H
#ifndef __ASSEMBLY__
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
extern void pti_init(void);
extern void pti_check_boottime_disable(void);
extern void pti_finalize(void);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
index f18ca44c904b..44a91ef5a23b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/dumpstack.c
@@ -410,7 +410,7 @@ static void __die_header(const char *str, struct pt_regs *regs, long err)
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SMP) ? " SMP" : "",
debug_pagealloc_enabled() ? " DEBUG_PAGEALLOC" : "",
IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KASAN) ? " KASAN" : "",
- IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) ?
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) ?
(boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI) ? " PTI" : " NOPTI") : "");
}
NOKPROBE_SYMBOL(__die_header);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
index b6554212b7c7..1ba091d388f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_32.S
@@ -424,7 +424,7 @@ __REFDATA
.align 4
SYM_DATA(initial_code, .long i386_start_kernel)
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
#define PGD_ALIGN (2 * PAGE_SIZE)
#define PTI_USER_PGD_FILL 1024
#else
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ SYM_DATA_START(initial_page_table)
# endif
.align PAGE_SIZE /* needs to be page-sized too */
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
/*
* PTI needs another page so sync_initial_pagetable() works correctly
* and does not scribble over the data which is placed behind the
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
index 086a2c3aaaa0..e23bc2a541cf 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/head_64.S
@@ -593,7 +593,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(vc_no_ghcb)
#define SYM_DATA_START_PAGE_ALIGNED(name) \
SYM_START(name, SYM_L_GLOBAL, .balign PAGE_SIZE)
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
/*
* Each PGD needs to be 8k long and 8k aligned. We do not
* ever go out to userspace with these, so we do not
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
index adc67f98819a..7e6de84b9358 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ldt.c
@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ static struct ldt_struct *alloc_ldt_struct(unsigned int num_entries)
return new_ldt;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
static void do_sanity_check(struct mm_struct *mm,
bool had_kernel_mapping,
@@ -377,7 +377,7 @@ static void unmap_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt)
flush_tlb_mm_range(mm, va, va + nr_pages * PAGE_SIZE, PAGE_SHIFT, false);
}
-#else /* !CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
static int
map_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt, int slot)
@@ -388,11 +388,11 @@ map_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt, int slot)
static void unmap_ldt_struct(struct mm_struct *mm, struct ldt_struct *ldt)
{
}
-#endif /* CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION */
static void free_ldt_pgtables(struct mm_struct *mm)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
struct mmu_gather tlb;
unsigned long start = LDT_BASE_ADDR;
unsigned long end = LDT_END_ADDR;
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
index c80febc44cd2..031cd10ed17f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/Makefile
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ obj-$(CONFIG_NUMA_EMU) += numa_emulation.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_INTEL_MEMORY_PROTECTION_KEYS) += pkeys.o
obj-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_MEMORY) += kaslr.o
-obj-$(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o
+obj-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION) += pti.o
obj-$(CONFIG_X86_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt.o
obj-$(CONFIG_AMD_MEM_ENCRYPT) += mem_encrypt_amd.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
index b43301cb2a80..ae5c213a1cb0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/debug_pagetables.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ static int ptdump_curknl_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
DEFINE_SHOW_ATTRIBUTE(ptdump_curknl);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
static int ptdump_curusr_show(struct seq_file *m, void *v)
{
if (current->mm->pgd)
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ static int __init pt_dump_debug_init(void)
debugfs_create_file("current_kernel", 0400, dir, NULL,
&ptdump_curknl_fops);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
debugfs_create_file("current_user", 0400, dir, NULL,
&ptdump_curusr_fops);
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
index e1b599ecbbc2..b7b88c1d91ec 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/dump_pagetables.c
@@ -408,7 +408,7 @@ void ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs(struct seq_file *m, struct mm_struct *mm,
bool user)
{
pgd_t *pgd = mm->pgd;
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
if (user && boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
pgd = kernel_to_user_pgdp(pgd);
#endif
@@ -418,7 +418,7 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ptdump_walk_pgd_level_debugfs);
void ptdump_walk_user_pgd_level_checkwx(void)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
pgd_t *pgd = INIT_PGD;
if (!(__supported_pte_mask & _PAGE_NX) ||
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
index 0cbc1b8e8e3d..cceb779d882d 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/pgtable.c
@@ -293,7 +293,7 @@ static void pgd_mop_up_pmds(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgdp)
for (i = 0; i < PREALLOCATED_PMDS; i++)
mop_up_one_pmd(mm, &pgdp[i]);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_PTI))
return;
@@ -325,7 +325,7 @@ static void pgd_prepopulate_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm, pgd_t *pgd, pmd_t *pmds[])
}
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
static void pgd_prepopulate_user_pmd(struct mm_struct *mm,
pgd_t *k_pgd, pmd_t *pmds[])
{
diff --git a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
index 453ea95b667d..77f448e55bf8 100644
--- a/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
+++ b/arch/x86/mm/tlb.c
@@ -89,10 +89,10 @@
#define CR3_HW_ASID_BITS 12
/*
- * When enabled, PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
+ * When enabled, MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION consumes a single bit for
* user/kernel switches
*/
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS 1
#else
# define PTI_CONSUMED_PCID_BITS 0
@@ -114,7 +114,7 @@ static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid)
{
VM_WARN_ON_ONCE(asid > MAX_ASID_AVAILABLE);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
/*
* Make sure that the dynamic ASID space does not conflict with the
* bit we are using to switch between user and kernel ASIDs.
@@ -149,7 +149,7 @@ static inline u16 kern_pcid(u16 asid)
static inline u16 user_pcid(u16 asid)
{
u16 ret = kern_pcid(asid);
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
ret |= 1 << X86_CR3_PTI_PCID_USER_BIT;
#endif
return ret;
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ static void choose_new_asid(struct mm_struct *next, u64 next_tlb_gen,
static inline void invalidate_user_asid(u16 asid)
{
/* There is no user ASID if address space separation is off */
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION))
return;
/*
diff --git a/include/linux/pti.h b/include/linux/pti.h
index 1a941efcaa62..1fbf9d6c20ef 100644
--- a/include/linux/pti.h
+++ b/include/linux/pti.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
#ifndef _INCLUDE_PTI_H
#define _INCLUDE_PTI_H
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
#include <asm/pti.h>
#else
static inline void pti_init(void) { }
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 3d61b2432991..aeb3fbbbce46 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@
# define DISABLE_LA57 (1<<(X86_FEATURE_LA57 & 31))
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
# define DISABLE_PTI 0
#else
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [PATCH v5 05/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
[not found] <20231019181158.1982205-1-leitao@debian.org>
` (3 preceding siblings ...)
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 04/12] x86/bugs: Rename PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION to MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] x86/bugs: Rename SLS to CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS Breno Leitao
` (6 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Peter Zijlstra, Pawan Gupta,
Jonathan Corbet, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Andy Lutomirski, Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Sean Christopherson, Paolo Bonzini, David S. Miller, David Ahern,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend,
KP Singh, Stanislav Fomichev, Hao Luo, Jiri Olsa, Wang YanQing,
Luis Chamberlain, Pablo Neira Ayuso, Jozsef Kadlecsik,
Florian Westphal, Eric Dumazet, Jakub Kicinski, Paolo Abeni,
Jamal Hadi Salim, Cong Wang, Jiri Pirko, Masahiro Yamada,
Nathan Chancellor, Nick Desaulniers, Nicolas Schier, Miguel Ojeda,
Alex Gaynor, Wedson Almeida Filho, Boqun Feng, Gary Guo,
Björn Roy Baron, Benno Lossin, Andreas Hindborg, Alice Ryhl
Cc: leit, Paul E. McKenney, Randy Dunlap, Tejun Heo, Catalin Marinas,
Mike Rapoport (IBM), Yu-cheng Yu, Rick Edgecombe, Juergen Gross,
Kim Phillips, Kirill A. Shutemov, Ingo Molnar, Kees Cook,
Jinghao Jia, Vincent Whitchurch, Yang Jihong, Petr Pavlu,
Andrew Morton, Sami Tolvanen, Alyssa Ross, Alexander Potapenko,
Ricardo Ribalda, Marco Elver, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
open list:DOCUMENTATION, open list,
open list:FUNCTION HOOKS (FTRACE),
open list:KERNEL VIRTUAL MACHINE FOR X86 (KVM/x86),
open list:BPF [GENERAL] (Safe Dynamic Programs and Tools),
open list:NETWORKING [IPv4/IPv6], open list:MODULE SUPPORT,
open list:NETFILTER, open list:NETFILTER, open list:RUST
CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.
The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.
Rename the Kconfig entry from RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst | 8 ++++----
Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt | 4 ++--
arch/x86/Kconfig | 6 +++---
arch/x86/Makefile | 4 ++--
arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile | 4 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 8 ++++----
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 8 ++++----
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/lib/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile | 2 +-
include/linux/compiler-gcc.h | 2 +-
include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h | 2 +-
include/linux/module.h | 2 +-
include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h | 2 +-
include/net/tc_wrapper.h | 2 +-
kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c | 2 +-
net/netfilter/Makefile | 2 +-
net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c | 6 +++---
net/netfilter/nft_ct.c | 4 ++--
net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c | 2 +-
net/sched/sch_api.c | 2 +-
scripts/Makefile.lib | 2 +-
scripts/generate_rust_target.rs | 2 +-
scripts/mod/modpost.c | 2 +-
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
37 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 59 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
index 32a8893e5617..cce768afec6b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
@@ -473,8 +473,8 @@ Spectre variant 2
-mindirect-branch=thunk-extern -mindirect-branch-register options.
If the kernel is compiled with a Clang compiler, the compiler needs
to support -mretpoline-external-thunk option. The kernel config
- CONFIG_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs to run with
- the latest updated microcode.
+ CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE needs to be turned on, and the CPU needs
+ to run with the latest updated microcode.
On Intel Skylake-era systems the mitigation covers most, but not all,
cases. See :ref:`[3] <spec_ref3>` for more details.
@@ -609,8 +609,8 @@ kernel command line.
Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
mitigation method at run time according to the
CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
- CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
- compiler with which the kernel was built.
+ CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
+ and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
against user space to user space task attacks.
diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
index ba0f4fbbe57d..60faccd29a34 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/kernel-parameters.txt
@@ -5978,8 +5978,8 @@
Selecting 'on' will, and 'auto' may, choose a
mitigation method at run time according to the
CPU, the available microcode, the setting of the
- CONFIG_RETPOLINE configuration option, and the
- compiler with which the kernel was built.
+ CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE configuration option,
+ and the compiler with which the kernel was built.
Selecting 'on' will also enable the mitigation
against user space to user space task attacks.
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 46885150efd2..f3593461ce35 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2436,7 +2436,7 @@ config CALL_PADDING
config FINEIBT
def_bool y
- depends on X86_KERNEL_IBT && CFI_CLANG && RETPOLINE
+ depends on X86_KERNEL_IBT && CFI_CLANG && MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
select CALL_PADDING
config HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
@@ -2474,7 +2474,7 @@ config MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION
See Documentation/arch/x86/pti.rst for more details.
-config RETPOLINE
+config MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
bool "Avoid speculative indirect branches in kernel"
select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
default y
@@ -2486,7 +2486,7 @@ config RETPOLINE
config RETHUNK
bool "Enable return-thunks"
- depends on RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
+ depends on MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
default y if X86_64
help
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 22e41d9dbc23..3053b60f017b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -191,7 +191,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS += -Wno-sign-compare
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -fno-asynchronous-unwind-tables
# Avoid indirect branches in kernel to deal with Spectre
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
KBUILD_CFLAGS += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
# Additionally, avoid generating expensive indirect jumps which
# are subject to retpolines for small number of switch cases.
@@ -299,7 +299,7 @@ vdso_install:
archprepare: checkbin
checkbin:
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
ifeq ($(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS),)
@echo "You are building kernel with non-retpoline compiler." >&2
@echo "Please update your compiler." >&2
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
index 6a1821bd7d5e..7605f41a5454 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/vdso/Makefile
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ CFL := $(PROFILING) -mcmodel=small -fPIC -O2 -fasynchronous-unwind-tables -m64 \
-fno-omit-frame-pointer -foptimize-sibling-calls \
-DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING -DBUILD_VDSO
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),)
CFL += $(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS)
endif
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += $(call cc-option, -foptimize-sibling-calls)
KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -fno-omit-frame-pointer
KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += -DDISABLE_BRANCH_PROFILING
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
ifneq ($(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS),)
KBUILD_CFLAGS_32 += $(RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS)
endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index fb604ec95a5f..24e4010c33b6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0
#else
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
index 571fe4d2d232..c5165204c66f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -42,25 +42,25 @@
#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
#define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk
-#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
#define RET ret; int3
#else
#define RET ret
#endif
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
#define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
-#else /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
#define ASM_RET "ret; int3\n\t"
#else
#define ASM_RET "ret\n\t"
#endif
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
#endif /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 64d9f0e87419..cab7c937c71b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -241,7 +241,7 @@
* instruction irrespective of kCFI.
*/
.macro JMP_NOSPEC reg:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
__CS_PREFIX \reg
jmp __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
#else
@@ -251,7 +251,7 @@
.endm
.macro CALL_NOSPEC reg:req
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
__CS_PREFIX \reg
call __x86_indirect_thunk_\reg
#else
@@ -378,7 +378,7 @@ static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING */
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
#define GEN(reg) \
extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_ ## reg;
@@ -399,7 +399,7 @@ static inline void call_depth_return_thunk(void) {}
/*
* Inline asm uses the %V modifier which is only in newer GCC
- * which is ensured when CONFIG_RETPOLINE is defined.
+ * which is ensured when CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE is defined.
*/
# define CALL_NOSPEC \
ALTERNATIVE_2( \
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 517ee01503be..8932f524c935 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -460,7 +460,7 @@ static inline bool is_jcc32(struct insn *insn)
return insn->opcode.bytes[0] == 0x0f && (insn->opcode.bytes[1] & 0xf0) == 0x80;
}
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_OBJTOOL)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_OBJTOOL)
/*
* CALL/JMP *%\reg
@@ -760,12 +760,12 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end)
void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
-#else /* !CONFIG_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index b906ed4f3091..fc46fd6447f9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1103,7 +1103,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_stibp __ro_after_init =
static enum spectre_v2_user_mitigation spectre_v2_user_ibpb __ro_after_init =
SPECTRE_V2_USER_NONE;
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
static bool spectre_v2_bad_module;
bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
@@ -1416,7 +1416,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE_GENERIC ||
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_LFENCE ||
cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_EIBRS_RETPOLINE) &&
- !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+ !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)) {
pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
@@ -1470,7 +1470,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation __init spectre_v2_select_retpoline(void)
{
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)) {
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)) {
pr_err("Kernel not compiled with retpoline; no mitigation available!");
return SPECTRE_V2_NONE;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 7ed7e8297ba3..0f26758c7a93 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union {
} __attribute__((packed));
};
-#define RET_SIZE (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+#define RET_SIZE (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
static unsigned long
create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
index 517821b48391..36d6809c6c9e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/kprobes/opt.c
@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ static int can_optimize(unsigned long paddr)
* However, the kernel built with retpolines or IBT has jump
* tables disabled so the check can be skipped altogether.
*/
- if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) &&
+ if (!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) &&
!IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_X86_KERNEL_IBT) &&
insn_is_indirect_jump(&insn))
return 0;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 9cdb1a7332c4..68654303c98e 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -277,7 +277,7 @@ SECTIONS
__parainstructions_end = .;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
/*
* List of instructions that call/jmp/jcc to retpoline thunks
* __x86_indirect_thunk_*(). These instructions can be patched along
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
index 2dea9ec589ce..d4fba1cc3e91 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu.c
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ static unsigned long get_guest_cr3(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
static inline unsigned long kvm_mmu_get_guest_pgd(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
struct kvm_mmu *mmu)
{
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && mmu->get_guest_pgd == get_guest_cr3)
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && mmu->get_guest_pgd == get_guest_cr3)
return kvm_read_cr3(vcpu);
return mmu->get_guest_pgd(vcpu);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
index decc1f153669..bf73a121c5ef 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/mmu/mmu_internal.h
@@ -312,7 +312,7 @@ static inline int kvm_mmu_do_page_fault(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, gpa_t cr2_or_gpa,
if (!prefetch)
vcpu->stat.pf_taken++;
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && fault.is_tdp)
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && fault.is_tdp)
r = kvm_tdp_page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
else
r = vcpu->arch.mmu->page_fault(vcpu, &fault);
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
index c2dae8ff9dc4..37295f8badee 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/svm.c
@@ -3453,7 +3453,7 @@ int svm_invoke_exit_handler(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, u64 exit_code)
if (!svm_check_exit_valid(exit_code))
return svm_handle_invalid_exit(vcpu, exit_code);
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_MSR)
return msr_interception(vcpu);
else if (exit_code == SVM_EXIT_VINTR)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
index ef2ebabb059c..b9e08837ab96 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm/vmenter.S
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_vcpu_run)
7: vmload %_ASM_AX
8:
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
#endif
@@ -344,7 +344,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(__svm_sev_es_vcpu_run)
/* Pop @svm to RDI, guest registers have been saved already. */
pop %_ASM_DI
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
/* IMPORTANT: Stuff the RSB immediately after VM-Exit, before RET! */
FILL_RETURN_BUFFER %_ASM_AX, RSB_CLEAR_LOOPS, X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
index 86ce9efe6c66..c782a4a46198 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/vmx/vmx.c
@@ -6544,7 +6544,7 @@ static int __vmx_handle_exit(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, fastpath_t exit_fastpath)
if (exit_reason.basic >= kvm_vmx_max_exit_handlers)
goto unexpected_vmexit;
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_MSR_WRITE)
return kvm_emulate_wrmsr(vcpu);
else if (exit_reason.basic == EXIT_REASON_PREEMPTION_TIMER)
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
index ea3a28e7b613..72cc9c90e9f3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/Makefile
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ lib-$(CONFIG_ARCH_HAS_COPY_MC) += copy_mc.o copy_mc_64.o
lib-$(CONFIG_INSTRUCTION_DECODER) += insn.o inat.o insn-eval.o
lib-$(CONFIG_RANDOMIZE_BASE) += kaslr.o
lib-$(CONFIG_FUNCTION_ERROR_INJECTION) += error-inject.o
-lib-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
+lib-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) += retpoline.o
obj-y += msr.o msr-reg.o msr-reg-export.o hweight.o
obj-y += iomem.o
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index 8c10d9abc239..ef732f323926 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip)
emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip);
} else {
EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); /* jmp *%\reg */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
EMIT1(0xCC); /* int3 */
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
index 429a89c5468b..efca6bd818a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp32.c
@@ -1273,7 +1273,7 @@ static int emit_jmp_edx(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip)
u8 *prog = *pprog;
int cnt = 0;
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
EMIT1_off32(0xE9, (u8 *)__x86_indirect_thunk_edx - (ip + 5));
#else
EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE2);
diff --git a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
index 08aa0f25f12a..bc31863c5ee6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/purgatory/Makefile
@@ -61,7 +61,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_STACKPROTECTOR_STRONG
PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE += -fstack-protector-strong
endif
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
PURGATORY_CFLAGS_REMOVE += $(RETPOLINE_CFLAGS)
endif
diff --git a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
index 2ceba3fe4ec1..d24f29091f4b 100644
--- a/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
+++ b/include/linux/compiler-gcc.h
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@
(typeof(ptr)) (__ptr + (off)); \
})
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
#define __noretpoline __attribute__((__indirect_branch__("keep")))
#endif
diff --git a/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h b/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
index c1c76a70a6ce..fe050dab55a3 100644
--- a/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
+++ b/include/linux/indirect_call_wrapper.h
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
#ifndef _LINUX_INDIRECT_CALL_WRAPPER_H
#define _LINUX_INDIRECT_CALL_WRAPPER_H
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
/*
* INDIRECT_CALL_$NR - wrapper for indirect calls with $NR known builtin
diff --git a/include/linux/module.h b/include/linux/module.h
index a98e188cf37b..d45e17fa7f98 100644
--- a/include/linux/module.h
+++ b/include/linux/module.h
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ static inline void module_bug_finalize(const Elf_Ehdr *hdr,
static inline void module_bug_cleanup(struct module *mod) {}
#endif /* CONFIG_GENERIC_BUG */
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
extern bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline);
#else
static inline bool retpoline_module_ok(bool has_retpoline)
diff --git a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
index 780a5f6ad4a6..ff27cb2e1662 100644
--- a/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
+++ b/include/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.h
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_bitmap_type;
extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_pipapo_type;
extern const struct nft_set_type nft_set_pipapo_avx2_type;
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
bool nft_rhash_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
const u32 *key, const struct nft_set_ext **ext);
bool nft_rbtree_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
diff --git a/include/net/tc_wrapper.h b/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
index a6d481b5bcbc..a13ba0326d5e 100644
--- a/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
+++ b/include/net/tc_wrapper.h
@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@
#include <net/pkt_cls.h>
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)
#include <linux/cpufeature.h>
#include <linux/static_key.h>
diff --git a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
index 515cafdb18d9..b1098ec2e7d7 100644
--- a/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
+++ b/kernel/trace/ring_buffer.c
@@ -1193,7 +1193,7 @@ static inline u64 rb_time_stamp(struct trace_buffer *buffer)
u64 ts;
/* Skip retpolines :-( */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && likely(buffer->clock == trace_clock_local))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && likely(buffer->clock == trace_clock_local))
ts = trace_clock_local();
else
ts = buffer->clock();
diff --git a/net/netfilter/Makefile b/net/netfilter/Makefile
index d4958e7e7631..614815a3ed73 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/Makefile
+++ b/net/netfilter/Makefile
@@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ endif
endif
ifdef CONFIG_NFT_CT
-ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
nf_tables-objs += nft_ct_fast.o
endif
endif
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
index 4d0ce12221f6..54f7c96b7dd9 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nf_tables_core.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
#include <net/netfilter/nf_log.h>
#include <net/netfilter/nft_meta.h>
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_X86)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) && defined(CONFIG_X86)
static struct static_key_false nf_tables_skip_direct_calls;
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ static void expr_call_ops_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
struct nft_regs *regs,
struct nft_pktinfo *pkt)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
unsigned long e;
if (nf_skip_indirect_calls())
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ static void expr_call_ops_eval(const struct nft_expr *expr,
X(e, nft_objref_map_eval);
#undef X
indirect_call:
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETPOLINE */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
expr->ops->eval(expr, regs, pkt);
}
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
index 86bb9d7797d9..d3e66bcb2a91 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_ct.c
@@ -751,7 +751,7 @@ static bool nft_ct_set_reduce(struct nft_regs_track *track,
return false;
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
static const struct nft_expr_ops nft_ct_get_fast_ops = {
.type = &nft_ct_type,
.size = NFT_EXPR_SIZE(sizeof(struct nft_ct)),
@@ -796,7 +796,7 @@ nft_ct_select_ops(const struct nft_ctx *ctx,
return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
if (tb[NFTA_CT_DREG]) {
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
u32 k = ntohl(nla_get_be32(tb[NFTA_CT_KEY]));
switch (k) {
diff --git a/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c b/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
index 870e5b113d13..a0055f510e31 100644
--- a/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
+++ b/net/netfilter/nft_lookup.c
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ struct nft_lookup {
struct nft_set_binding binding;
};
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
bool nft_set_do_lookup(const struct net *net, const struct nft_set *set,
const u32 *key, const struct nft_set_ext **ext)
{
diff --git a/net/sched/sch_api.c b/net/sched/sch_api.c
index e9eaf637220e..d577c9e1cb42 100644
--- a/net/sched/sch_api.c
+++ b/net/sched/sch_api.c
@@ -2353,7 +2353,7 @@ static struct pernet_operations psched_net_ops = {
.exit = psched_net_exit,
};
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_RETPOLINE)
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE)
DEFINE_STATIC_KEY_FALSE(tc_skip_wrapper);
#endif
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index cc44c95c49cc..d6e157938b5f 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_FTRACE_MCOUNT_USE_OBJTOOL
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_OBJTOOL_NOP_MCOUNT) += --mnop
endif
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += --orc
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETPOLINE) += --retpoline
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) += --retpoline
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETHUNK) += --rethunk
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_SLS) += --sls
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION) += --stackval
diff --git a/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs b/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
index 3c6cbe2b278d..eaf524603796 100644
--- a/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
+++ b/scripts/generate_rust_target.rs
@@ -155,7 +155,7 @@ fn main() {
"e-m:e-p270:32:32-p271:32:32-p272:64:64-i64:64-f80:128-n8:16:32:64-S128",
);
let mut features = "-3dnow,-3dnowa,-mmx,+soft-float".to_string();
- if cfg.has("RETPOLINE") {
+ if cfg.has("MITIGATION_RETPOLINE") {
features += ",+retpoline-external-thunk";
}
ts.push("features", features);
diff --git a/scripts/mod/modpost.c b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
index 2f3b0fe6f68d..55dde62c07c2 100644
--- a/scripts/mod/modpost.c
+++ b/scripts/mod/modpost.c
@@ -1886,7 +1886,7 @@ static void add_header(struct buffer *b, struct module *mod)
buf_printf(b,
"\n"
- "#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE\n"
+ "#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE\n"
"MODULE_INFO(retpoline, \"Y\");\n"
"#endif\n");
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index aeb3fbbbce46..d05158d8fe5f 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@
# define DISABLE_PTI (1 << (X86_FEATURE_PTI & 31))
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETPOLINE
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE 0
#else
# define DISABLE_RETPOLINE ((1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE & 31)) | \
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [PATCH v5 06/12] x86/bugs: Rename SLS to CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
[not found] <20231019181158.1982205-1-leitao@debian.org>
` (4 preceding siblings ...)
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 05/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETPOLINE to MITIGATION_RETPOLINE Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 07/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_UNRET_ENTRY to MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY Breno Leitao
` (5 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Steven Rostedt, Masami Hiramatsu, Mark Rutland,
Alexei Starovoitov, Daniel Borkmann, Andrii Nakryiko,
Martin KaFai Lau, Song Liu, Yonghong Song, John Fastabend,
KP Singh, Stanislav Fomichev, Hao Luo, Jiri Olsa, David S. Miller,
David Ahern, Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor, Nick Desaulniers,
Nicolas Schier
Cc: leit, Peter Zijlstra, Ingo Molnar, Vincent Whitchurch,
Jinghao Jia, Kees Cook,
open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT),
open list:FUNCTION HOOKS (FTRACE),
open list:BPF [GENERAL] (Safe Dynamic Programs and Tools),
open list:NETWORKING [IPv4/IPv6]
CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.
The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.
Rename the Kconfig entry from SLS to MITIGATION_SLS.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/x86/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c | 3 ++-
arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c | 4 ++--
scripts/Makefile.lib | 2 +-
7 files changed, 11 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index f3593461ce35..9dd2fb555973 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2556,7 +2556,7 @@ config CPU_SRSO
help
Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
-config SLS
+config MITIGATION_SLS
bool "Mitigate Straight-Line-Speculation"
depends on CC_HAS_SLS && X86_64
select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 3053b60f017b..1ac5d6002f5f 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -204,7 +204,7 @@ ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
endif
endif
-ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
KBUILD_CFLAGS += -mharden-sls=all
endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
index c5165204c66f..09e2d026df33 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@
#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
#define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk
#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
#define RET ret; int3
#else
#define RET ret
@@ -55,7 +55,7 @@
#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
#define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
-#ifdef CONFIG_SLS
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
#define ASM_RET "ret; int3\n\t"
#else
#define ASM_RET "ret\n\t"
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index 8932f524c935..ea9652eb455b 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -624,8 +624,8 @@ static int patch_retpoline(void *addr, struct insn *insn, u8 *bytes)
/*
* The compiler is supposed to EMIT an INT3 after every unconditional
* JMP instruction due to AMD BTC. However, if the compiler is too old
- * or SLS isn't enabled, we still need an INT3 after indirect JMPs
- * even on Intel.
+ * or MITIGATION_SLS isn't enabled, we still need an INT3 after
+ * indirect JMPs even on Intel.
*/
if (op == JMP32_INSN_OPCODE && i < insn->length)
bytes[i++] = INT3_INSN_OPCODE;
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
index 0f26758c7a93..b000158b781a 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/ftrace.c
@@ -297,7 +297,8 @@ union ftrace_op_code_union {
} __attribute__((packed));
};
-#define RET_SIZE (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+#define RET_SIZE \
+ (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) ? 5 : 1 + IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS))
static unsigned long
create_trampoline(struct ftrace_ops *ops, unsigned int *tramp_size)
diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index ef732f323926..96a63c4386a9 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -469,7 +469,7 @@ static void emit_indirect_jump(u8 **pprog, int reg, u8 *ip)
emit_jump(&prog, &__x86_indirect_thunk_array[reg], ip);
} else {
EMIT2(0xFF, 0xE0 + reg); /* jmp *%\reg */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) || IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS))
EMIT1(0xCC); /* int3 */
}
@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static void emit_return(u8 **pprog, u8 *ip)
emit_jump(&prog, x86_return_thunk, ip);
} else {
EMIT1(0xC3); /* ret */
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SLS))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS))
EMIT1(0xCC); /* int3 */
}
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index d6e157938b5f..0d5461276179 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -264,7 +264,7 @@ endif
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += --orc
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) += --retpoline
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETHUNK) += --rethunk
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_SLS) += --sls
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS) += --sls
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION) += --stackval
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE) += --static-call
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_UACCESS_VALIDATION) += --uaccess
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [PATCH v5 07/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_UNRET_ENTRY to MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
[not found] <20231019181158.1982205-1-leitao@debian.org>
` (5 preceding siblings ...)
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 06/12] x86/bugs: Rename SLS to CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 08/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBRS_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY Breno Leitao
` (4 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Peter Zijlstra, Pawan Gupta, Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor,
Nick Desaulniers, Nicolas Schier
Cc: leit, Yu-cheng Yu, Mike Rapoport (IBM), Rick Edgecombe,
Kirill A. Shutemov, Juergen Gross, Kim Phillips, Ingo Molnar,
Borislav Petkov, Alexey Kardashevskiy, Petr Pavlu,
Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.
The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.
Rename the Kconfig entry from CPU_UNRET_ENTRY to MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 2 +-
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 10 +++++-----
include/linux/objtool.h | 2 +-
scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o | 2 +-
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
10 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 9dd2fb555973..0e4c0c5c4818 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2495,7 +2495,7 @@ config RETHUNK
Requires a compiler with -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
-config CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+config MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64
default y
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 24e4010c33b6..151f0d50e7e0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
# define DISABLE_RETHUNK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
# define DISABLE_UNRET 0
#else
# define DISABLE_UNRET (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index cab7c937c71b..e25e98f012a3 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@
*/
.macro VALIDATE_UNRET_END
#if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
- (defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
+ (defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
nop
#endif
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@
.Lskip_rsb_\@:
.endm
-#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
#define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET "call entry_untrain_ret"
#else
#define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET ""
@@ -334,7 +334,7 @@ extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
static inline void __x86_return_thunk(void) {}
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
extern void retbleed_return_thunk(void);
#else
static inline void retbleed_return_thunk(void) {}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
index a8e042a685ba..0cf52efc7617 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/amd.c
@@ -943,7 +943,7 @@ static void init_amd_bd(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
void init_spectral_chicken(struct cpuinfo_x86 *c)
{
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
u64 value;
/*
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index fc46fd6447f9..2580368c32d1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -982,10 +982,10 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
return;
case RETBLEED_CMD_UNRET:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY)) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY)) {
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
} else {
- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_UNRET_ENTRY.\n");
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY.\n");
goto do_cmd_auto;
}
break;
@@ -1021,7 +1021,7 @@ static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void)
case RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO:
if (boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_AMD ||
boot_cpu_data.x86_vendor == X86_VENDOR_HYGON) {
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY))
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY))
retbleed_mitigation = RETBLEED_MITIGATION_UNRET;
else if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY) &&
boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_IBPB))
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index 68654303c98e..f5ee96a7bdd6 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -514,7 +514,7 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
"fixed_percpu_data is not at start of per-cpu area");
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
. = ASSERT((retbleed_return_thunk & 0x3f) == 0, "retbleed_return_thunk not cacheline-aligned");
#endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 910fd231b7d2..03a065ef57ae 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -221,7 +221,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(srso_return_thunk)
#define JMP_SRSO_ALIAS_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
/*
* Some generic notes on the untraining sequences:
@@ -303,11 +303,11 @@ SYM_CODE_END(retbleed_return_thunk)
SYM_FUNC_END(retbleed_untrain_ret)
#define JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET "jmp retbleed_untrain_ret"
-#else /* !CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY */
#define JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
-#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY */
-#if defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
ALTERNATIVE_2 JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET, \
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
SYM_FUNC_END(entry_untrain_ret)
__EXPORT_THUNK(entry_untrain_ret)
-#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h
index 33212e93f4a6..d030671a4c49 100644
--- a/include/linux/objtool.h
+++ b/include/linux/objtool.h
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
*/
.macro VALIDATE_UNRET_BEGIN
#if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
- (defined(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
+ (defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
.Lhere_\@:
.pushsection .discard.validate_unret
.long .Lhere_\@ - .
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
index 25b3b587d37c..6277dbd730bb 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ objtool-enabled := $(or $(delay-objtool),$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION))
vmlinux-objtool-args-$(delay-objtool) += $(objtool-args-y)
vmlinux-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL) += --no-unreachable
vmlinux-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) += --noinstr \
- $(if $(or $(CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY),$(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)), --unret)
+ $(if $(or $(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY),$(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)), --unret)
objtool-args = $(vmlinux-objtool-args-y) --link
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index d05158d8fe5f..4b816f55c634 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
# define DISABLE_RETHUNK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_UNRET_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
# define DISABLE_UNRET 0
#else
# define DISABLE_UNRET (1 << (X86_FEATURE_UNRET & 31))
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [PATCH v5 08/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBRS_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
[not found] <20231019181158.1982205-1-leitao@debian.org>
` (6 preceding siblings ...)
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 07/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_UNRET_ENTRY to MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 09/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_SRSO to MITIGATION_SRSO Breno Leitao
` (3 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Andy Lutomirski, Peter Zijlstra, Pawan Gupta
Cc: leit, open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.
The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.
Rename the Kconfig entry from CPU_IBRS_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/x86/entry/calling.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 0e4c0c5c4818..c53d2034a5ab 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2540,7 +2540,7 @@ config MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY
help
Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=ibpb mitigation.
-config CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
+config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
bool "Enable IBRS on kernel entry"
depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL && X86_64
default y
diff --git a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
index ace89d5c1ddd..2afdff42c107 100644
--- a/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
+++ b/arch/x86/entry/calling.h
@@ -297,7 +297,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
* Assumes x86_spec_ctrl_{base,current} to have SPEC_CTRL_IBRS set.
*/
.macro IBRS_ENTER save_reg
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ For 32-bit we have the following conventions - kernel is built with
* regs. Must be called after the last RET.
*/
.macro IBRS_EXIT save_reg
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
ALTERNATIVE "jmp .Lend_\@", "", X86_FEATURE_KERNEL_IBRS
movl $MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, %ecx
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 2580368c32d1..e11bacbd8f39 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1439,7 +1439,7 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
}
- if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY)) {
+ if (cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_IBRS && !IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY)) {
pr_err("%s selected but not compiled in. Switching to AUTO select\n",
mitigation_options[i].option);
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
@@ -1565,7 +1565,7 @@ static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void)
break;
}
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_IBRS_ENTRY) &&
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY) &&
boot_cpu_has_bug(X86_BUG_RETBLEED) &&
retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_OFF &&
retbleed_cmd != RETBLEED_CMD_STUFF &&
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [PATCH v5 09/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_SRSO to MITIGATION_SRSO
[not found] <20231019181158.1982205-1-leitao@debian.org>
` (7 preceding siblings ...)
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 08/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_IBRS_ENTRY to MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 10/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK Breno Leitao
` (2 subsequent siblings)
11 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Peter Zijlstra, Pawan Gupta, Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor,
Nick Desaulniers, Nicolas Schier
Cc: leit, Ingo Molnar, Kees Cook, Petr Pavlu,
open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.
The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.
Rename the Kconfig entry from CPU_SRSO to MITIGATION_SRSO.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 6 +++---
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 8 ++++----
arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S | 4 ++--
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 10 +++++-----
include/linux/objtool.h | 2 +-
scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o | 2 +-
7 files changed, 17 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index c53d2034a5ab..97004db07e38 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2549,7 +2549,7 @@ config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
This mitigates both spectre_v2 and retbleed at great cost to
performance.
-config CPU_SRSO
+config MITIGATION_SRSO
bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD"
depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK
default y
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index e25e98f012a3..9ea93a298a43 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -212,7 +212,7 @@
*/
.macro VALIDATE_UNRET_END
#if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
- (defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
+ (defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO))
ANNOTATE_RETPOLINE_SAFE
nop
#endif
@@ -271,7 +271,7 @@
.Lskip_rsb_\@:
.endm
-#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)
#define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET "call entry_untrain_ret"
#else
#define CALL_UNTRAIN_RET ""
@@ -340,7 +340,7 @@ extern void retbleed_return_thunk(void);
static inline void retbleed_return_thunk(void) {}
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
extern void srso_return_thunk(void);
extern void srso_alias_return_thunk(void);
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index e11bacbd8f39..f2775417bda2 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -2458,7 +2458,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
break;
case SRSO_CMD_SAFE_RET:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
/*
* Enable the return thunk for generated code
* like ftrace, static_call, etc.
@@ -2478,7 +2478,7 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
else
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_SAFE_RET_UCODE_NEEDED;
} else {
- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
}
break;
@@ -2494,13 +2494,13 @@ static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void)
break;
case SRSO_CMD_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT:
- if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)) {
+ if (IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)) {
if (!boot_cpu_has(X86_FEATURE_ENTRY_IBPB) && has_microcode) {
setup_force_cpu_cap(X86_FEATURE_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT);
srso_mitigation = SRSO_MITIGATION_IBPB_ON_VMEXIT;
}
} else {
- pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with CPU_SRSO.\n");
+ pr_err("WARNING: kernel not compiled with MITIGATION_SRSO.\n");
}
break;
}
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
index f5ee96a7bdd6..f54a4cf01a43 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/vmlinux.lds.S
@@ -139,7 +139,7 @@ SECTIONS
*(.text..__x86.rethunk_untrain)
ENTRY_TEXT
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
/*
* See the comment above srso_alias_untrain_ret()'s
* definition.
@@ -518,7 +518,7 @@ INIT_PER_CPU(irq_stack_backing_store);
. = ASSERT((retbleed_return_thunk & 0x3f) == 0, "retbleed_return_thunk not cacheline-aligned");
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
. = ASSERT((srso_safe_ret & 0x3f) == 0, "srso_safe_ret not cacheline-aligned");
/*
* GNU ld cannot do XOR until 2.41.
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 03a065ef57ae..7834bde8afd1 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array)
#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
-#ifdef CONFIG_CPU_SRSO
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
/*
* srso_alias_untrain_ret() and srso_alias_safe_ret() are placed at
@@ -216,10 +216,10 @@ SYM_CODE_END(srso_return_thunk)
#define JMP_SRSO_UNTRAIN_RET "jmp srso_untrain_ret"
#define JMP_SRSO_ALIAS_UNTRAIN_RET "jmp srso_alias_untrain_ret"
-#else /* !CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
+#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO */
#define JMP_SRSO_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
#define JMP_SRSO_ALIAS_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
-#endif /* CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO */
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
@@ -307,7 +307,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_END(retbleed_untrain_ret)
#define JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET "ud2"
#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY */
-#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)
SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
ALTERNATIVE_2 JMP_RETBLEED_UNTRAIN_RET, \
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ SYM_FUNC_START(entry_untrain_ret)
SYM_FUNC_END(entry_untrain_ret)
__EXPORT_THUNK(entry_untrain_ret)
-#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_CPU_SRSO */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY || CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO */
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_CALL_DEPTH_TRACKING
diff --git a/include/linux/objtool.h b/include/linux/objtool.h
index d030671a4c49..b3b8d3dab52d 100644
--- a/include/linux/objtool.h
+++ b/include/linux/objtool.h
@@ -131,7 +131,7 @@
*/
.macro VALIDATE_UNRET_BEGIN
#if defined(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) && \
- (defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO))
+ (defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO))
.Lhere_\@:
.pushsection .discard.validate_unret
.long .Lhere_\@ - .
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
index 6277dbd730bb..6de297916ce6 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.vmlinux_o
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ objtool-enabled := $(or $(delay-objtool),$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION))
vmlinux-objtool-args-$(delay-objtool) += $(objtool-args-y)
vmlinux-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_GCOV_KERNEL) += --no-unreachable
vmlinux-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_NOINSTR_VALIDATION) += --noinstr \
- $(if $(or $(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY),$(CONFIG_CPU_SRSO)), --unret)
+ $(if $(or $(CONFIG_MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY),$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO)), --unret)
objtool-args = $(vmlinux-objtool-args-y) --link
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [PATCH v5 10/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK
[not found] <20231019181158.1982205-1-leitao@debian.org>
` (8 preceding siblings ...)
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 09/12] x86/bugs: Rename CPU_SRSO to MITIGATION_SRSO Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 11/12] x86/bugs: Create a way to disable GDS mitigation Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation Breno Leitao
11 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Peter Zijlstra, Pawan Gupta, Jason Baron, Steven Rostedt,
Ard Biesheuvel, Masahiro Yamada, Nathan Chancellor,
Nick Desaulniers, Nicolas Schier
Cc: leit, Lukas Bulwahn, Ingo Molnar, Sven Joachim, Ian Kent,
Kees Cook, Yu-cheng Yu, Rick Edgecombe, Kirill A. Shutemov,
Juergen Gross, Kim Phillips, Jinghao Jia, Randy Dunlap,
Vincent Whitchurch, Arnaldo Carvalho de Melo,
open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
CPU mitigations config entries are inconsistent, and names are hard to
related. There are concrete benefits for both users and developers of
having all the mitigation config options living in the same config
namespace.
The mitigation options should have consistency and start with
MITIGATION.
Rename the Kconfig entry from RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 8 ++++----
arch/x86/Makefile | 2 +-
arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h | 4 ++--
arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h | 2 +-
arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c | 4 ++--
arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c | 2 +-
arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S | 4 ++--
scripts/Makefile.lib | 2 +-
tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h | 2 +-
12 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 97004db07e38..7a283602b257 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2441,7 +2441,7 @@ config FINEIBT
config HAVE_CALL_THUNKS
def_bool y
- depends on CC_HAS_ENTRY_PADDING && RETHUNK && OBJTOOL
+ depends on CC_HAS_ENTRY_PADDING && MITIGATION_RETHUNK && OBJTOOL
config CALL_THUNKS
def_bool n
@@ -2484,7 +2484,7 @@ config MITIGATION_RETPOLINE
branches. Requires a compiler with -mindirect-branch=thunk-extern
support for full protection. The kernel may run slower.
-config RETHUNK
+config MITIGATION_RETHUNK
bool "Enable return-thunks"
depends on MITIGATION_RETPOLINE && CC_HAS_RETURN_THUNK
select OBJTOOL if HAVE_OBJTOOL
@@ -2497,7 +2497,7 @@ config RETHUNK
config MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY
bool "Enable UNRET on kernel entry"
- depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && RETHUNK && X86_64
+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && MITIGATION_RETHUNK && X86_64
default y
help
Compile the kernel with support for the retbleed=unret mitigation.
@@ -2551,7 +2551,7 @@ config MITIGATION_IBRS_ENTRY
config MITIGATION_SRSO
bool "Mitigate speculative RAS overflow on AMD"
- depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && RETHUNK
+ depends on CPU_SUP_AMD && X86_64 && MITIGATION_RETHUNK
default y
help
Enable the SRSO mitigation needed on AMD Zen1-4 machines.
diff --git a/arch/x86/Makefile b/arch/x86/Makefile
index 1ac5d6002f5f..206d15235466 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Makefile
+++ b/arch/x86/Makefile
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ RETPOLINE_VDSO_CFLAGS := -mretpoline
endif
RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(call cc-option,-mindirect-branch-cs-prefix)
-ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
RETHUNK_CFLAGS := -mfunction-return=thunk-extern
RETPOLINE_CFLAGS += $(RETHUNK_CFLAGS)
endif
diff --git a/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig b/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig
index 1b411bbf3cb0..bf90917f2656 100644
--- a/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/configs/i386_defconfig
@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ CONFIG_EFI_STUB=y
CONFIG_HZ_1000=y
CONFIG_KEXEC=y
CONFIG_CRASH_DUMP=y
-# CONFIG_RETHUNK is not set
+# CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK is not set
CONFIG_HIBERNATION=y
CONFIG_PM_DEBUG=y
CONFIG_PM_TRACE_RTC=y
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 151f0d50e7e0..36d0c1e05e60 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
(1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)))
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
# define DISABLE_RETHUNK 0
#else
# define DISABLE_RETHUNK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
index 09e2d026df33..dc31b13b87a0 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/linkage.h
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
#ifdef __ASSEMBLY__
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
#define RET jmp __x86_return_thunk
#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@
#else /* __ASSEMBLY__ */
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK) && !defined(__DISABLE_EXPORTS) && !defined(BUILD_VDSO)
#define ASM_RET "jmp __x86_return_thunk\n\t"
#else /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE */
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
index 9ea93a298a43..33f76848c838 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/nospec-branch.h
@@ -289,7 +289,7 @@
* where we have a stack but before any RET instruction.
*/
.macro __UNTRAIN_RET ibpb_feature, call_depth_insns
-#if defined(CONFIG_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)
+#if defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK) || defined(CONFIG_MITIGATION_IBPB_ENTRY)
VALIDATE_UNRET_END
ALTERNATIVE_3 "", \
CALL_UNTRAIN_RET, X86_FEATURE_UNRET, \
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_thunk_array[];
extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_call_thunk_array[];
extern retpoline_thunk_t __x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array[];
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
extern void __x86_return_thunk(void);
#else
static inline void __x86_return_thunk(void) {}
diff --git a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
index 343b722ccaf2..125c407e2abe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
+++ b/arch/x86/include/asm/static_call.h
@@ -46,7 +46,7 @@
#define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, func) \
__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, ".byte 0xe9; .long " #func " - (. + 4)")
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
#define ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP(name) \
__ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_TRAMP(name, "jmp __x86_return_thunk")
#else
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
index ea9652eb455b..d0763dbb5719 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/alternative.c
@@ -685,7 +685,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_retpolines(s32 *start, s32 *end)
}
}
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
/*
* Rewrite the compiler generated return thunk tail-calls.
@@ -758,7 +758,7 @@ void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end)
}
#else
void __init_or_module noinline apply_returns(s32 *start, s32 *end) { }
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK */
#else /* !CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE || !CONFIG_OBJTOOL */
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
index 77a9316da435..4eefaac64c6c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/static_call.c
@@ -172,7 +172,7 @@ void arch_static_call_transform(void *site, void *tramp, void *func, bool tail)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(arch_static_call_transform);
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
/*
* This is called by apply_returns() to fix up static call trampolines,
* specifically ARCH_DEFINE_STATIC_CALL_NULL_TRAMP which is recorded as
diff --git a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
index 7834bde8afd1..070121161176 100644
--- a/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
+++ b/arch/x86/lib/retpoline.S
@@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ SYM_CODE_END(__x86_indirect_jump_thunk_array)
#undef GEN
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRSO
@@ -369,4 +369,4 @@ SYM_CODE_START(__x86_return_thunk)
SYM_CODE_END(__x86_return_thunk)
EXPORT_SYMBOL(__x86_return_thunk)
-#endif /* CONFIG_RETHUNK */
+#endif /* CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK */
diff --git a/scripts/Makefile.lib b/scripts/Makefile.lib
index 0d5461276179..48a4a81edac1 100644
--- a/scripts/Makefile.lib
+++ b/scripts/Makefile.lib
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_OBJTOOL_NOP_MCOUNT) += --mnop
endif
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_UNWINDER_ORC) += --orc
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETPOLINE) += --retpoline
-objtool-args-$(CONFIG_RETHUNK) += --rethunk
+objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK) += --rethunk
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SLS) += --sls
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_STACK_VALIDATION) += --stackval
objtool-args-$(CONFIG_HAVE_STATIC_CALL_INLINE) += --static-call
diff --git a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
index 4b816f55c634..bd7071f34f6b 100644
--- a/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
+++ b/tools/arch/x86/include/asm/disabled-features.h
@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
(1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETPOLINE_LFENCE & 31)))
#endif
-#ifdef CONFIG_RETHUNK
+#ifdef CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETHUNK
# define DISABLE_RETHUNK 0
#else
# define DISABLE_RETHUNK (1 << (X86_FEATURE_RETHUNK & 31))
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [PATCH v5 11/12] x86/bugs: Create a way to disable GDS mitigation
[not found] <20231019181158.1982205-1-leitao@debian.org>
` (9 preceding siblings ...)
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 10/12] x86/bugs: Rename RETHUNK to MITIGATION_RETHUNK Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation Breno Leitao
11 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Peter Zijlstra, Pawan Gupta
Cc: leit, open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
Currently there is no way to disable GDS mitigation at build time.
The current config option (GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) just enables a more
drastic mitigation.
Create a new kernel config that allows GDS to be completely disabled,
similarly to the "gather_data_sampling=off" or "mitigations=off" kernel
command-line. Move the GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE under this new mitigation.
Suggested-by: Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 16 +++++++++++-----
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 7 ++++---
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index 7a283602b257..a5cada7443ea 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2566,15 +2566,21 @@ config MITIGATION_SLS
against straight line speculation. The kernel image might be slightly
larger.
+config MITIGATION_GDS
+ bool "Mitigate Gather Data Sampling"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for Gather Data Sampling (GDS). GDS is a hardware
+ vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data
+ which was previously stored in vector registers. The attacker uses gather
+ instructions to infer the stale vector register data.
+
config MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
bool "Force GDS Mitigation"
- depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ depends on MITIGATION_GDS
default n
help
- Gather Data Sampling (GDS) is a hardware vulnerability which allows
- unprivileged speculative access to data which was previously stored in
- vector registers.
-
This option is equivalent to setting gather_data_sampling=force on the
command line. The microcode mitigation is used if present, otherwise
AVX is disabled as a mitigation. On affected systems that are missing
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index f2775417bda2..0172bb0f61fe 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -671,10 +671,11 @@ enum gds_mitigations {
GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
};
-#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE)
-static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS)
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE) ? GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE : GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
#else
-static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
#endif
static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation
[not found] <20231019181158.1982205-1-leitao@debian.org>
` (10 preceding siblings ...)
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 11/12] x86/bugs: Create a way to disable GDS mitigation Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-19 18:11 ` Breno Leitao
2023-10-25 16:29 ` Josh Poimboeuf
11 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-19 18:11 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: jpoimboe, mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin,
Peter Zijlstra, Pawan Gupta
Cc: leit, open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
could not be controlled at build time.
Create an entry for each CPU mitigation under
CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS. This allow users to enable or disable
them at compilation time.
Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
---
arch/x86/Kconfig | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 39 ++++++++++------
2 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
index a5cada7443ea..ccdcb1dcdc0c 100644
--- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
+++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
@@ -2591,6 +2591,99 @@ config MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
If in doubt, say N.
+config MITIGATION_MDS
+ bool "Mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) hardware bug"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS). MDS is
+ a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access
+ to data which is available in various CPU internal buffer. Deeper
+ technical information is available in the MDS specific x86 architecture
+ section: Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst.
+
+config MITIGATION_TAA
+ bool "Mitigate TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) hardware bug"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA). TAA is a hardware
+ vulnerability that allows unprivileged speculative access to data
+ which is available in various CPU internal buffers by using
+ asynchronous aborts within an Intel TSX transactional region.
+
+config MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA
+ bool "Mitigate MMIO Stale Data hardware bug"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for MMIO Stale Data hardware bugs. Processor MMIO
+ Stale Data Vulnerabilities are a class of memory-mapped I/O (MMIO)
+ vulnerabilities that can expose data. The vulnerabilities require the
+ attacker to have access to MMIO.
+
+config MITIGATION_L1TF
+ bool "Mitigate L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) hardware bug"
+ default y
+ help
+ Mitigate L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) hardware bug. L1 Terminal Fault is a
+ hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data
+ which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache when the page table
+ entry controlling the virtual address.
+
+config MITIGATION_RETBLEED
+ bool "Mitigate RETBleed hardware bug"
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for RETBleed (Arbitrary Speculative Code Execution
+ with Return Instructions) vulnerability. RETBleed is a speculative
+ execution attack which takes advantage of microarchitectural behavior
+ in many modern microprocessors, similar to Spectre v2. An
+ unprivileged attacker can use these flaws to bypass conventional
+ memory security restrictions to gain read access to privileged memory
+ that would otherwise be inaccessible.
+
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V1
+ bool "Mitigate SPECTRE V1 hardware bug"
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for Spectre V1 (Bounds Check Bypass). Spectre V1 is a
+ class of side channel attacks that takes advantage of speculative
+ execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions used for
+ memory access bounds check.
+
+config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2
+ bool "Mitigate SPECTRE V2 hardware bug"
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for Spectre V2 (Branch Target Injection). Spectre
+ V2 is a class of side channel attacks that takes advantage of
+ indirect branch predictors inside the processor. In Spectre variant 2
+ attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect branches in the
+ victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target buffer of a CPU
+ used for predicting indirect branch addresses.
+
+config MITIGATION_SRBDS
+ bool "Mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) hardware bug"
+ depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS).
+ SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows Microarchitectural Data
+ Sampling (MDS) techniques to infer values returned from special
+ register accesses. An unprivileged user can extract values returned
+ from RDRAND and RDSEED executed on another core or sibling thread
+ using MDS techniques.
+
+config MITIGATION_SSB
+ bool "Mitigate Speculative Store Bypass (SSB) hardware bug"
+ default y
+ help
+ Enable mitigation for Speculative Store Bypass (SSB). SSB is a
+ hardware security vulnerability and its exploitation takes advantage
+ of speculative execution in a similar way to the Meltdown and Spectre
+ security vulnerabilities.
+
endif
config ARCH_HAS_ADD_PAGES
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 0172bb0f61fe..11ccbadd8800 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -232,7 +232,8 @@ static void x86_amd_ssb_disable(void)
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "MDS: " fmt
/* Default mitigation for MDS-affected CPUs */
-static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init = MDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static enum mds_mitigations mds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MDS) ? MDS_MITIGATION_FULL : MDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
static bool mds_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
static const char * const mds_strings[] = {
@@ -292,7 +293,8 @@ enum taa_mitigations {
};
/* Default mitigation for TAA-affected CPUs */
-static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init = TAA_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static enum taa_mitigations taa_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_TAA) ? TAA_MITIGATION_VERW : TAA_MITIGATION_OFF;
static bool taa_nosmt __ro_after_init;
static const char * const taa_strings[] = {
@@ -393,7 +395,8 @@ enum mmio_mitigations {
};
/* Default mitigation for Processor MMIO Stale Data vulnerabilities */
-static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init = MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW;
+static enum mmio_mitigations mmio_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA) ? MMIO_MITIGATION_VERW : MMIO_MITIGATION_OFF;
static bool mmio_nosmt __ro_after_init = false;
static const char * const mmio_strings[] = {
@@ -542,7 +545,8 @@ enum srbds_mitigations {
SRBDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR,
};
-static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init = SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
+static enum srbds_mitigations srbds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SRBDS) ? SRBDS_MITIGATION_FULL : SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
static const char * const srbds_strings[] = {
[SRBDS_MITIGATION_OFF] = "Vulnerable",
@@ -812,7 +816,8 @@ enum spectre_v1_mitigation {
};
static enum spectre_v1_mitigation spectre_v1_mitigation __ro_after_init =
- SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V1) ?
+ SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_AUTO : SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE;
static const char * const spectre_v1_strings[] = {
[SPECTRE_V1_MITIGATION_NONE] = "Vulnerable: __user pointer sanitization and usercopy barriers only; no swapgs barriers",
@@ -927,7 +932,7 @@ static const char * const retbleed_strings[] = {
static enum retbleed_mitigation retbleed_mitigation __ro_after_init =
RETBLEED_MITIGATION_NONE;
static enum retbleed_mitigation_cmd retbleed_cmd __ro_after_init =
- RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO;
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_RETBLEED) ? RETBLEED_CMD_AUTO : RETBLEED_CMD_OFF;
static int __ro_after_init retbleed_nosmt = false;
@@ -1388,17 +1393,18 @@ static void __init spec_v2_print_cond(const char *reason, bool secure)
static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
{
- enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd cmd;
char arg[20];
int ret, i;
+ cmd = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) ? SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
cpu_mitigations_off())
return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2", arg, sizeof(arg));
if (ret < 0)
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ return cmd;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options); i++) {
if (!match_option(arg, ret, mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -1408,8 +1414,8 @@ static enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd __init spectre_v2_parse_cmdline(void)
}
if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(mitigation_options)) {
- pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
- return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO;
+ pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to default mode\n", arg);
+ return cmd;
}
if ((cmd == SPECTRE_V2_CMD_RETPOLINE ||
@@ -1882,10 +1888,12 @@ static const struct {
static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
{
- enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd = SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+ enum ssb_mitigation_cmd cmd;
char arg[20];
int ret, i;
+ cmd = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SSB) ?
+ SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO : SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospec_store_bypass_disable") ||
cpu_mitigations_off()) {
return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_NONE;
@@ -1893,7 +1901,7 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spec_store_bypass_disable",
arg, sizeof(arg));
if (ret < 0)
- return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+ return cmd;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options); i++) {
if (!match_option(arg, ret, ssb_mitigation_options[i].option))
@@ -1904,8 +1912,8 @@ static enum ssb_mitigation_cmd __init ssb_parse_cmdline(void)
}
if (i >= ARRAY_SIZE(ssb_mitigation_options)) {
- pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
- return SPEC_STORE_BYPASS_CMD_AUTO;
+ pr_err("unknown option (%s). Switching to default mode\n", arg);
+ return cmd;
}
}
@@ -2232,7 +2240,8 @@ EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(itlb_multihit_kvm_mitigation);
#define pr_fmt(fmt) "L1TF: " fmt
/* Default mitigation for L1TF-affected CPUs */
-enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init = L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH;
+enum l1tf_mitigations l1tf_mitigation __ro_after_init =
+ IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_L1TF) ? L1TF_MITIGATION_FLUSH : L1TF_MITIGATION_OFF;
#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_KVM_INTEL)
EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(l1tf_mitigation);
#endif
--
2.34.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation
2023-10-19 18:11 ` [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation Breno Leitao
@ 2023-10-25 16:29 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-10-26 17:09 ` Breno Leitao
0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Josh Poimboeuf @ 2023-10-25 16:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Breno Leitao
Cc: mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Peter Zijlstra,
Pawan Gupta, leit, open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
On Thu, Oct 19, 2023 at 11:11:58AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote:
> Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
> where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
> modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
> could not be controlled at build time.
>
> Create an entry for each CPU mitigation under
> CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS. This allow users to enable or disable
> them at compilation time.
>
> Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
We also probably need a CONFIG_MITIGATION_MELTDOWN.
> ---
> arch/x86/Kconfig | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 39 ++++++++++------
> 2 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/Kconfig b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> index a5cada7443ea..ccdcb1dcdc0c 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/Kconfig
> +++ b/arch/x86/Kconfig
> @@ -2591,6 +2591,99 @@ config MITIGATION_GDS_FORCE
>
> If in doubt, say N.
>
> +config MITIGATION_MDS
> + bool "Mitigate Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS) hardware bug"
> + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
> + default y
> + help
> + Enable mitigation for Microarchitectural Data Sampling (MDS). MDS is
> + a hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access
> + to data which is available in various CPU internal buffer. Deeper
buffers
> + technical information is available in the MDS specific x86 architecture
> + section: Documentation/arch/x86/mds.rst.
I believe the high-level document is actually
Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/mds.rst.
> +config MITIGATION_TAA
> + bool "Mitigate TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA) hardware bug"
> + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
> + default y
> + help
> + Enable mitigation for TSX Asynchronous Abort (TAA). TAA is a hardware
> + vulnerability that allows unprivileged speculative access to data
> + which is available in various CPU internal buffers by using
> + asynchronous aborts within an Intel TSX transactional region.
Refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/tsx_async_abort.rst
> +config MITIGATION_MMIO_STALE_DATA
> + bool "Mitigate MMIO Stale Data hardware bug"
> + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
> + default y
> + help
> + Enable mitigation for MMIO Stale Data hardware bugs. Processor MMIO
> + Stale Data Vulnerabilities are a class of memory-mapped I/O (MMIO)
> + vulnerabilities that can expose data. The vulnerabilities require the
> + attacker to have access to MMIO.
Refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/processor_mmio_stale_data.rst
> +config MITIGATION_L1TF
> + bool "Mitigate L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) hardware bug"
depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
> + default y
> + help
> + Mitigate L1 Terminal Fault (L1TF) hardware bug. L1 Terminal Fault is a
> + hardware vulnerability which allows unprivileged speculative access to data
> + which is available in the Level 1 Data Cache when the page table
> + entry controlling the virtual address.
-EGRAMMAR
Also refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/l1tf.rst
> +config MITIGATION_RETBLEED
> + bool "Mitigate RETBleed hardware bug"
depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL || (CPU_SUP_AMD && MITIGATION_UNRET_ENTRY)
> +config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V1
> + bool "Mitigate SPECTRE V1 hardware bug"
> + default y
> + help
> + Enable mitigation for Spectre V1 (Bounds Check Bypass). Spectre V1 is a
> + class of side channel attacks that takes advantage of speculative
> + execution that bypasses conditional branch instructions used for
> + memory access bounds check.
Refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> +config MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2
> + bool "Mitigate SPECTRE V2 hardware bug"
> + default y
> + help
> + Enable mitigation for Spectre V2 (Branch Target Injection). Spectre
> + V2 is a class of side channel attacks that takes advantage of
> + indirect branch predictors inside the processor. In Spectre variant 2
> + attacks, the attacker can steer speculative indirect branches in the
> + victim to gadget code by poisoning the branch target buffer of a CPU
> + used for predicting indirect branch addresses.
Refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/spectre.rst
> +config MITIGATION_SRBDS
> + bool "Mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) hardware bug"
> + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
> + default y
> + help
> + Enable mitigation for Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS).
> + SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows Microarchitectural Data
> + Sampling (MDS) techniques to infer values returned from special
> + register accesses. An unprivileged user can extract values returned
> + from RDRAND and RDSEED executed on another core or sibling thread
> + using MDS techniques.
Refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
> + cmd = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) ? SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
> if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
> cpu_mitigations_off())
> return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
I'm thinking CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 should also affect whether the spectre v2 user
mitigation gets enabled.
--
Josh
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation
2023-10-25 16:29 ` Josh Poimboeuf
@ 2023-10-26 17:09 ` Breno Leitao
2023-11-09 22:43 ` Josh Poimboeuf
0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-10-26 17:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Josh Poimboeuf
Cc: mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Peter Zijlstra,
Pawan Gupta, leit, open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
Hello Josh,
On Wed, Oct 25, 2023 at 09:29:06AM -0700, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 19, 2023 at 11:11:58AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote:
> > Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
> > where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
> > modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
> > could not be controlled at build time.
> >
> > Create an entry for each CPU mitigation under
> > CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS. This allow users to enable or disable
> > them at compilation time.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
>
> We also probably need a CONFIG_MITIGATION_MELTDOWN.
Isn't Meltdown covered by the MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION Kconfig
entry? Would you mind clarifying what would be the difference between
CONFIG_MITIGATION_MELTDOWN and MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION, and why
do we want CONFIG_MITIGATION_MELTDOWN?
> > ---
> > arch/x86/Kconfig | 93 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c | 39 ++++++++++------
> > 2 files changed, 117 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
<snip>
> > +config MITIGATION_SRBDS
> > + bool "Mitigate Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS) hardware bug"
> > + depends on CPU_SUP_INTEL
> > + default y
> > + help
> > + Enable mitigation for Special Register Buffer Data Sampling (SRBDS).
> > + SRBDS is a hardware vulnerability that allows Microarchitectural Data
> > + Sampling (MDS) techniques to infer values returned from special
> > + register accesses. An unprivileged user can extract values returned
> > + from RDRAND and RDSEED executed on another core or sibling thread
> > + using MDS techniques.
>
> Refer to Documentation/admin-guide/hw-vuln/special-register-buffer-data-sampling.rst
Sure, I will update this and all the other suggestions that were cut
above. Thanks!
> > + cmd = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) ? SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
> > if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
> > cpu_mitigations_off())
> > return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
>
> I'm thinking CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 should also affect whether the spectre v2 user
> mitigation gets enabled.
Makes sense, would something like this be enough?
diff --git a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
index 11ccbadd8800..cfcdbfa72a81 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
@@ -1221,8 +1221,10 @@ static __ro_after_init enum spectre_v2_mitigation_cmd spectre_v2_cmd;
static enum spectre_v2_user_cmd __init
spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
{
+ int ret, i, mode;
char arg[20];
- int ret, i;
+
+ mode = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) ? SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO : SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_NONE;
switch (spectre_v2_cmd) {
case SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE:
@@ -1236,7 +1238,7 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
ret = cmdline_find_option(boot_command_line, "spectre_v2_user",
arg, sizeof(arg));
if (ret < 0)
- return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+ return mode;
for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(v2_user_options); i++) {
if (match_option(arg, ret, v2_user_options[i].option)) {
@@ -1246,8 +1248,8 @@ spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline(void)
}
}
- pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to AUTO select\n", arg);
- return SPECTRE_V2_USER_CMD_AUTO;
+ pr_err("Unknown user space protection option (%s). Switching to default\n", arg);
+ return mode;
}
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation
2023-10-26 17:09 ` Breno Leitao
@ 2023-11-09 22:43 ` Josh Poimboeuf
2023-11-21 15:55 ` Breno Leitao
0 siblings, 1 reply; 16+ messages in thread
From: Josh Poimboeuf @ 2023-11-09 22:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Breno Leitao
Cc: mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Peter Zijlstra,
Pawan Gupta, leit, open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
On Thu, Oct 26, 2023 at 10:09:17AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote:
> Hello Josh,
>
> On Wed, Oct 25, 2023 at 09:29:06AM -0700, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> > On Thu, Oct 19, 2023 at 11:11:58AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote:
> > > Currently, the CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS is halfway populated,
> > > where some mitigations have entries in Kconfig, and they could be
> > > modified, while others mitigations do not have Kconfig entries, and
> > > could not be controlled at build time.
> > >
> > > Create an entry for each CPU mitigation under
> > > CONFIG_SPECULATION_MITIGATIONS. This allow users to enable or disable
> > > them at compilation time.
> > >
> > > Signed-off-by: Breno Leitao <leitao@debian.org>
> >
> > We also probably need a CONFIG_MITIGATION_MELTDOWN.
>
> Isn't Meltdown covered by the MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION Kconfig
> entry? Would you mind clarifying what would be the difference between
> CONFIG_MITIGATION_MELTDOWN and MITIGATION_PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION, and why
> do we want CONFIG_MITIGATION_MELTDOWN?
Ah yes, not sure how I missed that one.
> > > + cmd = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2) ? SPECTRE_V2_CMD_AUTO : SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
> > > if (cmdline_find_option_bool(boot_command_line, "nospectre_v2") ||
> > > cpu_mitigations_off())
> > > return SPECTRE_V2_CMD_NONE;
> >
> > I'm thinking CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 should also affect whether the spectre v2 user
> > mitigation gets enabled.
>
> Makes sense, would something like this be enough?
Looks good to me.
While you're at it, for consistency can you add a cpu_mitigations_off()
check to spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline()?
--
Josh
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH v5 12/12] x86/bugs: Add a separate config for missing mitigation
2023-11-09 22:43 ` Josh Poimboeuf
@ 2023-11-21 15:55 ` Breno Leitao
0 siblings, 0 replies; 16+ messages in thread
From: Breno Leitao @ 2023-11-21 15:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Josh Poimboeuf
Cc: mingo, tglx, bp, Dave Hansen, x86, H. Peter Anvin, Peter Zijlstra,
Pawan Gupta, leit, open list:X86 ARCHITECTURE (32-BIT AND 64-BIT)
On Thu, Nov 09, 2023 at 02:43:56PM -0800, Josh Poimboeuf wrote:
> On Thu, Oct 26, 2023 at 10:09:17AM -0700, Breno Leitao wrote:
> > > I'm thinking CONFIG_MITIGATION_SPECTRE_V2 should also affect whether the spectre v2 user
> > > mitigation gets enabled.
> >
> > Makes sense, would something like this be enough?
>
> Looks good to me.
>
> While you're at it, for consistency can you add a cpu_mitigations_off()
> check to spectre_v2_parse_user_cmdline()?
Good catch. I think we might want to do it in
`spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation()`, but let me test better and send it.
Since this is not dependent on this patch series, I will send this as an
idividual patch, to avoiding growing this patchset much (currently at 13
patches).
Thanks
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 16+ messages in thread