From: Ingo Molnar <mingo@kernel.org>
To: Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de>
Cc: David Kaplan <david.kaplan@amd.com>,
Thomas Gleixner <tglx@linutronix.de>,
Peter Zijlstra <peterz@infradead.org>,
Josh Poimboeuf <jpoimboe@kernel.org>,
Pawan Gupta <pawan.kumar.gupta@linux.intel.com>,
Ingo Molnar <mingo@redhat.com>,
Dave Hansen <dave.hansen@linux.intel.com>,
x86@kernel.org, "H . Peter Anvin" <hpa@zytor.com>,
linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v5 00/16] Attack vector controls (part 1)
Date: Tue, 22 Apr 2025 11:46:33 +0200 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <aAdlefbyU_oqOVIg@gmail.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20250418213336.GIaALFMKSwKKGw7tTd@fat_crate.local>
* Borislav Petkov <bp@alien8.de> wrote:
> On Fri, Apr 18, 2025 at 10:03:42PM +0200, Ingo Molnar wrote:
> > /* Select the proper CPU mitigations before patching alternatives: */
> > mitigation_select_spectre_v1();
> > mitigation_select_spectre_v2();
> > mitigation_select_retbleed();
> > mitigation_select_spectre_v2_user();
> > mitigation_select_ssb();
> > mitigation_select_l1tf();
> > mitigation_select_mds();
> > mitigation_update_taa();
> > mitigation_select_taa();
> > mitigation_select_mmio();
> > mitigation_select_rfds();
> > mitigation_select_srbds();
> > mitigation_select_l1d_flush();
> > mitigation_select_srso();
> > mitigation_select_gds();
> > mitigation_select_bhi();
>
> The bad side of that is that you have a whole set of letters
> - "mitigation_select" - before the *actual* name which is the only thing one
> is interested in. With the vectors, one is now interested in the operation too
> - select, update or apply.
I have three counter-arguments:
1)
The above pattern is not a big problem really, as the human brain has
no trouble ignoring well-structured syntactic repetitions on the left
side and will focus on the right side column.
Unlike the current status quo, which your reply didn't quote, so I'll
quote it again:
static void __init spectre_v1_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init retbleed_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init spectre_v2_user_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init ssb_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1tf_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init md_clear_update_mitigation(void);
static void __init md_clear_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init taa_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init mmio_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srbds_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init l1d_flush_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init srso_select_mitigation(void);
static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
Which is far more visually messy.
2)
As to shortening the function names to reduce (but not eliminate ...)
the mess:
That extra mitigation_ prefix or _mitigation postfix might sound like
repetitious when used in mass-calls like above - but it's really useful
when reading the actual definitions:
> Short, sweet,
... there's such a thing as too short, too sweet, too ambiguous, which
is why we ended up with the current name of gds_select_mitigation() et
al to begin with.
But let's see an example. Consider:
static void __init gds_select(void)
{
u64 mcu_ctrl;
What do I select? Some GDS detail? Or the main mitigation itself?
Nothing really tells me.
While with:
static void __init mitigation_select_gds(void)
{
u64 mcu_ctrl;
It's immediately clear that this is the main function that selects the
GDS mitigation.
3)
A proper namespace also makes it *much* easier to grep for specific
primitives.
With your suggested 'gds_select()' naming, if I want to search for all
gds_ primitives, I get:
starship:~/tip> git grep gds_ arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: gds_select_mitigation();
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:enum gds_mitigations {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:static enum gds_mitigations gds_mitigation __ro_after_init =
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:static const char * const gds_strings[] = {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: return (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL ||
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(gds_ucode_mitigated);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:void update_gds_msr(void)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: switch (gds_mitigation) {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_HYPERVISOR;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE) {
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: * here rather than in update_gds_msr()
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_UCODE_NEEDED;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: if (gds_mitigation == GDS_MITIGATION_OFF)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: * but others are then update_gds_msr() will WARN() of the state
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: * mismatch. If the boot CPU is locked update_gds_msr() will
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FULL_LOCKED;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: update_gds_msr();
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: pr_info("%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_OFF;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: gds_mitigation = GDS_MITIGATION_FORCE;
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:early_param("gather_data_sampling", gds_parse_cmdline);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: return sysfs_emit(buf, "%s\n", gds_strings[gds_mitigation]);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: return gds_show_state(buf);
Or, if I limit this to function calls only:
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: gds_select_mitigation();
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:bool gds_ucode_mitigated(void)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:void update_gds_msr(void)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:static void __init gds_select_mitigation(void)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: * here rather than in update_gds_msr()
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: * but others are then update_gds_msr() will WARN() of the state
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: * mismatch. If the boot CPU is locked update_gds_msr() will
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: update_gds_msr();
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:static int __init gds_parse_cmdline(char *str)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:static ssize_t gds_show_state(char *buf)
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: return gds_show_state(buf);
Versus a targeted, obvious, untuitive search for all mitigation_
functions related to GDS:
starship:~/tip> git grep -E 'mitigation_.*_gds' arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:static void __init mitigation_select_gds(void);
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c: mitigation_select_gds();
arch/x86/kernel/cpu/bugs.c:static void __init mitigation_select_gds(void)
Because a proper namespace is a far more easier to search.
Hierarchical lexicographic organization of function names is basically
a code organization 101 concept, and I didn't think it would be
particularly controversial. :-)
Thanks,
Ingo
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2025-04-22 9:46 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 65+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2025-04-18 16:17 [PATCH v5 00/16] Attack vector controls (part 1) David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 01/16] x86/bugs: Restructure MDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-18 20:42 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-20 21:00 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 8:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 14:32 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 17:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 02/16] x86/bugs: Restructure TAA mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-19 12:36 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-20 21:03 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-22 8:56 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 03/16] x86/bugs: Restructure MMIO mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-24 20:19 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-24 20:31 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-25 8:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-25 13:28 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-26 11:22 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 04/16] x86/bugs: Restructure RFDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-27 15:09 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-28 13:42 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 05/16] x86/bugs: Remove md_clear_*_mitigation() David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 06/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SRBDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 07/16] x86/bugs: Restructure GDS mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 08/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v1 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 09/16] x86/bugs: Allow retbleed=stuff only on Intel David Kaplan
2025-04-27 15:38 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 10/16] x86/bugs: Restructure retbleed mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-28 18:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-28 20:55 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-29 8:21 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 11/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2_user mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 8:47 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 14:11 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 12/16] x86/bugs: Restructure BHI mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 13/16] x86/bugs: Restructure spectre_v2 mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 10:46 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 14/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SSB mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 12:54 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 14:09 ` Kaplan, David
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 15/16] x86/bugs: Restructure L1TF mitigation David Kaplan
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 16:17 ` [PATCH v5 16/16] x86/bugs: Restructure SRSO mitigation David Kaplan
2025-04-29 16:50 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-29 17:18 ` Kaplan, David
2025-04-30 8:25 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-05-02 10:33 ` [tip: x86/bugs] " tip-bot2 for David Kaplan
2025-04-18 20:03 ` [PATCH v5 00/16] Attack vector controls (part 1) Ingo Molnar
2025-04-18 21:33 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 9:46 ` Ingo Molnar [this message]
2025-04-22 13:59 ` Borislav Petkov
2025-04-22 5:22 ` Josh Poimboeuf
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