* [PATCH] pidfs: detect refcount bugs
@ 2025-05-06 11:55 Christian Brauner
2025-05-06 14:12 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-05-06 14:43 ` Mateusz Guzik
0 siblings, 2 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2025-05-06 11:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Oleg Nesterov; +Cc: Christian Brauner, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel
Now that we have pidfs_{get,register}_pid() that needs to be paired with
pidfs_put_pid() it's possible that someone pairs them with put_pid().
Thus freeing struct pid while it's still used by pidfs. Notice when that
happens. I'll also add a scheme to detect invalid uses of
pidfs_get_pid() and pidfs_put_pid() later.
Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
---
kernel/pid.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
index 26f1e136f017..8317bcbc7cf7 100644
--- a/kernel/pid.c
+++ b/kernel/pid.c
@@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ void put_pid(struct pid *pid)
ns = pid->numbers[pid->level].ns;
if (refcount_dec_and_test(&pid->count)) {
+ WARN_ON_ONCE(pid->stashed);
kmem_cache_free(ns->pid_cachep, pid);
put_pid_ns(ns);
}
--
2.47.2
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] pidfs: detect refcount bugs
2025-05-06 11:55 [PATCH] pidfs: detect refcount bugs Christian Brauner
@ 2025-05-06 14:12 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-05-06 14:43 ` Mateusz Guzik
1 sibling, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Oleg Nesterov @ 2025-05-06 14:12 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christian Brauner; +Cc: linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel
I am traveling until May 15, can't read the code, but FWIW this change
looks good to me.
Oleg.
On 05/06, Christian Brauner wrote:
>
> Now that we have pidfs_{get,register}_pid() that needs to be paired with
> pidfs_put_pid() it's possible that someone pairs them with put_pid().
> Thus freeing struct pid while it's still used by pidfs. Notice when that
> happens. I'll also add a scheme to detect invalid uses of
> pidfs_get_pid() and pidfs_put_pid() later.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> ---
> kernel/pid.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
> index 26f1e136f017..8317bcbc7cf7 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid.c
> @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ void put_pid(struct pid *pid)
>
> ns = pid->numbers[pid->level].ns;
> if (refcount_dec_and_test(&pid->count)) {
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(pid->stashed);
> kmem_cache_free(ns->pid_cachep, pid);
> put_pid_ns(ns);
> }
> --
> 2.47.2
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] pidfs: detect refcount bugs
2025-05-06 11:55 [PATCH] pidfs: detect refcount bugs Christian Brauner
2025-05-06 14:12 ` Oleg Nesterov
@ 2025-05-06 14:43 ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-05-09 10:34 ` Christian Brauner
1 sibling, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Mateusz Guzik @ 2025-05-06 14:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Christian Brauner; +Cc: Oleg Nesterov, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel
On Tue, May 06, 2025 at 01:55:54PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> Now that we have pidfs_{get,register}_pid() that needs to be paired with
> pidfs_put_pid() it's possible that someone pairs them with put_pid().
> Thus freeing struct pid while it's still used by pidfs. Notice when that
> happens. I'll also add a scheme to detect invalid uses of
> pidfs_get_pid() and pidfs_put_pid() later.
>
> Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> ---
> kernel/pid.c | 1 +
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
>
> diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
> index 26f1e136f017..8317bcbc7cf7 100644
> --- a/kernel/pid.c
> +++ b/kernel/pid.c
> @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ void put_pid(struct pid *pid)
>
> ns = pid->numbers[pid->level].ns;
> if (refcount_dec_and_test(&pid->count)) {
> + WARN_ON_ONCE(pid->stashed);
> kmem_cache_free(ns->pid_cachep, pid);
> put_pid_ns(ns);
> }
> --
> 2.47.2
>
With the patch as proposed you are only catching the misuse if this is
the last ref though.
iow, the check should be hoisted above unrefing?
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] pidfs: detect refcount bugs
2025-05-06 14:43 ` Mateusz Guzik
@ 2025-05-09 10:34 ` Christian Brauner
0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: Christian Brauner @ 2025-05-09 10:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Mateusz Guzik; +Cc: Oleg Nesterov, linux-fsdevel, linux-kernel
On Tue, May 06, 2025 at 04:43:56PM +0200, Mateusz Guzik wrote:
> On Tue, May 06, 2025 at 01:55:54PM +0200, Christian Brauner wrote:
> > Now that we have pidfs_{get,register}_pid() that needs to be paired with
> > pidfs_put_pid() it's possible that someone pairs them with put_pid().
> > Thus freeing struct pid while it's still used by pidfs. Notice when that
> > happens. I'll also add a scheme to detect invalid uses of
> > pidfs_get_pid() and pidfs_put_pid() later.
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Christian Brauner <brauner@kernel.org>
> > ---
> > kernel/pid.c | 1 +
> > 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/kernel/pid.c b/kernel/pid.c
> > index 26f1e136f017..8317bcbc7cf7 100644
> > --- a/kernel/pid.c
> > +++ b/kernel/pid.c
> > @@ -100,6 +100,7 @@ void put_pid(struct pid *pid)
> >
> > ns = pid->numbers[pid->level].ns;
> > if (refcount_dec_and_test(&pid->count)) {
> > + WARN_ON_ONCE(pid->stashed);
> > kmem_cache_free(ns->pid_cachep, pid);
> > put_pid_ns(ns);
> > }
> > --
> > 2.47.2
> >
>
> With the patch as proposed you are only catching the misuse if this is
> the last ref though.
>
> iow, the check should be hoisted above unrefing?
No, not really. If there's more than one reference then pid->stashed can
be legimitately != NULL.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread
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2025-05-06 11:55 [PATCH] pidfs: detect refcount bugs Christian Brauner
2025-05-06 14:12 ` Oleg Nesterov
2025-05-06 14:43 ` Mateusz Guzik
2025-05-09 10:34 ` Christian Brauner
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