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From: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
To: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>
Cc: pbonzini@redhat.com, tglx@kernel.org, mingo@redhat.com,
	bp@alien8.de,  dave.hansen@linux.intel.com, hpa@zytor.com,
	djbw@kernel.org,  chao.gao@intel.com, x86@kernel.org,
	kvm@vger.kernel.org,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH v2] x86/virt: Silence RCU lockdep splat in emergency virt callback path
Date: Thu, 7 May 2026 14:59:28 -0700	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <af0LQNY6IhB0NEWy@google.com> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <20260504235435.90957-1-mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>

On Tue, May 05, 2026, Mikhail Gavrilov wrote:
> x86_virt_invoke_kvm_emergency_callback() reaches rcu_dereference()
> through machine_crash_shutdown() with IRQs disabled but with RCU not
> necessarily watching the crashing CPU, which triggers a suspicious
> RCU usage splat on debug kernels (CONFIG_PROVE_RCU=y) during
> panic/kdump:
> 
>   WARNING: suspicious RCU usage
>   arch/x86/virt/hw.c:52 suspicious rcu_dereference_check() usage!
> 
>   rcu_scheduler_active = 2, debug_locks = 1
>   1 lock held by tee/11119:
>    #0: ffff8881fa32c440 (sb_writers#3){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write
> 
>   Call Trace:
>    <TASK>
>    dump_stack_lvl+0x84/0xd0
>    lockdep_rcu_suspicious.cold+0x37/0x8f
>    x86_virt_invoke_kvm_emergency_callback+0x5f/0x70
>    x86_svm_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu+0x2a/0x30
>    x86_virt_emergency_disable_virtualization_cpu+0x6b/0x90
>    native_machine_crash_shutdown+0x72/0x170
>    __crash_kexec+0x137/0x280
>    panic+0xce/0xd0
>    sysrq_handle_crash+0x1f/0x20
>    __handle_sysrq.cold+0x192/0x335
>    write_sysrq_trigger+0x8c/0xc0
>    proc_reg_write+0x1c3/0x3c0
>    vfs_write+0x1d0/0xf80
>    ksys_write+0x116/0x250
>    do_syscall_64+0x11c/0x1480
>    entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
>    </TASK>
> 
> A truly correct fix is non-trivial: the RCU usage genuinely is wrong in
> panic context (RCU may ignore the crashing CPU during synchronization),
> and a concurrent KVM module unload could in principle race with the
> callback read; see commit 2baa33a8ddd6 ("KVM: x86: Leave user-return
> notifier registered on reboot/shutdown") which notes that nothing
> prevents module unload during panic/reboot.
> 
> However, the alternatives are worse:
> 
>   - smp_store_release()/smp_load_acquire() handles ordering but not
>     liveness; the kernel still needs to keep the module text alive
>     while the callback is in flight.
>   - Taking a lock in the panic path is risky — any lock could be held
>     by a CPU that has already been NMI'd to a halt.
> 
> Use rcu_dereference_raw() to silence the splat and accept the
> vanishingly small remaining race. Panic context inherently cannot
> guarantee complete correctness; the goal here is to keep debug builds
> quiet on the kdump path so the splat doesn't obscure the actual
> kernel state being captured.
> 
> Reproducible on a debug kernel (CONFIG_PROVE_LOCKING=y, CONFIG_PROVE_RCU=y)
> with kvm_amd or kvm_intel loaded by triggering kdump:
> 
>   echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger
> 
> Suggested-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>
> Fixes: 428afac5a8ea ("KVM: x86: Move bulk of emergency virtualizaton logic to virt subsystem")
> Signed-off-by: Mikhail Gavrilov <mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>
> ---

Acked-by: Sean Christopherson <seanjc@google.com>

(I can also take this through kvm-x86; I have no preference whatsoever)

  reply	other threads:[~2026-05-07 21:59 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 7+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
     [not found] <20260503174534.45699-1-mikhail.v.gavrilov@gmail.com>
2026-05-04 17:48 ` [PATCH] x86/virt: Fix RCU lockdep splat in emergency virt callback path Sean Christopherson
2026-05-04 18:50   ` Mikhail Gavrilov
2026-05-04 21:40     ` Mikhail Gavrilov
2026-05-04 23:03       ` Sean Christopherson
2026-05-04 23:54 ` [PATCH v2] x86/virt: Silence " Mikhail Gavrilov
2026-05-07 21:59   ` Sean Christopherson [this message]
2026-05-08 19:21     ` Mikhail Gavrilov

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