[PATCH net v2] vsock/vmci: fix UAF when peer resets connection during handshake

[PATCH net v2] vsock/vmci: fix UAF when peer resets connection during handshake

[Minh Nguyen]

vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server() jumps to its destroy: label
and performs an unconditional sock_put(pending) to release the
explicit sock_hold() taken by vmci_transport_recv_listen() before
schedule_delayed_work().  The existing comment claimed this was safe
because the listen handler removes pending from the pending list on
the way out, which would prevent vsock_pending_work() from dropping
the same reference later.

That assumption breaks for a peer RST.  The default arm of the packet
switch sets:

	err = pkt->type == VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_RST ? 0 : -EINVAL;

and vmci_transport_recv_listen() only calls vsock_remove_pending()
when err < 0:

	if (err < 0)
		vsock_remove_pending(sk, pending);

For RST (err == 0) the socket stays on the pending list, so when
vsock_pending_work() fires it takes the is_pending=true path and
drops all three references itself: the pending-list reference via
vsock_remove_pending(), then the two trailing sock_put(sk) calls.
The unconditional sock_put() in destroy: had already dropped the
explicit sock_hold() reference, so the second trailing sock_put(sk)
in vsock_pending_work() is a write into the freed AF_VSOCK slab
object.  KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free write of 4 bytes from
refcount_warn_saturate() on the workqueue path:

  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in refcount_warn_saturate
  Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800b1cac80 by task kworker
  Workqueue: events vsock_pending_work
  Call Trace:
   refcount_warn_saturate
   vsock_pending_work
   process_one_work
   worker_thread

Triggering the bug requires only the ability to open a VSOCK
connection to the target and send a RST before the listener accepts.

Skip the sock_put() in destroy: when err == 0 so it only compensates
the cases where vmci_transport_recv_listen() actually calls
vsock_remove_pending().  RST is the only path that reaches destroy:
with err == 0; every other path produces a negative value, so their
behaviour is unchanged.

Verified on lts-6.12.79 with KASAN enabled (CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE=y,
kasan_multi_shot): same trigger binary, same VM, 100 iterations:
without this patch 52 KASAN slab-use-after-free reports fire; with
this patch applied, 0 reports.

Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Minh Nguyen <minhnguyen.080505@gmail.com>
Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
---
v2:
  - Resubmit to netdev per Stefano Garzarella's request after v1 review.
  - Retested the PoC with the patch applied on lts-6.12.79 with KASAN
    enabled: 52/100 unpatched -> 0/100 patched (same trigger binary,
    same VM, 100 iterations); test summary captured in the commit
    message.
  - Changed Cc: stable@kernel.org -> stable@vger.kernel.org now that the
    bug is no longer embargoed.
  - Rebased onto net/main (no functional change to the diff).

v1 was sent to security@kernel.org on 2026-05-10 (not on lore archives;
no public link available).  v1 review summary, for reference:
  - Stefano Garzarella (vsock maintainer): "Overall LGTM, but I'd wait
    vmware guys on this that know this code better."  Asked for retest
    and resubmission via the net tree workflow.
  - Bryan Tan (VMCI maintainer): "Thanks for the fix, it looks good to
    me."  Also noted that no modern VMware product allows guest-to-guest
    VMCI communication, so the practical attack surface is host -> guest.

 net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c | 16 +++++++++-------
 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c b/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
index 4296ca1..88d7128 100644
--- a/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
@@ -1269,14 +1269,16 @@ vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server(struct sock *listener,
 destroy:
 	pending->sk_err = skerr;
 	pending->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
-	/* As long as we drop our reference, all necessary cleanup will handle
-	 * when the cleanup function drops its reference and our destruct
-	 * implementation is called.  Note that since the listen handler will
-	 * remove pending from the pending list upon our failure, the cleanup
-	 * function won't drop the additional reference, which is why we do it
-	 * here.
+	/* Drop the reference taken by vmci_transport_recv_listen() before
+	 * schedule_delayed_work() only on real errors.  For a peer RST
+	 * (err == 0) the listener leaves pending on the pending list, and
+	 * vsock_pending_work() will drop that reference itself when it
+	 * later cleans the socket up.  Calling sock_put() here in that
+	 * case would be a double-put and free the socket while
+	 * vsock_pending_work() still holds it.
 	 */
-	sock_put(pending);
+	if (err < 0)
+		sock_put(pending);
 
 	return err;
 }

base-commit: be48e5fe51a5864566307998286a699d6b986934
-- 
2.54.0

Re: [PATCH net v2] vsock/vmci: fix UAF when peer resets connection during handshake

[Stefano Garzarella]

On Tue, May 12, 2026 at 09:58:51AM +0700, Minh Nguyen wrote:
>vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server() jumps to its destroy: label
>and performs an unconditional sock_put(pending) to release the
>explicit sock_hold() taken by vmci_transport_recv_listen() before
>schedule_delayed_work().  The existing comment claimed this was safe
>because the listen handler removes pending from the pending list on
>the way out, which would prevent vsock_pending_work() from dropping
>the same reference later.
>
>That assumption breaks for a peer RST.  The default arm of the packet
>switch sets:
>
>	err = pkt->type == VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_RST ? 0 : -EINVAL;
>
>and vmci_transport_recv_listen() only calls vsock_remove_pending()
>when err < 0:
>
>	if (err < 0)
>		vsock_remove_pending(sk, pending);
>
>For RST (err == 0) the socket stays on the pending list, so when
>vsock_pending_work() fires it takes the is_pending=true path and
>drops all three references itself: the pending-list reference via
>vsock_remove_pending(), then the two trailing sock_put(sk) calls.
>The unconditional sock_put() in destroy: had already dropped the
>explicit sock_hold() reference, so the second trailing sock_put(sk)
>in vsock_pending_work() is a write into the freed AF_VSOCK slab
>object.  KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free write of 4 bytes from
>refcount_warn_saturate() on the workqueue path:
>
>  BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in refcount_warn_saturate
>  Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800b1cac80 by task kworker
>  Workqueue: events vsock_pending_work
>  Call Trace:
>   refcount_warn_saturate
>   vsock_pending_work
>   process_one_work
>   worker_thread
>
>Triggering the bug requires only the ability to open a VSOCK
>connection to the target and send a RST before the listener accepts.
>
>Skip the sock_put() in destroy: when err == 0 so it only compensates
>the cases where vmci_transport_recv_listen() actually calls
>vsock_remove_pending().  RST is the only path that reaches destroy:
>with err == 0; every other path produces a negative value, so their
>behaviour is unchanged.
>
>Verified on lts-6.12.79 with KASAN enabled (CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE=y,
>kasan_multi_shot): same trigger binary, same VM, 100 iterations:
>without this patch 52 KASAN slab-use-after-free reports fire; with
>this patch applied, 0 reports.
>
>Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
>Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
>Signed-off-by: Minh Nguyen <minhnguyen.080505@gmail.com>
>Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
>---
>v2:
>  - Resubmit to netdev per Stefano Garzarella's request after v1 review.
>  - Retested the PoC with the patch applied on lts-6.12.79 with KASAN
>    enabled: 52/100 unpatched -> 0/100 patched (same trigger binary,
>    same VM, 100 iterations); test summary captured in the commit
>    message.
>  - Changed Cc: stable@kernel.org -> stable@vger.kernel.org now that the
>    bug is no longer embargoed.
>  - Rebased onto net/main (no functional change to the diff).
>
>v1 was sent to security@kernel.org on 2026-05-10 (not on lore archives;
>no public link available).  v1 review summary, for reference:
>  - Stefano Garzarella (vsock maintainer): "Overall LGTM, but I'd wait
>    vmware guys on this that know this code better."  Asked for retest
>    and resubmission via the net tree workflow.
>  - Bryan Tan (VMCI maintainer): "Thanks for the fix, it looks good to
>    me."  Also noted that no modern VMware product allows guest-to-guest
>    VMCI communication, so the practical attack surface is host -> guest.
>
> net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c | 16 +++++++++-------
> 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

Acked-by: Stefano Garzarella <sgarzare@redhat.com>

>
>diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c b/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
>index 4296ca1..88d7128 100644
>--- a/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
>+++ b/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
>@@ -1269,14 +1269,16 @@ vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server(struct sock *listener,
> destroy:
> 	pending->sk_err = skerr;
> 	pending->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
>-	/* As long as we drop our reference, all necessary cleanup will handle
>-	 * when the cleanup function drops its reference and our destruct
>-	 * implementation is called.  Note that since the listen handler will
>-	 * remove pending from the pending list upon our failure, the cleanup
>-	 * function won't drop the additional reference, which is why we do it
>-	 * here.
>+	/* Drop the reference taken by vmci_transport_recv_listen() before
>+	 * schedule_delayed_work() only on real errors.  For a peer RST
>+	 * (err == 0) the listener leaves pending on the pending list, and
>+	 * vsock_pending_work() will drop that reference itself when it
>+	 * later cleans the socket up.  Calling sock_put() here in that
>+	 * case would be a double-put and free the socket while
>+	 * vsock_pending_work() still holds it.
> 	 */
>-	sock_put(pending);
>+	if (err < 0)
>+		sock_put(pending);
>
> 	return err;
> }
>
>base-commit: be48e5fe51a5864566307998286a699d6b986934
>-- 
>2.54.0
>

Re: [PATCH net v2] vsock/vmci: fix UAF when peer resets connection during handshake

[Bryan Tan]

[-- Attachment #1: Type: text/plain, Size: 5389 bytes --]

On Tue, May 12, 2026 at 3:59 AM Minh Nguyen <minhnguyen.080505@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server() jumps to its destroy: label
> and performs an unconditional sock_put(pending) to release the
> explicit sock_hold() taken by vmci_transport_recv_listen() before
> schedule_delayed_work().  The existing comment claimed this was safe
> because the listen handler removes pending from the pending list on
> the way out, which would prevent vsock_pending_work() from dropping
> the same reference later.
>
> That assumption breaks for a peer RST.  The default arm of the packet
> switch sets:
>
>         err = pkt->type == VMCI_TRANSPORT_PACKET_TYPE_RST ? 0 : -EINVAL;
>
> and vmci_transport_recv_listen() only calls vsock_remove_pending()
> when err < 0:
>
>         if (err < 0)
>                 vsock_remove_pending(sk, pending);
>
> For RST (err == 0) the socket stays on the pending list, so when
> vsock_pending_work() fires it takes the is_pending=true path and
> drops all three references itself: the pending-list reference via
> vsock_remove_pending(), then the two trailing sock_put(sk) calls.
> The unconditional sock_put() in destroy: had already dropped the
> explicit sock_hold() reference, so the second trailing sock_put(sk)
> in vsock_pending_work() is a write into the freed AF_VSOCK slab
> object.  KASAN reports a slab-use-after-free write of 4 bytes from
> refcount_warn_saturate() on the workqueue path:
>
>   BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in refcount_warn_saturate
>   Write of size 4 at addr ffff88800b1cac80 by task kworker
>   Workqueue: events vsock_pending_work
>   Call Trace:
>    refcount_warn_saturate
>    vsock_pending_work
>    process_one_work
>    worker_thread
>
> Triggering the bug requires only the ability to open a VSOCK
> connection to the target and send a RST before the listener accepts.
>
> Skip the sock_put() in destroy: when err == 0 so it only compensates
> the cases where vmci_transport_recv_listen() actually calls
> vsock_remove_pending().  RST is the only path that reaches destroy:
> with err == 0; every other path produces a negative value, so their
> behaviour is unchanged.
>
> Verified on lts-6.12.79 with KASAN enabled (CONFIG_KASAN_INLINE=y,
> kasan_multi_shot): same trigger binary, same VM, 100 iterations:
> without this patch 52 KASAN slab-use-after-free reports fire; with
> this patch applied, 0 reports.
>
> Fixes: d021c344051a ("VSOCK: Introduce VM Sockets")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Minh Nguyen <minhnguyen.080505@gmail.com>
> Assisted-by: Claude:claude-opus-4-7
> ---
> v2:
>   - Resubmit to netdev per Stefano Garzarella's request after v1 review.
>   - Retested the PoC with the patch applied on lts-6.12.79 with KASAN
>     enabled: 52/100 unpatched -> 0/100 patched (same trigger binary,
>     same VM, 100 iterations); test summary captured in the commit
>     message.
>   - Changed Cc: stable@kernel.org -> stable@vger.kernel.org now that the
>     bug is no longer embargoed.
>   - Rebased onto net/main (no functional change to the diff).
>
> v1 was sent to security@kernel.org on 2026-05-10 (not on lore archives;
> no public link available).  v1 review summary, for reference:
>   - Stefano Garzarella (vsock maintainer): "Overall LGTM, but I'd wait
>     vmware guys on this that know this code better."  Asked for retest
>     and resubmission via the net tree workflow.
>   - Bryan Tan (VMCI maintainer): "Thanks for the fix, it looks good to
>     me."  Also noted that no modern VMware product allows guest-to-guest
>     VMCI communication, so the practical attack surface is host -> guest.
>
>  net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c | 16 +++++++++-------
>  1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)

Acked-by: Bryan Tan <bryan-bt.tan@broadcom.com>

>
> diff --git a/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c b/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
> index 4296ca1..88d7128 100644
> --- a/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
> +++ b/net/vmw_vsock/vmci_transport.c
> @@ -1269,14 +1269,16 @@ vmci_transport_recv_connecting_server(struct sock *listener,
>  destroy:
>         pending->sk_err = skerr;
>         pending->sk_state = TCP_CLOSE;
> -       /* As long as we drop our reference, all necessary cleanup will handle
> -        * when the cleanup function drops its reference and our destruct
> -        * implementation is called.  Note that since the listen handler will
> -        * remove pending from the pending list upon our failure, the cleanup
> -        * function won't drop the additional reference, which is why we do it
> -        * here.
> +       /* Drop the reference taken by vmci_transport_recv_listen() before
> +        * schedule_delayed_work() only on real errors.  For a peer RST
> +        * (err == 0) the listener leaves pending on the pending list, and
> +        * vsock_pending_work() will drop that reference itself when it
> +        * later cleans the socket up.  Calling sock_put() here in that
> +        * case would be a double-put and free the socket while
> +        * vsock_pending_work() still holds it.
>          */
> -       sock_put(pending);
> +       if (err < 0)
> +               sock_put(pending);
>
>         return err;
>  }
>
> base-commit: be48e5fe51a5864566307998286a699d6b986934
> --
> 2.54.0
>

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