[PATCH 0/6] landlock: Add POSIX message queue scoping

[PATCH 0/6] landlock: Add POSIX message queue scoping

[Oxana Kharitonova]

Hi,

This series adds landlock support for scoping POSIX message queuesi [1].
 
Landlock already supports scoped IPC restrictions for signals and abstract
UNIX sockets. These restrictions make it possible to prevent a sandboxed
task from interacting with IPC objects outside of its Landlock domain,
while still allowing communication within the same domain or with nested
domains.
 
This series extends the same model to POSIX message queues with a new
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE scope. When this scope is enforced, a task
can only open POSIX message queues that were created by a task in the same
landlock domain or in a nested domain.
 
The implementation tags mqueuefs inodes at creation time with the creator's
landlock domain. This domain is kept alive for the lifetime of the inode
and is checked when the queue is opened.
 
The series also exposes the mqueuefs magic number through the shared UAPI
magic header, bumps the Landlock ABI, updates documentation, adds sandboxer
support, and adds selftests.
 
The new behavior is:
 
- a task restricted with LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE cannot open a queue
  created outside of its Landlock scope;
- a task can still open a queue created within its own Landlock domain;
- queues created outside of any Landlock domain are treated as outside the
  scope for a scoped opener.

[1] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man7/mq_overview.7.html

Oxana Kharitonova (6):
  ipc: Move mqueue fs magic to uapi magic header
  landlock: Scope POSIX message queue opens
  landlock: Bump ABI for LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE
  selftests/landlock: Test POSIX message queue scoping
  samples/landlock: Support POSIX message queue scoping
  landlock: Document POSIX message queue scoping

 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/landlock.rst    |   6 +-
 Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst      |  11 +-
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h                 |   7 +-
 include/uapi/linux/magic.h                    |   2 +
 ipc/mqueue.c                                  |   2 +-
 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c                  |  16 +-
 security/landlock/audit.c                     |   9 +
 security/landlock/audit.h                     |   1 +
 security/landlock/fs.c                        |  35 +++
 security/landlock/fs.h                        |  15 ++
 security/landlock/limits.h                    |   2 +-
 security/landlock/ruleset.c                   |   1 -
 security/landlock/syscalls.c                  |   2 +-
 security/landlock/task.c                      |  43 ++++
 security/landlock/task.h                      |   4 +
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c  |   2 +-
 .../landlock/scoped_posix_msg_queue_test.c    | 223 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_test.c  |   2 +-
 18 files changed, 371 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_posix_msg_queue_test.c

-- 
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

[PATCH 1/6] ipc: Move mqueue fs magic to uapi magic header

[Oxana Kharitonova]

Move MQUEUE_MAGIC from ipc/mqueue.c to include/uapi/linux/magic.h so
it can be shared by code outside of ipc/mqueue.c without duplicating
the constant.

Signed-off-by: Oxana Kharitonova <oxana@cloudflare.com>
---
 include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 2 ++
 ipc/mqueue.c               | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
index 4f2da935a76c..8e5d33bb1453 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
@@ -78,6 +78,8 @@
 
 #define V9FS_MAGIC		0x01021997
 
+#define MQUEUE_MAGIC		0x19800202
+
 #define BDEVFS_MAGIC            0x62646576
 #define DAXFS_MAGIC             0x64646178
 #define BINFMTFS_MAGIC          0x42494e4d
diff --git a/ipc/mqueue.c b/ipc/mqueue.c
index 4798b375972b..9515597d45ce 100644
--- a/ipc/mqueue.c
+++ b/ipc/mqueue.c
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
 #include <linux/sysctl.h>
 #include <linux/poll.h>
 #include <linux/mqueue.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
 #include <linux/msg.h>
 #include <linux/skbuff.h>
 #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
@@ -47,7 +48,6 @@ struct mqueue_fs_context {
 	bool			 newns;	/* Set if newly created ipc namespace */
 };
 
-#define MQUEUE_MAGIC	0x19800202
 #define DIRENT_SIZE	20
 #define FILENT_SIZE	80
 
-- 
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

Re: [PATCH 1/6] ipc: Move mqueue fs magic to uapi magic header

[Günther Noack]

Hello!

On Wed, Jul 22, 2026 at 01:29:37PM +0100, Oxana Kharitonova wrote:
> Move MQUEUE_MAGIC from ipc/mqueue.c to include/uapi/linux/magic.h so
> it can be shared by code outside of ipc/mqueue.c without duplicating
> the constant.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Oxana Kharitonova <oxana@cloudflare.com>
> ---
>  include/uapi/linux/magic.h | 2 ++
>  ipc/mqueue.c               | 2 +-
>  2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
> 
> diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
> index 4f2da935a76c..8e5d33bb1453 100644
> --- a/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
> +++ b/include/uapi/linux/magic.h
> @@ -78,6 +78,8 @@
>  
>  #define V9FS_MAGIC		0x01021997
>  
> +#define MQUEUE_MAGIC		0x19800202
> +
>  #define BDEVFS_MAGIC            0x62646576
>  #define DAXFS_MAGIC             0x64646178
>  #define BINFMTFS_MAGIC          0x42494e4d
> diff --git a/ipc/mqueue.c b/ipc/mqueue.c
> index 4798b375972b..9515597d45ce 100644
> --- a/ipc/mqueue.c
> +++ b/ipc/mqueue.c
> @@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
>  #include <linux/sysctl.h>
>  #include <linux/poll.h>
>  #include <linux/mqueue.h>
> +#include <linux/magic.h>
>  #include <linux/msg.h>
>  #include <linux/skbuff.h>
>  #include <linux/vmalloc.h>
> @@ -47,7 +48,6 @@ struct mqueue_fs_context {
>  	bool			 newns;	/* Set if newly created ipc namespace */
>  };
>  
> -#define MQUEUE_MAGIC	0x19800202
>  #define DIRENT_SIZE	20
>  #define FILENT_SIZE	80
>  
> -- 
> 2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)
> 

The only reference to MQUEUE_MAGIC that I find in your patchset is from
Landlock's kernel code -- For a value that gets serialized to disk, like
for the other file systems, I think there is actually a legitimate use
case for userspace to use that value, when dealing with raw images?  But
that's not the case here, I think?

Should this live in include/linux/ipc_namespace.h instead?  Or even be
exposed as a helper function that lets you check whether an inode is
referring to an mqueue?

—Günther

Re: [PATCH 1/6] ipc: Move mqueue fs magic to uapi magic header

[Oxana Kharitonova]

On Wed, Jul 22, 2026 at 1:43 PM Günther Noack <gnoack@google.com> wrote:
>
> Should this live in include/linux/ipc_namespace.h instead?  Or even be
> exposed as a helper function that lets you check whether an inode is
> referring to an mqueue?
>
> —Günther

Hi Günther,

Thanks for the feedback. Agree, better to move it. I'll check how to do it
better and include in v2.

[PATCH 2/6] landlock: Scope POSIX message queue opens

[Oxana Kharitonova]

Add support for enforcing LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE when opening
POSIX message queues.

Tag mqueuefs inodes at instantiation time with the landlock domain of
the task that created the queue. This domain is stored in the landlock
inode security blob and kept alive until the inode security blob is
released.

On file open, detect mqueuefs regular files and compare the queue
creator's domain with the opener's scoped domain. Deny the open when
the opener is restricted by LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE and the queue
was created outside of an allowed parent domain.

This makes POSIX message queues follow the same scoped-domain model as
the existing landlock IPC restrictions, while keeping the queue creator
domain tied to the lifetime of the queue inode.

Signed-off-by: Oxana Kharitonova <oxana@cloudflare.com>
---
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h |  1 +
 security/landlock/audit.c     |  9 ++++++++
 security/landlock/audit.h     |  1 +
 security/landlock/fs.c        | 35 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/fs.h        | 15 ++++++++++++
 security/landlock/limits.h    |  2 +-
 security/landlock/ruleset.c   |  1 -
 security/landlock/task.c      | 43 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 security/landlock/task.h      |  4 ++++
 9 files changed, 109 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 272f047df438..96d0c3b423ac 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -491,6 +491,7 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
 /* clang-format off */
 #define LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET		(1ULL << 0)
 #define LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL		                (1ULL << 1)
+#define LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE		        (1ULL << 2)
 /* clang-format on*/
 
 #endif /* _UAPI_LINUX_LANDLOCK_H */
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.c b/security/landlock/audit.c
index 50536c568526..895397b5cbca 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.c
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.c
@@ -82,6 +82,10 @@ get_blocker(const enum landlock_request_type type,
 	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL:
 		WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
 		return "scope.signal";
+
+	case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE:
+		WARN_ON_ONCE(access_bit != -1);
+		return "scope.posix_msg_queue";
 	}
 
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(1);
@@ -646,6 +650,11 @@ void landlock_log_denial(const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject,
 				!!(quiet_mask &
 				   LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET);
 			break;
+		case LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE:
+			quiet_applicable_to_access =
+				!!(quiet_mask &
+				   LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE);
+			break;
 		/*
 		 * Leave LANDLOCK_REQUEST_PTRACE and
 		 * LANDLOCK_REQUEST_FS_CHANGE_TOPOLOGY unhandled for now - they
diff --git a/security/landlock/audit.h b/security/landlock/audit.h
index 620f8a24291d..ce85417548fa 100644
--- a/security/landlock/audit.h
+++ b/security/landlock/audit.h
@@ -21,6 +21,7 @@ enum landlock_request_type {
 	LANDLOCK_REQUEST_NET_ACCESS,
 	LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET,
 	LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+	LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE,
 };
 
 /*
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.c b/security/landlock/fs.c
index f7e5e4ef9eac..c6558b448a06 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.c
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
 #include "object.h"
 #include "ruleset.h"
 #include "setup.h"
+#include "task.h"
 
 /* Underlying object management */
 
@@ -1268,6 +1269,33 @@ static void hook_inode_free_security_rcu(void *inode_security)
 	 */
 	inode_sec = inode_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
 	WARN_ON_ONCE(inode_sec->object);
+
+	landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(inode_sec->mq_domain);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Tag a newly created POSIX message queue with its creator's domain.
+ *
+ * This is the earliest reachable point with both the creator's context and a
+ * fully initialized inode.
+ */
+static void hook_d_instantiate(struct dentry *const dentry,
+			       struct inode *const inode)
+{
+	struct landlock_ruleset *dom;
+
+	if (!landlock_is_posix_mqueue_inode(inode))
+		return;
+
+	dom = landlock_get_current_domain();
+	if (!dom)
+		return;
+
+	if (WARN_ON_ONCE(landlock_inode(inode)->mq_domain))
+		return;
+
+	landlock_get_ruleset(dom);
+	landlock_inode(inode)->mq_domain = dom;
 }
 
 /* Super-block hooks */
@@ -1756,6 +1784,12 @@ static int hook_file_open(struct file *const file)
 	const struct landlock_cred_security *const subject =
 		landlock_get_applicable_subject(file->f_cred, any_fs, NULL);
 	struct landlock_request request = {};
+	int err;
+
+	/* POSIX message queue scoping is independent of FS access rights. */
+	err = landlock_check_posix_mqueue_open(file);
+	if (err)
+		return err;
 
 	if (!subject)
 		return 0;
@@ -1979,6 +2013,7 @@ static void hook_file_free_security(struct file *file)
 
 static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security_rcu, hook_inode_free_security_rcu),
+	LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, hook_d_instantiate),
 
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_delete, hook_sb_delete),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_mount, hook_sb_mount),
diff --git a/security/landlock/fs.h b/security/landlock/fs.h
index b4421d9df68f..aefe078845fa 100644
--- a/security/landlock/fs.h
+++ b/security/landlock/fs.h
@@ -14,6 +14,7 @@
 #include <linux/fs.h>
 #include <linux/init.h>
 #include <linux/rcupdate.h>
+#include <uapi/linux/magic.h>
 
 #include "access.h"
 #include "cred.h"
@@ -38,6 +39,14 @@ struct landlock_inode_security {
 	 * performed by get_inode_object().
 	 */
 	struct landlock_object __rcu *object;
+	/**
+	 * @mq_domain: Domain of the task that created POSIX message queue.
+	 * Only set for mqueuefs inodes (i.e. s_magic == MQUEUE_MAGIC) at
+	 * creation time by hook_d_instantiate(), never modified afterwards.
+	 * Used to check LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE against the
+	 * accessing task's domain.
+	 */
+	struct landlock_ruleset *mq_domain;
 };
 
 /**
@@ -141,6 +150,12 @@ landlock_inode(const struct inode *const inode)
 	return inode->i_security + landlock_blob_sizes.lbs_inode;
 }
 
+static inline bool
+landlock_is_posix_mqueue_inode(const struct inode *const inode)
+{
+	return S_ISREG(inode->i_mode) && inode->i_sb->s_magic == MQUEUE_MAGIC;
+}
+
 static inline struct landlock_superblock_security *
 landlock_superblock(const struct super_block *const superblock)
 {
diff --git a/security/landlock/limits.h b/security/landlock/limits.h
index 08d5f2f6d321..70a7c5c7af85 100644
--- a/security/landlock/limits.h
+++ b/security/landlock/limits.h
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
 #define LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET	((LANDLOCK_LAST_ACCESS_NET << 1) - 1)
 #define LANDLOCK_NUM_ACCESS_NET		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_ACCESS_NET)
 
-#define LANDLOCK_LAST_SCOPE		LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL
+#define LANDLOCK_LAST_SCOPE		LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE
 #define LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE		((LANDLOCK_LAST_SCOPE << 1) - 1)
 #define LANDLOCK_NUM_SCOPE		__const_hweight64(LANDLOCK_MASK_SCOPE)
 
diff --git a/security/landlock/ruleset.c b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
index 4dd09ea22c84..aa37d50ead87 100644
--- a/security/landlock/ruleset.c
+++ b/security/landlock/ruleset.c
@@ -520,7 +520,6 @@ static void free_ruleset_work(struct work_struct *const work)
 	free_ruleset(ruleset);
 }
 
-/* Only called by hook_cred_free(). */
 void landlock_put_ruleset_deferred(struct landlock_ruleset *const ruleset)
 {
 	if (ruleset && refcount_dec_and_test(&ruleset->usage)) {
diff --git a/security/landlock/task.c b/security/landlock/task.c
index 55522a601367..d65e43550b26 100644
--- a/security/landlock/task.c
+++ b/security/landlock/task.c
@@ -453,6 +453,49 @@ static int hook_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
 	return -EPERM;
 }
 
+static const struct access_masks posix_mqueue_scope = {
+	.scope = LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE,
+};
+
+/**
+ * landlock_check_posix_mqueue_open - Deny opening a POSIX message queue
+ * created by a task from a different (non-ancestor) domain
+ *
+ * @file: The mqueuefs file being opened.
+ *
+ * Return: -EPERM if the open must be denied, 0 otherwise.
+ */
+int landlock_check_posix_mqueue_open(struct file *const file)
+{
+	const struct inode *const inode = file_inode(file);
+	const struct landlock_cred_security *subject;
+	size_t handle_layer;
+
+	if (!landlock_is_posix_mqueue_inode(inode))
+		return 0;
+
+	subject = landlock_get_applicable_subject(file->f_cred,
+						  posix_mqueue_scope,
+						  &handle_layer);
+	if (!subject)
+		return 0;
+
+	if (!domain_is_scoped(subject->domain,
+			      landlock_inode(inode)->mq_domain,
+			      LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE))
+		return 0;
+
+	landlock_log_denial(subject, &(struct landlock_request) {
+		.type = LANDLOCK_REQUEST_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE,
+		.audit = {
+			.type = LSM_AUDIT_DATA_FILE,
+			.u.file = file,
+		},
+		.layer_plus_one = handle_layer + 1,
+	});
+	return -EPERM;
+}
+
 static struct security_hook_list landlock_hooks[] __ro_after_init = {
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, hook_ptrace_access_check),
 	LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, hook_ptrace_traceme),
diff --git a/security/landlock/task.h b/security/landlock/task.h
index 7c00360219a2..0b031dc17bbf 100644
--- a/security/landlock/task.h
+++ b/security/landlock/task.h
@@ -9,6 +9,10 @@
 #ifndef _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_TASK_H
 #define _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_TASK_H
 
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+
 __init void landlock_add_task_hooks(void);
 
+int landlock_check_posix_mqueue_open(struct file *const file);
+
 #endif /* _SECURITY_LANDLOCK_TASK_H */
-- 
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

[PATCH 3/6] landlock: Bump ABI for LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE

[Oxana Kharitonova]

Increase the landlock ABI version so userspace can detect support for
LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE.

Signed-off-by: Oxana Kharitonova <oxana@cloudflare.com>
---
 security/landlock/syscalls.c                 | 2 +-
 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c | 2 +-
 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/security/landlock/syscalls.c b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
index 36b02892c62f..84521a31bf75 100644
--- a/security/landlock/syscalls.c
+++ b/security/landlock/syscalls.c
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ static const struct file_operations ruleset_fops = {
  * If the change involves a fix that requires userspace awareness, also update
  * the errata documentation in Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst .
  */
-const int landlock_abi_version = 10;
+const int landlock_abi_version = 11;
 
 /**
  * sys_landlock_create_ruleset - Create a new ruleset
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
index cbd3c1669951..b8b5fa1042ba 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/base_test.c
@@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ TEST(abi_version)
 	const struct landlock_ruleset_attr ruleset_attr = {
 		.handled_access_fs = LANDLOCK_ACCESS_FS_READ_FILE,
 	};
-	ASSERT_EQ(10, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
+	ASSERT_EQ(11, landlock_create_ruleset(NULL, 0,
 					      LANDLOCK_CREATE_RULESET_VERSION));
 
 	ASSERT_EQ(-1, landlock_create_ruleset(&ruleset_attr, 0,
-- 
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

[PATCH 4/6] selftests/landlock: Test POSIX message queue scoping

[Oxana Kharitonova]

Add tests for LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE.

Verify that opening a queue created outside the current scoped domain is
denied, and that opening a queue created within the same domain remains
allowed.

Signed-off-by: Oxana Kharitonova <oxana@cloudflare.com>
---
 .../landlock/scoped_posix_msg_queue_test.c    | 223 ++++++++++++++++++
 .../testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_test.c  |   2 +-
 2 files changed, 224 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
 create mode 100644 tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_posix_msg_queue_test.c

diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_posix_msg_queue_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_posix_msg_queue_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000000..602ba5c7a83d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_posix_msg_queue_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,223 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0
+/*
+ * Landlock tests - POSIX message queue scoping
+ *
+ * Copyright © 2024-2026 Microsoft Corporation
+ */
+
+#define _GNU_SOURCE
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <linux/landlock.h>
+#include <mqueue.h>
+#include <stddef.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/prctl.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/wait.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#include "common.h"
+#include "scoped_common.h"
+
+static void set_mq_name(char *const name, const size_t size)
+{
+	snprintf(name, size, "/selftests-landlock-mq-tid%d", sys_gettid());
+}
+
+FIXTURE(scoped_domains)
+{
+	char mq_name[NAME_MAX];
+};
+
+#include "scoped_base_variants.h"
+
+FIXTURE_SETUP(scoped_domains)
+{
+	drop_caps(_metadata);
+
+	set_mq_name(self->mq_name, sizeof(self->mq_name));
+	/* Removes a possibly stale queue from a previous run. */
+	mq_unlink(self->mq_name);
+}
+
+FIXTURE_TEARDOWN(scoped_domains)
+{
+}
+
+/*
+ * The parent creates the message queue, then the child tries
+ * to open it, with scoped domain(s) or no domain at all.
+ */
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, open_parent_queue)
+{
+	pid_t child;
+	int status;
+	int pipe_parent[2], pipe_child[2];
+	char buf;
+	mqd_t mq;
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_parent, O_CLOEXEC));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_child, O_CLOEXEC));
+
+	if (variant->domain_both)
+		create_scoped_domain(_metadata, LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE);
+
+	child = fork();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+	if (child == 0) {
+		mqd_t mq_child;
+
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[1]));
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[0]));
+
+		if (variant->domain_child)
+			create_scoped_domain(_metadata,
+					     LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE);
+
+		/* Waits for the parent to create the queue. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_parent[0], &buf, 1));
+
+		mq_child = mq_open(self->mq_name, O_RDWR);
+		if (!variant->domain_child) {
+			EXPECT_LE(0, mq_child);
+			if (mq_child >= 0)
+				EXPECT_EQ(0, mq_close(mq_child));
+		} else {
+			EXPECT_EQ(-1, mq_child);
+			EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+		}
+
+		ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_child[1], ".", 1));
+		_exit(_metadata->exit_code);
+		return;
+	}
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[0]));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[1]));
+
+	if (variant->domain_parent)
+		create_scoped_domain(_metadata, LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE);
+
+	mq = mq_open(self->mq_name, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0600, NULL);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, mq);
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buf, 1));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, mq_close(mq));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, mq_unlink(self->mq_name));
+
+	if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || !WIFEXITED(status) ||
+	    WEXITSTATUS(status) != EXIT_SUCCESS)
+		_metadata->exit_code = KSFT_FAIL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The child creates the message queue, then the parent tries
+ * to open it, with scoped domain(s) or no domain at all.
+ */
+TEST_F(scoped_domains, open_child_queue)
+{
+	pid_t child;
+	bool can_open_child_queue;
+	int status;
+	int pipe_parent[2], pipe_child[2];
+	char buf;
+	mqd_t mq;
+
+	can_open_child_queue = !variant->domain_parent;
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_parent, O_CLOEXEC));
+	ASSERT_EQ(0, pipe2(pipe_child, O_CLOEXEC));
+
+	if (variant->domain_both)
+		create_scoped_domain(_metadata, LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE);
+
+	child = fork();
+	ASSERT_LE(0, child);
+	if (child == 0) {
+		mqd_t mq_child;
+
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[1]));
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[0]));
+
+		if (variant->domain_child)
+			create_scoped_domain(_metadata,
+					     LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE);
+
+		/* Waits for the parent to be in a domain, if any. */
+		ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_parent[0], &buf, 1));
+
+		mq_child = mq_open(self->mq_name, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0600, NULL);
+		ASSERT_LE(0, mq_child);
+
+		ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_child[1], ".", 1));
+
+		ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_parent[0], &buf, 1));
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, mq_close(mq_child));
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, mq_unlink(self->mq_name));
+		_exit(_metadata->exit_code);
+		return;
+	}
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_parent[0]));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, close(pipe_child[1]));
+
+	if (variant->domain_parent)
+		create_scoped_domain(_metadata, LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE);
+
+	/* Signals that the parent is in a domain, if any. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
+
+	/* Waits for the child to create the queue. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, read(pipe_child[0], &buf, 1));
+
+	mq = mq_open(self->mq_name, O_RDWR);
+	if (can_open_child_queue) {
+		EXPECT_LE(0, mq);
+		if (mq >= 0)
+			EXPECT_EQ(0, mq_close(mq));
+	} else {
+		EXPECT_EQ(-1, mq);
+		EXPECT_EQ(EPERM, errno);
+	}
+
+	/* Signals to the child that the open attempt is done. */
+	ASSERT_EQ(1, write(pipe_parent[1], ".", 1));
+
+	ASSERT_EQ(child, waitpid(child, &status, 0));
+	if (WIFSIGNALED(status) || !WIFEXITED(status) ||
+	    WEXITSTATUS(status) != EXIT_SUCCESS)
+		_metadata->exit_code = KSFT_FAIL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * A process must always be able to open a queue it created within its own
+ * domain, whatever the enforced scope is.
+ */
+TEST(create_and_open_same_domain)
+{
+	char mq_name[NAME_MAX];
+	mqd_t mq_create, mq_open_again;
+
+	drop_caps(_metadata);
+	set_mq_name(mq_name, sizeof(mq_name));
+	mq_unlink(mq_name);
+
+	create_scoped_domain(_metadata, LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE);
+
+	mq_create = mq_open(mq_name, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0600, NULL);
+	ASSERT_LE(0, mq_create);
+
+	mq_open_again = mq_open(mq_name, O_RDWR);
+	EXPECT_LE(0, mq_open_again);
+	if (mq_open_again >= 0)
+		EXPECT_EQ(0, mq_close(mq_open_again));
+
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, mq_close(mq_create));
+	EXPECT_EQ(0, mq_unlink(mq_name));
+}
+
+TEST_HARNESS_MAIN
diff --git a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_test.c b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_test.c
index b90f76ed0d9c..c530baa50948 100644
--- a/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_test.c
+++ b/tools/testing/selftests/landlock/scoped_test.c
@@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
 
 #include "common.h"
 
-#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL
+#define ACCESS_LAST LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE
 
 TEST(ruleset_with_unknown_scope)
 {
-- 
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

[PATCH 5/6] samples/landlock: Support POSIX message queue scoping

[Oxana Kharitonova]

Teach the sandboxer sample to request LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE
through LL_SCOPED.

Add the "q" scope selector for POSIX message queues and document it in
the sample help text. Also allow POSIX message queue denials to be
quieted with "posix_msg_queue" through LL_QUIET_ACCESS.

Signed-off-by: Oxana Kharitonova <oxana@cloudflare.com>
---
 samples/landlock/sandboxer.c | 16 ++++++++++++++--
 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)

diff --git a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
index ac71019e6212..59024ca53398 100644
--- a/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
+++ b/samples/landlock/sandboxer.c
@@ -240,10 +240,12 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
 	bool error = false;
 	bool abstract_scoping = false;
 	bool signal_scoping = false;
+	bool posix_mqueue_scoping = false;
 
 	/* Scoping is not supported by Landlock ABI */
 	if (!(ruleset_attr->scoped &
-	      (LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET | LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL)))
+	      (LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET | LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL |
+	       LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE)))
 		goto out_unset;
 
 	env_type_scope = getenv(env_var);
@@ -260,6 +262,9 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
 		} else if (strcmp("s", ipc_scoping_name) == 0 &&
 			   !signal_scoping) {
 			signal_scoping = true;
+		} else if (strcmp("q", ipc_scoping_name) == 0 &&
+			   !posix_mqueue_scoping) {
+			posix_mqueue_scoping = true;
 		} else {
 			fprintf(stderr, "Unknown or duplicate scope \"%s\"\n",
 				ipc_scoping_name);
@@ -276,6 +281,8 @@ static bool check_ruleset_scope(const char *const env_var,
 		ruleset_attr->scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
 	if (!signal_scoping)
 		ruleset_attr->scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL;
+	if (!posix_mqueue_scoping)
+		ruleset_attr->scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE;
 
 	unsetenv(env_var);
 	return error;
@@ -354,6 +361,9 @@ static int add_quiet_access(const char *const env_var,
 				LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET;
 		else if (strcmp(str_access, "signal") == 0)
 			ruleset_attr->quiet_scoped |= LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL;
+		else if (strcmp(str_access, "posix_msg_queue") == 0)
+			ruleset_attr->quiet_scoped |=
+				LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE;
 		else {
 			fprintf(stderr, "Unknown quiet access \"%s\"\n",
 				str_access);
@@ -400,6 +410,7 @@ static const char help[] =
 	"* " ENV_SCOPED_NAME ": actions denied on the outside of the landlock domain\n"
 	"  - \"a\" to restrict opening abstract unix sockets\n"
 	"  - \"s\" to restrict sending signals\n"
+	"  - \"q\" to restrict opening POSIX message queues\n"
 	"\n"
 	"A sandboxer should not log denied access requests to avoid spamming logs, "
 	"but to test audit we can set " ENV_FORCE_LOG_NAME "=1\n"
@@ -416,6 +427,7 @@ static const char help[] =
 	"  - \"udp_connect\" to quiet udp connect / send denials\n"
 	"  - \"abstract_unix_socket\" to quiet abstract unix socket denials\n"
 	"  - \"signal\" to quiet signal denials\n"
+	"  - \"posix_msg_queue\" to quiet POSIX message queue denials\n"
 	"\n"
 	"Example:\n"
 	ENV_FS_RO_NAME "=\"${PATH}:/lib:/usr:/proc:/etc:/dev/urandom\" "
@@ -423,7 +435,7 @@ static const char help[] =
 	ENV_TCP_BIND_NAME "=\"9418\" "
 	ENV_TCP_CONNECT_NAME "=\"80:443\" "
 	ENV_UDP_CONNECT_SEND_NAME "=\"53\" "
-	ENV_SCOPED_NAME "=\"a:s\" "
+	ENV_SCOPED_NAME "=\"a:s:q\" "
 	"%1$s bash -i\n"
 	"\n"
 	"This sandboxer can use Landlock features up to ABI version "
-- 
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)

[PATCH 6/6] landlock: Document POSIX message queue scoping

[Oxana Kharitonova]

Document LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE in the userspace API and UAPI
kernel-doc.

Signed-off-by: Oxana Kharitonova <oxana@cloudflare.com>
---
 Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/landlock.rst |  6 ++++--
 Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst   | 11 ++++++++++-
 include/uapi/linux/landlock.h              |  6 +++++-
 3 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)

diff --git a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/landlock.rst b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/landlock.rst
index 8eb85c9381ff..1ecb2017271b 100644
--- a/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/admin-guide/LSM/landlock.rst
@@ -60,9 +60,11 @@ AUDIT_LANDLOCK_ACCESS
         - net.bind_udp - UDP port binding was denied
         - net.connect_send_udp - UDP connection and send was denied
 
-    **scope.*** - IPC scoping restrictions (ABI 6+):
+    **scope.*** - IPC scoping restrictions:
         - scope.abstract_unix_socket - Abstract UNIX socket connection denied
-        - scope.signal - Signal sending denied
+          (ABI 6+)
+        - scope.signal - Signal sending denied (ABI 6+)
+        - scope.posix_msg_queue - POSIX message queue opening denied (ABI 11+)
 
     Multiple blockers can appear in a single event (comma-separated) when
     multiple access rights are missing. For example, creating a regular file
diff --git a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
index 5a63d4476c1c..c4fa84e6d281 100644
--- a/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
+++ b/Documentation/userspace-api/landlock.rst
@@ -86,7 +86,8 @@ to be explicit about the denied-by-default access rights.
             LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SEND_UDP,
         .scoped =
             LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET |
-            LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL,
+            LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL |
+            LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE,
     };
 
 Because we may not know which kernel version an application will be executed
@@ -140,6 +141,10 @@ version, and only use the available subset of access rights:
         ruleset_attr.handled_access_net &=
             ~(LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_BIND_UDP |
               LANDLOCK_ACCESS_NET_CONNECT_SEND_UDP);
+        __attribute__((fallthrough));
+    case 10:
+        /* Removes LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE for ABI < 11 */
+        ruleset_attr.scoped &= ~LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE;
     }
 
 This enables the creation of an inclusive ruleset that will contain our rules.
@@ -420,6 +425,10 @@ The operations which can be scoped are:
     A :manpage:`sendto(2)` on a socket which was previously connected will not
     be restricted.  This works for both datagram and stream sockets.
 
+``LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE``
+    This limits opening POSIX message queues to queues created by a process in
+    the same or a nested Landlock domain.
+
 IPC scoping does not support exceptions via :manpage:`landlock_add_rule(2)`.
 If an operation is scoped within a domain, no rules can be added to allow access
 to resources or processes outside of the scope.
diff --git a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
index 96d0c3b423ac..21ba31ad4d4b 100644
--- a/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
+++ b/include/uapi/linux/landlock.h
@@ -478,7 +478,9 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
  * Setting a flag for a ruleset will isolate the Landlock domain to forbid
  * connections to resources outside the domain.
  *
- * This is supported since Landlock ABI version 6.
+ * This is supported since Landlock ABI version 6.  The
+ * %LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE scope is supported since Landlock ABI version
+ * 11.
  *
  * Scopes:
  *
@@ -487,6 +489,8 @@ struct landlock_net_port_attr {
  *   related Landlock domain (e.g., a parent domain or a non-sandboxed process).
  * - %LANDLOCK_SCOPE_SIGNAL: Restrict a sandboxed process from sending a signal
  *   to another process outside the domain.
+ * - %LANDLOCK_SCOPE_POSIX_MSG_QUEUE: Restrict a sandboxed process from opening
+ *   a POSIX message queue created outside the domain.
  */
 /* clang-format off */
 #define LANDLOCK_SCOPE_ABSTRACT_UNIX_SOCKET		(1ULL << 0)
-- 
2.50.1 (Apple Git-155)