* [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering
@ 2026-07-31 14:09 Chengfeng Ye
2026-08-10 15:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Chengfeng Ye @ 2026-07-31 14:09 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: James Bottomley, Jarkko Sakkinen, Mimi Zohar, David Howells,
Paul Moore, James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Roberto Sassu
Cc: linux-integrity, keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel,
Chengfeng Ye, stable
trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest
array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup()
holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while
unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the
synchronization point that must precede backend teardown.
The current order permits this interleaving:
CPU 0 CPU 1
trusted_tpm_exit() key_type_lookup("trusted")
put_device(&chip->dev) trusted_tpm_seal()
kfree(digests) pcrlock()
unregister_key_type() tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests)
CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can
also be released before callbacks stop using it.
KASAN reported:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89
Call Trace:
tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted]
trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted]
trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted]
__key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0
__key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50
__do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310
Allocated by task 88:
__kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490
do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390
do_init_module+0x2df/0x840
Freed by task 90:
kfree+0x131/0x3c0
trusted_tpm_exit+0x59/0xa0 [trusted]
__do_sys_delete_module+0x346/0x510
Move unregister_key_type() before releasing either resource. This stops
new lookups and waits for in-flight key operations to finish before the
backend state is destroyed.
Fixes: 0b6cf6b97b7e ("tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()")
Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
---
security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
index 13513819991e..8f57c6111e7e 100644
--- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
+++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
@@ -987,9 +987,9 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)
static void trusted_tpm_exit(void)
{
if (chip) {
+ unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
put_device(&chip->dev);
kfree(digests);
- unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
}
}
--
2.43.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering
2026-07-31 14:09 [PATCH] KEYS: trusted: Fix TPM teardown ordering Chengfeng Ye
@ 2026-08-10 15:25 ` Jarkko Sakkinen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Jarkko Sakkinen @ 2026-08-10 15:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Chengfeng Ye
Cc: James Bottomley, Mimi Zohar, David Howells, Paul Moore,
James Morris, Serge E. Hallyn, Roberto Sassu, linux-integrity,
keyrings, linux-security-module, linux-kernel, stable
On Fri, Jul 31, 2026 at 10:09:24PM +0800, Chengfeng Ye wrote:
> trusted_tpm_exit() drops the TPM chip reference and frees the digest
> array before unregistering the trusted key type. key_type_lookup()
> holds key_types_sem for reading until the key operation finishes, while
> unregister_key_type() takes it for writing. It therefore provides the
> synchronization point that must precede backend teardown.
>
> The current order permits this interleaving:
>
> CPU 0 CPU 1
> trusted_tpm_exit() key_type_lookup("trusted")
> put_device(&chip->dev) trusted_tpm_seal()
> kfree(digests) pcrlock()
> unregister_key_type() tpm_pcr_extend(..., digests)
>
> CPU 1 can consequently dereference the freed digest array. The chip can
> also be released before callbacks stop using it.
>
> KASAN reported:
>
> BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
> Read of size 2 at addr ffff88810872d000 by task poc/89
> Call Trace:
> tpm_pcr_extend+0x1f0/0x200
> pcrlock+0x42/0x70 [trusted]
> trusted_tpm_seal+0x1b6/0x570 [trusted]
> trusted_instantiate+0x293/0x340 [trusted]
> __key_instantiate_and_link+0xb2/0x2b0
> __key_create_or_update+0x61e/0xb50
> __do_sys_add_key+0x1b8/0x310
> Allocated by task 88:
> __kmalloc_noprof+0x1a7/0x490
> do_one_initcall+0xa1/0x390
> do_init_module+0x2df/0x840
> Freed by task 90:
> kfree+0x131/0x3c0
> trusted_tpm_exit+0x59/0xa0 [trusted]
> __do_sys_delete_module+0x346/0x510
>
> Move unregister_key_type() before releasing either resource. This stops
> new lookups and waits for in-flight key operations to finish before the
> backend state is destroyed.
Thank for the great report.
>
> Fixes: 0b6cf6b97b7e ("tpm: pass an array of tpm_extend_digest structures to tpm_pcr_extend()")
> Cc: stable@vger.kernel.org
> Signed-off-by: Chengfeng Ye <nicoyip.dev@gmail.com>
> ---
> security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c | 2 +-
> 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
>
> diff --git a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> index 13513819991e..8f57c6111e7e 100644
> --- a/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> +++ b/security/keys/trusted-keys/trusted_tpm1.c
> @@ -987,9 +987,9 @@ static int __init trusted_tpm_init(void)
> static void trusted_tpm_exit(void)
> {
> if (chip) {
> + unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
> put_device(&chip->dev);
> kfree(digests);
> - unregister_key_type(&key_type_trusted);
> }
> }
>
> --
> 2.43.0
>
Reviewed-by: Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko@kernel.org>
BR, Jarkko
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