[PATCH] xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()

[PATCH] xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()

[Roshan Kumar]

iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() advances to the fragment containing @offset
with an unbounded loop:

	while (offset >= walk->past + walk->frags[walk->fragi].len)
		walk->past += walk->frags[walk->fragi++].len;

walk->fragi is advanced and walk->frags[walk->fragi] is dereferenced
without ever checking fragi against walk->nr_frags. When the requested
offset is at or beyond the total length spanned by the walk's fragments,
fragi runs past nr_frags and off the end of the fixed-size on-stack
frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1] array, reading out-of-bounds stack memory.

The two callers behave differently: iptfs_skb_add_frags() already guards
against this with

	if (!walk->nr_frags ||
	    offset >= walk->total + walk->initial_offset)
		return len;

but iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() has no such guard and calls
iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() unconditionally, so it performs the
out-of-range walk. Its own "fragi < walk->nr_frags" bound check runs only
afterwards, too late to prevent the read.

This is reachable from the receive path: a crafted IP-TFS (AGGFRAG)
payload delivered to an IPTFS SA drives iptfs_reassem_cont() ->
iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() with an offset past the fragment total, e.g.:

  BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250
  Read of size 4 at addr ffff888008ad7210 by task repro/345
   iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:392
   iptfs_skb_can_add_frags+0x155/0x310  net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:420
   iptfs_reassem_cont+0xcf8/0x1140      net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:902
   iptfs_input_ordered+0x552/0x670      net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1280
   iptfs_input+0x3d6/0xde0              net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1741
   xfrm_input+0x282f/0x6140             net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:700
   xfrm4_esp_rcv+0x93/0x120             net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c:104
   ip_rcv+0x278/0x2d0                   net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612

Give iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() the same up-front guard that
iptfs_skb_add_frags() already has, so the walk is never entered with an
out-of-range offset. When it triggers, the caller falls back to the
existing linearize-and-copy path, which is safe.

Fixes: 5f2b6a909574 ("xfrm: iptfs: add skb-fragment sharing code")
Reported-by: Roshan Kumar <roshaen09@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Roshan Kumar <roshaen09@gmail.com>
---
 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c | 8 ++++++++
 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)

diff --git a/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c b/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
index 597aedeac..2ce15c472 100644
--- a/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
+++ b/net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c
@@ -416,6 +416,14 @@ static bool iptfs_skb_can_add_frags(const struct sk_buff *skb,
 	if (skb_has_frag_list(skb) || skb->pp_recycle != walk->pp_recycle)
 		return false;
 
+	/* Reject an @offset that is at or beyond the end of the walk's data
+	 * before calling iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk(), whose fragment-advance
+	 * loop is otherwise unbounded and would index past walk->frags[].
+	 * This mirrors the guard already present in iptfs_skb_add_frags().
+	 */
+	if (!walk->nr_frags || offset >= walk->total + walk->initial_offset)
+		return false;
+
 	/* Make offset relative to current frag after setting that */
 	offset = iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk(walk, offset);
 
-- 
2.43.0

Re: [PATCH] xfrm: iptfs: fix stack OOB read in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk()

[Steffen Klassert]

On Tue, Jul 28, 2026 at 10:56:08AM +0530, Roshan Kumar wrote:
> iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() advances to the fragment containing @offset
> with an unbounded loop:
> 
> 	while (offset >= walk->past + walk->frags[walk->fragi].len)
> 		walk->past += walk->frags[walk->fragi++].len;
> 
> walk->fragi is advanced and walk->frags[walk->fragi] is dereferenced
> without ever checking fragi against walk->nr_frags. When the requested
> offset is at or beyond the total length spanned by the walk's fragments,
> fragi runs past nr_frags and off the end of the fixed-size on-stack
> frags[MAX_SKB_FRAGS + 1] array, reading out-of-bounds stack memory.
> 
> The two callers behave differently: iptfs_skb_add_frags() already guards
> against this with
> 
> 	if (!walk->nr_frags ||
> 	    offset >= walk->total + walk->initial_offset)
> 		return len;
> 
> but iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() has no such guard and calls
> iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk() unconditionally, so it performs the
> out-of-range walk. Its own "fragi < walk->nr_frags" bound check runs only
> afterwards, too late to prevent the read.
> 
> This is reachable from the receive path: a crafted IP-TFS (AGGFRAG)
> payload delivered to an IPTFS SA drives iptfs_reassem_cont() ->
> iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() with an offset past the fragment total, e.g.:
> 
>   BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250
>   Read of size 4 at addr ffff888008ad7210 by task repro/345
>    iptfs_skb_reset_frag_walk+0x235/0x250 net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:392
>    iptfs_skb_can_add_frags+0x155/0x310  net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:420
>    iptfs_reassem_cont+0xcf8/0x1140      net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:902
>    iptfs_input_ordered+0x552/0x670      net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1280
>    iptfs_input+0x3d6/0xde0              net/xfrm/xfrm_iptfs.c:1741
>    xfrm_input+0x282f/0x6140             net/xfrm/xfrm_input.c:700
>    xfrm4_esp_rcv+0x93/0x120             net/ipv4/xfrm4_protocol.c:104
>    ip_rcv+0x278/0x2d0                   net/ipv4/ip_input.c:612
> 
> Give iptfs_skb_can_add_frags() the same up-front guard that
> iptfs_skb_add_frags() already has, so the walk is never entered with an
> out-of-range offset. When it triggers, the caller falls back to the
> existing linearize-and-copy path, which is safe.
> 
> Fixes: 5f2b6a909574 ("xfrm: iptfs: add skb-fragment sharing code")
> Reported-by: Roshan Kumar <roshaen09@gmail.com>
> Signed-off-by: Roshan Kumar <roshaen09@gmail.com>

Applied, thanks a lot!