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From: Nicolas Bouchinet <nicolas.bouchinet@oss.cyber.gouv.fr>
To: Mario Limonciello <superm1@kernel.org>
Cc: Xiu Jianfeng <xiujianfeng@huawei.com>,
	 "Joerg Roedel (AMD)" <joro@8bytes.org>,
	Will Deacon <will@kernel.org>,
	 Robin Murphy <robin.murphy@arm.com>,
	Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>,
	 James Morris <jmorris@namei.org>,
	"Serge E. Hallyn" <serge@hallyn.com>,
	iommu@lists.linux.dev,  linux-kernel@vger.kernel.org,
	linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: Re: [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled
Date: Tue, 17 Nov 2026 09:49:49 +0100	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <avwUNw2if5GIPA11@archlinux> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <avr31i6M5PqKk_Vf@archlinux>

On Mon, Nov 16, 2026 at 02:29:01PM +0100, Nicolas Bouchinet wrote:
> > 
> > How would you feel about at least blocking the user from turning off IOMMU
> > (if it's present on the system) via the kernel command line while lockdown
> > was enabled?
> > 
> > Thinking about the case where most distros enable lockdown by default, this
> > will strenghten it's use without much downside that I can see.
> > 
> > At least on a properly configured system that contains an IOMMU it would
> > prevent a user from subverting lockdown with a malicious device during the
> > boot sequence.
> 
> I do agree with you, it could be a great addition. With Lockdown enabled
> as an early LSM (CONFIG_SECURITY_LOCKDOWN_LSM_EARLY), this might be
> feasible before boot parameter parsing. Lockdown already locks unsafe
> module parameters.
> 
> If I remember correctly on distro's that have a Lockdown patch that
> enables it if secure boot is enabled, it should also be called before
> early param parsing.
> 
> But taking this threat into account also brings other questions.
> i.e, a physical attacker with root access on a system where Lockdown is
> enabled and with a bootchain configured with shim+MOK is able to change
> kernel cmdline, generate a MOK and sign a compromised kernel
> binary. Thus defeating lockdown purpose.
> 
> In order to take the physical attacker into account, a securely
> configured bootchain where the kernel image can't be tampered with and
> where an attacker is not able to inject it owns certificates/hash in
> db/MOK is mandatory so that Lockdown makes sense.

To be perfectly clear, my intention was not to suggest including a
physical attacker in the Lockdown threat model, but rather to provide
examples of how such an attacker could bypass Lockdown through other
exploitation paths.

  reply	other threads:[~2026-11-17  8:50 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 10+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2026-11-02 14:00 [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:00 ` [PATCH 1/2] iommu: Add iommu_is_available() API Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-02 14:00 ` [PATCH 2/2] security: lockdown: Prevent boot with lockdown but no IOMMU Mario Limonciello (AMD)
2026-11-11  7:30 ` [PATCH 0/2] lockdown: Prevent booting with lockdown enabled but IOMMU disabled Xiu Jianfeng
2026-11-12 19:27   ` Mario Limonciello
2026-11-16 13:28     ` Nicolas Bouchinet
2026-11-17  8:49       ` Nicolas Bouchinet [this message]
2026-11-16 19:49     ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 19:44 ` Jason Gunthorpe
2026-11-16 19:46   ` Mario Limonciello

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