* [PATCH] rust_binder: disallow binder fd transfers
@ 2026-11-17 23:19 Carlos Llamas
2026-11-18 11:29 ` Alice Ryhl
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Carlos Llamas @ 2026-11-17 23:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Arve Hjønnevåg, Todd Kjos,
Christian Brauner, Carlos Llamas, Alice Ryhl
Cc: kernel-team, linux-kernel, rust-for-linux
Transferring a binder device fd via BINDER_TYPE_FD or BINDER_TYPE_FDA
has no valid use case and can create direct reference cycles that
prevent Process::release() from running when a queued transaction is
left unread. Moreover, a binder file is bound to the opening process's
task, credentials, and mmap state, so transferring it to another
process breaks binder's per-process ownership model.
Disallow binder device fd transfers by returning EINVAL in
Allocation::info_add_fd().
Signed-off-by: Carlos Llamas <cmllamas@google.com>
---
drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs | 7 +++++++
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
diff --git a/drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs b/drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs
index 927bf47d5d20..8cd4c2a4402a 100644
--- a/drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs
+++ b/drivers/android/binder/allocation.rs
@@ -182,6 +182,13 @@ pub(crate) fn info_add_fd(
buffer_offset: usize,
close_on_free: bool,
) -> Result {
+ // SAFETY: `file` is valid; read `f_op` with `READ_ONCE` semantics.
+ let f_op = unsafe { (&raw const (*file.as_ptr()).f_op).read_volatile() };
+ if core::ptr::eq(f_op, &crate::rust_binder_fops.0) {
+ // Binder FD transfers are not allowed.
+ return Err(EINVAL);
+ }
+
self.get_or_init_info().file_list.files_to_translate.push(
FileEntry {
file,
--
2.56.1.703.gf848ed807c-goog
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH] rust_binder: disallow binder fd transfers
2026-11-17 23:19 [PATCH] rust_binder: disallow binder fd transfers Carlos Llamas
@ 2026-11-18 11:29 ` Alice Ryhl
2026-11-21 18:21 ` Carlos Llamas
0 siblings, 1 reply; 3+ messages in thread
From: Alice Ryhl @ 2026-11-18 11:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Carlos Llamas
Cc: Alice Ryhl, Greg Kroah-Hartman, Arve Hjønnevåg,
Todd Kjos, Christian Brauner, kernel-team, linux-kernel,
rust-for-linux
On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:19:26PM +0000, Carlos Llamas wrote:
> @@ -182,6 +182,13 @@ pub(crate) fn info_add_fd(
> buffer_offset: usize,
> close_on_free: bool,
> ) -> Result {
> + // SAFETY: `file` is valid; read `f_op` with `READ_ONCE` semantics.
> + let f_op = unsafe { (&raw const (*file.as_ptr()).f_op).read_volatile() };
> + if core::ptr::eq(f_op, &crate::rust_binder_fops.0) {
> + // Binder FD transfers are not allowed.
> + return Err(EINVAL);
> + }
We have moved to using atomic_load instead of a volatile read when the C side
uses READ_ONCE. For example:
// SAFETY: `file` is valid, so `f_op` is valid and aligned, and any
// concurrent writes are atomic under LKMM.
let f_op = unsafe { atomic_load(&raw mut (*file.as_ptr()).f_op, Relaxed) };
however the f_op field isn't read/modified with READ/WRITE_ONCE on the C
side, so I think we can use a bare access.
let f_op = unsafe { (*file.as_ptr()).f_op };
Alice
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH] rust_binder: disallow binder fd transfers
2026-11-18 11:29 ` Alice Ryhl
@ 2026-11-21 18:21 ` Carlos Llamas
0 siblings, 0 replies; 3+ messages in thread
From: Carlos Llamas @ 2026-11-21 18:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Alice Ryhl
Cc: Greg Kroah-Hartman, Arve Hjønnevåg, Todd Kjos,
Christian Brauner, kernel-team, linux-kernel, rust-for-linux
On Wed, Nov 18, 2026 at 11:29:32AM +0000, Alice Ryhl wrote:
> On Tue, Nov 17, 2026 at 11:19:26PM +0000, Carlos Llamas wrote:
> > @@ -182,6 +182,13 @@ pub(crate) fn info_add_fd(
> > buffer_offset: usize,
> > close_on_free: bool,
> > ) -> Result {
> > + // SAFETY: `file` is valid; read `f_op` with `READ_ONCE` semantics.
> > + let f_op = unsafe { (&raw const (*file.as_ptr()).f_op).read_volatile() };
> > + if core::ptr::eq(f_op, &crate::rust_binder_fops.0) {
> > + // Binder FD transfers are not allowed.
> > + return Err(EINVAL);
> > + }
>
> We have moved to using atomic_load instead of a volatile read when the C side
> uses READ_ONCE. For example:
>
> // SAFETY: `file` is valid, so `f_op` is valid and aligned, and any
> // concurrent writes are atomic under LKMM.
> let f_op = unsafe { atomic_load(&raw mut (*file.as_ptr()).f_op, Relaxed) };
I see, ok I'll switch to this for v2.
>
> however the f_op field isn't read/modified with READ/WRITE_ONCE on the C
> side, so I think we can use a bare access.
>
> let f_op = unsafe { (*file.as_ptr()).f_op };
We don't but there are other fd's in other drivers that do. This was
flagged by my local LLM review. It was in some tty driver and somewhere
else that override the f_ops. It seems pretty far-fetched that a false
rust_binder_fops would trigger from this, but at least it would protect
against KCSAN reports and similar. So probably best to keep it.
--
Carlos Llamas
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 3+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-11-21 18:21 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 3+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2026-11-17 23:19 [PATCH] rust_binder: disallow binder fd transfers Carlos Llamas
2026-11-18 11:29 ` Alice Ryhl
2026-11-21 18:21 ` Carlos Llamas
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox