* [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest
2018-01-09 12:03 [PATCH v2 0/8] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant 2") mitigations " Paolo Bonzini
@ 2018-01-09 12:03 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 14:22 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-10 20:13 ` Tom Lendacky
0 siblings, 2 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2018-01-09 12:03 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: rkrcmar, liran.alon, jmattson, aliguori, thomas.lendacky, dwmw,
bp, x86
Direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD is important
for performance. Allow load/store of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, restore guest
IBRS on VM entry and set it to 0 on VM exit (because Linux does not use
it yet).
Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
---
arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
index 31ace8d7774a..934a21e02e03 100644
--- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
+++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
@@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
u64 gs_base;
} host;
+ u64 spec_ctrl;
+
u32 *msrpm;
ulong nmi_iret_rip;
@@ -248,6 +250,8 @@ struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
{ .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true },
{ .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true },
#endif
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = true },
+ { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = true },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false },
{ .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false },
@@ -283,6 +287,8 @@ struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
/* enable/disable Virtual GIF */
static int vgif = true;
module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
+
+static bool __read_mostly have_spec_ctrl;
static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool invalidate_gpa);
@@ -1135,6 +1141,17 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
pr_info("Virtual GIF supported\n");
}
+ /*
+ * FIXME: this is only needed until SPEC_CTRL is supported
+ * by upstream Linux in cpufeatures, then it can be replaced
+ * with static_cpu_has.
+ */
+ have_spec_ctrl = cpu_has_spec_ctrl();
+ if (have_spec_ctrl)
+ pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL available\n");
+ else
+ pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL not available\n");
+
return 0;
err:
@@ -3599,6 +3616,9 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
case MSR_VM_CR:
msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr;
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
msr_info->data = 0x01000065;
break;
@@ -3754,6 +3774,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
case MSR_VM_IGNNE:
vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented wrmsr: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", ecx, data);
break;
+ case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
+ svm->spec_ctrl = data;
+ break;
case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data);
@@ -4942,6 +4965,13 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
local_irq_enable();
+ /*
+ * MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL is restored after the last indirect branch
+ * before vmentry.
+ */
+ if (have_spec_ctrl && svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
+
asm volatile (
"push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t"
"mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
@@ -5015,6 +5045,18 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
#endif
);
+ if (have_spec_ctrl) {
+ rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
+ if (svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
+ wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
+ }
+ /*
+ * Speculative execution past the above wrmsrl might encounter
+ * an indirect branch and use guest-controlled contents of the
+ * indirect branch predictor; block it.
+ */
+ asm("lfence");
+
#ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
#else
--
1.8.3.1
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down " Paolo Bonzini
@ 2018-01-09 14:22 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 16:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 16:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-10 20:13 ` Tom Lendacky
1 sibling, 2 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk @ 2018-01-09 14:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paolo Bonzini
Cc: linux-kernel, kvm, rkrcmar, liran.alon, jmattson, aliguori,
thomas.lendacky, dwmw, bp, x86
On Tue, Jan 09, 2018 at 01:03:08PM +0100, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> Direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD is important
> for performance. Allow load/store of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, restore guest
> IBRS on VM entry and set it to 0 on VM exit (because Linux does not use
> it yet).
>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 31ace8d7774a..934a21e02e03 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
> u64 gs_base;
> } host;
>
> + u64 spec_ctrl;
> +
> u32 *msrpm;
>
> ulong nmi_iret_rip;
> @@ -248,6 +250,8 @@ struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
> { .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true },
> { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true },
> #endif
> + { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = true },
> + { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = true },
> { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false },
> { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false },
> { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false },
> @@ -283,6 +287,8 @@ struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
> /* enable/disable Virtual GIF */
> static int vgif = true;
> module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
> +
> +static bool __read_mostly have_spec_ctrl;
>
> static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
> static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool invalidate_gpa);
> @@ -1135,6 +1141,17 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
> pr_info("Virtual GIF supported\n");
> }
>
> + /*
> + * FIXME: this is only needed until SPEC_CTRL is supported
> + * by upstream Linux in cpufeatures, then it can be replaced
> + * with static_cpu_has.
> + */
> + have_spec_ctrl = cpu_has_spec_ctrl();
> + if (have_spec_ctrl)
> + pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL available\n");
> + else
> + pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL not available\n");
Perhaps just
pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL %s available\n", have_spec_ctrl ? "" : "not");
> +
> return 0;
>
> err:
> @@ -3599,6 +3616,9 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr_info)
> case MSR_VM_CR:
> msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr;
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> + msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
> + break;
> case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
> msr_info->data = 0x01000065;
> break;
> @@ -3754,6 +3774,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, struct msr_data *msr)
> case MSR_VM_IGNNE:
> vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented wrmsr: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", ecx, data);
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> + svm->spec_ctrl = data;
> + break;
> case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
> if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
> avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data);
> @@ -4942,6 +4965,13 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>
> local_irq_enable();
>
> + /*
> + * MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL is restored after the last indirect branch
> + * before vmentry.
> + */
> + if (have_spec_ctrl && svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
> +
> asm volatile (
> "push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t"
> "mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
> @@ -5015,6 +5045,18 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> #endif
> );
>
> + if (have_spec_ctrl) {
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
> + if (svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
Perhaps just :
if (svm->spec_ctrl) ?
And above too?
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
> + }
> + /*
> + * Speculative execution past the above wrmsrl might encounter
> + * an indirect branch and use guest-controlled contents of the
> + * indirect branch predictor; block it.
> + */
> + asm("lfence");
Don't you want this to be part of the if () .. else part?
Meaning:
if (have_spec_ctrl && svm->spec_ctrl)
wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
else
asm("lfence");
But .. I am missing something - AMD don't expose 0x48. They expose only 0x49.
That is only the IPBP is needed on AMD? (I haven't actually seen any official
docs from AMD).
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
> #else
> --
> 1.8.3.1
>
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest
2018-01-09 14:22 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
@ 2018-01-09 16:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 16:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
1 sibling, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2018-01-09 16:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Cc: linux-kernel, kvm, rkrcmar, liran.alon, jmattson, aliguori,
thomas.lendacky, dwmw, bp, x86
On 09/01/2018 15:22, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>> + have_spec_ctrl = cpu_has_spec_ctrl();
>> + if (have_spec_ctrl)
>> + pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL available\n");
>> + else
>> + pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL not available\n");
> Perhaps just
>
> pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL %s available\n", have_spec_ctrl ? "" : "not");
>
I don't expect any of these FIXMEs to be ever committed. :)
Paolo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest
2018-01-09 14:22 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 16:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
@ 2018-01-09 16:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-11 10:45 ` Wanpeng Li
1 sibling, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2018-01-09 16:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
Cc: linux-kernel, kvm, rkrcmar, liran.alon, jmattson, aliguori,
thomas.lendacky, dwmw, bp, x86
Oops, I missed these.
On 09/01/2018 15:22, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>> + if (have_spec_ctrl) {
>> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
>> + if (svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
> Perhaps just :
>
> if (svm->spec_ctrl) ?
>
> And above too?
These will become != SPEC_CTRL_ENABLE_IBRS or something like that.
>> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
>> + }
>> + /*
>> + * Speculative execution past the above wrmsrl might encounter
>> + * an indirect branch and use guest-controlled contents of the
>> + * indirect branch predictor; block it.
>> + */
>> + asm("lfence");
> Don't you want this to be part of the if () .. else part?
Not right now, because the processor could speculate that have_spec_ctrl
== 0 and skip the wrmsrl. After it becomes a static_cpu_has, it could
move inside, but only if the kernel is compiled with static keys enabled.
> Meaning:
>
> if (have_spec_ctrl && svm->spec_ctrl)
> wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
> else
> asm("lfence");
>
> But .. I am missing something - AMD don't expose 0x48. They expose only 0x49.
>
> That is only the IPBP is needed on AMD? (I haven't actually seen any official
> docs from AMD).
AMD is not exposing 0x48 yet, but they plan to based on my information
from a few weeks ago.
Paolo
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest
@ 2018-01-09 16:10 Liran Alon
0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Liran Alon @ 2018-01-09 16:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: pbonzini
Cc: jmattson, x86, dwmw, bp, thomas.lendacky, aliguori, rkrcmar,
linux-kernel, kvm
----- pbonzini@redhat.com wrote:
> Direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD is
> important
> for performance. Allow load/store of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, restore
> guest
> IBRS on VM entry and set it to 0 on VM exit (because Linux does not
> use
> it yet).
>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 31ace8d7774a..934a21e02e03 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> @@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
> u64 gs_base;
> } host;
>
> + u64 spec_ctrl;
> +
> u32 *msrpm;
>
> ulong nmi_iret_rip;
> @@ -248,6 +250,8 @@ struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
> { .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true },
> { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true },
> #endif
> + { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = true },
> + { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = true },
> { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false },
> { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false },
> { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false },
> @@ -283,6 +287,8 @@ struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
> /* enable/disable Virtual GIF */
> static int vgif = true;
> module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
> +
> +static bool __read_mostly have_spec_ctrl;
>
> static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
> static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool
> invalidate_gpa);
> @@ -1135,6 +1141,17 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
> pr_info("Virtual GIF supported\n");
> }
>
> + /*
> + * FIXME: this is only needed until SPEC_CTRL is supported
> + * by upstream Linux in cpufeatures, then it can be replaced
> + * with static_cpu_has.
> + */
> + have_spec_ctrl = cpu_has_spec_ctrl();
> + if (have_spec_ctrl)
> + pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL available\n");
> + else
> + pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL not available\n");
> +
> return 0;
>
> err:
> @@ -3599,6 +3616,9 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> struct msr_data *msr_info)
> case MSR_VM_CR:
> msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr;
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> + msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
> + break;
> case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
> msr_info->data = 0x01000065;
> break;
> @@ -3754,6 +3774,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> struct msr_data *msr)
> case MSR_VM_IGNNE:
> vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented wrmsr: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n", ecx,
> data);
> break;
> + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> + svm->spec_ctrl = data;
> + break;
> case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
> if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
> avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data);
> @@ -4942,6 +4965,13 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
> *vcpu)
>
> local_irq_enable();
>
> + /*
> + * MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL is restored after the last indirect branch
> + * before vmentry.
> + */
> + if (have_spec_ctrl && svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
> +
> asm volatile (
> "push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t"
> "mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
> @@ -5015,6 +5045,18 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
> *vcpu)
> #endif
> );
>
> + if (have_spec_ctrl) {
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
> + if (svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
> + }
> + /*
> + * Speculative execution past the above wrmsrl might encounter
> + * an indirect branch and use guest-controlled contents of the
> + * indirect branch predictor; block it.
> + */
> + asm("lfence");
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
> #else
> --
> 1.8.3.1
Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest
@ 2018-01-09 16:36 Liran Alon
0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Liran Alon @ 2018-01-09 16:36 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: pbonzini
Cc: jmattson, x86, dwmw, bp, aliguori, thomas.lendacky, rkrcmar,
linux-kernel, kvm
----- liran.alon@oracle.com wrote:
> ----- pbonzini@redhat.com wrote:
>
> > Direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD is
> > important
> > for performance. Allow load/store of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, restore
> > guest
> > IBRS on VM entry and set it to 0 on VM exit (because Linux does not
> > use
> > it yet).
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> > ---
> > arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> > 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
> >
> > diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> > index 31ace8d7774a..934a21e02e03 100644
> > --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> > +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> > @@ -183,6 +183,8 @@ struct vcpu_svm {
> > u64 gs_base;
> > } host;
> >
> > + u64 spec_ctrl;
> > +
> > u32 *msrpm;
> >
> > ulong nmi_iret_rip;
> > @@ -248,6 +250,8 @@ struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
> > { .index = MSR_CSTAR, .always = true },
> > { .index = MSR_SYSCALL_MASK, .always = true },
> > #endif
> > + { .index = MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, .always = true },
> > + { .index = MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD, .always = true },
> > { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHFROMIP, .always = false },
> > { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTBRANCHTOIP, .always = false },
> > { .index = MSR_IA32_LASTINTFROMIP, .always = false },
> > @@ -283,6 +287,8 @@ struct amd_svm_iommu_ir {
> > /* enable/disable Virtual GIF */
> > static int vgif = true;
> > module_param(vgif, int, 0444);
> > +
> > +static bool __read_mostly have_spec_ctrl;
> >
> > static void svm_set_cr0(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, unsigned long cr0);
> > static void svm_flush_tlb(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu, bool
> > invalidate_gpa);
> > @@ -1135,6 +1141,17 @@ static __init int svm_hardware_setup(void)
> > pr_info("Virtual GIF supported\n");
> > }
> >
> > + /*
> > + * FIXME: this is only needed until SPEC_CTRL is supported
> > + * by upstream Linux in cpufeatures, then it can be replaced
> > + * with static_cpu_has.
> > + */
> > + have_spec_ctrl = cpu_has_spec_ctrl();
> > + if (have_spec_ctrl)
> > + pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL available\n");
> > + else
> > + pr_info("kvm: SPEC_CTRL not available\n");
> > +
> > return 0;
> >
> > err:
> > @@ -3599,6 +3616,9 @@ static int svm_get_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > struct msr_data *msr_info)
> > case MSR_VM_CR:
> > msr_info->data = svm->nested.vm_cr_msr;
> > break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> > + msr_info->data = svm->spec_ctrl;
> > + break;
> > case MSR_IA32_UCODE_REV:
> > msr_info->data = 0x01000065;
> > break;
> > @@ -3754,6 +3774,9 @@ static int svm_set_msr(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu,
> > struct msr_data *msr)
> > case MSR_VM_IGNNE:
> > vcpu_unimpl(vcpu, "unimplemented wrmsr: 0x%x data 0x%llx\n",
> ecx,
> > data);
> > break;
> > + case MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL:
> > + svm->spec_ctrl = data;
> > + break;
> > case MSR_IA32_APICBASE:
> > if (kvm_vcpu_apicv_active(vcpu))
> > avic_update_vapic_bar(to_svm(vcpu), data);
> > @@ -4942,6 +4965,13 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
> > *vcpu)
> >
> > local_irq_enable();
> >
> > + /*
> > + * MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL is restored after the last indirect branch
> > + * before vmentry.
> > + */
> > + if (have_spec_ctrl && svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
> > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
> > +
> > asm volatile (
> > "push %%" _ASM_BP "; \n\t"
> > "mov %c[rbx](%[svm]), %%" _ASM_BX " \n\t"
> > @@ -5015,6 +5045,18 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu
> > *vcpu)
> > #endif
> > );
> >
> > + if (have_spec_ctrl) {
> > + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
> > + if (svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
In second thought, I think this condition is a bug.
Intel explicitly specified that after a #VMExit: Set IBRS bit even if it was already set.
Therefore, you should remove the "if (svm->spec_ctrl != 0)" condition here.
Otherwise, guest BTB/BHB could be used by host.
> > + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
> > + }
> > + /*
> > + * Speculative execution past the above wrmsrl might encounter
> > + * an indirect branch and use guest-controlled contents of the
> > + * indirect branch predictor; block it.
> > + */
> > + asm("lfence");
> > +
> > #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> > wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
> > #else
> > --
> > 1.8.3.1
>
> Reviewed-by: Liran Alon <liran.alon@oracle.com>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down " Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 14:22 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
@ 2018-01-10 20:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-11 10:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
1 sibling, 1 reply; 9+ messages in thread
From: Tom Lendacky @ 2018-01-10 20:13 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paolo Bonzini, linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: rkrcmar, liran.alon, jmattson, aliguori, dwmw, bp, x86
On 1/9/2018 6:03 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
> Direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD is important
> for performance. Allow load/store of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, restore guest
> IBRS on VM entry and set it to 0 on VM exit (because Linux does not use
> it yet).
>
> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
> ---
> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
> 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
>
> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> index 31ace8d7774a..934a21e02e03 100644
> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
...
> @@ -5015,6 +5045,18 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
> #endif
> );
>
> + if (have_spec_ctrl) {
> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
> + if (svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
> + }
> + /*
> + * Speculative execution past the above wrmsrl might encounter
> + * an indirect branch and use guest-controlled contents of the
> + * indirect branch predictor; block it.
> + */
> + asm("lfence");
This will end up needing to be an alternative macro based on the
LFENCE_RDTSC or MFENCE_RDTSC features [1]. You'll probably just want to
use the speculation barrier macro that ends up being defined to control
the speculation here.
Thanks,
Tom
[1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=151545930207815&w=2
> +
> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
> wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
> #else
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest
2018-01-10 20:13 ` Tom Lendacky
@ 2018-01-11 10:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Paolo Bonzini @ 2018-01-11 10:33 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Tom Lendacky, linux-kernel, kvm
Cc: rkrcmar, liran.alon, jmattson, aliguori, dwmw, bp, x86
On 10/01/2018 21:13, Tom Lendacky wrote:
> On 1/9/2018 6:03 AM, Paolo Bonzini wrote:
>> Direct access to MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD is important
>> for performance. Allow load/store of MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, restore guest
>> IBRS on VM entry and set it to 0 on VM exit (because Linux does not use
>> it yet).
>>
>> Signed-off-by: Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>
>> ---
>> arch/x86/kvm/svm.c | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
>> 1 file changed, 42 insertions(+)
>>
>> diff --git a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>> index 31ace8d7774a..934a21e02e03 100644
>> --- a/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>> +++ b/arch/x86/kvm/svm.c
>
> ...
>
>> @@ -5015,6 +5045,18 @@ static void svm_vcpu_run(struct kvm_vcpu *vcpu)
>> #endif
>> );
>>
>> + if (have_spec_ctrl) {
>> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
>> + if (svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
>> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
>> + }
>> + /*
>> + * Speculative execution past the above wrmsrl might encounter
>> + * an indirect branch and use guest-controlled contents of the
>> + * indirect branch predictor; block it.
>> + */
>> + asm("lfence");
>
> This will end up needing to be an alternative macro based on the
> LFENCE_RDTSC or MFENCE_RDTSC features [1]. You'll probably just want to
> use the speculation barrier macro that ends up being defined to control
> the speculation here.
Yes. Though, is there any processor that has spec_ctrl (which is none
on AMD) but needs a full fence?
Paolo
> Thanks,
> Tom
>
> [1] https://marc.info/?l=linux-kernel&m=151545930207815&w=2
>
>> +
>> #ifdef CONFIG_X86_64
>> wrmsrl(MSR_GS_BASE, svm->host.gs_base);
>> #else
>>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
* Re: [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest
2018-01-09 16:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
@ 2018-01-11 10:45 ` Wanpeng Li
0 siblings, 0 replies; 9+ messages in thread
From: Wanpeng Li @ 2018-01-11 10:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Paolo Bonzini
Cc: Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk, linux-kernel, kvm, Radim Krcmar,
Liran Alon, Jim Mattson, Anthony Liguori, thomas.lendacky, dwmw,
Borislav Petkov, the arch/x86 maintainers
2018-01-10 0:08 GMT+08:00 Paolo Bonzini <pbonzini@redhat.com>:
> Oops, I missed these.
>
> On 09/01/2018 15:22, Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk wrote:
>>> + if (have_spec_ctrl) {
>>> + rdmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, svm->spec_ctrl);
>>> + if (svm->spec_ctrl != 0)
>> Perhaps just :
>>
>> if (svm->spec_ctrl) ?
>>
>> And above too?
>
> These will become != SPEC_CTRL_ENABLE_IBRS or something like that.
>
>>> + wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
>>> + }
>>> + /*
>>> + * Speculative execution past the above wrmsrl might encounter
>>> + * an indirect branch and use guest-controlled contents of the
>>> + * indirect branch predictor; block it.
>>> + */
>>> + asm("lfence");
>> Don't you want this to be part of the if () .. else part?
>
> Not right now, because the processor could speculate that have_spec_ctrl
> == 0 and skip the wrmsrl. After it becomes a static_cpu_has, it could
> move inside, but only if the kernel is compiled with static keys enabled.
>
>> Meaning:
>>
>> if (have_spec_ctrl && svm->spec_ctrl)
>> wrmsrl(MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL, 0);
>> else
>> asm("lfence");
>>
>> But .. I am missing something - AMD don't expose 0x48. They expose only 0x49.
>>
>> That is only the IPBP is needed on AMD? (I haven't actually seen any official
>> docs from AMD).
>
> AMD is not exposing 0x48 yet, but they plan to based on my information
> from a few weeks ago.
Haha, interesting, they announce officially there is no issue for
variant 2. http://www.amd.com/en/corporate/speculative-execution
Regards,
Wanpeng Li
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 9+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2018-01-11 10:45 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 9+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
-- links below jump to the message on this page --
2018-01-09 16:10 [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down to guest Liran Alon
-- strict thread matches above, loose matches on Subject: below --
2018-01-09 16:36 Liran Alon
2018-01-09 12:03 [PATCH v2 0/8] KVM: x86: expose CVE-2017-5715 ("Spectre variant 2") mitigations " Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 12:03 ` [PATCH 6/8] kvm: svm: pass MSR_IA32_SPEC_CTRL and MSR_IA32_PRED_CMD down " Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 14:22 ` Konrad Rzeszutek Wilk
2018-01-09 16:05 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-09 16:08 ` Paolo Bonzini
2018-01-11 10:45 ` Wanpeng Li
2018-01-10 20:13 ` Tom Lendacky
2018-01-11 10:33 ` Paolo Bonzini
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox