* [LTP] [PATCH] prot_hsymlinks: Fix failure on read-only machine
@ 2017-03-10 0:54 the_hoang0709
2017-03-22 3:06 ` Hoang Nguyen
2017-04-05 17:25 ` Alexey Kodanev
0 siblings, 2 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: the_hoang0709 @ 2017-03-10 0:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
From: Hoang Nguyen <the_hoang0709@yahoo.com>
Return 32 if /etc/passwd is read-only.
Also move tst_tmpdir before useradd in setup, to avoid "TESTDIR was
NULL" in tst_rmdir in cleanup.
Fixes #88
Signed-off-by: Hoang Nguyen <the_hoang0709@yahoo.com>
---
testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c b/testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c
index b23064a..31ddefa 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c
@@ -206,6 +206,8 @@ static void setup(int argc, char *argv[])
tst_sig(FORK, DEF_HANDLER, cleanup);
+ tst_tmpdir();
+
test_user_cmd("useradd");
/*
* enable hardlinks and symlinks restrictions,
@@ -220,8 +222,6 @@ static void setup(int argc, char *argv[])
disable_protected_slinks = 1;
}
- tst_tmpdir();
-
init_base_dirs();
init_files_dirs();
@@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ static void cleanup(void)
if (skip_cleanup)
return;
- test_user_cmd("userdel -r");
+ if (!eaccess("/etc/passwd", W_OK))
+ test_user_cmd("userdel -r");
if (disable_protected_hlinks) {
tst_resm(TINFO, "Disable protected hardlinks mode back");
@@ -316,8 +317,13 @@ static void test_user_cmd(const char *user_cmd)
char cmd[MAX_CMD_LEN];
snprintf(cmd, MAX_CMD_LEN, "%s %s", user_cmd, users[TEST_USER].name);
if (system(cmd) != 0) {
- tst_brkm(TBROK, cleanup, "Failed to run cmd: %s %s",
+ if (eaccess("/etc/passwd", W_OK)) {
+ tst_brkm(TCONF, cleanup,
+ "/etc/passwd is not accessible");
+ } else {
+ tst_brkm(TBROK, cleanup, "Failed to run cmd: %s %s",
user_cmd, users[TEST_USER].name);
+ }
}
}
--
2.7.4
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* [LTP] [PATCH] prot_hsymlinks: Fix failure on read-only machine
2017-03-10 0:54 [LTP] [PATCH] prot_hsymlinks: Fix failure on read-only machine the_hoang0709
@ 2017-03-22 3:06 ` Hoang Nguyen
2017-04-05 1:14 ` Hoang Nguyen
2017-04-05 17:25 ` Alexey Kodanev
1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Hoang Nguyen @ 2017-03-22 3:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Hi,
Could you help to check, so that we can close the Issue ?
Thanks and regards
Hoang
Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android
On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 7:55, the_hoang0709@yahoo.com<the_hoang0709@yahoo.com> wrote: From: Hoang Nguyen <the_hoang0709@yahoo.com>
Return 32 if /etc/passwd is read-only.
Also move tst_tmpdir before useradd in setup, to avoid "TESTDIR was
NULL" in tst_rmdir in cleanup.
Fixes #88
Signed-off-by: Hoang Nguyen <the_hoang0709@yahoo.com>
---
testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c b/testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c
index b23064a..31ddefa 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c
@@ -206,6 +206,8 @@ static void setup(int argc, char *argv[])
tst_sig(FORK, DEF_HANDLER, cleanup);
+ tst_tmpdir();
+
test_user_cmd("useradd");
/*
* enable hardlinks and symlinks restrictions,
@@ -220,8 +222,6 @@ static void setup(int argc, char *argv[])
disable_protected_slinks = 1;
}
- tst_tmpdir();
-
init_base_dirs();
init_files_dirs();
@@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ static void cleanup(void)
if (skip_cleanup)
return;
- test_user_cmd("userdel -r");
+ if (!eaccess("/etc/passwd", W_OK))
+ test_user_cmd("userdel -r");
if (disable_protected_hlinks) {
tst_resm(TINFO, "Disable protected hardlinks mode back");
@@ -316,8 +317,13 @@ static void test_user_cmd(const char *user_cmd)
char cmd[MAX_CMD_LEN];
snprintf(cmd, MAX_CMD_LEN, "%s %s", user_cmd, users[TEST_USER].name);
if (system(cmd) != 0) {
- tst_brkm(TBROK, cleanup, "Failed to run cmd: %s %s",
+ if (eaccess("/etc/passwd", W_OK)) {
+ tst_brkm(TCONF, cleanup,
+ "/etc/passwd is not accessible");
+ } else {
+ tst_brkm(TBROK, cleanup, "Failed to run cmd: %s %s",
user_cmd, users[TEST_USER].name);
+ }
}
}
--
2.7.4
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* [LTP] [PATCH] prot_hsymlinks: Fix failure on read-only machine
2017-03-22 3:06 ` Hoang Nguyen
@ 2017-04-05 1:14 ` Hoang Nguyen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Hoang Nguyen @ 2017-04-05 1:14 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Hello,
Could you help to check if the patch is ok or not ?
Thanks and regards.
Hoang
From: Hoang Nguyen <the_hoang0709@yahoo.com>
To: "the_hoang0709@yahoo.com" <the_hoang0709@yahoo.com>; "ltp@lists.linux.it" <ltp@lists.linux.it>
Sent: Wednesday, 22 March 2017, 10:06
Subject: Re: [LTP] [PATCH] prot_hsymlinks: Fix failure on read-only machine
Hi,
Could you help to check, so that we can close the Issue ?
Thanks and regards
Hoang
Sent from Yahoo Mail on Android
On Fri, Mar 10, 2017 at 7:55, the_hoang0709@yahoo.com<the_hoang0709@yahoo.com> wrote: From: Hoang Nguyen <the_hoang0709@yahoo.com>
Return 32 if /etc/passwd is read-only.
Also move tst_tmpdir before useradd in setup, to avoid "TESTDIR was
NULL" in tst_rmdir in cleanup.
Fixes #88
Signed-off-by: Hoang Nguyen <the_hoang0709@yahoo.com>
---
testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c | 14 ++++++++++----
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c b/testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c
index b23064a..31ddefa 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c
+++ b/testcases/kernel/security/prot_hsymlinks/prot_hsymlinks.c
@@ -206,6 +206,8 @@ static void setup(int argc, char *argv[])
tst_sig(FORK, DEF_HANDLER, cleanup);
+ tst_tmpdir();
+
test_user_cmd("useradd");
/*
* enable hardlinks and symlinks restrictions,
@@ -220,8 +222,6 @@ static void setup(int argc, char *argv[])
disable_protected_slinks = 1;
}
- tst_tmpdir();
-
init_base_dirs();
init_files_dirs();
@@ -273,7 +273,8 @@ static void cleanup(void)
if (skip_cleanup)
return;
- test_user_cmd("userdel -r");
+ if (!eaccess("/etc/passwd", W_OK))
+ test_user_cmd("userdel -r");
if (disable_protected_hlinks) {
tst_resm(TINFO, "Disable protected hardlinks mode back");
@@ -316,8 +317,13 @@ static void test_user_cmd(const char *user_cmd)
char cmd[MAX_CMD_LEN];
snprintf(cmd, MAX_CMD_LEN, "%s %s", user_cmd, users[TEST_USER].name);
if (system(cmd) != 0) {
- tst_brkm(TBROK, cleanup, "Failed to run cmd: %s %s",
+ if (eaccess("/etc/passwd", W_OK)) {
+ tst_brkm(TCONF, cleanup,
+ "/etc/passwd is not accessible");
+ } else {
+ tst_brkm(TBROK, cleanup, "Failed to run cmd: %s %s",
user_cmd, users[TEST_USER].name);
+ }
}
}
--
2.7.4
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^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH] prot_hsymlinks: Fix failure on read-only machine
2017-03-10 0:54 [LTP] [PATCH] prot_hsymlinks: Fix failure on read-only machine the_hoang0709
2017-03-22 3:06 ` Hoang Nguyen
@ 2017-04-05 17:25 ` Alexey Kodanev
2017-04-09 8:29 ` Hoang Nguyen
1 sibling, 1 reply; 5+ messages in thread
From: Alexey Kodanev @ 2017-04-05 17:25 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Hi,
On 10.03.2017 3:54, the_hoang0709@yahoo.com wrote:
> ...
> if (disable_protected_hlinks) {
> tst_resm(TINFO, "Disable protected hardlinks mode back");
> @@ -316,8 +317,13 @@ static void test_user_cmd(const char *user_cmd)
> char cmd[MAX_CMD_LEN];
> snprintf(cmd, MAX_CMD_LEN, "%s %s", user_cmd, users[TEST_USER].name);
> if (system(cmd) != 0) {
> - tst_brkm(TBROK, cleanup, "Failed to run cmd: %s %s",
> + if (eaccess("/etc/passwd", W_OK)) {
> + tst_brkm(TCONF, cleanup,
> + "/etc/passwd is not accessible");
It would be better to add this check to the top of setup(), right after
tst_kvercmp(), and exit without doing cleanup.
Thanks,
Alexey
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 5+ messages in thread* [LTP] [PATCH] prot_hsymlinks: Fix failure on read-only machine
2017-04-05 17:25 ` Alexey Kodanev
@ 2017-04-09 8:29 ` Hoang Nguyen
0 siblings, 0 replies; 5+ messages in thread
From: Hoang Nguyen @ 2017-04-09 8:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Hi,
Thanks Alexey, this would be much simpler. I'll send new patch. (also setpriority01 fails on my read-only system, I'll update it similiarly)
Thanks a lot for your help,
Best regards,
Hoang
From: Alexey Kodanev <alexey.kodanev@oracle.com>
To: the_hoang0709@yahoo.com; ltp@lists.linux.it
Sent: Thursday, 6 April 2017, 0:25
Subject: Re: [LTP] [PATCH] prot_hsymlinks: Fix failure on read-only machine
Hi,
On 10.03.2017 3:54, the_hoang0709@yahoo.com wrote:
> ...
> if (disable_protected_hlinks) {
> tst_resm(TINFO, "Disable protected hardlinks mode back");
> @@ -316,8 +317,13 @@ static void test_user_cmd(const char *user_cmd)
> char cmd[MAX_CMD_LEN];
> snprintf(cmd, MAX_CMD_LEN, "%s %s", user_cmd, users[TEST_USER].name);
> if (system(cmd) != 0) {
> - tst_brkm(TBROK, cleanup, "Failed to run cmd: %s %s",
> + if (eaccess("/etc/passwd", W_OK)) {
> + tst_brkm(TCONF, cleanup,
> + "/etc/passwd is not accessible");
It would be better to add this check to the top of setup(), right after
tst_kvercmp(), and exit without doing cleanup.
Thanks,
Alexey
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2017-03-10 0:54 [LTP] [PATCH] prot_hsymlinks: Fix failure on read-only machine the_hoang0709
2017-03-22 3:06 ` Hoang Nguyen
2017-04-05 1:14 ` Hoang Nguyen
2017-04-05 17:25 ` Alexey Kodanev
2017-04-09 8:29 ` Hoang Nguyen
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