* [LTP] [PATCH v2] syscalls/userfaultfd01: add hint about unprivileged_userfaultfd
@ 2019-12-18 4:02 Yang Xu
2020-01-06 7:32 ` Yang Xu
2020-01-06 8:06 ` Li Wang
0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Yang Xu @ 2019-12-18 4:02 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Since commit cefdca0a86be ("userfaultfd/sysctl: add vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd").
, it adds a global sysctl knob "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" to control whether
unprivileged users can use the userfaultfd system calls. Set this to 1 to allow
unprivileged users to use the userfaultfd system calls, or set this to 0 to
restrict userfaultfd to only privileged users (with SYS_CAP_PTRACE capability). The
default value is 1. Add hint about it.
Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
---
.../syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
index a5e142209..4e178b4f8 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
@@ -82,12 +82,19 @@ static void run(void)
set_pages();
- uffd = sys_userfaultfd(O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK);
-
- if (uffd == -1)
- tst_brk(TBROK | TERRNO,
- "Could not create userfault file descriptor");
-
+ TEST(sys_userfaultfd(O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK));
+
+ if (TST_RET == -1) {
+ if (TST_ERR == EPERM) {
+ tst_res(TCONF, "Hint: check /proc/sys/vm/unprivileged_userfaultfd");
+ tst_brk(TCONF | TTERRNO,
+ "userfaultfd() requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE on this system");
+ } else
+ tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO,
+ "Could not create userfault file descriptor");
+ }
+
+ uffd = TST_RET;
uffdio_api.api = UFFD_API;
uffdio_api.features = 0;
SAFE_IOCTL(uffd, UFFDIO_API, &uffdio_api);
--
2.18.0
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [LTP] [PATCH v2] syscalls/userfaultfd01: add hint about unprivileged_userfaultfd
2019-12-18 4:02 [LTP] [PATCH v2] syscalls/userfaultfd01: add hint about unprivileged_userfaultfd Yang Xu
@ 2020-01-06 7:32 ` Yang Xu
2020-01-06 8:06 ` Li Wang
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Yang Xu @ 2020-01-06 7:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Hi
Ping.
> Since commit cefdca0a86be ("userfaultfd/sysctl: add vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd").
> , it adds a global sysctl knob "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" to control whether
> unprivileged users can use the userfaultfd system calls. Set this to 1 to allow
> unprivileged users to use the userfaultfd system calls, or set this to 0 to
> restrict userfaultfd to only privileged users (with SYS_CAP_PTRACE capability). The
> default value is 1. Add hint about it.
>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
> ---
> .../syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> index a5e142209..4e178b4f8 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> @@ -82,12 +82,19 @@ static void run(void)
>
> set_pages();
>
> - uffd = sys_userfaultfd(O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK);
> -
> - if (uffd == -1)
> - tst_brk(TBROK | TERRNO,
> - "Could not create userfault file descriptor");
> -
> + TEST(sys_userfaultfd(O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK));
> +
> + if (TST_RET == -1) {
> + if (TST_ERR == EPERM) {
> + tst_res(TCONF, "Hint: check /proc/sys/vm/unprivileged_userfaultfd");
> + tst_brk(TCONF | TTERRNO,
> + "userfaultfd() requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE on this system");
> + } else
> + tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO,
> + "Could not create userfault file descriptor");
> + }
> +
> + uffd = TST_RET;
> uffdio_api.api = UFFD_API;
> uffdio_api.features = 0;
> SAFE_IOCTL(uffd, UFFDIO_API, &uffdio_api);
>
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [LTP] [PATCH v2] syscalls/userfaultfd01: add hint about unprivileged_userfaultfd
2019-12-18 4:02 [LTP] [PATCH v2] syscalls/userfaultfd01: add hint about unprivileged_userfaultfd Yang Xu
2020-01-06 7:32 ` Yang Xu
@ 2020-01-06 8:06 ` Li Wang
2020-01-06 9:10 ` Yang Xu
1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Li Wang @ 2020-01-06 8:06 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 12:02 PM Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
wrote:
> Since commit cefdca0a86be ("userfaultfd/sysctl: add
> vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd").
> , it adds a global sysctl knob "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" to control
> whether
> unprivileged users can use the userfaultfd system calls. Set this to 1 to
> allow
> unprivileged users to use the userfaultfd system calls, or set this to 0 to
> restrict userfaultfd to only privileged users (with SYS_CAP_PTRACE
> capability). The
> default value is 1. Add hint about it.
>
Can we do the "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" check in the setup() and do set
to 1 if it exists?
And maybe we need more tests for the global sysctl knob
"vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd".
> Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>
> ---
> .../syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c | 19 +++++++++++++------
> 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> index a5e142209..4e178b4f8 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> @@ -82,12 +82,19 @@ static void run(void)
>
> set_pages();
>
> - uffd = sys_userfaultfd(O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK);
> -
> - if (uffd == -1)
> - tst_brk(TBROK | TERRNO,
> - "Could not create userfault file descriptor");
> -
> + TEST(sys_userfaultfd(O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK));
> +
> + if (TST_RET == -1) {
> + if (TST_ERR == EPERM) {
> + tst_res(TCONF, "Hint: check
> /proc/sys/vm/unprivileged_userfaultfd");
> + tst_brk(TCONF | TTERRNO,
> + "userfaultfd() requires CAP_SYS_PTRACE on
> this system");
> + } else
> + tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO,
> + "Could not create userfault file
> descriptor");
> + }
> +
> + uffd = TST_RET;
> uffdio_api.api = UFFD_API;
> uffdio_api.features = 0;
> SAFE_IOCTL(uffd, UFFDIO_API, &uffdio_api);
> --
> 2.18.0
>
>
>
>
> --
> Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
>
>
--
Regards,
Li Wang
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [LTP] [PATCH v2] syscalls/userfaultfd01: add hint about unprivileged_userfaultfd
2020-01-06 8:06 ` Li Wang
@ 2020-01-06 9:10 ` Yang Xu
2020-01-06 9:32 ` Li Wang
2020-01-07 4:56 ` Li Wang
0 siblings, 2 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Yang Xu @ 2020-01-06 9:10 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Hi Li
>
>
> On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 12:02 PM Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com
> <mailto:xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>> wrote:
>
> Since commit cefdca0a86be ("userfaultfd/sysctl: add
> vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd").
> , it adds a global sysctl knob "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" to
> control whether
> unprivileged users can use the userfaultfd system calls. Set this to
> 1 to allow
> unprivileged users to use the userfaultfd system calls, or set this
> to 0 to
> restrict userfaultfd to only privileged users (with SYS_CAP_PTRACE
> capability). The
> default value is 1. Add hint about it.
>
>
> Can we do the "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" check in the setup() and do
> set to 1 if it exists?
I remembered Jan Stancek has a patch about bpf hint about
unprivileged_bpf_disabled, I do as same as that patch did.
Also, month agos about acct02 discussion, Cyril points about adjusting
the threshold value of resume and suppend to make case passes.
So, I have a question that we have unified standards about these cases
(bpf, acct02, affected by sysctl)? Report TCONF or modify argument to
make case passes?
@Cyril and @Jan Stancek What do you think about it?
> And maybe?we need more tests for the global sysctl knob
> "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd".Eeven though we don't have case to test unprivileged_bpf_disabled. I
still think testing unprivileged_userfaultfd is meaningful and we can
begin with it.
Best Regards
Yang Xu
>
>
> Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com
> <mailto:xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>>
> ---
> ?.../syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c? ? ? | 19 +++++++++++++------
> ?1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
>
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> index a5e142209..4e178b4f8 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> @@ -82,12 +82,19 @@ static void run(void)
>
> ? ? ? ? set_pages();
>
> -? ? ? ?uffd = sys_userfaultfd(O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK);
> -
> -? ? ? ?if (uffd == -1)
> -? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?tst_brk(TBROK | TERRNO,
> -? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?"Could not create userfault file descriptor");
> -
> +? ? ? ?TEST(sys_userfaultfd(O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK));
> +
> +? ? ? ?if (TST_RET == -1) {
> +? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?if (TST_ERR == EPERM) {
> +? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?tst_res(TCONF, "Hint: check
> /proc/sys/vm/unprivileged_userfaultfd");
> +? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?tst_brk(TCONF | TTERRNO,
> +? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?"userfaultfd() requires
> CAP_SYS_PTRACE on this system");
> +? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?} else
> +? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO,
> +? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?"Could not create userfault file
> descriptor");
> +? ? ? ?}
> +
> +? ? ? ?uffd = TST_RET;
> ? ? ? ? uffdio_api.api = UFFD_API;
> ? ? ? ? uffdio_api.features = 0;
> ? ? ? ? SAFE_IOCTL(uffd, UFFDIO_API, &uffdio_api);
> --
> 2.18.0
>
>
>
>
> --
> Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
>
>
>
> --
> Regards,
> Li Wang
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [LTP] [PATCH v2] syscalls/userfaultfd01: add hint about unprivileged_userfaultfd
2020-01-06 9:10 ` Yang Xu
@ 2020-01-06 9:32 ` Li Wang
2020-01-07 4:56 ` Li Wang
1 sibling, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Li Wang @ 2020-01-06 9:32 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
On Mon, Jan 6, 2020 at 5:10 PM Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com> wrote:
> Hi Li
> >
> >
> > On Wed, Dec 18, 2019 at 12:02 PM Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com
> > <mailto:xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>> wrote:
> >
> > Since commit cefdca0a86be ("userfaultfd/sysctl: add
> > vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd").
> > , it adds a global sysctl knob "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" to
> > control whether
> > unprivileged users can use the userfaultfd system calls. Set this to
> > 1 to allow
> > unprivileged users to use the userfaultfd system calls, or set this
> > to 0 to
> > restrict userfaultfd to only privileged users (with SYS_CAP_PTRACE
> > capability). The
> > default value is 1. Add hint about it.
> >
> >
> > Can we do the "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" check in the setup() and do
> > set to 1 if it exists?
> I remembered Jan Stancek has a patch about bpf hint about
> unprivileged_bpf_disabled, I do as same as that patch did.
>
I just echo the nob file "unprivileged_bpf_disabled" and find it can't be
changed at runtime. So if the "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" is like this
behavior too, probably we can only do TCONF as your original patch. AnywayI
will take a close look at the kernel commit later.
# cat /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled
1
# echo 0 > /proc/sys/kernel/unprivileged_bpf_disabled
-bash: echo: write error: Invalid argument
>
> Also, month agos about acct02 discussion, Cyril points about adjusting
> the threshold value of resume and suppend to make case passes.
>
> So, I have a question that we have unified standards about these cases
> (bpf, acct02, affected by sysctl)? Report TCONF or modify argument to
> make case passes?
>
> @Cyril and @Jan Stancek What do you think about it?
>
> > And maybe we need more tests for the global sysctl knob
> > "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd".Eeven though we don't have case to test
> unprivileged_bpf_disabled. I
> still think testing unprivileged_userfaultfd is meaningful and we can
> begin with it.
>
> Best Regards
> Yang Xu
> >
> >
> > Signed-off-by: Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com
> > <mailto:xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com>>
> > ---
> > .../syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c | 19
> +++++++++++++------
> > 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
> >
> > diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> > b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> > index a5e142209..4e178b4f8 100644
> > --- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> > +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/userfaultfd/userfaultfd01.c
> > @@ -82,12 +82,19 @@ static void run(void)
> >
> > set_pages();
> >
> > - uffd = sys_userfaultfd(O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK);
> > -
> > - if (uffd == -1)
> > - tst_brk(TBROK | TERRNO,
> > - "Could not create userfault file
> descriptor");
> > -
> > + TEST(sys_userfaultfd(O_CLOEXEC | O_NONBLOCK));
> > +
> > + if (TST_RET == -1) {
> > + if (TST_ERR == EPERM) {
> > + tst_res(TCONF, "Hint: check
> > /proc/sys/vm/unprivileged_userfaultfd");
> > + tst_brk(TCONF | TTERRNO,
> > + "userfaultfd() requires
> > CAP_SYS_PTRACE on this system");
> > + } else
> > + tst_brk(TBROK | TTERRNO,
> > + "Could not create userfault file
> > descriptor");
> > + }
> > +
> > + uffd = TST_RET;
> > uffdio_api.api = UFFD_API;
> > uffdio_api.features = 0;
> > SAFE_IOCTL(uffd, UFFDIO_API, &uffdio_api);
> > --
> > 2.18.0
> >
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
> >
> >
> >
> > --
> > Regards,
> > Li Wang
>
>
>
--
Regards,
Li Wang
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread* [LTP] [PATCH v2] syscalls/userfaultfd01: add hint about unprivileged_userfaultfd
2020-01-06 9:10 ` Yang Xu
2020-01-06 9:32 ` Li Wang
@ 2020-01-07 4:56 ` Li Wang
2020-01-07 8:49 ` Jan Stancek
1 sibling, 1 reply; 7+ messages in thread
From: Li Wang @ 2020-01-07 4:56 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Hi Yang,
On Mon, Jan 6, 2020 at 5:10 PM Yang Xu <xuyang2018.jy@cn.fujitsu.com> wrote:
> ...
> > Can we do the "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd" check in the setup() and do
> > set to 1 if it exists?
> I remembered Jan Stancek has a patch about bpf hint about
> unprivileged_bpf_disabled, I do as same as that patch did.
>
> Also, month agos about acct02 discussion, Cyril points about adjusting
> the threshold value of resume and suppend to make case passes.
>
> So, I have a question that we have unified standards about these cases
> (bpf, acct02, affected by sysctl)? Report TCONF or modify argument to
> make case passes?
>
After thinking over, to report TCONF is the wise method here because this
test might run with an unprivileged user and it can not modify the knob
"vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd".
Sorry and now I pull back my last comment.
Reviewed-by: Li Wang <liwang@redhat.com>
--
Regards,
Li Wang
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^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v2] syscalls/userfaultfd01: add hint about unprivileged_userfaultfd
2020-01-07 4:56 ` Li Wang
@ 2020-01-07 8:49 ` Jan Stancek
0 siblings, 0 replies; 7+ messages in thread
From: Jan Stancek @ 2020-01-07 8:49 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
----- Original Message -----
>
> After thinking over, to report TCONF is the wise method here because this
> test might run with an unprivileged user and it can not modify the knob
> "vm.unprivileged_userfaultfd".
>
> Sorry and now I pull back my last comment.
>
> Reviewed-by: Li Wang <liwang@redhat.com>
Pushed, thanks.
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 7+ messages in thread
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2019-12-18 4:02 [LTP] [PATCH v2] syscalls/userfaultfd01: add hint about unprivileged_userfaultfd Yang Xu
2020-01-06 7:32 ` Yang Xu
2020-01-06 8:06 ` Li Wang
2020-01-06 9:10 ` Yang Xu
2020-01-06 9:32 ` Li Wang
2020-01-07 4:56 ` Li Wang
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