* [LTP] [PATCH v1] open15: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
@ 2023-10-09 11:20 Wei Gao via ltp
2023-12-08 15:34 ` Cyril Hrubis
2023-12-27 13:05 ` [LTP] [PATCH v2] " Wei Gao via ltp
0 siblings, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2023-10-09 11:20 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Fix: #574
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c | 188 ++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 190 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index 4f1ee1f34..4152e1e5f 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -935,6 +935,7 @@ open11 open11
open12 open12
open13 open13
open14 open14
+open15 open15
openat01 openat01
openat02 openat02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
index 001d874d6..af5997572 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@
/open12_child
/open13
/open14
+/open15
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..f0eec08e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c
@@ -0,0 +1,188 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2023 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * [Description]
+ *
+ * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
+ * writable sticky directories
+ *
+ * Linux commit 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5
+ */
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
+
+#define FILENAME "setuid04_testfile"
+#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
+#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
+#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
+#define LTP_USER1 "ltp_user1"
+#define LTP_USER2 "ltp_user2"
+#define CONCAT(dir, filename) dir "/" filename
+#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
+#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
+
+static int LTP_USER1_UID;
+static int LTP_USER2_UID;
+static int dir_fd;
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+ int pid;
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 0);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 0);
+
+ pid = SAFE_FORK();
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USER1_UID);
+
+ int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
+
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+ fd = SAFE_MKFIFO(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), 0777);
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(0);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(0);
+
+ pid = SAFE_FORK();
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USER2_UID);
+
+ int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
+
+ tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_regural == 0 pass");
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ fd = SAFE_OPEN(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT);
+ tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_fifos == 0 pass");
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(1);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(1);
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 1);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 1);
+
+ pid = SAFE_FORK();
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USER2_UID);
+
+ TEST(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
+ if (TST_RET == -1 && TST_ERR == EACCES)
+ tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_regural == 1 pass");
+ else
+ tst_res(TFAIL | TERRNO, "check protect_regural == 1 failed");
+
+ TEST(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
+ if (TST_RET == -1 && TST_ERR == EACCES)
+ tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_fifos == 1 pass");
+ else
+ tst_res(TFAIL | TERRNO, "check protect_fifos == 1 failed");
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(2);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(2);
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 2);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 2);
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
+
+ pid = SAFE_FORK();
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USER2_UID);
+
+ TEST(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
+ if (TST_RET == -1 && TST_ERR == EACCES)
+ tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_regural == 2 pass");
+ else
+ tst_res(TFAIL | TERRNO, "check protect_regural == 2 failed");
+
+ TEST(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
+ if (TST_RET == -1 && TST_ERR == EACCES)
+ tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_fifos == 2 pass");
+ else
+ tst_res(TFAIL | TERRNO, "check protect_fifos == 2 failed");
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(3);
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(3);
+}
+
+static int add_user(char *username)
+{
+ const char *const cmd_useradd[] = {"useradd", username, NULL};
+ struct passwd *ltpuser;
+ int rc, uid = -1;
+
+ switch ((rc = tst_cmd(cmd_useradd, NULL, NULL, TST_CMD_PASS_RETVAL))) {
+ case 0:
+ case 9:
+ ltpuser = SAFE_GETPWNAM(username);
+ uid = ltpuser->pw_uid;
+ break;
+ default:
+ tst_brk(TBROK, "Useradd failed (%d)", rc);
+ }
+
+ return uid;
+}
+
+static void del_user(char *username)
+{
+ const char *const cmd_userdel[] = {"userdel", "-r", username, NULL};
+
+ tst_cmd(cmd_userdel, NULL, NULL, TST_CMD_PASS_RETVAL);
+
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ umask(0);
+ SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+
+ dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
+
+ LTP_USER1_UID = add_user(LTP_USER1);
+ LTP_USER2_UID = add_user(LTP_USER2);
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+ del_user(LTP_USER1);
+ del_user(LTP_USER2);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .cleanup = cleanup,
+ .needs_root = 1,
+ .test_all = run,
+ .needs_tmpdir = 1,
+ .forks_child = 1,
+ .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
+ {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_SKIP},
+ {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_SKIP},
+ {}
+ },
+ .needs_checkpoints = 1,
+};
--
2.35.3
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* Re: [LTP] [PATCH v1] open15: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2023-10-09 11:20 [LTP] [PATCH v1] open15: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2023-12-08 15:34 ` Cyril Hrubis
2023-12-27 13:05 ` [LTP] [PATCH v2] " Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Cyril Hrubis @ 2023-12-08 15:34 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Gao; +Cc: ltp
Hi!
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only
The default license should be GPL-2.0-or-later for new tests.
> +/*
> + * Copyright (c) 2023 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
> + */
> +
> +/*\
> + * [Description]
> + *
> + * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
> + * writable sticky directories
> + *
> + * Linux commit 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5
> + */
> +
> +#include <pwd.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include "tst_test.h"
> +#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
> +
> +#define FILENAME "setuid04_testfile"
> +#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
> +#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
> +#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
> +#define LTP_USER1 "ltp_user1"
> +#define LTP_USER2 "ltp_user2"
> +#define CONCAT(dir, filename) dir "/" filename
> +#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
> +#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
> +
> +static int LTP_USER1_UID;
> +static int LTP_USER2_UID;
> +static int dir_fd;
> +
> +static void run(void)
> +{
> + int pid;
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 0);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 0);
> +
> + pid = SAFE_FORK();
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USER1_UID);
> +
> + int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
> +
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> + fd = SAFE_MKFIFO(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), 0777);
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> + TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(0);
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(0);
This shouldn't be checkpoint, but rather you should wait for the child
process with tst_reap_children() and the same in all the other cases.
> + pid = SAFE_FORK();
> +
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USER2_UID);
> +
> + int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
This can't be SAFE_OPENAT() since it will TBROK instead of TFAIL in a
case of a failure. You have to do the TST_EXP_FD(openat(...)) instead.
And the same for all the cases that shouldn't fail.
> + tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_regural == 0 pass");
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> + fd = SAFE_OPEN(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT);
> + tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_fifos == 0 pass");
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> + TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(1);
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(1);
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 1);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 1);
> +
> + pid = SAFE_FORK();
> +
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USER2_UID);
> +
> + TEST(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
> + if (TST_RET == -1 && TST_ERR == EACCES)
> + tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_regural == 1 pass");
> + else
> + tst_res(TFAIL | TERRNO, "check protect_regural == 1 failed");
And here you have to do TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(...)) and in all the failing
cases as well.
> + TEST(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
> + if (TST_RET == -1 && TST_ERR == EACCES)
> + tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_fifos == 1 pass");
> + else
> + tst_res(TFAIL | TERRNO, "check protect_fifos == 1 failed");
> +
> + TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(2);
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(2);
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 2);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 2);
> + SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
> +
> + pid = SAFE_FORK();
> +
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USER2_UID);
> +
> + TEST(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
> + if (TST_RET == -1 && TST_ERR == EACCES)
> + tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_regural == 2 pass");
> + else
> + tst_res(TFAIL | TERRNO, "check protect_regural == 2 failed");
> +
> + TEST(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
> + if (TST_RET == -1 && TST_ERR == EACCES)
> + tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_fifos == 2 pass");
> + else
> + tst_res(TFAIL | TERRNO, "check protect_fifos == 2 failed");
> +
> + TST_CHECKPOINT_WAKE(3);
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + TST_CHECKPOINT_WAIT(3);
> +}
> +
> +static int add_user(char *username)
> +{
> + const char *const cmd_useradd[] = {"useradd", username, NULL};
> + struct passwd *ltpuser;
> + int rc, uid = -1;
> +
> + switch ((rc = tst_cmd(cmd_useradd, NULL, NULL, TST_CMD_PASS_RETVAL))) {
> + case 0:
> + case 9:
> + ltpuser = SAFE_GETPWNAM(username);
> + uid = ltpuser->pw_uid;
> + break;
> + default:
> + tst_brk(TBROK, "Useradd failed (%d)", rc);
> + }
> +
> + return uid;
> +}
> +
> +static void del_user(char *username)
> +{
> + const char *const cmd_userdel[] = {"userdel", "-r", username, NULL};
> +
> + tst_cmd(cmd_userdel, NULL, NULL, TST_CMD_PASS_RETVAL);
> +
> +}
> +
> +static void setup(void)
> +{
> + umask(0);
> + SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
> +
> + dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
> +
> + LTP_USER1_UID = add_user(LTP_USER1);
> + LTP_USER2_UID = add_user(LTP_USER2);
We actually does not need to add users for these tests, we can just
choose two random UIDs and use them, since all the kernel does is to
compare the UIDs of the processes...
So we can just do:
#define LTP_USR_UID1 1000
#define LTP_USR_UID2 1001
> +}
> +
> +static void cleanup(void)
> +{
> + del_user(LTP_USER1);
> + del_user(LTP_USER2);
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> + .setup = setup,
> + .cleanup = cleanup,
> + .needs_root = 1,
> + .test_all = run,
> + .needs_tmpdir = 1,
> + .forks_child = 1,
> + .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
> + {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_SKIP},
> + {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_SKIP},
^
TST_SR_TCONF
Since we want to skip the test if these files are missing.
> + {}
> + },
> + .needs_checkpoints = 1,
> +};
> --
> 2.35.3
>
>
> --
> Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
--
Cyril Hrubis
chrubis@suse.cz
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v2] open15: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2023-10-09 11:20 [LTP] [PATCH v1] open15: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
2023-12-08 15:34 ` Cyril Hrubis
@ 2023-12-27 13:05 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2024-02-26 13:37 ` Cyril Hrubis
2024-06-03 12:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3] " Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2023-12-27 13:05 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp; +Cc: s.mesoraca16
Fix: #574
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c | 138 ++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 140 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index 4f1ee1f34..4152e1e5f 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -935,6 +935,7 @@ open11 open11
open12 open12
open13 open13
open14 open14
+open15 open15
openat01 openat01
openat02 openat02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
index 001d874d6..af5997572 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@
/open12_child
/open13
/open14
+/open15
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..4feb1bb08
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c
@@ -0,0 +1,138 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2023 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * [Description]
+ *
+ * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
+ * writable sticky directories
+ *
+ * commit 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5
+ * Author: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
+ * Date: Thu Aug 23 17:00:35 2018 -0700
+ * namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
+ */
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
+
+#define FILENAME "setuid04_testfile"
+#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
+#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
+#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
+#define LTP_USR_UID1 1000
+#define LTP_USR_UID2 1001
+#define CONCAT(dir, filename) dir "/" filename
+#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
+#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
+
+static int dir_fd;
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+ int pid;
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 0);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 0);
+
+ pid = SAFE_FORK();
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID1);
+
+ int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+ fd = SAFE_MKFIFO(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), 0777);
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ pid = SAFE_FORK();
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
+
+ int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+
+ tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_regural == 0 pass");
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ fd = SAFE_OPEN(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT);
+ tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_fifos == 0 pass");
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 1);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 1);
+
+ pid = SAFE_FORK();
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
+
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 2);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 2);
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
+
+ pid = SAFE_FORK();
+
+ if (pid == 0) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
+
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ umask(0);
+ SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+
+ dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+ SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .cleanup = cleanup,
+ .needs_root = 1,
+ .test_all = run,
+ .needs_tmpdir = 1,
+ .forks_child = 1,
+ .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
+ {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {}
+ },
+ .needs_checkpoints = 1,
+};
--
2.35.3
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* Re: [LTP] [PATCH v2] open15: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2023-12-27 13:05 ` [LTP] [PATCH v2] " Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2024-02-26 13:37 ` Cyril Hrubis
2024-06-03 12:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3] " Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Cyril Hrubis @ 2024-02-26 13:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Gao; +Cc: s.mesoraca16, ltp
Hi!
> +/*\
> + * [Description]
> + *
> + * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
> + * writable sticky directories
> + *
> + * commit 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5
> + * Author: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
> + * Date: Thu Aug 23 17:00:35 2018 -0700
> + * namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
> + */
> +
> +#include <pwd.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include "tst_test.h"
> +#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
> +
> +#define FILENAME "setuid04_testfile"
> +#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
> +#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
> +#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
> +#define LTP_USR_UID1 1000
> +#define LTP_USR_UID2 1001
> +#define CONCAT(dir, filename) dir "/" filename
> +#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
> +#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
> +
> +static int dir_fd;
> +
> +static void run(void)
> +{
> + int pid;
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 0);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 0);
> +
> + pid = SAFE_FORK();
No need to store the pid if we are not using it. We can do instead just:
if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID1);
> +
> + int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
> +
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> + fd = SAFE_MKFIFO(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), 0777);
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
This part has to be done in the test setup() otherwise the test will
fail with EEXIST with -i 2.
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + pid = SAFE_FORK();
> +
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> +
> + int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
> +
> + tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_regural == 0 pass");
The TST_EXP_FD() should print TPASS message, there is no point in adding
another.
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
This should be closed only if the fd is valid.
> + fd = SAFE_OPEN(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT);
> + tst_res(TPASS, "check protect_fifos == 0 pass");
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
Again this should be TST_EXP_FD().
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 1);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 1);
> +
> + pid = SAFE_FORK();
> +
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> +
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> +
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 2);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 2);
> + SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
I suppose that this will break the test with -i 2 as well, you need to
chmod the directory back at the end of the test.
> + pid = SAFE_FORK();
> +
> + if (pid == 0) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> +
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> +
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +}
> +
> +static void setup(void)
> +{
> + umask(0);
> + SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
> +
> + dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
> +}
> +
> +static void cleanup(void)
> +{
> + SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> + .setup = setup,
> + .cleanup = cleanup,
> + .needs_root = 1,
> + .test_all = run,
> + .needs_tmpdir = 1,
> + .forks_child = 1,
> + .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
> + {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
> + {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
> + {}
> + },
> + .needs_checkpoints = 1,
This should have been removed.
> +};
> --
> 2.35.3
>
>
> --
> Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
--
Cyril Hrubis
chrubis@suse.cz
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v3] open15: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2023-12-27 13:05 ` [LTP] [PATCH v2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2024-02-26 13:37 ` Cyril Hrubis
@ 2024-06-03 12:55 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2025-02-21 10:01 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2025-03-19 14:23 ` [LTP] [PATCH v4] open16: " Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2024-06-03 12:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Fix: #574
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 127 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index 4f1ee1f34..4152e1e5f 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -935,6 +935,7 @@ open11 open11
open12 open12
open13 open13
open14 open14
+open15 open15
openat01 openat01
openat02 openat02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
index 001d874d6..af5997572 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
@@ -12,3 +12,4 @@
/open12_child
/open13
/open14
+/open15
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..de5325e01
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2023 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * [Description]
+ *
+ * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
+ * writable sticky directories
+ *
+ * commit 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5
+ * Author: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
+ * Date: Thu Aug 23 17:00:35 2018 -0700
+ * namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
+ */
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
+
+#define FILENAME "setuid04_testfile"
+#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
+#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
+#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
+#define LTP_USR_UID1 1000
+#define LTP_USR_UID2 1001
+#define CONCAT(dir, filename) dir "/" filename
+#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
+#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
+
+static int dir_fd;
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+ int pid;
+
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 0);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 0);
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID1);
+
+ int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ SAFE_MKFIFO(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), 0777);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
+
+ int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 1);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 1);
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 2);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 2);
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+ unlink(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO));
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ umask(0);
+ SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+ SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .cleanup = cleanup,
+ .needs_root = 1,
+ .test_all = run,
+ .needs_tmpdir = 1,
+ .forks_child = 1,
+ .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
+ {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {}
+ },
+};
--
2.35.3
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* Re: [LTP] [PATCH v3] open15: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2024-06-03 12:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3] " Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2025-02-21 10:01 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2025-03-19 14:23 ` [LTP] [PATCH v4] open16: " Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Andrea Cervesato via ltp @ 2025-02-21 10:01 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Gao, ltp
Hi Wei,
If we want to merge this patch, we need to do a couple of things more.
The open15 is now taken by an another test, so we need to move it to open16.
Also we don't have a nice git commit message describing what's the
purpose of the test.
On 6/3/24 14:55, Wei Gao via ltp wrote:
> Fix: #574
>
> Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
> ---
> runtest/syscalls | 1 +
> testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
> testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c | 125 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 127 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c
>
> diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
> index 4f1ee1f34..4152e1e5f 100644
> --- a/runtest/syscalls
> +++ b/runtest/syscalls
> @@ -935,6 +935,7 @@ open11 open11
> open12 open12
> open13 open13
> open14 open14
> +open15 open15
>
> openat01 openat01
> openat02 openat02
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
> index 001d874d6..af5997572 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
> @@ -12,3 +12,4 @@
> /open12_child
> /open13
> /open14
> +/open15
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..de5325e01
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open15.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * Copyright (c) 2023 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
> + */
> +
> +/*\
> + * [Description]
Not needed anymore.
> + *
> + * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
> + * writable sticky directories
> + *
> + * commit 30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5
> + * Author: Salvatore Mesoraca <s.mesoraca16@gmail.com>
> + * Date: Thu Aug 23 17:00:35 2018 -0700
> + * namei: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
we should update .tags instead of copying commit message here.
> + */
> +
> +#include <pwd.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include "tst_test.h"
> +#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
> +
> +#define FILENAME "setuid04_testfile"
> +#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
> +#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
> +#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
> +#define LTP_USR_UID1 1000
> +#define LTP_USR_UID2 1001
> +#define CONCAT(dir, filename) dir "/" filename
> +#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
> +#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
> +
> +static int dir_fd;
> +
> +static void run(void)
> +{
> + int pid;
> +
> + SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 0);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 0);
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID1);
> +
> + int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
> +
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> + SAFE_MKFIFO(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), 0777);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> +
> + int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
> +
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> + fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 1);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 1);
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 2);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 2);
> + SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> + unlink(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO));
SAFE_UNLINK()
> +}
> +
> +static void setup(void)
> +{
> + umask(0);
> + SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
> + dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
> +}
> +
> +static void cleanup(void)
> +{
> + SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
if (dir_fd != -1)
SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> + .setup = setup,
> + .cleanup = cleanup,
> + .needs_root = 1,
> + .test_all = run,
> + .needs_tmpdir = 1,
> + .forks_child = 1,
> + .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
> + {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
> + {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
> + {}
> + },
.tags is missing.
> +};
Andrea
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v4] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2024-06-03 12:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3] " Wei Gao via ltp
2025-02-21 10:01 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
@ 2025-03-19 14:23 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2025-07-11 12:04 ` Cyril Hrubis
2025-07-23 15:46 ` [LTP] [PATCH v5] " Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2025-03-19 14:23 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
This commit adds test cases to verify the security restrictions for opening
FIFOs and regular files in world-writable sticky directories.
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 121 ++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 123 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index 839c23d0a..7a1a64c01 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -974,6 +974,7 @@ open12 open12
open13 open13
open14 open14
open15 open15
+open16 open16
openat01 openat01
openat02 openat02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
index af5997572..d2cacc02e 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@
/open13
/open14
/open15
+/open16
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..709c5c87f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
@@ -0,0 +1,121 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2023 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
+ * writable sticky directories
+ */
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
+
+#define FILENAME "setuid04_testfile"
+#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
+#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
+#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
+#define LTP_USR_UID1 1000
+#define LTP_USR_UID2 1001
+#define CONCAT(dir, filename) dir "/" filename
+#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
+#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
+
+static int dir_fd;
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 0);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 0);
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID1);
+
+ int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ SAFE_MKFIFO(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), 0777);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
+
+ int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 1);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 1);
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 2);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 2);
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+ SAFE_UNLINK(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO));
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ umask(0);
+ SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+ if (dir_fd != -1)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .cleanup = cleanup,
+ .needs_root = 1,
+ .test_all = run,
+ .needs_tmpdir = 1,
+ .forks_child = 1,
+ .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
+ {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {}
+ },
+ .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+ {"linux-git", "30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5"},
+ {}
+ }
+};
--
2.35.3
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* Re: [LTP] [PATCH v4] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2025-03-19 14:23 ` [LTP] [PATCH v4] open16: " Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2025-07-11 12:04 ` Cyril Hrubis
2025-07-23 15:46 ` [LTP] [PATCH v5] " Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Cyril Hrubis @ 2025-07-11 12:04 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Gao; +Cc: ltp
Hi!
> +/*\
> + * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
> + * writable sticky directories
> + */
> +
> +#include <pwd.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include "tst_test.h"
> +#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
> +
> +#define FILENAME "setuid04_testfile"
> +#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
> +#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
> +#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
> +#define LTP_USR_UID1 1000
> +#define LTP_USR_UID2 1001
> +#define CONCAT(dir, filename) dir "/" filename
> +#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
> +#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
^
Just a single space?
> +
> +static int dir_fd;
> +
> +static void run(void)
> +{
> + SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 0);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 0);
Huh, why not just SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "0") ?
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID1);
> +
> + int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
> +
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
^
if (TST_PASS)
SAFE_CLOSE(TST_RET);
Also this seems like a setup phase, so we should probably use just
SAFE_OPEN() instead of the TST_EXP_FD() at this point.
> + SAFE_MKFIFO(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), 0777);
^
We usually do this as:
#define TEST_FIFO_PATH DIR "/" TEST_FIFO
And use the TEST_FIFO_PATH instead.
Or we can just do SAFE_CHDIR(DIR) after the fork and use just the file
names.
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> +
> + int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
> +
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
Here as well:
if (TST_PASS)
SAFE_CLOSE(TST_RET)
> + fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
And here as well.
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 1);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 1);
Here as well why the %d?
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%d", 2);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%d", 2);
And here as well.
> + SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(open(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO), O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> + SAFE_UNLINK(CONCAT(DIR, TEST_FIFO));
> +}
> +
> +static void setup(void)
> +{
> + umask(0);
> + SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
> + dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
> +}
> +
> +static void cleanup(void)
> +{
> + if (dir_fd != -1)
> + SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> + .setup = setup,
> + .cleanup = cleanup,
> + .needs_root = 1,
> + .test_all = run,
> + .needs_tmpdir = 1,
> + .forks_child = 1,
> + .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
> + {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
> + {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
> + {}
> + },
> + .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
> + {"linux-git", "30aba6656f61ed44cba445a3c0d38b296fa9e8f5"},
^
We usually shorten these to just first 12
characters.
> + {}
> + }
> +};
> --
> 2.35.3
>
>
> --
> Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
--
Cyril Hrubis
chrubis@suse.cz
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v5] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2025-03-19 14:23 ` [LTP] [PATCH v4] open16: " Wei Gao via ltp
2025-07-11 12:04 ` Cyril Hrubis
@ 2025-07-23 15:46 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2026-02-18 13:21 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] " Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2025-07-23 15:46 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
This commit adds test cases to verify the security restrictions for opening
FIFOs and regular files in world-writable sticky directories.
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 126 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index 3531c2a3c..0de9bfaef 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -984,6 +984,7 @@ open12 open12
open13 open13
open14 open14
open15 open15
+open16 open16
openat01 openat01
openat02 openat02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
index af5997572..d2cacc02e 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@
/open13
/open14
/open15
+/open16
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..6e01dde26
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2023 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
+ * writable sticky directories
+ */
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
+
+#define FILENAME "setuid04_testfile"
+#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
+#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
+#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
+#define LTP_USR_UID1 1000
+#define LTP_USR_UID2 1001
+#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
+#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
+#define TEST_FIFO_PATH DIR "/" TEST_FIFO
+
+static int dir_fd;
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "0");
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "0");
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID1);
+
+ int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
+
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ SAFE_MKFIFO(TEST_FIFO_PATH, 0777);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
+
+ int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+
+ if (TST_PASS)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
+
+ if (TST_PASS)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "1");
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "1");
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "2");
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "2");
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+ SAFE_UNLINK(TEST_FIFO_PATH);
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ umask(0);
+ SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+ if (dir_fd != -1)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .cleanup = cleanup,
+ .needs_root = 1,
+ .test_all = run,
+ .needs_tmpdir = 1,
+ .forks_child = 1,
+ .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
+ {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {}
+ },
+ .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+ {"linux-git", "30aba6656f61"},
+ {}
+ }
+};
--
2.49.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* Re: [LTP] [PATCH v5] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2025-07-23 15:46 ` [LTP] [PATCH v5] " Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2026-02-18 13:21 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] " Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Andrea Cervesato via ltp @ 2026-02-18 13:21 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Gao, ltp
Hi!
On Wed Jul 23, 2025 at 5:46 PM CEST, Wei Gao via ltp wrote:
> This commit adds test cases to verify the security restrictions for opening
> FIFOs and regular files in world-writable sticky directories.
>
> Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
> ---
> runtest/syscalls | 1 +
> testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
> testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 124 ++++++++++++++++++++++
> 3 files changed, 126 insertions(+)
> create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
>
> diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
> index 3531c2a3c..0de9bfaef 100644
> --- a/runtest/syscalls
> +++ b/runtest/syscalls
> @@ -984,6 +984,7 @@ open12 open12
> open13 open13
> open14 open14
> open15 open15
> +open16 open16
>
> openat01 openat01
> openat02 openat02
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
> index af5997572..d2cacc02e 100644
> --- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
> @@ -13,3 +13,4 @@
> /open13
> /open14
> /open15
> +/open16
> diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
> new file mode 100644
> index 000000000..6e01dde26
> --- /dev/null
> +++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
> @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
> +// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
> +/*
> + * Copyright (c) 2023 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
> + */
> +
> +/*\
> + * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
> + * writable sticky directories
> + */
> +
> +#include <pwd.h>
> +#include <stdlib.h>
> +#include "tst_test.h"
> +#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
> +
> +#define FILENAME "setuid04_testfile"
Never used.
> +#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
> +#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
> +#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
> +#define LTP_USR_UID1 1000
> +#define LTP_USR_UID2 1001
If target is to have a UID that doesn't belong to the current user,
we can just have:
pw = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
and use the provided UID.
> +#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
> +#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
> +#define TEST_FIFO_PATH DIR "/" TEST_FIFO
> +
> +static int dir_fd;
Not initialized to -1.
> +
> +static void run(void)
> +{
> + SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "0");
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "0");
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID1);
> +
> + int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
> +
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> + SAFE_MKFIFO(TEST_FIFO_PATH, 0777);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> +
> + int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
> +
> + if (TST_PASS)
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> + fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
> +
> + if (TST_PASS)
> + SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "1");
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "1");
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> +
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "2");
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "2");
> + SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(LTP_USR_UID2);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> +
> + exit(0);
> + }
> +
> + tst_reap_children();
> + SAFE_UNLINK(TEST_FIFO_PATH);
> +}
> +
> +static void setup(void)
> +{
> + umask(0);
> + SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
> + dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
> +}
> +
> +static void cleanup(void)
> +{
> + if (dir_fd != -1)
> + SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
> +}
> +
> +static struct tst_test test = {
> + .setup = setup,
> + .cleanup = cleanup,
> + .needs_root = 1,
> + .test_all = run,
> + .needs_tmpdir = 1,
> + .forks_child = 1,
> + .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
> + {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
> + {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
> + {}
> + },
> + .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
> + {"linux-git", "30aba6656f61"},
> + {}
> + }
> +};
--
Andrea Cervesato
SUSE QE Automation Engineer Linux
andrea.cervesato@suse.com
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2025-07-23 15:46 ` [LTP] [PATCH v5] " Wei Gao via ltp
2026-02-18 13:21 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
@ 2026-04-15 6:07 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
` (2 more replies)
1 sibling, 3 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2026-04-15 6:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Wei Gao (2):
lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
v5->v6:
- Remove unused FILENAME
- Initialize dir_fd to -1
- Use tst_get_free_uid() dynamically find unused UIDs instead of fixed
uids
include/tst_uid.h | 7 +-
lib/tst_uid.c | 26 +++++
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 162 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
--
2.52.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v6 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] " Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2026-04-15 6:07 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 7:54 ` [LTP] " linuxtestproject.agent
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2 siblings, 1 reply; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2026-04-15 6:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
include/tst_uid.h | 7 +++++--
lib/tst_uid.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/tst_uid.h b/include/tst_uid.h
index 2237ddcbf..394cb3edc 100644
--- a/include/tst_uid.h
+++ b/include/tst_uid.h
@@ -8,10 +8,13 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
/*
- * Find unassigned gid. The skip argument can be used to ignore e.g. the main
+ * Find unassigned uid/gid. The skip argument can be used to ignore e.g. the main
* group of a specific user in case it's not listed in the group file. If you
- * do not need to skip any specific gid, simply set it to 0.
+ * do not need to skip any specific id, simply set it to 0.
*/
+uid_t tst_get_free_uid_(const char *file, const int lineno, uid_t skip);
+#define tst_get_free_uid(skip) tst_get_free_uid_(__FILE__, __LINE__, (skip))
+
gid_t tst_get_free_gid_(const char *file, const int lineno, gid_t skip);
#define tst_get_free_gid(skip) tst_get_free_gid_(__FILE__, __LINE__, (skip))
diff --git a/lib/tst_uid.c b/lib/tst_uid.c
index af4ef8cf7..deff17085 100644
--- a/lib/tst_uid.c
+++ b/lib/tst_uid.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define TST_NO_DEFAULT_MAIN
@@ -12,6 +13,31 @@
#include "tst_uid.h"
#define MAX_GID 32767
+#define MAX_UID 32767
+
+uid_t tst_get_free_uid_(const char *file, const int lineno, uid_t skip)
+{
+ uid_t ret;
+
+ errno = 0;
+
+ for (ret = 1; ret < MAX_UID; ret++) {
+ if (ret == skip || getpwuid(ret))
+ continue;
+
+ if (errno == 0 || errno == ENOENT || errno == ESRCH) {
+ tst_res_(file, lineno, TINFO | TERRNO,
+ "Found unused UID %d", (int)ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK|TERRNO, "User ID lookup failed");
+ return (uid_t)-1;
+ }
+
+ tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK, "No free user ID found");
+ return (uid_t)-1;
+}
gid_t tst_get_free_gid_(const char *file, const int lineno, gid_t skip)
{
--
2.52.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v6 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2026-04-15 6:07 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2026-04-15 6:07 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 129 ++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 131 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index d72fceb5e..c14ebb3a0 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ open12 open12
open13 open13
open14 open14
open15 open15
+open16 open16
openat01 openat01
openat02 openat02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
index af5997572..d2cacc02e 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@
/open13
/open14
/open15
+/open16
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..9ec6515e7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
@@ -0,0 +1,129 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
+ * writable sticky directories
+ */
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
+#include "tst_uid.h"
+
+#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
+#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
+#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
+#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
+#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
+#define TEST_FIFO_PATH DIR "/" TEST_FIFO
+
+static int dir_fd = -1;
+static uid_t uid1, uid2;
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "0");
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "0");
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(uid1);
+
+ int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
+
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ SAFE_MKFIFO(TEST_FIFO_PATH, 0777);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
+
+ int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+
+ if (TST_PASS)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
+
+ if (TST_PASS)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "1");
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "1");
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "2");
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "2");
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+ SAFE_UNLINK(TEST_FIFO_PATH);
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ pw = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
+ uid1 = pw->pw_uid;
+ uid2 = tst_get_free_uid(uid1);
+
+ umask(0);
+ SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+ if (dir_fd != -1)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .cleanup = cleanup,
+ .needs_root = 1,
+ .test_all = run,
+ .needs_tmpdir = 1,
+ .forks_child = 1,
+ .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
+ {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {}
+ },
+ .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+ {"linux-git", "30aba6656f61"},
+ {}
+ }
+};
--
2.52.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* Re: [LTP] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2026-04-15 7:54 ` linuxtestproject.agent
0 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: linuxtestproject.agent @ 2026-04-15 7:54 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Gao; +Cc: ltp
Hi Wei,
--- [PATCH 1/2] ---
On Wed, 15 Apr 2026 06:07:16 +0000, Wei Gao wrote:
> [PATCH 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
The commit body is empty. Add at least one sentence explaining why
this helper is needed — e.g. that open16 requires two distinct
unprivileged UIDs and that this extends the existing tst_get_free_gid
pattern to UIDs.
--- [PATCH 2/2] ---
On Wed, 15 Apr 2026 06:07:17 +0000, Wei Gao wrote:
> [PATCH 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
Same issue — no commit body. Describe what kernel feature is under
test (protected_regular/protected_fifos, kernel commit 30aba6656f61)
and why a dedicated test was needed.
> +/*\
> + * Verify disallows open of FIFOs or regular files not owned by the user in world
> + * writable sticky directories
> + */
Incomplete. The test also verifies the positive case (protection=0
allows access) and level 2 protection (group-writable sticky
directories via SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020|S_ISVTX)). Update the doc
comment to cover all three scenarios.
---
Note:
Our agent completed the review of the patch. The full review can be
found at: https://github.com/linux-test-project/ltp-agent/actions/runs/24442661607
The agent can sometimes produce false positives although often its
findings are genuine. If you find issues with the review, please
comment this email or ignore the suggestions.
Regards,
LTP AI Reviewer
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2026-04-15 10:37 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v7 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v7 " Wei Gao via ltp
2 siblings, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2026-04-15 10:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Wei Gao (2):
lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
v6->v7:
- Add commit body
- Update test description
include/tst_uid.h | 7 +-
lib/tst_uid.c | 26 +++++
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 165 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
--
2.52.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v7 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] " Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2026-04-15 10:37 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 11:08 ` [LTP] " linuxtestproject.agent
2026-04-16 0:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8 0/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v7 " Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2026-04-15 10:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Add tst_get_free_uid() to dynamically find unused UIDs for tests.
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
include/tst_uid.h | 7 +++++--
lib/tst_uid.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/tst_uid.h b/include/tst_uid.h
index 2237ddcbf..394cb3edc 100644
--- a/include/tst_uid.h
+++ b/include/tst_uid.h
@@ -8,10 +8,13 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
/*
- * Find unassigned gid. The skip argument can be used to ignore e.g. the main
+ * Find unassigned uid/gid. The skip argument can be used to ignore e.g. the main
* group of a specific user in case it's not listed in the group file. If you
- * do not need to skip any specific gid, simply set it to 0.
+ * do not need to skip any specific id, simply set it to 0.
*/
+uid_t tst_get_free_uid_(const char *file, const int lineno, uid_t skip);
+#define tst_get_free_uid(skip) tst_get_free_uid_(__FILE__, __LINE__, (skip))
+
gid_t tst_get_free_gid_(const char *file, const int lineno, gid_t skip);
#define tst_get_free_gid(skip) tst_get_free_gid_(__FILE__, __LINE__, (skip))
diff --git a/lib/tst_uid.c b/lib/tst_uid.c
index af4ef8cf7..deff17085 100644
--- a/lib/tst_uid.c
+++ b/lib/tst_uid.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define TST_NO_DEFAULT_MAIN
@@ -12,6 +13,31 @@
#include "tst_uid.h"
#define MAX_GID 32767
+#define MAX_UID 32767
+
+uid_t tst_get_free_uid_(const char *file, const int lineno, uid_t skip)
+{
+ uid_t ret;
+
+ errno = 0;
+
+ for (ret = 1; ret < MAX_UID; ret++) {
+ if (ret == skip || getpwuid(ret))
+ continue;
+
+ if (errno == 0 || errno == ENOENT || errno == ESRCH) {
+ tst_res_(file, lineno, TINFO | TERRNO,
+ "Found unused UID %d", (int)ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK|TERRNO, "User ID lookup failed");
+ return (uid_t)-1;
+ }
+
+ tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK, "No free user ID found");
+ return (uid_t)-1;
+}
gid_t tst_get_free_gid_(const char *file, const int lineno, gid_t skip)
{
--
2.52.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v7 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v7 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2026-04-15 10:37 ` Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2026-04-15 10:37 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
This commit adds test cases to verify the security restrictions for opening
FIFOs and regular files in world-writable sticky directories.
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 132 ++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 134 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index d72fceb5e..c14ebb3a0 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ open12 open12
open13 open13
open14 open14
open15 open15
+open16 open16
openat01 openat01
openat02 openat02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
index af5997572..d2cacc02e 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@
/open13
/open14
/open15
+/open16
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..726b05df9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Verify restricted opening of FIFOs and regular files in sticky directories.
+ * This test covers the positive case where access is allowed when protection
+ * is disabled (level 0), and the negative cases where access is disallowed
+ * (EACCES) in world-writable (level 1) or group-writable (level 2) sticky
+ * directories when the file is not owned by the opener.
+ */
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
+#include "tst_uid.h"
+
+#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
+#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
+#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
+#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
+#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
+#define TEST_FIFO_PATH DIR "/" TEST_FIFO
+
+static int dir_fd = -1;
+static uid_t uid1, uid2;
+
+static void run(void)
+{
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "0");
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "0");
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(uid1);
+
+ int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
+
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ SAFE_MKFIFO(TEST_FIFO_PATH, 0777);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
+
+ int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+
+ if (TST_PASS)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
+
+ if (TST_PASS)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "1");
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "1");
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "2");
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "2");
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
+
+ if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
+ SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ tst_reap_children();
+ SAFE_UNLINK(TEST_FIFO_PATH);
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ pw = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
+ uid1 = pw->pw_uid;
+ uid2 = tst_get_free_uid(uid1);
+
+ umask(0);
+ SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+ if (dir_fd != -1)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .cleanup = cleanup,
+ .needs_root = 1,
+ .test_all = run,
+ .needs_tmpdir = 1,
+ .forks_child = 1,
+ .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
+ {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {}
+ },
+ .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+ {"linux-git", "30aba6656f61"},
+ {}
+ }
+};
--
2.52.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* Re: [LTP] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v7 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2026-04-15 11:08 ` linuxtestproject.agent
2026-04-16 0:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8 0/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: linuxtestproject.agent @ 2026-04-15 11:08 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Gao; +Cc: ltp
Hi Wei,
On Wed, 15 Apr 2026, Wei Gao wrote:
> open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
--- [PATCH 2/2] ---
On Wed, 15 Apr 2026, Wei Gao wrote:
> open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "2");
> + SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "2");
> + SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0020 | S_ISVTX);
> +
> + if (!SAFE_FORK()) {
> + SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
> + TST_EXP_FAIL(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777), EACCES);
uid2 is a free (unused) UID with no group memberships. With mode 0020|S_ISVTX
the "other" bits are 0, so the kernel's DAC check rejects openat/open before
reaching the protected_regular/protected_fifos logic in may_open(). EACCES
fires for the wrong reason.
For a valid level-2 test the directory needs group-execute and group-write
(e.g. 0770|S_ISVTX), and uid2 must be placed in the directory's owning group
so it can access the directory but is still blocked by the protection check.
---
Note:
Our agent completed the review of the patch. The full review can be
found at: <review_url>
The agent can sometimes produce false positives although often its
findings are genuine. If you find issues with the review, please
comment this email or ignore the suggestions.
Regards,
LTP AI Reviewer
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v8 0/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v7 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 11:08 ` [LTP] " linuxtestproject.agent
@ 2026-04-16 0:55 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-16 0:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-16 0:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 2 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2026-04-16 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Wei Gao (2):
lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
v7->v8
- Update comments of test cases
- Refactor test case with tcase array
- Set file mode to 0030 for level2 check
- TST_EXP_FAIL->TST_EXP_FAIL2
include/tst_uid.h | 7 +-
lib/tst_uid.c | 26 +++++
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++
5 files changed, 161 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
--
2.52.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v8 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
2026-04-16 0:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8 0/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2026-04-16 0:55 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-16 2:43 ` [LTP] " linuxtestproject.agent
2026-04-16 0:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 1 reply; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2026-04-16 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
Add tst_get_free_uid() to dynamically find unused UIDs for tests.
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
include/tst_uid.h | 7 +++++--
lib/tst_uid.c | 26 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
2 files changed, 31 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/tst_uid.h b/include/tst_uid.h
index 2237ddcbf..394cb3edc 100644
--- a/include/tst_uid.h
+++ b/include/tst_uid.h
@@ -8,10 +8,13 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
/*
- * Find unassigned gid. The skip argument can be used to ignore e.g. the main
+ * Find unassigned uid/gid. The skip argument can be used to ignore e.g. the main
* group of a specific user in case it's not listed in the group file. If you
- * do not need to skip any specific gid, simply set it to 0.
+ * do not need to skip any specific id, simply set it to 0.
*/
+uid_t tst_get_free_uid_(const char *file, const int lineno, uid_t skip);
+#define tst_get_free_uid(skip) tst_get_free_uid_(__FILE__, __LINE__, (skip))
+
gid_t tst_get_free_gid_(const char *file, const int lineno, gid_t skip);
#define tst_get_free_gid(skip) tst_get_free_gid_(__FILE__, __LINE__, (skip))
diff --git a/lib/tst_uid.c b/lib/tst_uid.c
index af4ef8cf7..deff17085 100644
--- a/lib/tst_uid.c
+++ b/lib/tst_uid.c
@@ -5,6 +5,7 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <grp.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
#include <errno.h>
#define TST_NO_DEFAULT_MAIN
@@ -12,6 +13,31 @@
#include "tst_uid.h"
#define MAX_GID 32767
+#define MAX_UID 32767
+
+uid_t tst_get_free_uid_(const char *file, const int lineno, uid_t skip)
+{
+ uid_t ret;
+
+ errno = 0;
+
+ for (ret = 1; ret < MAX_UID; ret++) {
+ if (ret == skip || getpwuid(ret))
+ continue;
+
+ if (errno == 0 || errno == ENOENT || errno == ESRCH) {
+ tst_res_(file, lineno, TINFO | TERRNO,
+ "Found unused UID %d", (int)ret);
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK|TERRNO, "User ID lookup failed");
+ return (uid_t)-1;
+ }
+
+ tst_brk_(file, lineno, TBROK, "No free user ID found");
+ return (uid_t)-1;
+}
gid_t tst_get_free_gid_(const char *file, const int lineno, gid_t skip)
{
--
2.52.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* [LTP] [PATCH v8 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
2026-04-16 0:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8 0/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-16 0:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2026-04-16 0:55 ` Wei Gao via ltp
1 sibling, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2026-04-16 0:55 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: ltp
This commit adds test cases to verify the security restrictions for opening
FIFOs and regular files in world-writable sticky directories.
Signed-off-by: Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
---
runtest/syscalls | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore | 1 +
testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c | 128 ++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 130 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
diff --git a/runtest/syscalls b/runtest/syscalls
index d72fceb5e..c14ebb3a0 100644
--- a/runtest/syscalls
+++ b/runtest/syscalls
@@ -1005,6 +1005,7 @@ open12 open12
open13 open13
open14 open14
open15 open15
+open16 open16
openat01 openat01
openat02 openat02
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
index af5997572..d2cacc02e 100644
--- a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/.gitignore
@@ -13,3 +13,4 @@
/open13
/open14
/open15
+/open16
diff --git a/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
new file mode 100644
index 000000000..8ba2d9ec9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/testcases/kernel/syscalls/open/open16.c
@@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later
+/*
+ * Copyright (c) 2026 Wei Gao <wegao@suse.com>
+ */
+
+/*\
+ * Verify restricted opening of FIFOs and regular files in sticky directories.
+ * This test covers the positive case where access is allowed when protection
+ * is disabled (level 0), and the negative cases where access is disallowed
+ * (EACCES) in world-writable (level 1) or group-writable (level 2) sticky
+ * directories when the file is not owned by the opener.
+ *
+ * This test requires root to modify /proc/sys/fs/protected_* sysctls and
+ * to manage file ownership and permissions in sticky directories.
+ */
+
+#include <pwd.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include "tst_test.h"
+#include "tst_safe_file_at.h"
+#include "tst_uid.h"
+
+#define DIR "ltp_tmp_check1"
+#define TEST_FILE "test_file_1"
+#define TEST_FIFO "test_fifo_1"
+#define PROTECTED_REGULAR "/proc/sys/fs/protected_regular"
+#define PROTECTED_FIFOS "/proc/sys/fs/protected_fifos"
+#define TEST_FIFO_PATH DIR "/" TEST_FIFO
+
+static int dir_fd = -1;
+static uid_t uid1, uid2;
+static gid_t gid1;
+
+static struct tcase {
+ char *level;
+ int exp_errno;
+} tcases[] = {
+ {"0", 0},
+ {"1", EACCES},
+ {"2", EACCES},
+};
+
+static void verify_open(unsigned int n)
+{
+ struct tcase *tc = &tcases[n];
+ pid_t pid;
+
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_REGULAR, "%s", tc->level);
+ SAFE_FILE_PRINTF(PROTECTED_FIFOS, "%s", tc->level);
+
+ if (n == 2) {
+ SAFE_CHOWN(DIR, -1, gid1);
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0030 | S_ISVTX);
+ } else {
+ SAFE_CHOWN(DIR, 0, 0);
+ SAFE_CHMOD(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ }
+
+ pid = SAFE_FORK();
+ if (!pid) {
+ SAFE_SETGID(gid1);
+ SAFE_SETUID(uid2);
+
+ if (tc->exp_errno) {
+ TST_EXP_FAIL2(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
+ tc->exp_errno, "openat %s (Level %s)", TEST_FILE, tc->level);
+ TST_EXP_FAIL2(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777),
+ tc->exp_errno, "open %s (Level %s)", TEST_FIFO, tc->level);
+ } else {
+ int fd = TST_EXP_FD(openat(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777));
+ if (TST_PASS)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+
+ fd = TST_EXP_FD(open(TEST_FIFO_PATH, O_RDWR | O_CREAT, 0777));
+ if (TST_PASS)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+ }
+
+ exit(0);
+ }
+
+ SAFE_WAITPID(pid, NULL, 0);
+}
+
+static void setup(void)
+{
+ struct passwd *pw;
+
+ pw = SAFE_GETPWNAM("nobody");
+ uid1 = pw->pw_uid;
+ gid1 = pw->pw_gid;
+ uid2 = tst_get_free_uid(uid1);
+
+ umask(0);
+ SAFE_MKDIR(DIR, 0777 | S_ISVTX);
+ dir_fd = SAFE_OPEN(DIR, O_DIRECTORY);
+
+ int fd = SAFE_OPENAT(dir_fd, TEST_FILE, O_CREAT | O_RDWR, 0777);
+ SAFE_CLOSE(fd);
+ SAFE_MKFIFO(TEST_FIFO_PATH, 0777);
+ SAFE_CHOWN(TEST_FIFO_PATH, uid1, gid1);
+ SAFE_CHOWN(DIR "/" TEST_FILE, uid1, gid1);
+}
+
+static void cleanup(void)
+{
+ if (dir_fd != -1)
+ SAFE_CLOSE(dir_fd);
+}
+
+static struct tst_test test = {
+ .setup = setup,
+ .cleanup = cleanup,
+ .needs_root = 1,
+ .tcnt = ARRAY_SIZE(tcases),
+ .test = verify_open,
+ .needs_tmpdir = 1,
+ .forks_child = 1,
+ .save_restore = (const struct tst_path_val[]) {
+ {PROTECTED_REGULAR, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {PROTECTED_FIFOS, NULL, TST_SR_TCONF},
+ {}
+ },
+ .tags = (const struct tst_tag[]) {
+ {"linux-git", "30aba6656f61"},
+ {}
+ }
+};
--
2.52.0
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* Re: [LTP] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
2026-04-16 0:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
@ 2026-04-16 2:43 ` linuxtestproject.agent
2026-04-16 4:15 ` Wei Gao via ltp
0 siblings, 1 reply; 23+ messages in thread
From: linuxtestproject.agent @ 2026-04-16 2:43 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Wei Gao; +Cc: ltp
Hi Wei,
On Thu, 16 Apr 2026 00:55:23 +0000, Wei Gao via ltp wrote:
> [PATCH 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
>
> This commit adds test cases to verify the security restrictions for opening
> FIFOs and regular files in world-writable sticky directories.
The body only describes what the test does, not why it is being added.
State the motivation explicitly, e.g. "Add LTP coverage for kernel commit
30aba6656f61 (Linux 4.19), which introduced protection against spoofing
attacks via O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files in world-writable sticky
directories."
[...]
Regards,
LTP AI Reviewer
---
Note:
Our agent completed the review of the patch.
The agent can sometimes produce false positives although often its
findings are genuine. If you find issues with the review, please
comment this email or ignore the suggestions.
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
* Re: [LTP] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid
2026-04-16 2:43 ` [LTP] " linuxtestproject.agent
@ 2026-04-16 4:15 ` Wei Gao via ltp
0 siblings, 0 replies; 23+ messages in thread
From: Wei Gao via ltp @ 2026-04-16 4:15 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: linuxtestproject.agent; +Cc: ltp
On Thu, Apr 16, 2026 at 02:43:24AM +0000, linuxtestproject.agent@gmail.com wrote:
> Hi Wei,
>
> On Thu, 16 Apr 2026 00:55:23 +0000, Wei Gao via ltp wrote:
> > [PATCH 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files
> >
> > This commit adds test cases to verify the security restrictions for opening
> > FIFOs and regular files in world-writable sticky directories.
>
> The body only describes what the test does, not why it is being added.
> State the motivation explicitly, e.g. "Add LTP coverage for kernel commit
> 30aba6656f61 (Linux 4.19), which introduced protection against spoofing
> attacks via O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files in world-writable sticky
> directories."
Patchset cover letter and the tags within the test code (which already reference
linux-git 30aba6656f61) clearly established the purpose
>
> [...]
>
> Regards,
> LTP AI Reviewer
>
> ---
> Note:
>
> Our agent completed the review of the patch.
>
> The agent can sometimes produce false positives although often its
> findings are genuine. If you find issues with the review, please
> comment this email or ignore the suggestions.
--
Mailing list info: https://lists.linux.it/listinfo/ltp
^ permalink raw reply [flat|nested] 23+ messages in thread
end of thread, other threads:[~2026-04-16 4:15 UTC | newest]
Thread overview: 23+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2023-10-09 11:20 [LTP] [PATCH v1] open15: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
2023-12-08 15:34 ` Cyril Hrubis
2023-12-27 13:05 ` [LTP] [PATCH v2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2024-02-26 13:37 ` Cyril Hrubis
2024-06-03 12:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v3] " Wei Gao via ltp
2025-02-21 10:01 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2025-03-19 14:23 ` [LTP] [PATCH v4] open16: " Wei Gao via ltp
2025-07-11 12:04 ` Cyril Hrubis
2025-07-23 15:46 ` [LTP] [PATCH v5] " Wei Gao via ltp
2026-02-18 13:21 ` Andrea Cervesato via ltp
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 7:54 ` [LTP] " linuxtestproject.agent
2026-04-15 6:07 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v6 0/2] " Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v7 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 11:08 ` [LTP] " linuxtestproject.agent
2026-04-16 0:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8 0/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-16 0:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8 1/2] lib: New library function tst_get_free_uid Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-16 2:43 ` [LTP] " linuxtestproject.agent
2026-04-16 4:15 ` Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-16 0:55 ` [LTP] [PATCH v8 2/2] open16: allow restricted O_CREAT of FIFOs and regular files Wei Gao via ltp
2026-04-15 10:37 ` [LTP] [PATCH v7 " Wei Gao via ltp
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