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From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
To: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <hawk@diku.dk>
Cc: paulmck@linux.vnet.ibm.com, Patrick McHardy <kaber@trash.net>,
	Changli Gao <xiaosuo@gmail.com>,
	hawk@comx.dk,
	Linux Kernel Network Hackers <netdev@vger.kernel.org>,
	Netfilter Developers <netfilter-devel@vger.kernel.org>
Subject: Re: DDoS attack causing bad effect on conntrack searches
Date: Fri, 23 Apr 2010 22:57:17 +0200	[thread overview]
Message-ID: <1272056237.4599.7.camel@edumazet-laptop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <Pine.LNX.4.64.1004222213290.10919@ask.diku.dk>

Le jeudi 22 avril 2010 à 22:38 +0200, Jesper Dangaard Brouer a écrit :

> 
> I think its plausable, there is a lot of modification going on.
> Approx 40.000 deletes/sec and 40.000 inserts/sec.
> The hash bucket size is 300032, and with 80000 modifications/sec, we are 
> (potentially) changing 26.6% of the hash chains each second.
> 
> As can be seen from the graphs:
>   http://people.netfilter.org/hawk/DDoS/2010-04-12__001/list.html
> 
> Notice that primarily CPU2 is doing the 40k deletes/sec, while CPU1 is 
> caught searching...
> 
> 
> > maybe hash table has one slot :)
> 
> Guess I have to reproduce the DoS attack in a testlab (I will first have 
> time Tuesday).  So we can determine if its bad hashing or restart of the 
> search loop.
> 
> 
> The traffic pattern was fairly simple:
> 
> 200 bytes UDP packets, comming from approx 60 source IPs, going to one 
> destination IP.  The UDP destination port number was varied in the range 
> of 1 to 6000.   The source UDP port was varied a bit more, some ranging 
> from 32768 to 61000, and some from 1028 to 5000.
> 
> 

Re-reading this, I am not sure there is a real problem on RCU as you
pointed out.

With 800.000 entries, in a 300.032 buckets hash table, each lookup hit
about 3 entries (aka searches in conntrack stats)

300.000 packets/second -> 900.000 'searches' per second.

If you have four cpus all trying to insert/delete entries in //, they
all hit the central conntrack lock.

On a DDOS scenario, every packet needs to take this lock twice,
once to free an old conntrack (early drop), once to insert a new entry.

To scale this, only way would be to have an array of locks, like we have
for TCP/UDP hash tables.

I did some tests here, with a multiqueue card, flooded with 300.000
pack/second, 65.536 source IP, millions of flows, and nothing wrong
happened (but packets drops, of course)

My two cpus were busy 100%, after tweaking smp_affinities, because on
first try, irqbalance put "01" mask on both queues, so only one ksoftirq
was working, other cpu was idle :(




  parent reply	other threads:[~2010-04-23 20:57 UTC|newest]

Thread overview: 54+ messages / expand[flat|nested]  mbox.gz  Atom feed  top
2010-04-22 12:58 DDoS attack causing bad effect on conntrack searches Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2010-04-22 13:13 ` Changli Gao
2010-04-22 13:17   ` Patrick McHardy
2010-04-22 14:36     ` Eric Dumazet
2010-04-22 14:53       ` Eric Dumazet
2010-04-22 15:51         ` Paul E. McKenney
2010-04-22 16:02           ` Eric Dumazet
2010-04-22 16:34             ` Paul E. McKenney
2010-04-22 20:38             ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2010-04-22 21:03               ` Eric Dumazet
2010-04-22 21:14                 ` Eric Dumazet
2010-04-22 23:44                   ` David Miller
2010-04-23  5:44                     ` Eric Dumazet
2010-04-23  8:13                       ` David Miller
2010-04-23  8:18                         ` David Miller
2010-04-23  8:40                           ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2010-04-23 10:36                   ` Patrick McHardy
2010-04-23 11:06                     ` Eric Dumazet
2010-04-22 21:28                 ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2010-04-23  7:23                   ` Jan Engelhardt
2010-04-23  7:46                     ` Eric Dumazet
2010-04-23  7:55                       ` Jan Engelhardt
2010-04-23  9:23                         ` Eric Dumazet
2010-04-23 10:55                 ` Patrick McHardy
2010-04-23 11:05                   ` Eric Dumazet
2010-04-23 11:06                     ` Patrick McHardy
2010-04-23 20:57               ` Eric Dumazet [this message]
2010-04-24 11:11                 ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2010-04-24 20:11                   ` Eric Dumazet
2010-04-26 14:36                     ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2010-05-31 21:21                       ` Eric Dumazet
2010-06-01  0:28                         ` Changli Gao
2010-06-01  5:05                           ` Eric Dumazet
2010-06-01  5:48                             ` Changli Gao
2010-06-01 10:18                             ` Patrick McHardy
2010-06-01 10:31                               ` Eric Dumazet
2010-06-01 10:41                                 ` Patrick McHardy
2010-06-01 16:20                                   ` [RFC nf-next-2.6] conntrack: per cpu nf_conntrack_untracked Eric Dumazet
2010-06-04 11:40                                     ` Patrick McHardy
2010-06-04 12:10                                       ` Changli Gao
2010-06-04 12:29                                         ` Patrick McHardy
2010-06-04 12:36                                           ` Eric Dumazet
2010-06-04 16:25                                             ` [PATCH nf-next-2.6] conntrack: IPS_UNTRACKED bit Eric Dumazet
2010-06-04 20:15                                               ` [PATCH nf-next-2.6 2/2] conntrack: per_cpu untracking Eric Dumazet
2010-06-08 14:29                                                 ` Patrick McHardy
2010-06-08 14:52                                                   ` Eric Dumazet
2010-06-08 15:12                                                     ` Eric Dumazet
2010-06-09 12:45                                                       ` Patrick McHardy
2010-06-08 14:12                                               ` [PATCH nf-next-2.6] conntrack: IPS_UNTRACKED bit Patrick McHardy
2010-04-23 10:56       ` DDoS attack causing bad effect on conntrack searches Patrick McHardy
2010-04-23 12:45         ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2010-04-23 13:57           ` Patrick McHardy
2010-04-22 13:31   ` Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2010-04-23 10:35     ` Patrick McHardy

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