From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
To: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Cc: David Miller <davem@davemloft.net>,
netdev@vger.kernel.org, mvadkert@redhat.com,
linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
Subject: [PATCH] selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hook
Date: Mon, 08 Apr 2013 20:58:11 -0700 [thread overview]
Message-ID: <1365479891.3887.99.camel@edumazet-glaptop> (raw)
In-Reply-To: <6182509.cOVcY8B4g7@sifl>
From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Commit 90ba9b1986b5ac (tcp: tcp_make_synack() can use alloc_skb())
broke certain SELinux/NetLabel configurations by no longer correctly
assigning the sock to the outgoing SYNACK packet.
Cost of atomic operations on the LISTEN socket is quite big,
and we would like it to happen only if really needed.
This patch introduces a new security_ops->skb_owned_by() method,
that is a void operation unless selinux is active.
Reported-by: Miroslav Vadkerti <mvadkert@redhat.com>
Diagnosed-by: Paul Moore <pmoore@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: "David S. Miller" <davem@davemloft.net>
Cc: linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org
---
include/linux/security.h | 8 ++++++++
net/ipv4/tcp_output.c | 1 +
security/capability.c | 6 ++++++
security/security.c | 5 +++++
security/selinux/hooks.c | 7 +++++++
5 files changed, 27 insertions(+)
diff --git a/include/linux/security.h b/include/linux/security.h
index eee7478..6c3a78a 100644
--- a/include/linux/security.h
+++ b/include/linux/security.h
@@ -1638,6 +1638,7 @@ struct security_operations {
int (*tun_dev_attach_queue) (void *security);
int (*tun_dev_attach) (struct sock *sk, void *security);
int (*tun_dev_open) (void *security);
+ void (*skb_owned_by) (struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -2588,6 +2589,8 @@ int security_tun_dev_attach_queue(void *security);
int security_tun_dev_attach(struct sock *sk, void *security);
int security_tun_dev_open(void *security);
+void security_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk);
+
#else /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
static inline int security_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
struct sock *other,
@@ -2779,6 +2782,11 @@ static inline int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
{
return 0;
}
+
+static inline void security_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
diff --git a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
index 5d0b438..b44cf81 100644
--- a/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
+++ b/net/ipv4/tcp_output.c
@@ -2709,6 +2709,7 @@ struct sk_buff *tcp_make_synack(struct sock *sk, struct dst_entry *dst,
skb_reserve(skb, MAX_TCP_HEADER);
skb_dst_set(skb, dst);
+ security_skb_owned_by(skb, sk);
mss = dst_metric_advmss(dst);
if (tp->rx_opt.user_mss && tp->rx_opt.user_mss < mss)
diff --git a/security/capability.c b/security/capability.c
index 5797750..c36cca6 100644
--- a/security/capability.c
+++ b/security/capability.c
@@ -737,6 +737,11 @@ static int cap_tun_dev_open(void *security)
{
return 0;
}
+
+static void cap_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
@@ -1071,6 +1076,7 @@ void __init security_fixup_ops(struct security_operations *ops)
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_open);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach_queue);
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, tun_dev_attach);
+ set_to_cap_if_null(ops, skb_owned_by);
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
set_to_cap_if_null(ops, xfrm_policy_alloc_security);
diff --git a/security/security.c b/security/security.c
index 7b88c6a..03f248b 100644
--- a/security/security.c
+++ b/security/security.c
@@ -1290,6 +1290,11 @@ int security_tun_dev_open(void *security)
}
EXPORT_SYMBOL(security_tun_dev_open);
+void security_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
+{
+ security_ops->skb_owned_by(skb, sk);
+}
+
#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK */
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
diff --git a/security/selinux/hooks.c b/security/selinux/hooks.c
index 2fa28c8..7171a95 100644
--- a/security/selinux/hooks.c
+++ b/security/selinux/hooks.c
@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
#include <linux/tty.h>
#include <net/icmp.h>
#include <net/ip.h> /* for local_port_range[] */
+#include <net/sock.h>
#include <net/tcp.h> /* struct or_callable used in sock_rcv_skb */
#include <net/net_namespace.h>
#include <net/netlabel.h>
@@ -4363,6 +4364,11 @@ static void selinux_inet_conn_established(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
selinux_skb_peerlbl_sid(skb, family, &sksec->peer_sid);
}
+static void selinux_skb_owned_by(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sock *sk)
+{
+ skb_set_owner_w(skb, sk);
+}
+
static int selinux_secmark_relabel_packet(u32 sid)
{
const struct task_security_struct *__tsec;
@@ -5664,6 +5670,7 @@ static struct security_operations selinux_ops = {
.tun_dev_attach_queue = selinux_tun_dev_attach_queue,
.tun_dev_attach = selinux_tun_dev_attach,
.tun_dev_open = selinux_tun_dev_open,
+ .skb_owned_by = selinux_skb_owned_by,
#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM
.xfrm_policy_alloc_security = selinux_xfrm_policy_alloc,
next prev parent reply other threads:[~2013-04-09 3:58 UTC|newest]
Thread overview: 64+ messages / expand[flat|nested] mbox.gz Atom feed top
2013-04-08 15:45 [PATCH] tcp: assign the sock correctly to an outgoing SYNACK packet Paul Moore
2013-04-08 16:14 ` David Miller
2013-04-08 17:22 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-08 17:36 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-08 17:40 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-08 17:47 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-08 18:01 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-08 18:12 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-08 18:21 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-08 18:26 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-08 18:34 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-08 18:30 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-08 20:37 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-08 20:44 ` David Miller
2013-04-08 20:53 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-08 20:55 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-08 21:09 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-08 21:14 ` David Miller
2013-04-08 21:17 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-09 3:58 ` Eric Dumazet [this message]
2013-04-09 4:29 ` [PATCH] selinux: add a skb_owned_by() hook Casey Schaufler
2013-04-09 4:41 ` David Miller
2013-04-09 5:14 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-04-09 11:39 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-09 6:24 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-09 11:45 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-09 7:38 ` James Morris
2013-04-09 12:06 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-09 17:23 ` David Miller
2013-04-08 18:32 ` [PATCH] tcp: assign the sock correctly to an outgoing SYNACK packet Paul Moore
2013-04-08 21:10 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-08 21:15 ` David Miller
2013-04-08 21:24 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-08 21:33 ` David Miller
2013-04-08 22:01 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-08 22:08 ` David Miller
2013-04-08 23:40 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-04-09 0:33 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-09 0:59 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-04-09 1:09 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-09 1:24 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-04-09 13:19 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-09 13:33 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-09 14:00 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-09 14:19 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-09 14:31 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-09 14:52 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-09 15:05 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-09 15:07 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-09 15:17 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-09 15:32 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-09 15:57 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-09 16:11 ` Casey Schaufler
2013-04-09 16:56 ` David Miller
2013-04-09 17:00 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-09 17:09 ` David Miller
2013-04-09 17:10 ` David Miller
2013-04-09 14:05 ` Ben Hutchings
2013-04-09 14:10 ` Paul Moore
2013-04-08 21:34 ` Ben Hutchings
2013-04-08 19:25 ` David Miller
2013-04-08 16:19 ` Eric Dumazet
2013-04-08 18:03 ` Sergei Shtylyov
2013-04-08 18:12 ` Paul Moore
Reply instructions:
You may reply publicly to this message via plain-text email
using any one of the following methods:
* Save the following mbox file, import it into your mail client,
and reply-to-all from there: mbox
Avoid top-posting and favor interleaved quoting:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Posting_style#Interleaved_style
* Reply using the --to, --cc, and --in-reply-to
switches of git-send-email(1):
git send-email \
--in-reply-to=1365479891.3887.99.camel@edumazet-glaptop \
--to=eric.dumazet@gmail.com \
--cc=davem@davemloft.net \
--cc=linux-security-module@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=mvadkert@redhat.com \
--cc=netdev@vger.kernel.org \
--cc=pmoore@redhat.com \
/path/to/YOUR_REPLY
https://kernel.org/pub/software/scm/git/docs/git-send-email.html
* If your mail client supports setting the In-Reply-To header
via mailto: links, try the mailto: link
Be sure your reply has a Subject: header at the top and a blank line
before the message body.
This is a public inbox, see mirroring instructions
for how to clone and mirror all data and code used for this inbox