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* [PATCH net-next]  x86: bpf_jit_comp: can call module_free() from any context
@ 2013-05-17  5:45 Eric Dumazet
  2013-05-17 21:19 ` David Miller
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2013-05-17  5:45 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Miller; +Cc: netdev, Al Viro

From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

It looks like we can call module_free()/vfree() from softirq context,
so no longer need a wrapper and a work_struct.

Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
Cc: Al Viro <viro@ZenIV.linux.org.uk>
---
 arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c |   20 +++-----------------
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)

diff --git a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
index f66b540..c0212db 100644
--- a/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
+++ b/arch/x86/net/bpf_jit_comp.c
@@ -717,9 +717,7 @@ cond_branch:			f_offset = addrs[i + filter[i].jf] - addrs[i];
 			break;
 		}
 		if (proglen == oldproglen) {
-			image = module_alloc(max_t(unsigned int,
-						   proglen,
-						   sizeof(struct work_struct)));
+			image = module_alloc(proglen);
 			if (!image)
 				goto out;
 		}
@@ -738,20 +736,8 @@ out:
 	return;
 }
 
-static void jit_free_defer(struct work_struct *arg)
-{
-	module_free(NULL, arg);
-}
-
-/* run from softirq, we must use a work_struct to call
- * module_free() from process context
- */
 void bpf_jit_free(struct sk_filter *fp)
 {
-	if (fp->bpf_func != sk_run_filter) {
-		struct work_struct *work = (struct work_struct *)fp->bpf_func;
-
-		INIT_WORK(work, jit_free_defer);
-		schedule_work(work);
-	}
+	if (fp->bpf_func != sk_run_filter)
+		module_free(NULL, fp->bpf_func);
 }

^ permalink raw reply related	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net-next] x86: bpf_jit_comp: can call module_free() from any context
  2013-05-17  5:45 [PATCH net-next] x86: bpf_jit_comp: can call module_free() from any context Eric Dumazet
@ 2013-05-17 21:19 ` David Miller
  2013-05-17 22:22   ` Eric Dumazet
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: David Miller @ 2013-05-17 21:19 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: eric.dumazet; +Cc: netdev, viro

From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 16 May 2013 22:45:30 -0700

> From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> 
> It looks like we can call module_free()/vfree() from softirq context,
> so no longer need a wrapper and a work_struct.
> 
> Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>

Applied.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net-next] x86: bpf_jit_comp: can call module_free() from any context
  2013-05-17 21:19 ` David Miller
@ 2013-05-17 22:22   ` Eric Dumazet
  2013-05-18  1:29     ` David Miller
  0 siblings, 1 reply; 4+ messages in thread
From: Eric Dumazet @ 2013-05-17 22:22 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: David Miller; +Cc: netdev, viro

On Fri, 2013-05-17 at 14:19 -0700, David Miller wrote:
> From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
> Date: Thu, 16 May 2013 22:45:30 -0700
> 
> > From: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> > 
> > It looks like we can call module_free()/vfree() from softirq context,
> > so no longer need a wrapper and a work_struct.
> > 
> > Signed-off-by: Eric Dumazet <edumazet@google.com>
> 
> Applied.

Thanks David

I am considering adding ReadOnly protection to the pages containing BPF
generated code, like we do for modules text if
CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX=y

Should we have an option to configure this, driven by HAVE_BPF_JIT_RO,
or should we do the RO thing in all cases (ie not adding yet another
Kconfig stuff)



Another ongoing work is to add some protection against BPF JIT spraying
attacks
( http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html )

My idea would be to have a hole of random size before the code, filled
with 0xcc (int3) opcodes. Since we allocate a multiple of PAGE_SIZE
anyway, we have plenty of available space to play with.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

* Re: [PATCH net-next] x86: bpf_jit_comp: can call module_free() from any context
  2013-05-17 22:22   ` Eric Dumazet
@ 2013-05-18  1:29     ` David Miller
  0 siblings, 0 replies; 4+ messages in thread
From: David Miller @ 2013-05-18  1:29 UTC (permalink / raw)
  To: eric.dumazet; +Cc: netdev, viro

From: Eric Dumazet <eric.dumazet@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 17 May 2013 15:22:46 -0700

> I am considering adding ReadOnly protection to the pages containing BPF
> generated code, like we do for modules text if
> CONFIG_DEBUG_SET_MODULE_RONX=y
> 
> Should we have an option to configure this, driven by HAVE_BPF_JIT_RO,
> or should we do the RO thing in all cases (ie not adding yet another
> Kconfig stuff)

I think we should do this unconditionally, it'll be noise as far as
overhead during filter compilation.

> Another ongoing work is to add some protection against BPF JIT spraying
> attacks
> ( http://mainisusuallyafunction.blogspot.com/2012/11/attacking-hardened-linux-systems-with.html )
> 
> My idea would be to have a hole of random size before the code, filled
> with 0xcc (int3) opcodes. Since we allocate a multiple of PAGE_SIZE
> anyway, we have plenty of available space to play with.

This sounds like a good idea too.

^ permalink raw reply	[flat|nested] 4+ messages in thread

end of thread, other threads:[~2013-05-18  1:29 UTC | newest]

Thread overview: 4+ messages (download: mbox.gz follow: Atom feed
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2013-05-17  5:45 [PATCH net-next] x86: bpf_jit_comp: can call module_free() from any context Eric Dumazet
2013-05-17 21:19 ` David Miller
2013-05-17 22:22   ` Eric Dumazet
2013-05-18  1:29     ` David Miller

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