* [PATCH bpf] xdp: fix cpumap redirect SKB creation bug
@ 2019-03-29 9:18 Jesper Dangaard Brouer
2019-03-29 19:16 ` Alexei Starovoitov
0 siblings, 1 reply; 2+ messages in thread
From: Jesper Dangaard Brouer @ 2019-03-29 9:18 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: netdev, Daniel Borkmann, Alexei Starovoitov
Cc: makita.toshiaki, Ilias Apalodimas,
Toke Høiland-Jørgensen, Jesper Dangaard Brouer
We want to avoid leaking pointer info from xdp_frame (that is placed in
top of frame) like commit 6dfb970d3dbd ("xdp: avoid leaking info stored in
frame data on page reuse"), and followup commit 97e19cce05e5 ("bpf:
reserve xdp_frame size in xdp headroom") that reserve this headroom.
These changes also affected how cpumap constructed SKBs, as xdpf->headroom
size changed, the skb data starting point were in-effect shifted with 32
bytes (sizeof xdp_frame). This was still okay, as the cpumap frame_size
calculation also included xdpf->headroom which were reduced by same amount.
A bug was introduced in commit 77ea5f4cbe20 ("bpf/cpumap: make sure
frame_size for build_skb is aligned if headroom isn't"), where the
xdpf->headroom became part of the SKB_DATA_ALIGN rounding up. This
round-up to find the frame_size is in principle still correct as it does
not exceed the 2048 bytes frame_size (which is max for ixgbe and i40e),
but the 32 bytes offset of pkt_data_start puts this over the 2048 bytes
limit. This cause skb_shared_info to spill into next frame. It is a little
hard to trigger, as the SKB need to use above 15 skb_shinfo->frags[] as
far as I calculate. This does happen in practise for TCP streams when
skb_try_coalesce() kicks in.
KASAN can be used to detect these wrong memory accesses, I've seen:
BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_try_coalesce+0x3cb/0x760
BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in skb_release_data+0xe2/0x250
Driver veth also construct a SKB from xdp_frame in this way, but is not
affected, as it doesn't reserve/deduct the room (used by xdp_frame) from
the SKB headroom. Instead is clears the pointers via xdp_scrub_frame(),
and allows SKB to use this area.
The fix in this patch is to do like veth and instead allow SKB to (re)use
the area occupied by xdp_frame, by clearing via xdp_scrub_frame(). (This
does kill the idea of the SKB being able to access (mem) info from this
area, but I guess it was a bad idea anyhow, and it was already killed by
the veth changes.)
Fixes: 77ea5f4cbe20 ("bpf/cpumap: make sure frame_size for build_skb is aligned if headroom isn't")
Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
---
This patch is stable material for v5.0 see:
$ git describe --contains 77ea5f4cbe20
v5.0-rc1~129^2~15^2~1
kernel/bpf/cpumap.c | 13 ++++++++++---
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
index 8974b3755670..3c18260403dd 100644
--- a/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
+++ b/kernel/bpf/cpumap.c
@@ -162,10 +162,14 @@ static void cpu_map_kthread_stop(struct work_struct *work)
static struct sk_buff *cpu_map_build_skb(struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *rcpu,
struct xdp_frame *xdpf)
{
+ unsigned int hard_start_headroom;
unsigned int frame_size;
void *pkt_data_start;
struct sk_buff *skb;
+ /* Part of headroom was reserved to xdpf */
+ hard_start_headroom = sizeof(struct xdp_frame) + xdpf->headroom;
+
/* build_skb need to place skb_shared_info after SKB end, and
* also want to know the memory "truesize". Thus, need to
* know the memory frame size backing xdp_buff.
@@ -183,15 +187,15 @@ static struct sk_buff *cpu_map_build_skb(struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *rcpu,
* is not at a fixed memory location, with mixed length
* packets, which is bad for cache-line hotness.
*/
- frame_size = SKB_DATA_ALIGN(xdpf->len + xdpf->headroom) +
+ frame_size = SKB_DATA_ALIGN(xdpf->len + hard_start_headroom) +
SKB_DATA_ALIGN(sizeof(struct skb_shared_info));
- pkt_data_start = xdpf->data - xdpf->headroom;
+ pkt_data_start = xdpf->data - hard_start_headroom;
skb = build_skb(pkt_data_start, frame_size);
if (!skb)
return NULL;
- skb_reserve(skb, xdpf->headroom);
+ skb_reserve(skb, hard_start_headroom);
__skb_put(skb, xdpf->len);
if (xdpf->metasize)
skb_metadata_set(skb, xdpf->metasize);
@@ -205,6 +209,9 @@ static struct sk_buff *cpu_map_build_skb(struct bpf_cpu_map_entry *rcpu,
* - RX ring dev queue index (skb_record_rx_queue)
*/
+ /* Allow SKB to reuse area used by xdp_frame */
+ xdp_scrub_frame(xdpf);
+
return skb;
}
^ permalink raw reply related [flat|nested] 2+ messages in thread* Re: [PATCH bpf] xdp: fix cpumap redirect SKB creation bug
2019-03-29 9:18 [PATCH bpf] xdp: fix cpumap redirect SKB creation bug Jesper Dangaard Brouer
@ 2019-03-29 19:16 ` Alexei Starovoitov
0 siblings, 0 replies; 2+ messages in thread
From: Alexei Starovoitov @ 2019-03-29 19:16 UTC (permalink / raw)
To: Jesper Dangaard Brouer
Cc: Network Development, Daniel Borkmann, Toshiaki Makita,
Ilias Apalodimas, Toke Høiland-Jørgensen
On Fri, Mar 29, 2019 at 2:18 AM Jesper Dangaard Brouer
<brouer@redhat.com> wrote:
>
> We want to avoid leaking pointer info from xdp_frame (that is placed in
> top of frame) like commit 6dfb970d3dbd ("xdp: avoid leaking info stored in
> frame data on page reuse"), and followup commit 97e19cce05e5 ("bpf:
> reserve xdp_frame size in xdp headroom") that reserve this headroom.
>
> These changes also affected how cpumap constructed SKBs, as xdpf->headroom
> size changed, the skb data starting point were in-effect shifted with 32
> bytes (sizeof xdp_frame). This was still okay, as the cpumap frame_size
> calculation also included xdpf->headroom which were reduced by same amount.
>
> A bug was introduced in commit 77ea5f4cbe20 ("bpf/cpumap: make sure
> frame_size for build_skb is aligned if headroom isn't"), where the
> xdpf->headroom became part of the SKB_DATA_ALIGN rounding up. This
> round-up to find the frame_size is in principle still correct as it does
> not exceed the 2048 bytes frame_size (which is max for ixgbe and i40e),
> but the 32 bytes offset of pkt_data_start puts this over the 2048 bytes
> limit. This cause skb_shared_info to spill into next frame. It is a little
> hard to trigger, as the SKB need to use above 15 skb_shinfo->frags[] as
> far as I calculate. This does happen in practise for TCP streams when
> skb_try_coalesce() kicks in.
>
> KASAN can be used to detect these wrong memory accesses, I've seen:
> BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in skb_try_coalesce+0x3cb/0x760
> BUG: KASAN: wild-memory-access in skb_release_data+0xe2/0x250
>
> Driver veth also construct a SKB from xdp_frame in this way, but is not
> affected, as it doesn't reserve/deduct the room (used by xdp_frame) from
> the SKB headroom. Instead is clears the pointers via xdp_scrub_frame(),
> and allows SKB to use this area.
>
> The fix in this patch is to do like veth and instead allow SKB to (re)use
> the area occupied by xdp_frame, by clearing via xdp_scrub_frame(). (This
> does kill the idea of the SKB being able to access (mem) info from this
> area, but I guess it was a bad idea anyhow, and it was already killed by
> the veth changes.)
>
> Fixes: 77ea5f4cbe20 ("bpf/cpumap: make sure frame_size for build_skb is aligned if headroom isn't")
> Signed-off-by: Jesper Dangaard Brouer <brouer@redhat.com>
Applied. Thanks
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